War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Hunt, 1986

But I think I did I want to talk first about the viewer and to the personal experiences and artillery. It was understood that we had to have them too. And given that the Soviet army was on the face without numbers vary considerably you would have to use these against them if you were in danger of losing and often don't go on because you're doing very well that will lead to the cameras running home. Let's see how we go but if if at first we can stick to the sort of directs tactics and then we'll get on to the strategy as we need to later. OK all right so if you could explain first of all from the earliest period that you had experience of it yourself what what the tactical thinking was of how these American artillery atomic artillery weapons were to be used. I think the surface the first thinking was that here was the option of making selective nuclear strikes. Instead all of the old massive strikes which were all available to us. So they're folded into the range of the weapon contemplated using them against the troops in front of you. The airfields

from which the aircraft came said they were simply determined strikes they weren't in the nature of war fighting that came rather later when the weapons became smaller and more discreet. But initially there were a lot of big weapons but a good deal smaller of course and the strategic ones that. But you did have these atomic shells didn't you in American artillery units attached to the various No Indian armies that they were just a little later. What was the idea for using them. Oh well they came just a little later and then the idea was based and indeed it was to be able to hit the enemy units against you. You would use a shell for example to an attack an arm advertisement attacking you to be able to destroy the people in front of you. It used to be called a majority to stabilize the battle to stop the battle being lost at that point. And of course obviously also politically to give the other side time to think about whether they wanted to go on in longer.

There's a thing called the plastic bottles and you tell us about that. Yes the plastic bag philosophy was that within the limits of your conventional forces you would contain the enemy when he came by defending or close in front of his advance defending on the sides and making a living on him so to speak and then obligingly putting a nuclear weapon in the middle of that plastic bag if you couldn't hold him in any other way. And that would ruin his whole day and in that it would load his own day. I think it could well have been days afterwards but I mean that's it maybe the first thing was better destroy him in that way than be destroyed yourself. Now from the point of you come out in the field ha certain Could they be that when the cons came they're going to be allowed to use these things when they want to use them what was the process for that. Well the process will come to in a second but certainly there was always the worry that you would have to get permission obviously your own command to your brigade command your divisional commander. There was a certain way that you might also have to what we call an American Idol. But no American would actually trust the British will build and the Great Mother they want to come and look themselves. But having established that there was a need on your brigade

front on your divisional front then the request had to go all the way up to CO headquarters and then eventually to the Sakha in the headquarters right at the rear. And that one in the same time you sent a message up through your various headquarters each to say yes these are the people that need it most. But in the media one went right across the street to psycho himself so that he could be resumed it could be contemplating. But he put that request back to the United States. Now all this was going to take time. I knew that perfect world and one of the real problems inevitably was Willie enemy. Stay still while you're getting all this. Will he still be there when you get permission. So how long do you think it might've taken between the time you put in the request of the time you could drop your fire gun. I guess we used to think about two days to say I mean one would like to have thought seven of eight hours but that would have meant I guess that Sacco would have had to

have some delegated power already. And the problem was not that one was thinking about all of them. It was the first ones and when I say today's I'm thinking of it first. Difficult choice. Of course afterwards had there been years before then I think you would get it much more quickly. Presumably were once the plug was pulled as it were. The amount of munitions that there were on duty one would have been talking about a very large number of of these weapons being used at the same time. Guess what. What thinking was given to what this would do to. The Germans for example. Well of course it's a little difficult to say that from the regimental commander level. Certainly on our front we weren't so to speak planning to shoot them at areas in which they were Germans. But of course in a wider context a lot of these dropped right across the front would do devastating

damage. But initially I guess people saw that we were really fighting the Russians and that is the first priority. I think it was really only when these exercises have taken place and one had seen how many weapons people notionally wanted to use but it was up in the villas that you were doing much much more damage than was politically tolerable. And indeed it was likeable to be both indeed militarily sensible. Do you remember the particular exercise that you to toss in without that dawned on people. I remember exercise in which I took part I confess it is for the second I can't quite remember the names of them. But yes I'm in the middle indeed. I mean can you just sort of describe it you know one of them and not by the name but to well take on the battle would start in the usual way would two sides fight each other conventionally. You'd then be told that several divisions were in front of you and you're in your one division or you're one brigade were going to be quite unable to hold them. You start off with conventional to refine and then came the point at which the teller a commander would have to decide what to do and you would look at the type of a target you look at the error involved. You

