War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Nichols, 1986 [2]

Going to begin to ask you to explain why in the years you've been following. You don't start immediately following the war. The stockpile is very small for several reasons. One the war was over. There is no urgency. Why is the word continued why Los Alamos would have continued to design better weapons and we would have continued to fabricate them make them. But the second reason was that Los Alamos was one in charge at that time of making weapons. We were trying to convert the whole system to where an industry report into manufacture the weapon. And more important however we did not want to continue to produce what we considered laboratory models. We wanted a better weapon and we saw no way to get a better weapon until we tested the various theories which were then being considered at Los Alamos and that was sandstone test which for the better

weapons you would need an implosion weapon for use 230 U-235 as material. And we also want to make better more efficient weapons so we didn't stockpile weapons. In other words the probably in the early days era we maybe could have put together nine seven or nine weapons whereas during the war we thought we could manufacture at least 15 before the end of 1945. But keep in mind the war was no arrogancy. I thought the war was over and are perfectly happy to go out to West Point as a professor over the idea of going to stay there 26 years. When I tangled with Mr. Golden Dawn and and get the job I was being considered for the. Figures remain low until 48 and then after sandstone why we started manufacturing improved model plus some of the older models and they

figured it's been released like you're the only one I would discuss with that. And in the summer of 48 I think it was that we had about 50 weapons. And it wasn't until fifty three that we started getting into reasonable numbers. One thing that was great to the extent that you can I'm not sure right now. Why do you in General Groves consider secrecy the size of the arsenal. Well we thought security is necessary primarily because we had so few. Now Japan was willing to surrender after two. But keep in mind that Japan was licked at the time we started to bomb them all. The atomic bomb did was convince them that it was time the Emperor took over from the military and go for peace. Now Russia would any potential enemy at that time and in 46 We didn't consider

it we were alarmed about it and alarmed about it was Russia. And I'm sure the number of weapons we had would not scare Russia. So I remember one conference where later when Senator Symington I believe wanted to announce the number we had. And I know Larry Norris had sent for me in a hurry to come over to his house to talk to the senator and we convinced him the number was so small that we announced it why comic weapons at that time would lose their. See atomic weapons were over rated as a result of Hiroshima Nagasaki. They were still vague compared to anything else although more damage were done by firebombs in Tokyo. So where they still were not the effective weapon that say the hydrogen bomb turned out to pay and we needed large numbers before going to war later.

Can you describe the we talked about because they were going to use the strength of the arguments that you make in favor of military. And how would your views differ from those. Well the main reason why the military should have custody is you can expect an army and navy or an air force to use a weapon with which you're not familiar. I've always said it takes a sergeant to discover all the bugs in a weapon. Not some scientists that work under laboratory conditions things work but to find out whether something will work in wartime you have to have people handling it knowing all the idiosyncrasies knowing what the capabilities are in other words what are you able to do. And that's for the planners here to where they start figuring out how do we use that. And to be able to do it at that time. Why every weapon had to be assembled just before it was used so it would take quite a few hours to assemble the weapon United get to have assembly teams unless

you could train those teams and maneuver with the Air Force just how you would use them and all go through all the process. You couldn't hope to develop a military force with atomic weapons. Same Also you need to distribute them strategically to where they were at the bases where you might be loading them onto airplanes. Those are the five fundamental. Reasons why it should be so natural to me. I mean that custody should be in the hands of the military. That's what cost me the job of director military application. Explain to me how your views are different from those you characterize those used for. Well the case a lot of him thought he was essentially a pacifist. In other words you didn't believe in war. He didn't believe in the use of atomic weapons and he felt that if you got international control you'd never have to use them even after you

didn't have international control is a possibility he still abhor the idea of ever using a weapon or ever developing a better one or two to much better like a hydrogen bomb. He was essentially against as he said it gave him I know he didn't use the term gut or a visceral feeling about the idea of using atomic weapons. And he just couldn't understand why why the military needed to practice with them and handling them and all that type of thing and to maintain them in custody see the army we had filled on our own. It was authorized by Actually Congress appropriated the money three storage bases at the period when offers first took over. While we continued to build storage bases in the mountains and one wanted a chat in Albuquerque and we built three bases and with the I.D. we have assembly teams at each one. So all of the military planning required custody. And we felt we could maintain them all. Even said the military not

technically qualified do it to use all kind of argument. But basically the argument real argument. Why is that. He believed in civilian control and not only civilian control but one name which civilian which was Lilienthal by the way I've always felt we always had civilian control of the military. Secretary of Defense the civilian the secretary of the Army Navy and Air Force are civilians and the United States is a civilian. Do you have civilian control. You don't need a Mr. Lilienthal in between. Who is that type of man should never be in the chain of command. If you're considering a weapon for use in war that's my only objection to it. Now I'm going to take you forward to spring and summer for you. Let's start by asking you describe your recollections for Christmas

please sir. Thank you. Well of course it involved me personally very much. You know that when considering the spring of 48 Why is one of the most critical period in my life inspired excitement concern and responsibility. In 47 I was Professor of mechanics at West Point although doing such odd jobs 200 days 365. In Washington and New York and United Nations and military leaders on convince committee acting as a consultant. But in January of 48. I received word that I was to replace Grolier. And my wife didn't like it. We all enjoyed West Point. We were looking forward to 26 years of a flesh line right. You might call it. But Groves is

leaving the end of February and I was appointed chief primarily at the instigation of Navy and Air Force because they couldn't agree on a man of their own or for veto any navy man Navy veto the air force. So they selected the Army and I was it. So I came down to Washington and then we ran into difficulty of promoting me to be promoted to be a major general and I think Mr Lilienthal opposed the idea I should come back to Washington and so my promotion was held up and when Burroughs left in February 28 the General Bradley said can you take over Ashwani first W.P. armed forces special weapons project without being promoted and I know you have an admiral and a senior officer in air force plus the senior officer in the Army chief of staff.

