Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with W. Averell (William Averell) Harriman, 1979 [Part 1 of 4]

Why was I the only source of many documents for example our attempts at accommodation rep. And a true reflection of the position like pedestrians crossing the street. They make allowances for the direction and momentum of the oncoming stream of other pedestrians that alter their own course to accommodate. There was also much that is left out of documents especially in a telephonic age. And finally statesmen today are so terribly conscious that historians will soon be along to pore over their documents and judge their actions that they are tempted to write the documents with this fact in mind. In attempting to serve all these several purposes one runs the danger of fully satisfying none but the advantages of a multiple approach seem worth the risk. And this book in consequence attempts to combine all three and part it is a theoretical study in political science. In part it is history. And in top. Yes. If you go to church like I said Churchill was for the maintenance of the

embassy. What you might say that might be worth saying even though yours. OK well why not say it's not that simple. Breaking up them how can you say when you're ready OK we're rolling now. OK Governor Harriman you were close to President Roosevelt during World War Two. What was his attitude toward the future of Indochina. Well I talked to president when President Roosevelt talked about Indochina on several occasions and one of the most dramatic was when he talked to Stalin about it and he

indicated that he didn't think the French should be allowed to go back in Indochina and Stalin hardly prove that. Then Rosell suggested that there be a trusteeship of the United Nations. Stalin didn't comment on that and agreed to the United Nations which is a great breakthrough. But on other occasions he mentions that he thought the French had done nothing for the Indo-Chinese and that they shouldn't be allowed to go back. In fact he sent word to the Pentagon by road by road who was in the army and then later on a vaster told me that he had been a staff officer and he saw a telegraph message come from Roseville to the army that they should not have anything to do with the surrender of the Japanese in Indo-China. But he never left any word with the State Department so no one understood just what his ideas were.

What do you think. Churchill's attitude was towards the situation in China. Well he didn't talk with Churchill about it because of course Churchill had made it very plain he wasn't for first break up of the empires. His usual wouldn't fit in. This was an understanding between rows of the style and you were the head of the Marshall Plan in Europe during the early 1950s. At that time we were giving France and France was fighting in Indochina or the French diverting American economic aid to Indochina. Well they were diverting their powers through mid 50s until we had the Korean War known as an assistant to first assistant to President Truman but I was quite unhappy about the fact that much of the aid that we were giving France was diverted because of this war in Indochina. Knowing Roosevelt position

and having accepted that as wise I took up with this Acheson secretary of state that we should think in Lisp and we ought to. Slow down helping the French and get them to reduce their commitments. I've got a good back. I think one of the few telegrams I ever got from the State Department they said Your job is in Europe not in the Far East. Well the fact that I didn't know anything about the very little he was trying to butter up the French at that time to get them to accept the arrangement by which the Germans could enter into the defense of Europe and he wanted to get their goodwill and he didn't want to raise this issue. So I was against this war as far back as

on the record as far back as forty nine. What was President Truman's attitude towards the French war and China mediately after it attacked him in Korea. He wanted to strengthen all the situation because he didn't know who was back of this. He thought the Chinese might be. He didn't step up but I think he accelerated to the French and we sent out to make sure that there were no difficulties but with the Chinese attacking. He also ordered the fleet to see that there was no way out of China. He wanted to protect all of all the world's flanks against possible action on the part of China.

Did you approve of President Truman's decision to send an American military mission. Well it wasn't a mission of course it was because we were trying to do everything we could to protect against Chinese activities with China it had to do with the problem of the war we were having in Korea. Could you. Looking back on the Eisenhower administration's policy towards East Asia What was your opinion that you were not in the administration of course but what was your view. Well I was very strongly present I was in opposition to what the three men Nixon Dulles and Brad Radford wanted to intervene even to the point of discussing the use of nuclear bombs to

put a stop to that he had met Ridgway advised that Ridgway very strongly against getting involved with the American troops and I thought Eisenhower's decision at that time against his very strong advisors was very wise. Did you ever discuss the situation in Asia with Eisenhower No. What about the move by the Eisenhower administration and Secretary of State Dulles to install yam as the head of the government in Saigon. What did you think of that I don't know that he installed it but what he did do which I was opposed to he took over. Responsibility which the French head for South Vietnam generally only was there attempting to deal with the situation that we found. I think you sound supportive. I think General Collins made a report indicating that he thought it was not a very good thing to do.