decide what sort of yield you needed but what height you wish to burst it and you'd make a request to use a weapon or two weapons of that particular type. In a way it will go and the brigade commander press would repeat and say yes fine and then it will go up the chain. Now remembering that one was also competing against the needs of the next door the gate commanded and you had to speak to be in the worst spot to have any chance of getting it. They were holding the enemy or trying to. So that was the way in which it operated. Now at this point of course you didn't have to worry about some of the weapons being used against you. Perhaps you could give us meekly accept I want to use these questions if I can help it. You may have thought about that and tell me at what point you did have to why and what effect that had. We did not have to worry about the Soviet Union using battlefield nuclear weapons. Relatively small yields against us really until quite late sixties indeed when flexible responds K.M. was

adopted in the middle to late sixties. It was because the enemy had no ability to fight back but it seemed of avi's most attitude to adopt. You could counter their conventional forces with nuclear weapons but very shortly after that the Soviet Union did get the capacity to fall back. And frankly once he could fall back we didn't know what to do next. We haven't really solved that problem yet. We simply haven't. And of course now all he has not only the ability to fight back but rather more of all the better weapons than we have in that particular field. Battlefield UK weapons do you think that the. Can you tell me at all about the how it struck you that the American Army thought about these things was there a division of opinion within the American army as it seemed to you at that time. Yes I guess there has always been a bored division of opinion in that the American Army was almost always more ready for war fighting of any sort

than we were even conventionally the American army in the sense was quite happy to fight back to the Pyrenees. It didn't make much appeal to the Germans of course or to any of the vest on those. So it's fair to say that the American army did not particularly want to use nuclear weapons. It would have gone to fight along with the war. But when nuclear weapons were also being contemplated then it was a strand of opinion running so that army which treated them dearly like a larger fall far down and certainly contemplated war fighting at least in theory. Now I don't believe any command on the ground was wedded to that. But there's a lot in American thinking at that time that these were war fighting weapons. What what was the relationship between those of the rest of you in the NATO's armies who were being supplied with these weapons and the Americans I mean did you feel that you knew all that you needed to know there is enough information coming out that the. Or not and what kind of innocent it was oh yes at most levels we have all the information we wanted I

mean we were trained for example in American schools in Texas we knew about the weapons. We were trained in handling them and so on. We knew very well who would be American custodians of nuclear warheads. We had no problem with that sort of technical level at all. The difference was that the political control which lay entirely in American hands and with American commanders right at the very top. So there was a certain difference there. Now in the early stage of course we didn't have our own delivery systems atoll. So we had American ones to cover our front and then of course in the late 50s or mid 50s when we got them those American units went back home again for the all time stand flew the warheads were American. It must have been a strange that means the first time the British army is dependent on somebody else to supply the weapons that it's apparently relying on. Did that seem to you at the time as a perhaps a come down for the British Army I mean was it.

No not really because we were in a transitory stage where the nuclear weapons were relatively new people were acquiring the British Army. A lot of the British were developing their own nuclear weapon and at that time in the late 50s the British were indeed developing a tactical nuclear weapon. It didn't actually happen in the end but we would have had a tactical nuclear weapon with our own warhead. Whether that was desirable not some other method but we ran out of money and decided then to stay with the double Keven anti-American warhead British manned system. Is it your impression either from what you knew that all from what you know now. That the numbers and types and everything of tactical nuclear weapons that came into Europe between say 55 and 65 was very large numbers. Was that process adequately controlled in your view. I guess the control lay entirely in American hands and there was no denying that the eventual number of the vibe was far far beyond anything that one

needed. It was made up of course of mines also nuclear warheads on anti-aircraft artillery. But the great bulk of it was pretty short range over to short range systems and they were far too many. But now remember that the new curative of a short range nuclear Tillery had a range of only 15000 16000 yards in its all of a conventional role. But to cover the front with nuclear weapons you had to have nuclear weapons available to every gun and they gave you very many more weapons and you might need overall just in order to have them. But every point on the front and that applied of course within the range of Eveleigh weapon too. So a lot of weapons therefore were simply there to give you coverage everywhere. Or not was the idea you should use the same done or indeed a tool or indeed at all. Yes indeed at all. We were absolutely clear that these were weapons of last resort. And when they were first used opposition would not after that be a pick a healthy one. Do you think it's fair to