I said Yes I have no trouble if you tell them I am chief. I don't need written orders. So that worked ok. The first incident that came up in March. I believe it was the 5th of March. Secretary Royal had a dinner where for us dollars I invited Secretary of the Army Navy Air Force and Mr. Carr and Mr. Carpenter who were to be the military liaison committee chairman and I was the last guest. And the purpose was to encourage cooperation between the AEC and the military because DROs had been quite an irritant to Lilienthal and he also felt I would be an irritant So the idea was how do you get people together. Well we had the best encouragement for cooperation because Klage letter came in about that time. So it

was a matter of discussion for the evening and the necessity for cooperation. But you're describing some of the Telegraph's Nicolay telegram as I remember Clay started out that up until the present time he had felt there was no threat of war with Russia. She was commander of troops in Europe at that time. And but he felt that the Russians were tightening up on Berlin and passage way to Berlin and he also felt that other actions were the first ones that ever gave him the feeling that war might be imminent threat. All right we're going to war. But there were warning letters that things were changing. Jean you had to Czechoslovakia crisis before that was really one of the things that brought me to Washington and any way to stir things up. That was the first of several things that stirred things

up. Around that time. What was your personal assessment. I had no basis of making an assessment except play. My assessment at the time. Of course I had to be based on Clay's observation. I've not over there and I I knew Clay when the best officers we had although I had many an argument with him but that was I took at face value. What did you say in your. In my effort was the question of custody this things. Well it had this event the Klage telegram had several facts in regard to preparation for war and it also had quite an effect on my personal future. Five days later I got a call from secretary to our secretary of war I think you like that. I know

of an army then Secretary of War Reille to come over to his office and when I got there he just walked toward the elevator and I followed him and we went down to ground level and got into a car and he said to me why are we going. And I said Mr. Secretary I don't even know where we're going. So I have no basis for knowing why. You know I thought you know President Truman when I went to see you told him you told me to bring you over at the White House. Well I got the White House and Mr. Lilienthal was already there. And we went into the president's office and Truman motioned to two chairs in front of him front of his desk and we sat down. Royal was off the. And he looked at choice and should I know you two hate each other's guts. Well we one made a comment of.

But that never true. He then turned to me and look me straight in the eye and you said Nichols if you have I direct Mr. Low and all that the primary function of the ABC is to produce weapons would you have any problem cooperating with him. I said No sir not if that is the directive. And he turned it in. And this as I recall it all and said Dave you don't have to forget your idea of a bottle of milk on every doorstep and start producing weapons and then he said I expect you to to cooperate and I'm going to enter the Dave again. All he said I have Nickols promotion on my desk I'm about to sign it. And he had to become chief at Swapan and be on the military leaders on committee. He said No you two cooperate and so he dismissed me and and I stayed on. And so I went back and I had a job but.

So that is one effect. Then of course the overall effect gradually increased. Other incidents occurred on custody. And on producing more weapons. And and just the readiness in regard to custardy if you take one issue going through it that arouse more people in the military is of course I've been fighting for custody and others in the military liaison committee had really got to be of interest to Mr. forestalls secretary of defense and to the various chiefs and secretaries. The next incident that stirred things up was it was the 30th 30 for the next

incident to stir things up and custody and other problems was an incident occurred at the end of March when Clay sent another telegram that the Russians were opposing trains going to Berlin and he said unless and strategy like the wording was advise it unless instructed otherwise you would use arms in place. They tried to stop him. Well the decision was not to have a confrontation so be gentle. But in any way that was another step and incidents were happening and custody what we try to resolve it. I know we had meetings out in Los Alamos and with Mr. Carpenter. He thought he had a child but he didn't understand just what the opposition was back and had 48 you see. But then they finally had a conference that I attended which were the three secretaries and the

commission and the secretary of defense to try to resolve the issue. And we had another one similar in later to where Goldenthal raised the issue of technical qualification to military I knew that was going to be raised so I asked the band Bush be invited and Van Bush supported me on the basis that all you need to do is train military they can do anything. They're intelligent people. We had many corps of engineer officers on the assembly team plus the cream of the crop of Navy and Air Force and he backed me on the basis that nothing you can do if you take the time to do it and that is not an argument. And we discovered that literally until the main argument was civilian control. That was your next meeting on that was with the president. And I know I rode over with Mr. Forrestal and he said as if you are not important is that issue important enough for me to resign on the issue. I said what is

important. But I hope you won't because I think we need you for other purposes. Perhaps I should have recommended it because he would at that time you know getting started or ragged edge. But the president definitely backed loan and thought so in forty eight. The custody issue still remains. The next problem that we had during this period. The next problem we had to solve during this critical period was whether or not to plan for the use of atomic weapons in the military. And I remember my first encounter with General Granter I went down to his office to indicate my thoughts on what the armed forces should be doing. I thought we ought to be holding maneuvers with the use of atomic weapons dummy weapons and trained for. How

how how we get there is a logistical problem. That was my job and chief as well. And he said well first I want to inform you that you're violating the order of the president. We're not supposed to plan on the use of a comic weapon. I said What are you ordering me to stop. You don't know. I just want you to know that you're a little bit off base. You can keep on working. So that continued to where we started working on the problem and it finally was resolved by Mr. Forestal in August in July or August of 48 and he made the decision then we would plan on the use of a comic weapon and they had the Newport meeting and it also involved who should be in command of that swap. She was reporting then to the three chiefs as individuals not to GCE

aspect the three chiefs as individuals. And we resolved that for war planning. I would report directly to the Air Force but for other purposes continued to report to the Navy and the army. And I actually received an order in August from three chiefs signed as individuals that I would report directly to the chief Air Force would be part time immediately in preparation of carrying out war plan. I forget the name of it because the copy I have never deleted to make it declassified. And so I know I called my classmate and Vandenberg not there. And when do you want me to report. I want a date he says. So he called back and he said he does need your report. You've been doing all right as you've been doing and just continue. But so that and I understand in September and President

