War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Paul Nitze, 1987 [2]

I mustn't leave the discussion where you said the intentions were to achieve a Germany over Europe in the best way must outflank Europe through the Middle East in the best way to achieve a gemman in the Middle East was to outflank the Middle East to Africa. Now we're all I don't want to I want to start with but I'd like somehow to get that idea out because I think it's a it's a good one. But in 1976 when Carter was elected when you first started putting out your papers early 77 My question is What would your perception of this in terms of Soviet intentions but the Soviets and their Cuban proxies were doing and go remember this is I don't want to jump I'm going to ask several questions as we get into the heart of Africa later in Afghanistan but just at that time I think that we knew was that the Soviets were in Angola with. Through the Cuban proxies. What did that tell you who did that were you. What it tell you about Soviet intentions.

It seemed to me to confirm what I thought for a long period of time and that was that the Soviet Union was interested. In fact with their doctrine calls for continuous expansion of what they call the socialist world but they really mean the communist world which they call the camp of peace and freedom and they really are dedicated to expanding that as much as they possibly can. And certainly Mr. Cross showoff made that evident when he discussed publicly his view of peaceful coexistence and peaceful coexistence was they were intending a situation in which the Soviet Union could vigorously support wars of liberation. Which is the same thing as saying trying to expand the camp of peace and freedom.

But did you see the situation in Angola as being just what martial showman would call that. So it's a strategic opportunity. You know Scoop Jackson said they beat on a door and they can go in they go in but that's different from a grand design. Where was the angle of him going to lead. Except I'm saying that the grand design was exactly spelled out by Mr. Cross in his definition of peaceful coexistence. Soviets always use words which mean almost the reverse of what they mean to us. So peaceful coexistence is not in any way mean peaceful. In fact he spelled it out as being the doctrine under which they proposed to support and actively support what they call wars of national liberation which I in fact was conducted by a small conspiracy of men dedicated to communism would tempt takeover by forceful means. You know perfectly normal countries. What do you think was going on in 1978 in the Horn of Africa. They were and you know

there they were torn between you know if you then in Ethiopia can you begin your answer there but no I'm talking about Ethiopia and the horn you were to ask me again. Let me begin again because. With respect to the situation in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in both countries the Soviet Union had been working hard to create an infrastructure of those who shared their point of view and were prepared to take over the countries they had made much more progress in. And the Horn of Africa than they had in Ethiopia they had then had they decided however that Ethiopia was a much more important country than was Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Therefore they switched their effort and they decided to back Ethiopia against Somalia. And that's what happened at that time.

But what was the. This was the time when you said they were going to Germany over Europe and to get Europe to the Middle East to get the Middle East to Africa. This is what what I would want to get out of what was the ultimate goal or the interest if you will be it for the sake of Ethiopia because the ultimate goal of the whole policy of peaceful coexistence was to make progress on the basic goal laid down by Lenin of a world largely composed of socialist communist states and which the Soviet Union would be the prime mover. And then they couldn't really make progress. They'd been rather checkmated and Europe by our efforts in the build up of night. Therefore the thing to do is to make progress in the third world and in that world. He's the right doctrine as from their standpoint is the doctrine of

peaceful coexistence and the support of what they called wars of national liberation which as I say were small groups. Dedicated to communism prepared by fair means and foul to take over those countries and that they were doing this in Africa and they were doing it in Angola. They were doing it in Ethiopia and had been doing it in Somalia and what was really the idea of the entire policy was that if they could make progress through a wide belt through Africa and connect that with control over Yemen and then various countries in the Middle East if they could really then get control over southeast southwest Asia and Africa and the belt down through the equatorial part about there they would have United States isolated at least to a bar to one flank of the European segment of the Eurasian landmass.

Do you see a correlation between the geo political moves in the 70s and the Soviet commitment to developing a larger and larger nuclear force. I do indeed. I thought I think they saw the larger nuclear force as being a method of guaranteeing them that they would not be subject to the threat of U.S. intervention backed by the threat of the U.S. escalating any military confrontation which might result therefrom. After all they had lived through the war resulting from their fomenting of the attack by North Korea and South Korea and they had had were having a lot of experience with. They had had a lot of experience with the war that they formatted in Southeast Asia by the

attack of North Vietnam into South Vietnam and its repercussions. And they understood that there was some point in which the United States might it not only back local resistance to these aggressive acts but might in fact at some time if it were in a superior nuclear position. Escalate. To a nuclear response and they wanted to be sure that that would be an impossible thing by building up their nuclear forces. So they got up out of your voice in the 70s. Did you feel that this made us land ICBM force vulnerable why was it vulnerable because he wasn't then that vulnerable but you could see that it was becoming more vulnerable what they were doing was increasing. First of all the number of their ICBMs.

