Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Huynh Van Tieng, 1981

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Transcript

The Japanese plea to the Vietnamese upon their surrender

SR 2096/4

HUYNH VAN THIENG

692 Take 1

Clapstick

Interview with Huynh Van Thieng, student leader in 1945-6, now director

of TV Saigon.

Interviewer:

Please tell us about the August 20th incident.

Huynh Van Tieng:

On August 20th, 1945, which was five days after Japan officially

surrendered to the Allies, there was the incident of Genera1 Terauchi,

Commander in Chief of all the Japanese forces in the southern part of

our country, asking to meet with Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach, a representative

of the Viet Minh in Saigon. During this meeting General Terauchi wept

when he announced that Japan had officially surrendered. General

Terauchi suggested that the Vietnamese revolutionary forces supply the

defeated Japanese forces.

In return, he assured that he would not do anything to create

difficulties for the Vietnamese revolution and that Japan was

applauding the Vietnamese effort in regaining their freedom and

independence. And it was during this meeting that General Terauchi

handed over to Pham Ngoc Thach a statement...

693 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

On August 20th, 1945, which was five days after Japan officially

surrendered to the Allies, General Terauchi, Commander in Chief of the

Japanese army in Saigon, asked to meet with our representative who was

Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach. During this meeting General Terauchi wept at the

news that Japan had surrendered and he earnestly suggested that the

Vietnamese revolution supply the Japanese forces.

He assured Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach that Japan would not interfere in the

struggle for freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people. As a

symbol of this promise, General Terauchi gave Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach a

gilded sword about thirty centimeters long and a pistol of inlaid pearl

and silver.

Events at Ho Chi Minh's Declaration of Independence

694 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

On September 2nd, 1945, the day in which President Ho Chi Minh read the

Declaration of Independence at the Ba Dinh Square in Hanoi, we brought

about two million persons to a rally in Saigon to listen to the

Declaration of Independence on the radio. But it was really regrettable

that we could not broadcast the speech on the radio.

While one of our representative was calling on the population to defend

the nation's independence, gun shots came from the top of a nearby

building, killing and wounding many of the marchers. We immediately

issued the order that the blood of the perpetrators of the crime should

not be spilled and that those people should be captured alive. And the

population exercised a miraculous discipline in that they neither shot

nor stabbed these people to death although they were in possession of

guns and swords. And so they captured the rebels with their own bare

hands.

That night I and another person, Comrade Bach Mai , were assigned to go

and talk sense to the prisoners being kept in the various soons. The

funny thing was that when we arrived at these places the criminals

kowtowed to us, thinking that we were going to have them shot. But our

policy was one of clemency.

And so, after lecturing them, we let them go. We told them that the

determination of the Vietnamese people was to regain our freedom and to

defend it until the end. And this incident, after that, became well

known within the French community. It was also reported in the French

press.

695 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

It must be said that since we took over administrative power on August

25, 1945 and since the incident took place on September 2nd, it created

the feeling that the enemy was all around us...

Gracey and the threat of re-colonization

696 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

We took over administrative power on August 25th from the Japanese. On

September 2nd, the French, using the pretext of rescuing American and

English POWs, opened fire on us. Their intention was to create chaos

and use that as a pretext for intervention. But our people were very

well disciplined. And so order and security were maintained to the

maximum.

The people were very happy to have recaptured their independence after

100 years of domination. But this did not please those who were bent on

invading our country. So when Gracey came to us and saw the cheerful

and happy atmosphere of a people who had just been liberated, he Gracey

himself sowed the seeds of chaos. And even before he came, he had

already taken part in the September 2nd scheme.

When he came, he did not come in order to negotiate with us. Rather, he

came with the attitude of a new master, resembling that of the former

French Governor General. As soon as he came he ordered that there

should be no newspapers and no rallies. He demanded that we turn over

our headquarters to him. Then he occupied our police station and

created confusion and chaos.

Even so, we received orders from Hanoi to the effect that we should be

extremely obliging to the Allies who were represented by Gracey. So it

can be stated that we did everything possible to accommodate Gracey. In

reality, he came here with only two battalion of Indian troops who did

not represent a formidable force at all. But we still did our best to

accommodate him.