Truman diary there's an entry that he approves the idea that we are planning for atomic weapons. Very briefly why do you think for so far I still felt there is no other way to counter the threat of Russia on the budget we had without using atomic weapons. And he felt he would just go ahead and plan and then present Truman with the. Situation and the plans and that's what happened when he did why Truman approved it reluctantly. I'm going to get a little bit and ask you whether you perceive that the threat is worse than the war. I don't think you ever decide ahead of time because the situation warrants the use of atomic weapons until that situation. Right. But you should plan for being ready to

use atomic weapons if the situation demands it. And I also believe that the threat of use of atomic weapons should come first before you use them whether you felt. Whether the spring of 1940 either threat is not true or not with any situation that rose at that time although there was one meeting in June that I was hastily found I had an election date with somebody else and I was called to come over to forestalls office and when I got there I found quite an array of people. There were three chief three secretary Mr. Leavitt secretary of state as I recall and all I can find in the record J Edgar Hoover was there. I don't know why he was there. And I said at the end of the lunch table not knowing for sure why I was there. It looked like

something important. There's another crisis in Berlin. And during the course of the meal General Eisenhower came in and I know he was then president of Columbia University but he was called down to attend this meeting by down. And it was during the sandstone test and they were looking what we could do in regard to the Berlin action that occurring at that time to get around March 30th. Was what we had. In other words could you use atomic weapons. I was specifically asked how soon could you hang a bomb on unhooks over air of. A B-29 and if we wanted to use it in Europe. And I had to give a very discouraging answer I said well the only Semele team is capable of assembling and weapons is a civilian team now out of sandstone. Now whether they would be willing to assemble

a weapon for this purpose why each individual is acting on his own. We do not yet have a certification that the teams we have we're training are qualified. I know I forgot to read a rough answer from General Eisenhower. I'd better get on the ball and get them trained. But that's just another indication of how this thing went step by step. Here's a situation that more serious as they are getting ready for the use of atomic weapons. You discuss briefly what you will between say well I don't know at that time why don't they send some 3:29 over to England or not. I think they're a little later I will discuss it. You know I don't know the exact date of that but we had equipment in England. This was handled back and 46

General Groves and I had authorized a shipment of assembly equipment and building assembly rooms. In other words properly the type of rooms we needed to use building at two bases in England. An informal agreement with regard to her marginal verifiers and with the full knowledge of the sort of chief of staff Eisenhower and Secretary of War Patterson and we set that up to where if we ever needed it you needed to go to England with planes we at least had the assembly equipment there and a place to assemble weapons that were done without my say any agreement with England and the United States at a formal level but it was known by the secretary of war and that. Staff actual aggressors.

Well all I know is they moved some over but we didn't do anything about assembling equipment or moving weapons at that time. Can you briefly assess military significance of the sandstorm. Well well it's sandstone tests were very important at that time. You started the sandstone test were very important in early 48 because that removed the obstacle of producing obsolete weapons. In other words we learned enough from the sandstone cash to develop better weapons and reach out by the summer of RDA. And later we had some 50 weapons and stockpile usable. So it really had a very significant influence. Plus the weapons were so much more efficient that for a given quantity of fissionable material

U-235 and plutonium we had more weapons. OK I want to shift a little bit and ask you bring you back to best of your own. How do you characterize your dealings with the GCC in 48 49. My gosh I had relations with the Joint Congressional Committee because in many cases the military leaders on committee would appear before them for presenting our views on certain matters and in general I was treated fairly well although I never mind appearing before them because they all know Sander McMann and I generally are not on the same side particularly custody issue. I think he respected me and if he did ask two embarrassing questions which he did

occasionally why Hickenlooper who was a Republican who I'd been a personal consultant to when he was chairman would always defend and defend me or sometimes say that's not a proper question. But so I never had any real unhappy relationship with the Joint Congressional Committee. You got the level of specificity you pervasion. No I don't think we had as much trouble as ABC they were attacking the military on the basis of information. You have to keep in mind that the Republicans continued to attack Lilly until after the confirmation hearings. And I think at one time we had an investigation of gross mismanagement. She and I the a of a little bit of 235 that I was involved in. Were a little bit too early for you know

some of the things were saying for us. Why did you support it at the time. You what I this. We believe it. Why did you freeze production I was during the period 48 and 49 I recognized that we were not thinking in big enough numbers for atomic weapons. I've never been one to overrate atomic weapons that we had in those days. And my first opportunity to push on this was in January of 1949 I was called by Alan Grunter and he notified me that General Eisenhower probably was returning in some form to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he wanted me to brief him on atomic weapons the availability and readiness and whatnot. So I briefed General Eisenhower on the problem that we had and it also involved a letter

that we had to sign jointly that Secretary for all stall and Lowenthal had to sign saying jointly each year under the provision of Islamic energy act two. How many how much material you should produce each year and the military leaders on committee had been working on this with Lilienthal and you see without much luck about any increase or 8:59. So I briefed General Eisenhower and also briefed General practice the next day. So read generally I've read General eyes and I brief General Eisenhower on the problem. And took the opportunity to express my views in regard to numbers as I stated at that time that I felt we should be thinking in thousands rather than hundreds of weapons. And I

