Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with W. Averell (William Averell) Harriman, 1979 [Part 3 of 4]

I. Sat on the ride. That's right. That's what you need to do that. Yeah. It's amazing about. Governor 10 years ago. Richard thank you for like that. I'd like to start out maybe you start out the questions and how you viewed the rising

opposition. ZM inside South Vietnam 63 and maybe you can get into describing what kind of impression he made on you when you first met him and his brother and his brother's wife. How's that sound. OK. OK all right we're going. We're rolling out Governor. How did you view the rising opposition to him inside Vietnam and 1963. I was very much worried about it of course at that time I was making we just start again. Could I want to ask a question could you start the subject. How did you view the rising opposition to know Dean's YEM inside South Vietnam in 1963. I was very much concerned rising opposition to the spring 63. Of course by that time I was under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs and had been for some months and I didn't follow the situation as closely as I had before. But I remember in the spring the particulars brother knew was very discriminatory against the Bulls who wouldn't love flags to fly and did another number of things which was to lead them astray. And then there was no relation self-immolation over the burned themselves in the middle of one of the squares of I think that was along of June. After that I made some sort of Runic with you. He would treat them better in the future. But instead of that he went right ahead and

his brother knew or rather didn't. The number of incidents which were most unfortunate particular the one that kills and. In July. Violated. But if they want to put in prison some of the Buddhist priest and the nuns and there was a demonstration. But the rest of you did it with his own troops knew had some troops of his own special forces and he tried to blame the Army for it. United States made a very definite statement at that time. Divorce yourself from the events against the voters. We felt that the Buddha should have the same privileges of all others and whatnot but knew was doing

a great deal of damage at that time. I thought that it was almost as fast as the filth of the really true either had to get rid of or else he wouldn't be able to rule. What kind of impression make on you when you talk to him. Well I first met him and when I went on the trip to the Far East and I must have been April 1961 before I took on the Laos negotiations and. I met him he pressed me for a determination that is his sister in law who's known as the Dragon Lady. She was very charming. I didn't meet New think I was before the influence and felt as serious as it was it was later on I don't recall that many of them but it came to a point where I

was having disastrous influence on CM's administration. And he was losing support. There's a very large Buddhist population as you know. What was behind either way of course you know ZM was a Catholic and one of his brothers was a priest who was a bishop I think. What was behind the decision to appoint Henry Cabot Lodge as a bastard in Saigon. Do you think that President Kennedy sought the appointment of a Republican as a way of protecting himself in the event that fell. Well I don't think Johnson was thinking about that as I'm going to be good to present. Johnson any idea of the time of it falling. I think you picked large because he thought

that it was good to have the situation of a bipartisan. For all of us are the commitments and and I thought it was a way to strengthen the situation politically. Plus the fact that he had respect I think for lodges the ministry and he done very well in the work that he had been assigned to before and of course you must know him when he was senator. What did you think of the lodge's appointment. I thought I agreed with junction both of us saw no reason why that wasn't a good a good appointment. Let's talk a little bit about the controversial telegram that was sent on August 24th 1963 reportedly. You know when George Ball Roger Hillsman and Mike forest all drafted the cable

telling lies to support efforts to overthrow ZM if I have it right. What was your role in this affair. Well there was a telegram and I think it was 25th which was sent out of the bull's signature as I recall it. Hills one who is a separate state from the salaries to Mike Forrestal who was the president's advisor on the far east came to me. So yeah yeah yeah. And you're I'm sorry I have to do we want to do the whole thing again. You know let me just pose the question again. There was a controversial and famous telegram that was sent on August 24th 1963 to lauch

telling him to support the efforts to overthrow ZM and that telegram was supposedly signed by George Bush. Roger Hillsman might forestall yourself. What was your real role in that affair. Well this is telegraphed throughout 21st was was drafted by those men I think and you know apart from the two of them brought it to me I was then on the circuit of State for Political Affairs. George Bush Saturday it was George well was out on the golf course so we went out to the golf course you playing golf with Alex Johnson. The father sat down and read it and Burrill and Johnson both approved. Johnson was one of the advisors at that time. Then it was up to him. It was up to the two to get it cleared because his signature was the one that would would would would send it

out because. Rusk was out of town for some reason or other. You remember at that time I was not very close to the daily operations I just got back from Moscow. The limited test ban agreement and I was involved in other things but as I told you I was very much concerned over the. Way the Zam Zam was allowing knew who to. Go to get all of the builder's population against him and was very serious now this Telegraph article that gave the larger choice of of talking to him not of choice but of a lot of action. The first was to talk to Zam about removing a new direction or new of CM.