say that the. Public debate or even the political attention of those at the top in NATO countries was almost exclusively focused on strategic systems I mean the British case the V bombers and so on and the replacements for them and the four missiles and those kinds of things French case the thing they were trying to develop even in the German case that there wasn't very much understanding outside the military directly responsible of this. These tactical systems how they be used and everything else would that be a fair thing. I think it's reasonable or fair but with certain exceptions. Because when for example General North starts start to develop the concept of the pause to be able to use nuclear weapons to give the other side pause to think that came along in the same sort of time that these weapons were beginning to appear. And so in the Syria I'm in academia and so on the web people who understood full well what the shorter range weapons were about. But nonetheless it was still in the in the elite

argument in this country. Thank you Bill a little discussed indeed just in the audience to toot and that's about all. But it was fairly wide coverage in the United States. But for many years I guess another 10 years or so it's mainly was in the military and the defense academics of whom are relatively few. What did you know about these of that union at that time. Military I mean what did you know about the threat if I can use that word. And do you think that what you knew in hindsight was accurate or exaggeration. Well at all times it's not so to speak what the threat is it's what you think it is. And the conventional wisdom was that the Soviet forces grossly outnumbered ourselves. And I think it was something to support that. We were not convinced that the better weapons and the better aircraft. We had an effective exchange for the very much larger numbers. So the prevailing feeling always was that we are facing an

extremely heavy Swit we should be very lucky indeed to contain it. And given that we only have very little dips in West Germany anyway that would be extreme difficulty in not being beaten and therefore a small nuclear weapon which came on the battlefield looked a bit like a fix gun it was the equalizer made up of the difference between your strings and hears. And I'm sure that that was a prevailing feeling and if you go back a little earlier say into the 50s certainly would be serving in Germany felt we would have a chicken's neck. I mean we're really well forward with no conceivable chance of defending ourselves conventionally we simply didn't have those forces this before you see even the German army was built up. Now during the the flexible response debate period the British Army. It was was never able with this rise in the 60s or how long could the British Army have force even after a flexible response was adopted which was a very intelligent question at the time that the official cause directly

on scene 62 in 67 during that period if there had been a a war what was the British Army. What length of time as a British army equipped to fight for. We were equipped to fight probably for 30 days or there were boats but that is not really the issue the issue is what sort of warning do you get. What sort of forces are brought against you and how long can you actually hold. And I guess the average time the people had in their mines was four days five days six days seven days of that order before you were in real trouble. In short before you might need to threaten nuclear weapons so those sort of day there's sort of time periods now if everything went right for a choice every two weeks. If everything went wrong for us it might be two days. There are all sorts of different factors which you simply can't accurately forecast. But days. And is it would it be fair to say that the flexible response effectively was brought in the

idea that that is to say that nuclear weapons would not be used until absolutely necessary to avoid defeat. That idea was brought in well in advance of the official. Theory being adopted the idea of flexible response was to make you more flexible to give you more options than just relying on nuclear weapons. By definition that meant being conventionally stronger. And that movement towards being conventional or stronger was certainly going on in the late 50s. It began to be affected somewhat by the Americans taking troops away to get a Viet Nam that cut across it later on. But yes that was the wish to be strong in order to put off for a time when you had to use them. But as you well know the Europeans didn't want to be too strong. They wanted to be clear that nuclear weapons might have to be used. And they went there for a toll keen on having a

purely conventional defense. Perhaps you could. I don't quite know where whether we use this in this program or the next program but what is the notion I'm forget the term you use Enfamil insufficient size. Yes I mean the notion of can. Well. You start out by trying to defend yourself convention. If you cannot then you are forced to rely on nuclear weapons. And what you want to put into the Soviet mind is that the danger of nuclear weapons is always there. So if you built up your own conventional strings to the point at which it looked as if you were ready and willing to contemplate a purely conventional war then the threat of nuclear weapons would recede in the Soviet line. Therefore what the Europeans wanted was to have. Conventional forces stronger but not too strong. They wanted this gap. What is being called the doctrine of conventional insufficiency to make quite sure that the Russians would realize we weren't quite strong enough conventionally and therefore might well be forced to