stress that the day that atomic weapons were the cheapest form of security against the Russians that we could devise and requires everybody were suffering under the budget limitation of Mr. Truman which as I recall was to what would now be considered a ridiculously low figure a 13 and a half billion dollars. And the only way we could do it Mr. forestall that backing was with more weapons. And I know I had more I apparently had more influence than I signed because that was on a Saturday and on Monday my paper came up to Jaysh Yes. I'd also had brief General Bradley on it expressed the same thing we ought to be looking for more numbers and I was talking about working in the future. But about 10 o'clock that morning I got a call from Al Granter come down to us meeting room immediately and I again face General Eisenhower to where he didn't seem to be in the usual friendly mood. He said that this

letter to you and him and my MLC are recommending that I forward to Mr. Force God approve it recommending approval. It's not at all in accord with what you told me Saturday. Why aren't we recommending increased weapons. I said because this is the best compromise we could make with the AEC. Well he said at that time will you go back and write that letter the way it should be written. He's And I want have anything go to present the United States that I've passed on is indicates I'm at all satisfied with the number of weapons we're now producing. Well I didn't mind that. I went back to my office and wrote a letter. I can't find a copy of it but at least I started the ball rolling on increasing production. Of course we had to go through all the rigamarole of the Pentagon and the president's office to work out to set up a special committee of the Security Council

and finally got the president I think late in 49 and was approved. That was the first expansion. You want to just you could just briefly do the story which was going back to make sure you can just buy it. Now wait a minute. How far would you with that. All right. Well I went back to the I was called early relatively early morning on Monday by Al grunters to come down to the J.C. us meeting room. And there I found General Eisenhower very unhappy with the letter that he had been briefed on Saturday and he chided me on the basis that I had sold him on the idea that we needed increased weapons and there were

nothing in the letter that indicated that. And I told him that that was the best compromise we could get with the AEC and were not a single department fenceline but a joint letter. And he said well he would never have any letter appear before the president. President Truman indicated in any way that he was satisfied with the present rate of production and I should go back to my office and write it the way it should be written explain briefly the role really I think that we're planning military services as well. Additionally the planning with primarily Air Force they were the only ones who had the capability to deliver a weapon. And that of course stirred up desire and a part of a navy to get into the act. Of course

I was working for the Navy as well as the air force. So I supported the Navy's views on this thing as far as I was concerned to encourage the design or smaller weapons because a carrier plane could not be large enough to carry size weapons that the Air Force could do is to characterize their position the Air Force position at that time was that they wanted to be the exclusive agent for delivering comic weapons. They had I would say three reasons for it. One they wanted to dominate the situation because they felt that they could win a war with solely with atomic weapons. Second they felt their best qualified to deliver the weapons. And third they felt there are not enough weapons that you can spread them around to where you at or about the Navy as well as the Air Force

the Navy position was that they should be a part of delivering atomic weapons. Because they had capabilities carrier capabilities they were designing a super carrier. And I think it was under construction. I'm not sure. And that was as they were designing planes that could take off from and that would be capable of carrying atomic weapons. And they felt that their capability of the for whatever number oceans would have that they would increase the readiness of the United States that they should be a part of this program. Considering the position of the Air Force and the Navy at that time. It's understandable that there should be a conflict. The Air Force wanted to dominate the situation. They felt they could win a war by strategic bombing and they needed no help and that they could do the job and then challenge that. And they also felt that there was a shortage of weapons and that

they could do the job so much better in the Navy that there is no sense of wasting any weapons with the Navy. The Navy however felt that they had things to offer in a matter of security to where they were very could be in various parts of the ocean and they were designing a super carrier United States. The whole basis of super carrier depended would be an atomic weapon carrier that they felt they were a party to it that that would add to our defense get more flexibility. But the Air Force countered that that a single atomic bomb would eliminate the carrier. So it was definitely a problem of reconciling that two view. I think one issue for 36 go back to the characterization of the views 36 controversy that resulted from this struggle between the Navy and Air Force although Admiral towers and

tweeze bonce had come to an agreement that there was a place for the Navy. When Secretary Johnson came in you not only cut the budget but you eliminated the super carrier and that would knock the Navy completely out of the well really the strategic bombing or any other type of bombing using atomic weapons. They countered with against Air Force by staging the Air Force and overemphasising the nuclear possibilities and relying solely on nuclear capabilities and in particular attack to be 36 or the monstrosity and a failure. And the argument got so heated that the Navy even came out on the moral issue that you shouldn't use atomic weapons. Is morally wrong. And that controversy resulted in the resignation of Admiral Fallon and the

appointment of Admiral Sherman who was a naval aviator and a very co-operative individual. I know I enjoyed meeting him of course and I had my new boss one of them. Was great. I going to ask you did you just be moral argument again. I think it at the knees it's not just primarily. OK. OK moral argument characterizes the moral argument that the Navy's moral issue in this particular argument with the Air Force was primarily based on the plan to bomb cities as well as just military objectives. And they in particular consider that to be immoral and their use of weapons in warfare. One word. OK the mark and the moral argument the Navy was using was

restricted primarily to the bombing of civilians by air force planes. They considered that bombing of cities and eliminating cities blotting them out was immoral. Now we're going to go a few months you. Right right right right. So on. Your first recollections reaction first your recollection of. The impact of the Soviet explosion of a comic weapon was tremendous and the whole set up in the Pentagon. I first heard about it because the air force was patrolling the air at all times with fillers and finally picked up radiation and when that report came in why it was quite startling and it was soon obvious it was an atomic weapon or atomic explosion and that we were in a new