Wanted to get rid of him. If new was. It was eliminated and his wife was eliminated. His wife had been playing a very bad road and prejudice and many people by her behavior. So yeah very patient with. Her let's just do it again we started together. Don't forget this and say that. You. Will start the thing again. There was a telegram just seconds. Rob is twenty four thousand nine hundred sixty three. A cable was sent to

large instructing him to support efforts to overthrow ZM the cable was signed by drafted by George Ball Roger Hill sman Michael Forrest on yourself. What was your real role in this affair. But my role in this telegram of July 21st was rather limited. It was drafted by those women. I think in the first instance Forrestal may have had something to do with it they brought it to me on the Saturday afternoon and we tried to find George but no. Cause. Dean Rusk was out of town. We found him on the golf course playing golf with Alex Johnson. They both read it and both approved it and then it was up to George Bush to to to get it cleared. I dropped out of the situation. The telegram was not quite what you indicated was. There was

instructions to not instructions a suggestion to him that he should talk to them about getting rivers. His brother knew his brother knew it was intact. The Buddhist population here responsible for violating. Arresting the nuns and the priests. In other ways discriminating against them and it was a crisis situation. It was getting worse and worse and we had come out of public opposition to what had been done in the message to the public the day before. Included the statement The Army had nothing to do with it it was personal or personal bunch of of operators of special forces as they called it. If he did not. Agreed to part out of you didn't agree to

the news that he would lose the whole support of a very large section of the people. Then larger if he did will refuse. Well. You should talk to the military. See how they felt about it and see whether they would want to undertake to organize a coup. We would stay out of it entirely but it would only be if they were already able to to to to to do it. Nobody at that time wanted to see ZM moved out of the situation. It was news that they wanted knew and his wife they felt all people were damaging situation. Now George Ball. Thought so he called up. President Kennedy on the telephone at Hyannisport read in the telephone

telegram and president proved that it was approved in the court and records was approved by Roscoe Patrick who was deputy secretary of defense was also approved. General Cavil number two in the CIA. All those approval were gotten ahead of time. The telegram went on large did not want to talk to us because he didn't think that GM would would would get rid of his brother's orders to depended on him. We also. Were not and subject them were not in a position to move and the subject was discussed for counsel.

Reading about it I think only of the 20. The subject was discussed a number of different times. So the telegram itself had no direct effect except it's started the subject going on was continued to be a sober discussion until finally the military did undertake to take over the government and a few. Large never did talk to them about eliminating not eliminating But getting pressure and years of getting rid of his brother and sister he was who's too dependent upon them and loves to think it was worthwhile. But sure agreed.

Over the period that GM was losing so much popularity that he would lose public was losing public support and the situation was getting to be a very serious situation which he flew. There was a later Kamal that seemed to indicate that Washington did not want to see overthrown. But I don't think there was a telegram or Graham about a meeting you want to do. You sure that we had no connection with any crew and wanted to make sure that if the generals did it. They would be informed that we would support them if they did it but it wouldn't on their own. Why pose that question To what extent during that period was

large operating on his own in Saigon or was he very tightly controlled. I wouldn't know that I wasn't clear I was in daily contact with it I've no idea. I think generally carried out instructions except he refused to talk to them about his brother he thought if he did he would just create a lot of difficulty and achieve nothing. But he did have a girl who needed who was who was close to the offices. You did keep in touch with through him some of the thinking of the of the officers on that during that period but I don't recall those details I was not involved in the day to day transactions. It's been suggested that one of the reasons why that was a certain courage and our support at least for the opposition was that

we knew was secretly contacting Hanoi. This of course struck that I know that knew that Sam's brother knew yes was secretly contacting Hanoi. I heard that rumor but I didn't pay much attention to it because I didn't see any future. True these men were working for themselves their own future in mind and they would win in the future to them. And dealing with the North. Oh I thought that was just removed out of foundation. To what extent do you think the United States was responsible for overthrow death. Well they certainly are not state certainly did good that the generals know that if they did decide the CM was so damaging to the war effort the unity of the country we would support them. We took no

note staged took no direct part in the coup and participate in a shameful amount of not only told them if they did do it they would continue to help and support. Do you think that continued in the way they had it there would have been some sort of blow up couldn't go on the way. What would you say that there was that the United States shared some responsibility for their overthrow. Well I think you're talking about. I can't answer that question about well I can say that there were very few people in the government of the Gulf at any gulf it's a tall and do believe that one would play a losing game. The war couldn't be won with with a divided country which is becoming On the other news

influence. But looking back do you think that that is Yemen's overthrow and the role the United States played in that. However in direct that role might have been deep in the American commitment to get us on the way to more involvement. I think we got committed to Dulles in 1954 when he supported the start of the support of I don't know that our commitment was increased or decreased. We were supporting the government of South Vietnam and doesn't seem to me that made any difference no commitment one way or the other. We will we will to see the self it moves government will survive the attacks of the DCM get control of the country and also later on the attacks of the north.