Secondly they were increasing the size of those ICBMs even in one thousand seventy one seventy two. They were deploying the SS nines which were more than double the size of our light largest missiles so that they had what we could one cause throw away the capability to throw large wakes of material into Intercontinental or orbit. And they were then working hard on accuracy. And as they progress toward getting accuracy then I silos would be vulnerable and they are today and you could see foresee it happening and you could see it then and it did happen. We talked to Paul worky and he said that the Soviets would have to spend two warheads for every ICBM That's two thousand warheads and you assume 50 percent accuracy or malfunction of 3000 warheads and it was to leave 70 percent of our deterrent force.

He's talking nonsense or just those figures are just not correct. Why is it not. Because the reliability of Soviet systems is greater than that. What if they got the whole and we you know whether it requires two warheads or not depends upon the level of damage that you wish to achieve. But what about the other two legs of the drive. The other two legs of the triad are in a different position clearly that the submarine leg of the triad is the prime thing that we have been and continue to rely upon because of its relative invulnerability. The bomber forces vulnerability is in part dependent upon the fact that it coexists with the ICBM as an attack on the bomber force would alert the ICBMs and would give the president the option of firing the ICBM.

An attack on the on the ICBMs would give. The bomber force the time to get up in the air and be invulnerable. Therefore it is the combination of having an ICBM voice and a bomber force which really protects you and those two legs. The question of the survivability SLBM in part depends upon their being other the other two forces being there. If the Soviets could concentrate solely upon the ICBMs I think we'd be in great danger. Was your concern simply what might happen in an exchange or was it the perception of superiority. Even if there were no exchange it was both. And the two intermittently intimately related. One's perception of what might happen. Politically X in exchange depends in part about what one thinks and what one thinks the subnets would think about the

relationship in the event there were an exchange. Therefore the two are not separable. You think superiority that I'm saying exactly that. Now let me be more explicit about it. It isn't a direct relationship one with the other because the side that is facing a superior enemy knows that it must exhibit more courage Otherwise it is in dreadful shape and therefore one doesn't see a direct relationship in actions between superiority and inferiority. But there nevertheless is a very clear relationship between the two and at some time one gets a breaking point where clearly very inferior country would say to not even consider escalating with respect to a superior country that measures their questions of degree involved. And these are

hard to have judgments on in their head to make. I mean one should avoid making absolute statements on these things. I'm trying to say precisely what the factors involved are. What you believe Soviet going in and saw in there and the negotiations in general or two particularly with the thinking you already go. I think they said a he said it so I'm talking about that. But the Soviets and saw it too. We're certainly trying to avoid restrictions which would inhibit them from attaining a militarily superior strategic nuclear force. We certainly also did not want to see the Soviets attain a superior nuclear for nuclear force. Our

goal was to assure if we could that neither side would be able to have a useful superior force although clearly we had a greater concern about the Soviet side of it than about our own. We've lived through a period where we clearly had a superior force and we'd used it with words we exercised great restraint during that period. We could not be that confident of what the Soviets might do if they had a superior military force. Harry already went and joined it and it's good of a political dividend why wasn't it our goal because it didn't seem to be feasible with the realities of what we could do. The congressional support we could get the impact upon our economy. We did not think it was you know consistent with the American attitude to in peacetime fully mobilize a degree of mobilization. It would be necessary against the determined

opposition the Soviet Union to maintain clearly superior nuclear forces would have required not a defense budget of 6 piece 6 percent of our GNP. But if you know what the Soviets is you know 18 percent that kind of thing that they're going to fit in danger. You're already part of Europe now because we did not think it was possible and we thought we should do everything that was necessary to prevent the Soviets from achieving superiority. It's easier to prevent the other fella from having a useful superiority than it is to maintain one oneself. We thought one could do the second task. But working nation wide. Because it was pretty clear that having been a most useful person he had been in the Pentagon and been a tower of strength in the Pentagon. But