era. Now it was a little shorter than what I had thought it would take into a little shorter period and I had thought it would it would take the Russians to accomplish the atomic bomb but we probably should have been a little bit more alert to it because of the hard Scheppers the Russians were becoming. In other words we should have realized that they were approaching the time when we no longer had a cosmic bomb by ourselves. Now if credit is given a good fire to Admiral straws who has suggested and insisted on this method of detection we used the similar methods you just analyzed results that bikini and it was fortunate that we didn't have the air force set up to control the air around Russia to pick up the radiation. What did you want to say OK. I would

ask you to characterize how the Soviet explosion affected your assessment. Soviet. Well the Soviet explosion of course put us in a new era. We no longer could just threaten to use comic weapons and not expect a counter proposal. Of course we knew that we would have several years where we would have more weapons than the Soviet would have had. And it also led to greater another expansion program. So it really you might say increased the tension between U.S. and Russia and it increased our preparedness. Many issues came along and were resolved more rapidly than they had been resolved before. Now it's rather interesting that Louis Johnson did not take

this opportunity to change his economy policy. I always thought he should have. I remember meeting with him with Bill Webster who is an attorney who is on committee chairman. And we went out to inform Louis Johnson and what the results were before they were official. Before we went to see the president's off the Security Council and I know we outlined to them as to how a special committee would shut up and analyze the whole problem and obviously an atomic explosion. And that would require a lot of change and thinking. Well Louis Johnson said I don't believe that type of intelligence and I know I perhaps it out a little too suddenly. Well Mr. Secretary you better be prepared to understand and accept this type of intelligence this should not cloak and dagger stuff that we have positive information that they exploded. It exploded an atomic weapon but he never changed his stance he

still kept on with the economy program until he finally left. There's one other thing before that. No in no there isn't. What can. I ask you about super specifically. We'll begin by asking what was your role in the decision making process and one of the results of the Russian explosion was to enhance the possibility of developing a hydrogen bomb. There have always been a possibility in fact some people like Kellar wanted to develop that during the war and he always had a current plan as to how to develop a hydrogen bomb. And immediately after the Russian explosion I know I attended a meeting at the APEC with Jim

McCormack director of military application and Bradbury was in from Los Alamos and the military leaders on committee was there and he went over a program for developing a hydrogen bomb which we thought was adequate response to the Russian explosion. So then the next thing that occurred I got an invitation from Senator McMann to come over to her house for breakfast on Sunday morning. It was in October. And it is rather peculiar because I didn't expect it but I you respond with Senators invitation to breakfast. But there are people in the state department the AG there. I was the only military and it amused me because I was sitting back in the corner and I saw one of his staff go up to the rostrum there and hand them a note and he said yes I know General Nicholson is here. I invited him.

And on this stage you know I think we probably will be on the same side. At least I hope so. And I thought that was rather interesting because it showed Senator McMahon was on the side for developing a nuclear hydrogen bomb. You know I looked at it the same as many other individuals that have been in the development of weapons that when is possible to develop a new weapon. You're derelict if you don't do it somebody else is going to do it whether you do it or not. And in this regard I know I went over to see Van Bush when it got into a controversy reaching the president's office. Phil Webster and I went over and we went to band Bush for the idea. He had influence with Truman. He said he didn't which would. Have been gone. And then he said Nichols when will you learn to be patient. This was after I knew the ABC was against it. But he said when will you learn to be patient.

You say you finally had your friend if you life out on a limb. They'll all be gone by June. No. No government agency can afford to upload a logical technical development which enhances our security. When we reached the stage it can be developed in response to the arguments for it. But of course in regard to the arguments against the hydrogen bomb in October I didn't expect any opposition. Everything looked to be in good shape to go ahead. I went over to England on another extraneous matter of trying to negotiate a new agreement with England which would be permissible under the atomic energy and when I came back I found a wall of silence. I couldn't find any information of what was what had happened at the commission. My good friend

McCormick clammed up although he did tell me at absolute orders not to discuss it with me. So that was our problem. So we had to find out what the opposition was through. People like Talor Ernest Laurence Alvarez Melican who had inside sources. Plus I had a few looting Louis straws that there was a fight going on. And then of course we had to find out well what is the opposition in which we were actually found. But basically the she was opposing it on moral grounds on the basis we didn't need it. So on the basis technically impossible and I know the arguments that we didn't need it were based on fallacy. Manley I think that one of the few secretaries one of the chief ones that advocated that the atomic bomb because you have 10 of them instead of one you get the same results but you

do not get the same results because if you say you want to take out a submarine pen it's a harder target. And aspartate illustrated today when Russia has finally developed bond big enough George jeopardises our retaliation for us. In other words if you don't have enough out on the lake and hit hard targets so you do need something besides just a small bang for certain missions. Plus the other big thing the plus the other big thing is that the hydrogen bomb does. But most people thought the atomic bomb would do not take out an entire city on alert. What's your response to. Moral argument. Well it comes down to the same thing. Atomic Bomb. When when does killing become immoral does it

become immoral. Just because you have a bigger weapon. Now we've been bombing civilians which at one point was frowned upon all through World War 2. In other words we disregard the moral argument that you don't bomb civilians. Well if you're going to bomb civilians you might as well do it efficiently. And plus the main the other I am quite sure you need a hydrogen bomb to hit certain targets. It can't be taken out of an ordinary cosmic bomb or ordinary bombing. General with the response so that we are concerned that the U.S. is relying too much on military friendly correct. In other words I concede that there's an argument there. Can you rephrase my question. Lillian Bill brought up the argument that we were relying too much on atomic weapons and our foreign policy