That's what they had anyway and that was the start of all the trouble if we hadn't intervened in south and south at that time and taken political economic and military responsibility for all of the difficulties in the future. Well could I ask. That was the beginning and I was opposed to it when Kennedy came in of course. He inherited the situation and was quite different in the situation in the beginning. Responsibilities. Looking back as maybe as a historian what would you what do you think might have been the alternative to our getting involved in South Vietnam as back as 954. Well I think we could have stayed out of stayed out of it. You know anybody who knew history knew that he was rather of an Asian type of Tito ist. He didn't want to be

dominated by anyone. Way back in Wilson's day. We had advisors with him during the war. They were quite friendly to America and all that information. Look part of the. Normal communist expansionist look blunders and the patriot that no one really didn't have any great feeling that we should get involved at that time in Vietnam. If the French wanted to continue to support anybody else in South Vietnam that they chose that was of course we were helping the French. It's one thing to help the French and quite another thing to take direct responsibility.

A governor now we're going to jump up to that period in 1968. We want to do it because Dan it's yours. That's right. So I'm going to jump ahead here. It's good all right. In the spring of 1968 you became the president's chief negotiator at the peace talks and pirates. What was it like negotiating with the Vietnamese. Well I want to say that I was the chief to go to but so was my partner. We work together as a team. He was everything we did we did together. And I've never had a more satisfactory relationship with him. But the discussions were very long drawn out or

frustrating. We required fantastic patients. There were two sets of discussions. You want me to go into detail here if you would what they were like. We had the plenary sessions which were formal. There were only between representatives One was his name and myself. I would he would start off with a statement each one of us would accuse the other of being the aggressor and of doing cruel and unnecessary and damaging actions the other side would would would we would always have a little after one had made a speech. The other side would criticize us briefly what the first man had said and then the second man would make his speech and then the first

would criticize that. The other man the south Lebanese oddly enough used to criticize my criticism of his speech so it turned out he always had the last word I didn't do it myself to a point of doing that so as to say I always give you the last word. These amounted to nothing they didn't get it either they were trying to make a little variety in them by getting news stories and stories of what some men had said they try to get some Senator's statement or something else from the United States not try to get some statements from other international sources. But then we began to have tea breaks between the two speeches. Coffee breaks rather. Those coffee breaks. It's one crazy. I used to sit down with us and myself and I think

still have the truck and then the military would get together and the staff would get together there would be three or four different groups would get together cause we talked for about half an hour. That began to loosen personal relationships. We we we we talk things of special interest. Good. The first. Real change came when. It's arranged with two halves of private trucks. They went to two private range house. Sometimes it was there some began to talk about things in a private way. But I want to say that from the standpoint of Washington we had a great of difficulty I think. I think it was the 8th of June

1968 there was a telegram came from. From Seguin to President Roosevelt President Johnson he said this was one of the phrases you use. And my colleagues believe and we have reason to believe that if you will stop all the bombing that productive talks will will will will solve. We came back for Bobby Kennedy's funeral which was I think it was jus thereabouts so we were in Washington when this telegram was being considered. We sent word from Paris that we could discuss it. We talked it over with the rest of the clocks if it was then secretary of defense and we strongly urged that it be accepted. We thought that was a very good idea the Russians should be involved and I had found

other dealings and the Russians were anxious to see the war stop. But there was a meeting with the president took a point of view that we didn't know and I think after talking to the president we didn't know enough about what was involved and talk to us and indicated that he thought we were accepted and that indicated who or who accepted but the president decided that he ought to have more information and social justice and Supreme Court I think and he was there at the meeting. He and Russ drafted a telegram. Which you couldn't take exception to because it asked sensible questions.

Although we were very much opposed to it there was nothing we could do. So these this telegram was sent and received and obviously took as an insult. But he didn't accept the word and that up to the last I think there was a loss of a very very great opportunity I think if we stopped all of that time we would have gotten down talks with the relationship which were beginning to establish at that time we might have made some very real progress. And as was shown later talks then excuse me do you recall anything that telegram sent back telling you what the detail was that detail was actually questions what did you mean what did you think would happen just what did you do talk about it. It was it was a carefully drawn league listing question and listed in its relationship not in terms of the human.