afterwards when he got out he suddenly flipped to a point where he truly believed in unilateral disarmament which I thought was extremely dangerous he said. That's the way people characterize as you think about the respect he wasn't really. I can quote you. I couldn't find a statement out to state perform in which in fact said the reverse. Well you've been with Jesus on a treadmill. I am indeed. What is that what he was suggesting we get off first and then the Soviets could or would get off. There isn't any indication of that at all. Harold Brown I think correctly stated when he said that when we arm the Soviets on when we don't arm the Soviets are but he says what he meant and they said that if we got off we might

encourage them to get out. If they didn't get up we could get back I was asking reciprocal restraint not you know after all as I understand but once you get off once you'd engage in unilateral disarmament then it is very hard and dangerous to attempt to catch catch up act. What he said he foresaw a series of agreements. It's like climbing down if you can't get rid of all the heavy ICBMs it was going down by branches step by step. What's wrong with that. I don't think there's anything wrong with that approach but I do think that it does not follow that because you can get one agreement that you can get a better agreement later. We've had the ABM Treaty for a long period of time. It's very difficult to get a better treaty in the field in that field. Step by step

you walk the plank walk step by step Yes and step by step is something you know it's a good objective providing do it but whether you can do it or not there's no evidence that you can do it. What he taught us that committing the present danger and never seen an arms agreement like figure like Groucho Marx he would want to join any club that would let him win. I think that's been completely unfair comment. I believe there is no one who had as much to do with the ABM treaty than I did. I think you know I'm sure that the nonproliferation treaty would not have been ratified except my support I don't believe anybody had any more to do to working out the limited test ban treaty than I did and he's just talking balderdash. All these treaties that you.

You saw and just bedded in and like suggests that you feel it is possible to do business with the Soviets because when they're with us I mean you did say it in 70 and I'm hearing that you know what I came to conclusion in 1974 that it was no longer possible to see any way to get an equal treaty and that we would have to do ourselves those things which would maintain for us an attorney that suggests that during the latter part of the 70s we didn't feel we could negotiate. I didn't think that at that time we could get an equal treaty and we haven't been able to. We tried. If you look in the future do you think it is possible it is something that's agreeable to you going to be agreeable. My view is to try. I believe it is possible I think we made a lot of progress and we're much further along toward a START agreement for instance.

We've been at any time in the past. Let's go back to Vance and I think I've had something to do with that. The backbenches mission to Moscow American 77 did it ever they want to do a comprehensive proposal to cut the Soviet ICBM heavy missiles from 308. Do you agree with that goal. I agree with that goal but the other part of it was that we agreed that we would make no improvements in our strategic forces beyond those that we then had and wouldn't add to them and prove that that would have guaranteed the Soviet Union in perpetuity complete freedom of concern about any danger to them from an attack against their forces by us because our forces had very little in fact zero what is called counter force capability against Soviet side those. Now the this would not have guaranteed the reciprocal for us we would have been under increasing

danger I thought. Well they would have been under none. I've talked to some of my Soviet friends since that time and they deeply regret that they didn't accept Mr vents his proposal when they did and we had to give up on people because having this is that when your committee really went into position. No I don't remember a connection between the do well. Wasn't your main concern about treaty that was negotiated their ICBM was in but there are many things that I thought were of dubious political and did not correspond with what the executive branch was saying about sought to Treaty and was those things that I talked about would take the

evidence that we have X allay your concerns about a bombing or land base. We didn't have an Amex deployed president but saying were you saying that you're going to deploy something quite different than actually being able to deploy it had been deployed and been consistent with the treaty with Adelaide you were here it would have been led. Part of my fears I would have thought it much better if we'd been able to get rid of both the IMAX and the Soviet missiles that have the size of the IMAX which you can see in the terminology of the ABM Treaty as a small missile. Yeah the M-x is not a heavy metal in the terms of the treaty but I would if we'd gotten rid of the last missiles of the size of the mags and those larger there what that would have been much better than having to deploy Macs in large numbers