both military and diplomatically and there is some merit in it. But the problem is that we were following up proud on how do you contain Russia with a given amount of money and see we were change time and 49 starting NATO. And the question is how do you defend Europe and the Europeans are only willing to spend so much money. The cheapest way to give a defense at that time was the threat of using atomic weapons. And I think that threat has given us 40 years of peace. I suggest you. Ask what you are a valuation at that time was being yes you know. Well of course it was a surprise to me that I first heard of the of the espionage of Carl folks to begin by

asking you because you said you got a life. You asked me not to have claws. Folks had several significant influences. I don't think it influenced the hydrogen bomb decision because that was essentially made by the time that was known generally in Washington. But it did hasten the second step. I was on a working committee to after the president had made a decision that we would develop the atomic hydrogen bomb to then expand our production facilities particularly at Savannah River registar Savannah River to produce more plutonium and more and tritium. Now that went through just as easily as can be because everybody seemed to be for it. And so that you can say credit to the espionage clause folks. Another factor that was influenced.

She had been over in England in November on negotiating for a better arrangement with England for cooperation. And various senators were opposing it. My friend Senator Hickenlooper among others. But when these folks case came up boy that killed any cooperation with Britain. You tell us briefly what your evaluation. I wrote a report that the interview is ongoing. Certainly clause folks had a lot of information that were damaging to the United States position. General Roper and I wrote a report shortly after it was announced. Which in effect outlined where Russia might be a hydrogen bomb. It's reach out of sludged folks knowledge and we base it on all knowledge that draws folks was exposed to

not we didn't know how much the Russians would accept. You know it's always a problem. SB No but if they accept it every day and taken action they could very well be ahead of us in the development of hydrogen bomb. And as it turned out they were certainly much closer to us than what we ever expected. The beginning of the Korean War had a tremendous effect on the custody issue and the location of weapons and the testing of weapons in regard to custody. It resolved the issue and all was gone. And shortly after the war started the whole issue of custody was resolved on the basis of calling it availability and the word GHC and a military liaison committee sat down and amicably decided that the situation was such that we should make steps take steps to increase our preparedness. In other words to relocate first the non fictional material

part of weapons to where they would be in their possession. Same as I had worked with groves and getting assembly equipment in place. But the first move was to move components to England. Where they would be there with the assembly equipment and we even moved the assembly team men from afterwhile and then the Korean War why it was moved to Pacific bases. But all this was done with very little controversy of course in each case that was recommended by a combination of military leaders on committee and the AC and the president approved it personally. This was during a period in 1951 I became deputy director of guided missiles in office of secretary of defense and continued 2:53 in that job and also chief of research and

development of the U.S. Army. And as chief of research and development. When I heard that there were no so-called targets in Korea I said upon the business of finding in other words I had people over in Korea and they would outline and study the situation and I would fill in the find was in regard to the tactical situation which we knew about long enough ahead of time. Or you could prepare and bomb it with comic weapon for tactical use. I also advocated that we should be using it against the Chinese on China not just tactically. However I got a very deaf ear for most people. I complained to General Ridgeway who was in my chain of command and as chief R&D and he said Well go see the Chiefs you know more and I know Vandenberg had the most valid argument.

He said he didn't want de-bunk atomic weapons if we used too many. Tactically it wouldn't win the war for us. And even if we just bombed a few places in China probably would and he felt we should save all the weapons we had for a potential war with Russia. The Navy of course was not enthusiastic and the army would just soon continue to fight with them. So I didn't get very far. However in Korea it finally was resolved by Eisenhower when they started the armistice negotiations and then when they started but in 53 when Eisenhower came in as president he was. He felt something had to be done he had promised to end the Korean War and in his book he cites that MacArthur first talked to him about the necessity to use atomic weapons in Korea artists threatened to use them. And in our book why he

cites that he allowed it to be leaked out to work with Greeks through India to the North Koreans and Chinese that he was no longer going to observe a gentleman's agreement not to use all weapons and that he was ready to use whatever necessary to end the endless controversy with North Korea and come to a peace and he had the credibility. That's the other thing if you threaten to use atomic weapons. You have to be credible in other words to where the other side believes you. Well they believed Eisenhower and I believed him. And the result was a few. Finally in July of 9 or July of 1953 you had an agreement for a peace. I don't quote much of a peace but nevertheless you stopped fighting. He that. Even in words. Why. Wasn't it just that game.

I visited several of the chiefs and I always felt the general Vandenberg had the sound as an argument for not using atomic weapons in Korea. His argument was that we had so few that it would be bunk you use the threat of atomic weapons. It probably would not win the war for us if we used them just tactically and we weren't sure it would win against the Chinese strategically because our value of life and so forth. So he felt that we should reserve all the weapons we had for use against a potential enemy Russia. No good. Officers with him. Before when you were at your job you know.

