War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Harold Brown, 1987 [1]

Once you took over as chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission what was the policy of the country at that time. Well our first priority was to harness nuclear energy for our development and on the political side we wanted to ensure. That. Nuclear weapons did Knox and. The subcontinent. Just. Again if you think this is that you want to just say just continue like OK when you took over as chairman. How would you describe Pakistan's nuclear policy at that stage. Our nuclear policy was to harness atomic energy as quickly as possible for our development and at the same time to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes. That is right. In November 1972 while inaugurating did Christ a nuclear power. The then president Mr Bhutto announced that Pakistan wanted to establish a nuclear free zone

in South Asia to debar the entry of nuclear weapons and as a private. Q That's even slightly different prior. To. That. Change of writing OK. Could you describe for me how Mr Bush what his views were on the utility of nuclear weapons about stage on the board what the policy was as regards the use of nuclear energy. Yes the policy to guide the use of nuclear energy use only nuclear energy for power. How was your commitment to that time I would OK a policy in 1970 the tool was to focus on development

and mystically and regionally. We want to take the area to be free of nuclear weapons. That is right at the inauguration of the Iraqi nuclear power plan. The president of Pakistan of that time made a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in cyberspace. In 1974 when the Indian peaceful nuclear device I would reaction was that of shock. But not complete surprise because we knew of the growing give ability of India and also the pronouncements of various Indian leaders with regard to acquiring capability of developing nuclear weapons.

I'll go with that again. Our reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion was that of a complete shock but not surprise. Because judging from the pronouncement in the 60s we felt that India would explode a nuclear device because at the 1971 Geneva conference. It was announced by the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission that India was interested in peaceful nuclear explosions. This public announcement was ignored by the supreme powers and if they had taken it seriously they could

have done something before starting. The impact. Of that explosion was tremendous both internationally and reached the nuclear energy it was in a state of shock. From which it has not recovered so far. It was a tremendous setback for nuclear energy for the world. It was considered as a breach of faith. And trust because India had received assistance from Canada on the understanding. That it would not be used for exploding it located right. So an era. Of mistrust began after that explosion. This terrible shuffle as we try to make it a little easier. What did the India

how did the Indian explosion affect the international nuclear energy programs as a whole how did on the part. I think I keep my ears desk perfect. What was the explosion of India's nuclear explosion. Had it tremendous negative impact on the development of nuclear energy throughout the world. It spoiled that relationship of trust with existed between the splatter and the recipient state. It.

Resulted in the true suspicion and the supplier States started and locked in a policy of denial. I do that already. You watch every other minute or do one minute you want a lot of the dark side but let it go. India's nuclear explosion was a tremendous setback for international cooperation in nuclear energy and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The world. Was shocked to see that India broke the trust of a supplier state like that. And then the suppliers state started on a policy

of denial and non cooperation which made the recipe and country feel insecure just days. OK as chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission of the time that I didn't get it. How did you receive the news of that DNA test what did you think about that. I mean if you were in the program what effect. And the chairman of the Neanderthal McNary commission of us shocked to get the news of the nuclear test. Oh you're. OK. I did not cut any of this and let's just say what was your reaction to the news of the Indian Test. Oh. No. OK.

And the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic a commission I was shocked at the News of the Indian nuclear test. We knew. That India could explode a nuclear device. But we talked India would never go that far. It was a tremendous setback. Look here throughout the world and also it had a far reaching impact regionally. How do you think you know what gets done. Let's begin with the stations just for you. The Indian nuclear test had a strong and negative impact on our program. Because the supplier States thereafter as a negative on existing agreements cut off

nuclear supplies even for our safeguarded nuclear facilities and our program slowed down. This is the sort of probably they didn't think that they made a statement that it was a piece by you to define just what you understood you know. How did you react to that. And you said that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion but the message that it be received was that it was a demonstration of capability. To manufacture. A nuclear weapon and they ordered the situation as far as this region or west side.

We felt very insecure. That's the kind of also you want to know. OK. Now in the early 70s. You I think you're rather preoccupied at the time with this with trying to acquire reprocessing. Could you describe why and how Pakistan needed reprocessing facilities. Thank you. I think I'll start with the need for us. In 19 in 19. In 1972 we invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to analyze

the requirements for nuclear power in Pakistan and prepared a master plan for us. This was completed in two years and it indicated that Pakistan being very short of convention energy resources needed more than 10000 megawatts of nuclear. Power capacity by the year 2000. So we had to get prepared for that not only in terms of building or acquiring nuclear power plants but also basic Realty in the nuclear fuel cycle. So our motivation in. Negotiating. For a reprocessing plant was. To have. A basic measure of self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle. This reprocessing plant are

the last to be under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency believe Dr. Kissinger was trying to reach an understanding you had with a multinational replace the thing into what is this. And he tried to stop it at multinational he began to look at this. No no that was a different move. OK he said to stop the reprocessing. Block. What do you think could just be an action. Now first. First we can amend the reaction of the United States say OK it just didn't want to happen. The project I should be in the Franco Pakistan project

for the construction of a reprocessing plant in Pakistan was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors in February. Nineteen seventy six when it tried that agreement was concluded. Although the board supported it. The agency approved it and the project was placed under former agency guards. The United States did not approve of this project. In August 1976 Dr. Kissinger. With Egypt Pakistan and demanding that Pakistan. Abundant this

project and warned us of dire consequences if he continued with it. But this is sort of the one big joke you just never again documented. OK OK I'll make it very clear that despite the least of it is I just have one thought. The only project for the construction of the reprocessing plant was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency in February 1976 and the save guards agreement was concluded in March 1976. In spite of the fact that this plan was to be completely

safeguarded by the i.e.. The United States did not. Approve of this project. The United States felt that there was it broadly Federation risk involved in letting Aug. 19 76. Dr. Kissinger Richard Pakistan and demanded that we abandon this project and warned us of dire consequences if we persisted in the construction of this. But the government of Pakistan rejected that made by Dr. Kissinger and decided to continue with the project. However the pressures on Fras were equally great. In

December 1976 president for our president just disdain not to supply the PLA to practice. And that was the turning point as far as the from Pakistan reprocessing plant project was concerned because there after France decided not to go ahead with the project. And some of the criticism leveled at Pakistan is still very much to do with the size of this commercial. They visit commissions every persons thing planned and I think people have said that the people of Pakistan have made films from the reprocessing. We post plutonium could you just explain why that wasn't in your minds at the time. This leaves us is an old blockhead been misused

for non-peaceful purposes because this was under i.e. if God so was a Karachi nuclear power and so were the other power reactors blank to be elected in Pakistan. So the contention that this constituted a proliferation risk is on deck. Pakistan without getting into the attack. Why do you need such logic. This was a small reprocessing plant capable of reprocessing fuel. From for power reactors. And we were planning a number of power reactors at that time with one reactor in operation

and other reactors on the drawing board. How did Canada's decision following the Indian extinction How did that decision to withdraw assistance to Pakistan affect the program. Are you feeling less of it. I think you are yes because but I CAPELLI point is another to yet another. And of the turning point in our program was the unilateral decision by Canada to abrogate the bilateral cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This decision was announced by Canada. In December. I know you said just the opposite. OK. OK. Shell a combined these two three things. For instance the

atmosphere in seventy seven Lexus have a DC at the atmosphere and 76 and ourselves. Yes yes I think I think I think. So.