The motions of full back of all this. Then there was a lull in the fighting and the end of July early July and sent a telegram in July again. I guess it was in July saying that we thought that the signal had been given to us that they were ready to stop the fighting because of the low in the siding and we urge that we stop all the bombing just for the Democratic National Committee meeting. Of course if that happened that would have been accepted in the Democratic Party and you would would have been claimed and we would have won the election. But Johnson was afraid he would be considered a political move and I think turned it down because of political moves so that those true up to his will what will last. But then we went on with our talks and there was a senior

member of the Politburo from the noise. He was fifth or sixth rank in the hierarchy. He joined the talks. We began to have again have private talks with him and Swan tree. In September through September 7th. We used to have one of two in the plenary sessions where we used to have about two or three in the beginning and then we reduced it to I think to one and then we have a couple of private talks. Nobody knew those private talks never got in the press when we were. You can see a little some of them a very long one of them lasted nine hours. But we found finally found a breakthrough in relationship by these private talks.

Were demanding it wouldn't change any of this. But the United States should should stop the bombing and all other hostile acts against North Vietnam unconditionally. But then they indicated that first they said it would and later on as explained the Woodward will prompt him some language of the detail I think they used several different kinds of language but a series of talks were undertaken. We said no we're not going to talk about the unconditional stopping of United States bombing and all out against you. But we have a right to know the circumstances and conditions which would would which would be

true which would surround the these these chalks. I think there was one time for productive talks serious talks. And we wanted to get to deafen we wanted to we asked and they accept the fact it was reasonable for us to ask the question of what the what the circumstances would be what the position of the situation would be in order to to have these talks productive or serious. We we took this we took the strong position with already from Washington. There should be no fighting in or around the deer through the DMZ and no attacks on Saigon on the big cities. We didn't think they could be productive trucks when there were and there were conversations that time and

we also insisted that the government of South Vietnam be the be present. Governor as as you saw at the time what was the real policy of the United States. What do we really want. At the end the president wanted to get the talks started in these October talks he showed every disposition of wanting to get the talks starting. We we we we had some very long talks because he wanted to talk of every detail we thought we had an agreement and they wanted to have an agreed upon minute and would very difficult for us to have agreed upon minute we'd argue about what was our objective. But what was our ultimate objective. We want to have. We wanted to have what was what we would system is that there should be no fighting in and around the across the DMZ or no attacks on the big cities and that the government of South

Vietnam should be present in trucks and their route of that. But on the other hand the south or at least government present cheer began to make trouble and it seemed very obvious that he was trying to delay the talks and of the bombing of these talks until after the election. If this story is mad I'm sure it wasn't if it wasn't the best to hear sent word to Saigon that they'd have a better chance with you or continue with Nixon than with but then with Humphrey unsatisfied they delayed us and put in roadblocks. And so finally President Johnson. On the thirty first of December ordered the stopping of all the bombing to take effect the first of November. This was done without the approval. Oh dear.

That was so close to election that it had some effect. But nothing like the effect it would have had to be made to come to that agreement which I think we probably would have a week earlier if it hadn't been for the intervention of the self that we could have sat down then and had some serious talks. After that when Nixon was was was elected we had all this difficulty in the shape of the table I'll tell you about that if you want to. Well the whole argument all over the period had been what was the relationship between the four parties which would take. Pause in the discussion these discussions that would

be easy. She sells the south side and the NLF the National Liberation Front which was D.C. as we call them the other. So we got the idea of calling it our side your side. They wanted to call it for party conference because they wanted to build up and I left. We didn't want to raise them as a government that these were government talks. We couldn't read them and we had a great deal of difficulty. We wanted to have a two sided table. They wanted to have a round table. South at least we're very strong for this. We were ready to accept a round table on the basis of people sitting at the table didn't have any position. But they said that if it was a round table each one were

equal and they wouldn't stand for it. So we had an endless discussion about whether it should be a round table or oval table or a two sided table. The issue was the radiation of the status of the NLF people made fun of it. But it wasn't it was a very major issue particularly for the South unease. The interesting thing was that the Russian embassy helped us all through this period they helped us get some of these decisions. There was a devotee due to the investor by the name of the rent of a rent coal a great big square Russian. He really dealt with the North days when he thought they were making the state he was the one that finally broke the ice we agreed on having. To have round tables with a