Did. You see the appointment of a Republican as a way of protecting himself in case the Vietnam fell just a second you're right. You're already running away. Just answer it. I don't have to go to you. What was behind the decision to appoint Henry Cabot Lodge as embassadors Saigon. Did President Kennedy see the appointment of a Republican as a way of protecting himself in case Vietnam fell. Well I don't know whether he was thinking of of that numb falling or whether he was thinking of public opinion supporting what he was doing. I think he wanted to make the situation as bipartisan as possible he believed in bipartisanship in international affairs. Of course he knew large and

respect for him I think he made the appointment because he thought he would do a good job as well as politically and getting public support and could well congressional support. You know I want to take you up to 36 letters through the six. Well I'll tell you the question. You think anything else I can say on the chat about the step the one in life. I think the telegram was all right was in there. I don't know. I think it was I think it was all right. I don't want to go out again. OK. What. Yes yes.

Governor at the end of 1963 when Lyndon Johnson became president you were shifted out of East Asian affairs. Why did this happen. How did you feel. Well I wasn't shift of it he says in affairs of the president decided to replace Roger Hilsum and it wasn't because as far as I remember it wasn't because he was dissatisfied with Hill's women's views on Vietnam was because he thought he was quite

rude. And one of the White House one of the meetings I was a little too arbitrary and positions it was a very positive he would placed him with Bill Bundy Bill Bundy had. Recommendations of. That sort of myself the rest of the budget was women I thought that was a good appointment so I was very much gratified. Thought he was worth while. But Russ decided that he wanted to have Bill Bundy to report to him directly rather than through me. That meant that I was cut out entirely from the vet Minnie's if I was then on the set of political says there was no particular reason for me to resign because that particular subject was taken out and present Johnston

asked me to space special attention to Africa. He thought African affairs were being neglected and I had the whole world to deal with except that I was taken out of sight of Vietnam but not not to tall I went to Australia I had problems with problems of leisure there were all sorts of problems that I was involved in which I was concerned with which were booking career of course and I had not. Type so that I had plenty to do but I was not involved in any of the decisions. I stayed out of it completely. I thought I think the president didn't agree with

things I thought about Vietnam. I was very glad to be active in other matters. Therefore I cannot talk about what happened in those days until the president asked me to get involved in trying to get peace going and then I became very much involved in that subject. I don't get to that minute I just want to ask you one more question about. The Johnson administration in Vietnam wasn't there at that time. A tendency in Johnson's support to shift the. Center of policy making control out of the State Department and into the White House on Vietnam. I would say I would say that wasn't taken out of the State Department.

Dean Rusk was a very loyal supporter of President Johnson and he carried out President Johnson's wishes and desires. I think what is there a way to say it was that President Johnson paid much more attention to the details of the Vietnam than as time went on. Could you discuss President Johnson as a personality and how his character shaped the management of the war in Vietnam. What did he want in Vietnam. He didn't he was not told about international affairs as compared to his Great Society his Great Society it was the thing that was very close to his heart I knew Johnson Well he was. He'd been a young congressman in fact he had a job under President Roosevelt charge of the youth movement before he became a congressman.

And there was unfinished business of the New Deal in the Fed deal. And he wanted to see that carried through. And he had the ability to get legislation which no the president had because of his experience as majority leader of the Senate. He he he used to talk to me about his plans and he was very proud of the improvement of the education which he'd been a school teacher himself. These things were very close to his to his heart. Civil rights legislation protection his views on civil rights were extraordinarily liberal. Medicaid Medicare and which President Truman and trying to get through Congress unsuccessfully and he did a very generous thing he went through to the Truman of independence and had that piece of legislation was

true it would for signed Truman's library. So I can say that his emotions were involved with it never had any too much experience with international affairs. This thing was forced on him. He was a man of action. He wanted to see it one and want to see it. He had some advisors told him that no president ever lost a war that was red meat for a Texan. He was very much annoyed that this situation I think interfered with his main interest as president. That would be MY SIZE OF about it and he wanted to get the war over as rapidly as possible. Do you think that's when it started you know that he wanted to get the war over and what.