In 1951 to 53 I was assigned as deputy director of guided missiles in the office of secretary of defense and then one year later I had the additional duties as being chief of research and development of the army. And at the time the idea came up to develop an intercontinental missile by the Air Force which we study stage in 53. I felt the logical thing would be to start at the same time a defense. So in my position as chief of R&D I called in the ordinance and suggested they spend fifty thousand dollars with Bell Telephone labs I'm studying the possibility of a missile hitting a missile. In other words a defense against a ballistic intercontinental ballistic missile. Everybody says it can't be done it. You can't hit a bullet with a bullet. I just took the view you have studied to

find out what you can or not. Well belakang iPhone lab came up with a study and it eventually grew to where we finally developed. An anti ballistic missile. And then our intelligentsia came in and decided that dealing with Russia you shouldn't have a defense that that would indicate to them that we were planning a first strike. Well I can't imagine anything so unfounded that is that if you have a defense at least it puts more doubt in Russia's mind as to whether or not they can knock us out in one blow. Well people say you have to have a defensive purpose. You don't have you just have to have enough of a threat to where they can't evaluate whether or not they can knock you out with one blow. And so it if it's 60 80 percent effective they don't know how effective it is. And the only way you eventually can reduce weapons. In other words

the ideal thing and control is reduced to zero. Weapons. But then you have to worry about some damned fool like Weddady who may have say 10 or 12 to do it in secret. It can't be done. Then you need a defense just to counter that. So I'm very happy with President Reagan's proposal to have a strategic defense initiative. The most logical thing in the world I can't understand for the life of me why people oppose it. Now how do how long it takes to do it. I don't know but I know there have been tremendous advances made. For example we have been able to hit take off at quite in line with a missile and actually hit an intercontinental missile fired from California. So it's no longer a case you need an atomic warhead to destroy incoming missiles. There are ways and means of doing it directly and with the improvement in laser and all that computer system you certainly should be working on a defense.

I feel very strongly that the Pentagon is going to be oh. Now. What the first business in general is what are your recollections your role. You already told us before beginning here again that I'm sorry. The Oppenheimer case it's always been. Subject to more questions than any other topic. Whenever I talk to people. They always ask me about the Oppenheimer case. I probably know more about it than any other individual. Having been in on the beginning of it and then happened to be general manager at the time that the hearing which precipitated all during a period after the war I was called from time to time with various

secretaries to ask whether or not I knew about Oppenheimer's record. She's a security people every time he came up pre-clearance it would always raise Oppenheimer's record. I had a consistent answer by any reasonable evaluation on whether or not he is a security risk. He could be considered a security risk. However I believe he is loyal and it's up to you to decide is he essential for the project or are you willing to assume whatever security risk may be. That was a consistent answer I gave every time I work. When Eisenhower was elected. He campaigned on the issue of getting Communist out of government. And he particularly chided Truman on the basis that white and the Treasury Department and J Edgar Hoover sent a warning about him and all that happened was the Truman promoted him or somebody promoted him. That was

a campaign issue. The result was when Eisenhower came in he issued a new regulation change the regulations on the basis of distinguishing between a security risk and a loyalty question. You didn't have to be disloyal to be a security risk. Now most people don't understand that now. And he also ordered that everybody should review all the questionable cases they see had not done this I downwardly would have raised the issue with regard to Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer at that time was losing his influence because of his decision on the hydrogen bomb. So he no longer being used to that extent he had been previously he had resigned from the edgiest the chairman and most of the contracts he had with the military had been canceled or just terminated. So he no longer had the influence that he had previously. And

probably I doubt I didn't even know blockish order president so when I came in there general manager said I fear I would not have raised. I know it. I doubt astrology would have. But it was precipitated by what later turned out to be a good friend of mine. I just knew him at that time. Bill Borden who had been secretary of the Joint Congressional Committee staff and he worried about Oppenheimer. He made quite a study. And in theory you get when you exactly wrote the letter. But anyway you wrote a letter outlining all the fell about Oppenheimer how he was security risk and he not only thought he was security risk he said more probably not if he had been disloyal or just spy and felt that he should be terminated. Well that he had J. Edgar Hoover and J Edgar Hoover always protect himself I think he sent about 10 copies out or ten letters out

to various secretaries and to present the United States. Well I went ahead and also bought same time he wrote that letter. Brownell was Attorney General was giving a speech reminding the public of this event with Truman. In other words the need to eliminate communists from government. That's your background. So I had very little recourse except to say set up a wall of security around him and there were no more information go to Oppenheimer until he's cleared. And the obvious thing was to do go ahead with the provision of the presidential order and have a hearing. And we know normally the general manager was a finalist already and staying like this. And what the commission thought it was so important that they said everything I did could only be a recommendation and they would finally resolve it. Well the first thing was to

pick a committee or a panel for a security hearing. And I felt we had and the chairman Gordon Gray probably as good a man as you possibly could do weigh a thing fairly. He had been secretary of the Army. He had been president of one of the universe and one of the Carolinas I forget which one. And you're an outstanding citizen. So he was the chairman and then they had two other scientists. And Mr. Morgan from an industry well you know the whole thing was precipitated where we set up a business having a hearing. I tried to get a man I knew to be counsel. But he couldn't get away from his work. And finally Brownell is the security attorney general I guess Brownell recommended. A con.. So we drew up to charges not charges but a statement of allegations

everything that was practically was in Borden's letter plus a few other things that we knew about it he didn't have. And I know we called Oppenheimer and he was overseas at the time and it didn't help any to where I read the FBI report that one of his visits over there was to visit our old friend Shivani again. Atkins that worried a lot of people. And before going over he had just gone out to Los Alamos to be briefed on the situation and he hadn't been there much the previous year. So it was a little alarming. And what I always had that idea that we might learn the truth to nonkosher Bali a case during the course of the hearing. General Groves I think put it more specifically that to where if you consider the present rules that were in existence under Eisenhower that if he were a commissioner he would not be