ourselves. But but we could and I don't the time you're concerned the treaty didn't allow the backspacing to MySpace and I thought we should have the right. I thought this was a very unfair and unequal provision. By and large it seems to be right that the Soviets and we should have the same rights under a treaty. There's no reason why the Soviet Union should have preference in a treaty with respect to the rights that it has that we. So I objected to that even though that was not our intention. And the chiefs did not want to deploy a missile as heavy as their large missiles. Still I thought it was not wise to give them rights why we did not have the rise. But you said at the time that you pretended not to be thinking it would be America ministration was considering Carter and told me last week and you know

now that I have combat complete doubt then and I have complete doubt now that what was contemplated by the bases they were talking about was in fact in conformity with the language of the treaty the treaty quite clearly says that it is not permitted to have to move silos or to add additional silos to replace to yes move to different locations to have additional ones. They're basing male and did in fact contemplate what I would think would be replacing what you didn't. The treaty doesn't talk about Saddam as it talks about launchers but still I'm absolutely persuaded that he is wrong about that. And the executive branch was wrong about that. You were concerned more in your testimony than the specific

right to alert America what was what was your major. You know I was particularly concerned about the specifics of the treaty and that the Senate before I voted for ratification should understand exactly what the treaty provided and they should understand what the probable even possible consequences of that of those provisions should be. That's what I was concerned about. That's what I testified to. But you never you always duck short of saying you recommended is not relevant. I'm not sure that I always did but I certainly tried to refer refrain from stating that when Senator Mathias asked me whether I was recommending to him that he ratify or not ratify. I said that that is your business. That is the Senate's business to decide upon whether a treaty should ratify my business is to try to answer your questions to make it as

clear as I can what the treaty's terms are what it provides and what it doesn't provide and what the probable consequences of those provisions in the treaty. So I bet that your testimony was very damaging. It was indeed and the reason it was damaging was because the executive branch was not correctly describing what the provisions were and what the consequences might be for the country. Because I don't quite understand this it is not a consequence of reading would be that the Soviets would gain there of course. I didn't hear and I have. A lot of the feeling about them when they were here but they weren't. Equal rights there are equal ceilings in numbers but the treaty did not limit the throw away it did not limit accuracy the result has been that they have been there since the treaty.

Since the date when the treaty would have taken effect has been an enormous increase in what is called the throw away of the Soviet missile force but in particularly of its counterforce potential. In fact I think it's counter force potential in other words its ability to take out US hardened silos is going up by a factor of 10 so that nobody thought that treaty we really somehow rather limiting the threat to the United States. It just wasn't and it didn't and it hasn't. You know all this has been done under the framework of the free. Thank you Jack. So were you disappointed when credible here. Well I thought he did the correct thing although I thought the treaty had no chance of going through in any case. If I find it ironic that you and I think about 50 members of the committee of resonating with the president you know when you all got into

the administration we just didn't hear so much about the vulnerability of our ICBMs. We didn't adopt a mobile base. Now we have heard a great deal about the vulnerability of our ICBMs. The question at issue has been what do you do about it that you can do it then. The provisions that the Congress will approve. It's a tough problem. Bread deal the work is going into it so that your interest in this is not slack and since you didn't slacken one bet. Did you get it in the 40s nomination confirmation hearing because he was asked and I believe I did. I thought they were and I still think they were. He says that he was you know there's a bunch of weapons systems that he was in favor of you know including the cruise missiles. So I don't deny that. I'm not saying it was against every weapons system. You're saying that the net of what he was

proposing was in fact what he said in that ape's on a trade bill thing and that is we ought to get off the treadmill we oughtn't to compete with the Soviet Union and then hopefully the Soviets would respond. I said we'd done that and it doesn't work. We went for a long period of time. We did not add to our nuclear forces. Good gosh you look at the comparison between what we did in the long period from I guess from 69 70 80 or even to today. How many new ICBMs have we deployed. None. He said We always develop with the first to develop the weapons and then they would mimic. We know it isn't. That isn't a true statement. And even the thermonuclear weapon I believe it is correct to say that the first nuclear weapon deployed or even tested was tested by them. It isn't true and the cruise missiles My

goodness they were working on you know highly accurate cruise missiles for a much longer period than we continued in even after we abandoned our cruise missile work for a long period of time. So it just isn't so what he says. OK thank you very much. You did induce me to what I don't like to do and do a non hominem argument what.