have nuclear weapons in use. Then of course came 1960. Why move to. The might of our whiz kids came over to start briefing people in Europe about the new ideas of flux or sponsons on what was your reaction to that. It was of course just a little later than that but are we all first of all told anything. Now look if you sit still and you look at the blackboard you will begin to see the arguments we're painting them when you see them you'll understand them. And when you understand them you'll show a point of view and of course we went for the first part of it but not the second. We regarded them as kindergarten briefings we simply didn't want to sit there and be told all of these simplicity is which in the end one didn't take it all. So we found the whiz kids intolerably Alec and intellectually not all that attractive as individuals a lot of them and frankly they cost a great deal of difficulty and particularly above all with the French. Why particularly. Well the

French don't like to be lectured to by anybody in the French have very strong views on their own doctrines their own strategy and they simply regarded the French as not understanding the euro. I'm sorry they regarded the Americans who came over as really not understanding the problem in Europe at all. But seeing it's purely from their point of view and one of the phrases used was they want us to be conventionally stronger in order to fight for longer. They want to trade European space for American time and we don't want to trade European space. Another point made by the French was the flexible response means flexibility going backwards. It means that you defend for longer. And that again made no appeal when you fought back across Germany towards funds. I mean the. Some of those whiz kids whom we have interviewed for the series are thinking back say well of course these were very new ideas and it took the Europeans some time to get used to them but eventually

I think we managed to get through to them I mean what's your reaction to that. OK well there's a certain amount in there in the sense that flexible that response was eventually agreed but it wasn't quite the flexible response they came over with as their flexible response was really conventional defense by another means with the nuclear weapons merely in reserve in case what was eventually adopted was we will be conventionally stronger. And the role of the nuclear weapons will be watered down a little but still it was a strategy with a nuclear kernel to it it was nuclear hot. And that wasn't what they came over for. So yeah they certainly have and you wouldn't really except that they. Had thought about these things and you're great you're more about these things than than you did. I think they may have a little salt about them all because after all they had originated the doctrine. Nuclear weapons were. More easily discussable. I guess what they hadn't thought about it at all was a

reaction to Europeans who lived on the ground with their own particular positions and the evidence of other courses. That was what made the French leave the integrated part of the alliance. They simply wanted no part of flexible response as enunciated at that time. The Germans weren't able to disagree of course so openly do you think what do you think. I says euros but Germans I think were a bit mixed. There were some Germans who wanted nuclear mines for example. If any Russian crosses the front of the mine goes up that never seem to be likely to recommend itself to a German public but nonetheless there were Germans who wanted to end so little stranded among the German military that wouldn't of minded German nuclear weapons either. They were about to go listed in their thinking they wanted a certain independence. But in most cases the Germans above all wanted to keep the Americans involved in their defense and wanted therefore in a sense to agree with the Americans but not too much because they

wanted the doctrine of conventional insufficiency. I think a lot of Europeans laymen in Europe believe that nuclear weapons of all kinds really are in Europe because the Americans want them to be and that if it weren't for the Americans there wouldn't be any here. Which made some sense of being true for the first few years the 1950s. But it's probably the reverse the true sense isn't it I mean what what. What's your reaction to that belief. That is right it is the reverse of the truth. Really could you spot so to spell it out for us for us and say it another way. When the nuclear weapons first came. Yes they seem the answer to everybody's prayers because the other side didn't have them. That's a wonderful form of deterrence. After that once the union was able to fire back that concentrated American minds wonderfully and when it became apparent that not only could they fall back but also fall back at the American mainland. Then the whole business of a strategy

which locked into nuclear escalation became very unattractive to the Americans and from that point on and this is what a flexible response debate started it was the Americans who did not want to get involved in the use of nuclear weapons. It is the Europeans who wanted to because they've reckoned that nothing but a threat to the Soviet homeland would deter the Soviet Union. They were not liable to be deterred just by the cost of fighting a conventional war in West Germany. So it was the Europeans that wanted the nuclear weapons and ever since then the position has been the same. The Americans have really tried to get off the hook of a strategy which involved an early use. They want a devil stronger conventional forces. They wanted us to have larger Alaniz and stocks all of the things which put off and the Europeans didn't actually want it. So ironically despite Mr Weinberg as. Public alarm the policy that the Labor Party moment is putting