able to clear Oppenheimer if you complied with the rules. Well the vote of the hearing board long hearing was two to one. The man we thought most adamant against Oppenheimer the scientists voter declare him. In fact our Council reported to me during the course hearing he's afraid was going to disqualify himself by the statements he's making and the question to you asking Oppenheimer looked like he was prejudiced but he shifted the other two soldiers two to one vote. I recommended no Clarence on the basis that the story Oppenheimer told back in 1943 was one story he told another story after the war the FBI and he repeated that same story essentially at the hearing. One story must be a lie. And of course Oppenheimer said the story in during the war was a lie

and he used the term. I must have been an idiot to tell that story to come cook up a cock and bull story. He tried to claim that he had told Groser that I'm sure he never did be good growth but he told me I was in on the business and it always amazed me why the Groves told me that when he was called by the council for Oppenheimer that he'd warned the council are the two different stories. In other words as his story it grows as jelling was different than the story. That Oppenheimer was now telling and so they should have known that that was going to come up. But he just fell into the trap of trying to repeat the same story after war and of course we got a tape of what he said doing during the war. The two stories were in contradiction. So the hearing board is called it. I'm not

completely frank or something like that but the I passed my recommendation on to the commission and they voted 4 to 1 not declare Oppenheimer. Now people often ask What is the difference. Well there are several differences. One the regulations and change one first place under gross myself. We had no regulations but we went on the basis he was essential out of nothing and the present regulation of the regulations at that time that gave any basis for considering whether or not a man was essential if he was a rescue it out. The next factor is at the time of the forty three hearing or not hearing but consideration of why Russia is supposedly an ally in history why Russia was a potential enemy. The other thing in 43. Oppenheimer is absolutely essential

in 53. Why nobody considered him essential. So there are many reasons as to why. No I regret very much I mean that the incident ever came up. It ruined a damn good man but I don't think he's completely blameless. He brought a lot of it on himself. The question frequently comes up as to what how much of a factor on Oppenheimer's opposition to the hydrogen bomb had in the security clearance. That is an issue which is quite confusing. I know it was in Boardman's letter at the time. My instructions to the young council that was preparing the list of allegations. I said we don't want to put too much stress on that because I don't think we should try our man for his opinions and in

danger of being accused of that. However green argued that he was putting it in not because of the what the opposition meant but because of his veracity. In other words was he telling the truth about his position and I said well people still misunderstand he finally convinced me that the way it was paragraphed why that issue would not come up. The commission approved it. I finally approved it reluctantly because I just didn't feel we should use that as any basis for security clearance. However the matter was compounded by the leak to the New York Times. On the whole I released my letter and the general manager letter and they changed the paragraphing. Green said the paragraphing is next. Now that that won't come up they just changed it to worse clearly than an issue of more clearly an issue. And that in hindsight indicate to me they were planning to go public and

which they did although we were trying to keep the thing secret and we thought we had Oppenheimer's agreement to that. We gave him the choice. But any way that he had no Gray was warned about that and how to handle it. And I thought he did a fair job of how he handled the thing as not being a basis for Clarance. But he did cite the veracity part and see that coupled along with the Avali case on veracity was one of the main questions about now groves in his opinion she cited primarily as associations in the past. Now when you describe differences the way you characterize this means. There were several differences and probably if I had been general manager that never would have arisen because when they started reading the transcript of our case I mean what are

counselors. I called them and said you don't have the case. I want to know about Chavalit case. In other words what's the truth about that. You're not asking any question we don't seem to be handling that. And he said we have nothing on the side of that in the Shamali case that I knew that there was a tape recording we'd made it that Oppenheimer decided two or three contacts you cited photocopying material and I think that is the basic thing. And so the council finally hit check with the FBI and they had the stuff in a box. General Groves and I had sent it over when we went out of office on the basis that these were our six hottest pieces because we should be with the FBI. That's how it happened. Now some people say that's double jeopardy. I checked with the

judge and you said not of his newly found but. No group that girls had warned him that we had a different story. Now I'm going to back you up when I asked you to clarify something. Who knew about size of this story for you. I just I want to know what's true. Do. You raise a question about who knew about the size of the stockpile. And this question has been repeatedly raised is how many people knew about the size of the stockpile after the war. And the answer is very few chords I Groves. I knew about it is reported to me what their status was. Each time the APCP are not the a few people but are people out in Los Alamos should have the responsibility

for storing the weapons and Skandia would report monthly on what was the status of all the equipment. And also we got a report from our production division on that plutonium and 235 available. I would say there are probably not more than 10 people in our organization in that Treanor command knew the score very optically. Julie fell to my lot. I would go over to brief General Eisenhower what General Eisenhower did with the information I don't know but we felt at that time our Rand report to General Eisenhower whether he and fully inform Patterson I don't know. I've never been able to find anything that indicated that Truman was informed. I have found a couple of occasions some indication he didn't want to be. Now DeLay in talking makes a big issue of it that everybody was shocked when they discovered the size of the. Stockpile which I think I explained earlier.

You do. You just assumed it was very shortly after the AC took over. I don't believe quite shocked at the size of the stockpile he had. He had to show them from all conversations he had heard from various people that it should have been much bigger than it was. But and I think he is an informed Truman and what Truman reaction was I don't know for sure but Truman could have had the information at any time he asked for it. But I think during that period he felt he was not about to use the atomic weapons for any purpose whatsoever. So he probably felt better not knowing he should have known it. All right. Final final final where

do you find yourself in agreement Mr. FORD. Yes it is important Larry. So please yourself in regard to Borden's letter. When I read it there I found nothing new in it. In other words it was essentially information which I had and I finally could have added more to it. I agreed with the facts as reported by various security agencies that Rynders letter. I did not agree with his conclusions that I and I believed that I had always believed and still believed that Oppenheimer were loyal a security risk. But I have no doubt in my mind that he was loyal