with a space between them and the question was how wide that space would be. I think someone suggested the Big enough for Mr over uncoachable to go through what was quite a little space and then there were two tables to be opposite each other. These open spaces with papers on it so as to make it look as little as possible as a division. But on that basis we agreed on that basis. We left it for the Nixon administration in January to take over with an agreement reached. These four parties should start peace negotiations and but we never had any talks that time because I think in that period itself it will store. And part of it to make this fuss about this table was to say to

the leg of the L action until the next administration took took over. So we never had a serious talk. We never were able to get down to. I was naturally very keen to find out what their attitude was and as every other questions we had some inkling of some of their thoughts. Just to go back to a question I asked before. In your mind what President Johnson wanted you want to have to have a neutral sound What was his ultimate objective. Never no never never discussed that but he was ready to have satisfied everyone realized that there had to be some sort of a neutral. But as I've told you other questions there was indication that the North accepted

given the chance to develop itself. I know in Algeria where they had quite a big delegation certainly the Algerians told me that they spoke of the fact that there was no hurry of the north in the south. It might take five years and 10 years to two two to happen. No one quite knows as I was concerned. I wanted to see people have a chance to have a political chance won't be able to. The military situation wasn't satisfactory. I wanted to see them have a little chance so I was rather I was rather for them. I've I've told you in so many of the questions which I saw about the

different indications that I'd had of the situation so that these questions of the house of the four what did you how did you find people when you were private sessions as individuals. What kind of pressure. Well they were human beings very tough very determined. They wanted to be very independent as the Russians wanted to see the war over with. The Chinese wanted to see it continue. They were under some influence from the Chinese but they wanted to be independent of the Chinese or want to be independent. Everybody is closest thing to an Asian type of Tito vs. existed and you wanted to be independent. We got talking about their problems and they got very interested in the kinds of things that we would bring up like the miracle of rice and Miracle Wheat which would grow very much more. And I said you know to get peace we can work together

for this sandwich but it would be to work together for peaceful. There were human beings that wanted to see their country develop but they were very strong communists and a very strong in the development of the life of of the North independently of of Chinese domination. Governor before the peace talks started in Paris are you engaged in various peace missions for the Johnson administration. Which was the one that you considered the most serious. Well I think one of the most serious and attempts to get peace negotiation going was that was undertaken by the Rumanians. In 1967 I had gone to Pakistan for the opening of one of the Great on the Indus River and I came back and stopped it.

So Tito and then I went to remain You went there because the prime minister of India Mr. Mauer had been wanted to find out what he had to say. They treated me very well they gave me a private house to live in my party and we had a couple of days of real solid talks. There was a deputy. Sorry minister who who really took a lot of luck with his name. He took very special interest in this. I've sold instantly as to who was who gave me quite a scolding over the war he thought we were absolutely wrong in the war but was ready to help help us get out. They sent their level best

to Hanoi twice they sent in once to find out about the situation and they came to see us so you could see me and in Washington. Really I think that down to December 1967 YOU CAME FIRST earlier than that and I think and then went back. He was one of the best negotiators I've ever dealt with. He was very very straight and told me the difficulties as well as the good ones. He was one of those that carried the message that they had changed the words. If we stopped all the bombing all of the hostilities. Discussions might take place too. Discussions will take place but he was not successful because we did not stop the bombing and unfortunately while he was there there was some heavy bombing and he had to admit that he was not able

to get an agreement but I think he did a lot of good and I think his work contributed. He was one of the most useful of those a negotiated and persuading them that they ought to start talks and I think he may well have had some influence on them to accept the Johnson proposal which he made in that famous speech and March when he when he announced he wasn't going to be run for the presidency said he'd stop the bombing. In the northern part only limited to bombing the net can i didn't think they'd accept that but they did accept that. So I was very grateful to him for that. I was very grateful for the Rumanians for that and of course as I've explained before as were a group of the poles for what they did. Governor one looks back on that whole period. Your search for settlement and peace. Sometimes there were