forward of not having nuclear weapons based in Britain about increasing conventional forces is exactly what America's been asking for for 20 years. No not quite because what the Americans have wanted is always to have a nuclear weapons there in reserve they hold firm to the belief that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons and if you're going to deter Soviet nuclear weapons you've got to have some of your own and that is what the Labor Party misses totally. They would in effect have as there were seven nuclear weapons on the other side. But with number one and that's a very vulnerable very dangerous position. The Americans wouldn't agree to still. Just going back to the 50s won some stuff and it can flip. Some He's a journalist anything else or me in the army which you know usually as if he were in the same office what he was yes he was in essence yes and that was literally the reason to rise. This was the period of course the early 60s of the height of the

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at least until at least as to this resurgence in the late 70s. Was there any communication at all between those of you who were professionally concerned with defense nuclear matters and with the demonstrations outside the gates as it were. I don't think so. It was a very general movement. One was very aware of course of strong political figures in it who later on became members of the Labor government. And not forgetting there were quite a number of people in the services senior people who were inclined to vote Labor anyway at that time. But no there was absolutely no communication with CND as such. And then of course the various members of CND join the Labor government and in a way that put an end to the movement but also helped because in the period from about 66 notably in 1968 up to about 72. They were quite big arms control measures were taken. The nonproliferation treaty and salt one for example.

So they did see some arms control going on and the whole thing became questioned. But it really dispersed into the Labor government except for the brown bird and sandals were go to went off and did something else that we would talk a lot so for and he said that he sat down on one occasion quite early on this new 58 59 outside the gates of Aldermaston. And as he put it I became aware of this huge gulf that existed between the real world where I was and those people in there. Now you perceive you was in Iran. I would have seen it the other way. And with blind qualification the second because after all nuclear weapons was that there was no way one was ever going to get rid of them. The Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons and merely to talk about disbanding them like that was tried Google and that wasn't the real world atoll. Now I do share his view that

nuclear weapons well hopeful things and one should have to do something about them. But one's own personal feeling was as you couldn't get with all you have to learn to manage them and not merely walk and playing. They will go away. One last question do you think it's nice. Yeah. Oh well. Oh OK. We haven't talked at all because you were in the Army and later nater about the British nuclear deterrent to be bombers Clarus and so on. But to what extent do you think that for the defense of Europe from NATO point of view the British to talent was necessary. I think from a military point of view it will be hard to argue that the British independent deterrent was important to NATO's simply because a percentage of the

warheads it represented was so very very small. There were more than enough American warheads to look after us all together. And I've applied all the way down the line and of course at the bottom of the pile we actually relied on American wars in the battlefield nuclear weapons. Now I think the purpose of the Independent was always see the bottom line was it was to deter an attack on the this country. It wasn't really for NATO's purposes. So that excuse was often given. It was simply for the defense of a terrorism attack on this country and that of course was the logic behind the French one as well. Do you think that there was a growing doubts and reasonable growing doubts throughout this whole period that when it came to the crunch Washington would not be swapped for bar north of Paris or for London. I think inevitably that diety is always there is there today if the Soviet Union and the United States can each destroy the other one. And

regardless of which one fires first they can each destroy the other one then they've surely got a compelling wish not to go to war and an even more compelling reason not to go to war on behalf of somebody else. So it was always there. Now I should have added much earlier on that when the British nuclear weapon was first contemplated right at the end of the war then I don't think there are any doubts at all that any medium sized or major power would have to have nuclear weapons one simply felt that nuclear weapons are going to decide future wars. But that was rather political his thinking. And later one got out of that whole course H-bombs made it much less likely that wars would be fought in that sense at all than that is right. But the fact that a major power should not have a nuclear weapon seemed in those early days unthinkable. These were the weapons of the future. I remember thinking that you'd never mount a Normandy invasion again or something of that type because of one little nuclear weapon put in the middle would totally destroy it.

But as I said that was very undeveloped thinking.