Now who were Johnson's closest advisors. Well I would know that because I was not around at that time. You got a number of people within the administration and you had a number of friends on the outside that used to consult and so they thought it was used and so I think that he had another group used to come in occasionally like Dean Acheson and others who would try to get their advice see whether that in the new ways of dealing with that and in a way it was became a weakness because these outsiders really didn't know the details of the war sufficiently to have a judgment. I think you'd rather confuse situation. Let me just ask you one question. You said earlier that the president wanted to win the war. And you told us earlier that your view was that it

was a winnable war. Thank you. That's correct. Did you feel it was a winnable war. Do you feel what you feel that the war in Vietnam could be won in those terms. Well I was out of it. But in your own view and my view was that we should have negotiations as rapidly as possible. I think the reports came from neck fever which is the headquarters of the embassy were distorted to see the press view was much sound and much more knowledgeable. I also used to see some of the juniors some of the majors and colonels who were on the ground and some of the junior State Department people and their reports of the way the war was going was quite different from those that came and I was very much concerned that the war was not going well. But I had no connection with it and this

was one of them. Concern with American Welfare has just had also been told about it much earlier. Remember we should have supported the French an Indo China. I never felt the end of China was because of the major interest I thought it was a Tito type of not expanding China's influence would not. Never believed in the Domino Theory. I thought it was a special situation. Just let's perhaps Yugoslavia and Europe in the summer of 1965. You went to Moscow to explore the possibility of Vietnam's settlement. Could you describe that meeting and what was the source I went to. I don't I'm not sure but I think the president would want me to talk with the Russians and see how they felt about it and see what I could get and suggestions

from it. General talk in the beginning. This to Seguin was very much happy by certain changes that he felt had occurred between the Kennedy administration and the Johnson and stray Sion he was very much against. Very much concern by our support of the Left remember nuclear force in Europe. He gave me quite a talking to about that. He was against Germany playing a more important role. He was he thought we were making a mistake. He thought that we didn't have any real government that the people supported. He thought the other side was speaking for the people but he was he thought that we ought to have a settlement he'd like to see the war finished.

He said we ought to look at the four points of the north that had given us and turned them around and look them over who didn't like them. And that's some of the suggestions. And he offered this voluntarily so that he thought of negotiation started. The good news to accept the 17th parallel in connection with the settlement. That indicated to me that he felt that the South should be kept independent from the north for a period of years as far as North Vietnam was concerned. But he didn't offer to take any leadership in it and he indicated that the Chinese will more for war. He didn't indicate that he was ready to take any leadership. But I found and when I got involved in the process of trying to get negotiations going that the Russians were always

ready to help. And the Chinese were trying to block that. Keep the war going. During the Christmas bombing pause 1965 and late night 65 there was a pause in storage that lasted 37 days. President Johnson sent you to 12 countries during that period to explore these possibilities. You described this mission to us. Well he called me on the telephone and said to everyone that you could be starting it said Johnson called Johnson called me on the telephone. He said everyone gets a bad back and I said well it's always back where you want what you want me to do. He said well I've got it right here. He's got a plane waiting for you and I want you to go out and explain what he wanted me to do. He wanted to and he called me back a second time. In the meantime rusted indicated it's not sure these trips were good. He said

don't live Ruskin to fear I want you to go. I want you to live the way you did other jobs report directly to me. He said you want to chill and you did my job for me there and you didn't have in the press about it. I don't want to look as if this is just. A political gesture on my part I won't really have it down. And in one of the settlements. And I think at that time he had come to a point where he did want to have a settlement but he but he wanted to go she ations start in the appropriate way. So I asked him which country wanted me to go first he said well you know those people want you to go and see people in Eastern Europe. I decided that was too soon to go back to Moscow. After a lot of consideration Rusk wanted to keep with

hungry to himself I decided to go to Poland. Poland was one of the three members of the. Of the Control Commission and had a certain influence. So I left that same evening. He insisted that I go that same day he was in a rush because he didn't want them. It was just too long and I had a little difficulty landing because communication hadn't gone to arrive there but I got there. I think 10 o'clock in the morning and I saw the prime minister the same day. I spent most of the day with him or a muckle who was the thought ahead. And then there was the Assistant Secretary of

Foreign Affairs Mark of us. McCloskey. He was later ambassador here. He attended all the meetings. They showed great interest and asked me all sorts of questions. I used the 14 points the rest. I just announced which stated opposition very steadily and indicated that we were quite ready to negotiate and they took it seriously. Among them I met in Moscow before you. With all their organization was formed actually so I knew him of old. He was quite critical of. Keeping the war going but the others were under his instructions did everything they could.

I later found out from him because I was gay. When he told me later on he left Moscow he left Also even before I did and he went first to Moscow and they encouraged him. He went to Peking and they were infuriated. He said he never had tough talks with anyone he had with them but silently the sort of good stuff going. He told me that he'd been kept two days. And one of the airports for no particular reason we just sat in the airport for two days. It was but obviously they sent the people on ahead to prepare the north of NIS to do to oppose what he was doing. You were part of that he was there for two weeks and they began to weaken as he kept talking to them about it and he thought that if we kept the ball's going for a couple months they

might have changed. Remember they were taking the position that annoyed was taking a position on the authority to take place. We had to stop the bombing without any conditions. And of course that was something that was very difficult for President Johnson to accept he wanted to know what what was going to happen. So in any event I'm sorry I went on.