periods when you were negotiating and when stopping the bombing was crucial and yet the bombing was not stopped. Was there a lack of coordination here in the administration in Washington. Well that gets into the let's get one of the other question which you've already asked me. I'm sorry I'm sorry. That question gets into one of the other questions of your you have already asked me that the marigold question you want to go back and I thought we'd agreed to do that later but I thought she just left a question about Humphrey. Oh yeah ok. Do you think that you would Humphrey would have withdrawn from Vietnam had he been elected. I'm absolutely certain that he would have. I remember talking to the television and he followed me

when I was down there making a speech and you both were on the local television and I said I was satisfied that somebody would have pointed the ball Klock secretary of state and we would have gotten out of the both of them a lot of the war he said. The ricin that he'd made up his mind he was going to put it up it was very slim and definite and he was going to stick to the center of the fence and leave me in Paris the three of us were determined to get out. I think we could have had a responsible settlement when we had 500000 troops. I thought the idea developed that we could make a settlement after we'd taken all of our troops out. Just didn't make any sense. As you know Nixon administration continued the war for three years 40 percent of our

men killed killed on the out of that period and we try to make a settlement after we supposedly have the war time to have made a settlement was when we had the 500000 troops that will satisfy that we could have made a deal of some kind and I know that was determined to get out. Humphrey Filled with me picked him because of the skill and the determination to get out of the war. So there's no question in my mind that Humphrey would have gotten out of the war and 69 if you would on some basis what basis I can tell. I will always want to do. I never spoke about an honorable settlement. It was no honor in this situation. But I want to I want to see a responsible settlement which I personally thought was of some sort of either neutral south or independent for a period of years and then would we would have to leave the future to

what what happened in Britain was to give the people that we've been supporting a political opportunity they hadn't had a military that we were going to take away the military operation because it was not successful. But you know the political of children in President Johnson resent him for his attitude toward war. Well I think he did but it was rather cautious to campaign rather more cautious than I hoped he would be. I was thinking about resigning and going back and trying to help him but then when George Ball resigned. I thought I was more use in Paris which I think showed it was with goods you could stop the bombing start of the gauche ations of which we could have done if we'd had some cooperation from the government. But. Johnson was always a member of the Salt Lake speech which was rather mild.

He was always afraid that Humphrey would do. Say something which was to zation he'd taken in the camp. And remember he forced the vote in the convention in August 1968. There had been an agreement reached. I was told by the chairman of the Rules Committee of whom there was a platform committee. That there had been agreement reached for a compromise which should have the initials D R and the rest obviously Johnson wouldn't take that he wanted to have a strong resolution and that's what upset the whole campaign. Number was put to a vote and he got 60 percent. Some thought but there was thought of dissent of position because that's what beat him for years if it had.

If Johnson had accepted this compromise resolution of which which I had been accepted by all the leaders well we would have you swum through. Remember I'm for it was very much in the polls very much ahead with all the convention. Now that he was behind affluence but he began to pick up again and MEMBER He wasn't beaten very much so that the. That really is war with history. That's the key to it. Unfortunately Humphrey was in the position he needed the money from Texas which Johnson controlled money was very hard to get and didn't want to have Johnson come out against him. I don't know what chances feelings were very great emotion about about the war but his feelings about the war and about the Great Society was a great tragedy.

Johnson got him in this war because his Great Society programs programs and present was that what you thought Johnson's attitudes towards. But we've covered that by a good many of the questions that we've already discussed but summing it up. My belief was that his principal interest in life was the Great Society. He had been and President Johnson became President Roosevelt. He wanted to complete the unfinished business of the New Deal and develop some of his own ideas. No country great and all of the programs that were so in that necessary

civil rights program of cation program he was most proud of and so forth but he inherited this war. Unfortunately he didn't know how to handle it he didn't know much about it he hadn't had much to do with it. He was advised by some of his friends who are in this situation no presence of a lost war you cannot afford to lose a war. And then he divided the group of advisors within his administration. So he was and I'm happy with this and it's a great tragedy that he got involved in this war. He wanted to stop it and yet he wanted to too. He wanted to achieve the objectives of giving itself that protection. He wanted to get out. Let's let's go back and pick up from earlier

by the way the view for people got in there to say above what I said. OK.