We turned over our headquarters to him and we created the necessary

conditions to enable his troops to move about freely. But instead he

forbade us to move around freely. He imposed a curfew against us at

night. But Gracey's troops and the Japanese soldiers were allowed to

move around freely. And he took advantage of this to mount a sneak

attack on us on September 23rd, 1945. This was the nature of Gracey's

bad intentions.

697 TAKE 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

At that time Japan was a vanquished nation, a defeated fascist nation.

But its forces were still numerous in Saigon. There were 100,000

Japanese troops armed to the teeth. The French had not returned yet.

The French had lost Indochina and had not come back yet. But England,

as represented by Gracey, had arrived.

There was a connivance between the English and the French. There were

many French officers who were wearing Allied Forces' insignia -

actually English paratrooper's insignia - as they poured into Vietnam.

So there was a connivance between the English and the French to

maintain their colonial systems in the world, especially in Southeast

Asia. Therefore they made use of Japan.

They did the illegal thing of using the fascist army of which they were

supposed to supervise the surrender as the means of oppression against

the Vietnamese revolution. And this was against the promise made by

General Terauchi to us. Therefore, at that time we had to contend with

the French, British and Japanese armed forces. They were conniving to

hold on firmly to their colonial yoke in this part of the world, in our

country.

But this did not frighten us. Rather, it roiled our anger and induced

us to increase our struggle. Therefore, they eventually got frustrated.

Terauchi was frustrated. And Gracey was certainly frustrated. This was

because instead of smashing the movement for independence they only

caused it to become stronger. And, in the end, we won.

698 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

When Gracey first arrived in Saigon he looked very grumpy. And so we

knew right away. He was waiting for an administration in Saigon which

was pro-French, pro-British or even pro-Japanese. But none of these was

available since the population had risen up and swept all these

possibilities aside. There was only an administration which truly

represented Vietnam. So Gracey was very grumpy.

So he did everything possible to destroy our administration in order to

re-install a pro-French administration. In order to achieve this, he

intentionally went against the order given him by the Allies to disarm

the 100,000 Japanese troops. Instead of disarming the Japanese troops,

he disarmed us, he disarmed the revolutionary forces of Vietnam. Worse

still, he used the 100,000 Japanese troops and rearmed the various

French Legionnaire regiments to fight against the Vietnamese

revolution. He did many outrageous things.

So what did we think about all these? We realized that the struggle for

independence was not so simple, that independence could not come to us

so instantaneously and that we would have to fight very hard still in

order to maintain our independence after a century of colonial

domination. We knew that there would be giant waves, hard rain and

large storms. And we were ready to engage in a protracted struggle.

Having decided on this course, we tried our best to accommodate Gracey

and the Allies. But we were on our toes, preparing for the inevitable

which was the coup against us as it was to occur on September 23rd,

1945. When this happened, we immediately defended Saigon and engaged

them in a protracted struggle. These are the few sketches of the

period.

Dewey's relationship with the Viet Minh

699 Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

During the darkest and stormiest days of our struggle, there was a new

thing. That was the presence of General Dewey. We did not know of what

Dewey was like as a person before that.

We had heard that the Viet Minh Front in Viet Bac had been in contact

with a delegation of Allied Forces in China and had cooperated with the

Allied Forces there by giving them information on the Japanese. As soon

as Dewey arrived in person, we immediately asked for an opinion from

our central government which stated that attention should be paid to

the Allies, especially the Americans, and that we should do everything

to help them. For this reason, we welcomed Dewey very warmly.

We asked him about the situation around the world and presented to him

all our activities. This is to say we told him that we had regained our

independence from the Japanese and that our desire was to maintain it,

to maintain peace and to do all we could to cooperate with the Allies,

which, of course, included the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dewey was quite relaxed and open. His attitude was the opposite of that

of Gracey. Gracey acted as a superior and issued orders. Dewey acted as

an equal and seemed quite moderate. Dewey suggested that we should

place our case before the United Nations and should send a delegation

to the United States. But this was beyond our power to decide on the

spot. This was for the central government, for President Ho, to decide.

But although we could not discuss the issue at that time, we promised

that we were ready to cooperate with the Allies. When Gracey and the

French representative, who were then present as Allied official, found

out that we were meeting with Dewey, they were extremely angry. And

although they did not say it publicly, they showed that they were

clearly against the activities of Dewey.

From the theoretical point of view, we were wary of imperialism, be it

French, British, or American. We were wary of it and we hated it. And

we were determined to protect our independence. But there at that time

you had two imperialist powers, the French and the British, who

connived with each other to oppose our independence. Now, there was a

third power - from the ideological standpoint, we were not close to the

Americans - which represented a new outlook. And so, in our attempt to

protect our independence, we had to do what we could to exploit the

situation. So, with some hope, we reported the situation to the central

government.

But the next day we learned that Dewey had been ambushed and killed. We

knew right away that this was the French scheme. And, at that time,

Gracey contacted the French spies and allowed the French to become

active again. We had to contend with the French efforts to re-install

their colonial system day and night and so we suspected that Dewey was

a victim of the French scheme.

Support for the Viet Minh

700, Take 1

Clapstick

Huynh Van Tieng:

Our relationship with people in the West, especially the French, the

British and the Americans, was somewhat special. At that time the

Japanese held a lot of French, British and American POWs. And the

closer they got to the day of their surrender, the more brutal was

their treatment of the POWs. Hence we tried our best to help.

How was this done? Before and after our taking over administrative

power on August 25th, 1945, we opened up the clubhouses and brought the

American prisoners there, giving them meals and drinks, letting them

listen to music, talking with them and consoling them, giving them

information on the military situation around the world, and telling

them that the Japanese and the Germans would certainly lose and that

they, the POWs, would certainly be able to go home soon to be with

their families. This was our attitude towards the American and British

POWs.

But the French were treacherous to the point that, on the occasion of

September 2nd, which I mentioned earlier, they invited some young

American and British soldiers out and gave them drinks and French women

and guns to shoot at us. We dismissed the whole thing as a thoughtless

act under the influence of alcohol and we brought these men back to the

clubhouses to let them rest and to come to their senses after that.

As for the French, I must say that there were many extremely vile

colonialists as well as many good Frenchmen. And we wholly applauded

those who behaved themselves. For example, a French air force officer

named Jean Souteray who had been discharged and who was writing

newspaper articles for the left wing Socialist Party in Saigon was

quite close to us. Many times he told us that should we have to defend

our independence with force, we should give him a gun and allow him to

fight alongside us. But it was really unfortunate that during all the

confusion when the fighting erupted, Souteray was killed.

But our friendship toward the French people, especially the working

people and the progressive people, continues to develop until today. A

French journalist, Mrs. Violis, maintained a longstanding friendship

with us. And her children and grandchildren have been in touch with us

frequently.

At that time we had few contacts with the British. But later on we had

many British friends who supported our cause. And the British peace

movement opposed the American war of aggression from the very beginning

and is still supporting us. And there were many American groups who

supported us during the war years. We were very touched to see honest

and courageous Americans who stood up to struggle, thereby contributing

to, the inability of the US government to continue with its war of

aggression and to the final withdrawal of the American troops from

Indochina.

We are still very grateful to the British, the French and the American

peoples for having supported us. And the Vietnamese people and the

Vietnamese government will never tolerate a policy of xenophobia. We

know that international solidarity and friendship is to the benefit of

everyone. This is our attitude and this is also the precious and

profound legacy of our President Ho Chi Minh.

Transcript

Transcript

Series: Vietnam: A Television History

Raw Footage: Interview with Huynh Van Tieng, 1981

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-xg9f47h84t

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Description

Credits: Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Huynh, Van Tieng

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 850bdbf689458c86e22e6999bc44825c3f774f8d (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:17:05:28

Citations: Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Huynh Van Tieng, 1981,” 1981-03-15, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 17, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-xg9f47h84t.; MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Huynh Van Tieng, 1981.” 1981-03-15. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 17, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-xg9f47h84t>.; APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Huynh Van Tieng, 1981. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-xg9f47h84t