thumbnail of War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Pipes, 1986
Transcript
Hide -
This transcript was received from a third party and/or generated by a computer. Its accuracy has not been verified. If this transcript has significant errors that should be corrected, let us know, so we can add it to FIX IT+.
That's about it. You wrote a paper for the Committee of the present danger in April 1977 and one of the Soviet Union. What do you feel they were. Well the principal theme of that. Document and everything else evident as Soviet Union is that the Soviet Union basically strives for global hegemony and uses the great variety of instrumentalities that is a great strategy around strategy including military but also political economic psychological and so on. So that the objectives of the Soviet Union not the town's instability but destabilization. And world had Germany. France well dominated Germany is a better word because you can exercise hegemony without actually dominating you know the end Germany can be in direct rule. Now Britain Britain or it was a huge ammonia power in the 19th century. We were right after World War 2 we didn't dominate the world but our our world counter the great deal.
What we know about grand a grand strategy is the employment of a great variety of means political. Economic and psychological. As well as military. For the attainment of ultimate political objectives. It is different from normal military strategy which employs only military tools. So Tarion state like the Soviet Union can do and employ all its means for example when the Soviet Union. Uses economic inducements to get its political ways by offering contracts to a country which is to get together to swing certain ways or when it can organize or threaten to organize strikes in a given country in order to have the country issued credits or to give it technology that is the employment of economic means for. Grand Strategy. And sense of it's the
sort of thing that very difficult for us to understand because you can only have it in a dictatorship with time to time start to reason is not an objective it's a means it's. The grand strategy is not an objective and the objective is a Gemini. Or if you will global domination. Grand Strategy is a means towards that objective. Some people say that. You know there's a power vacuum some way this over. So it was sort of opportunistically you know Philip. How do you know when say the Soviets are or directly or with or against a country like Angola or whether this is just opportunism or if it's part of a global design. Well there is no obvious link but in the first place it is not true that the Soviet Union will fill any vacuum in the world they choose their
targets rather carefully because they have limited resources. So for example when Mozambique got into deep economic trouble not long ago and turned to the Soviet Union for an admission to the Comic-Con and the East European Soviet economic not so what you rejected. Because you didn't think Muslim beak was a worthwhile objective. And Mozambique then turned to South Africa and to the United States. In Chile for example the Soviet Union did not make a really great effort to save. I and this government didn't think she was worth it. And you know over Jamaica for example they didn't think critically worthwhile. So they don't grab anything they grab things which I for one reason other important strategically important economically important regionally important to surround South Africa you know
what I'm going to definitely but I'm going to self-sustaining Thanks to our oil well the oil we pump the oil cover is something like 70 percent of Angola's budget. So in a sense all they have to pay for is the Cuban mercenaries. But it's not a great expense to them. Mozambique is a is a bottomless hole without any resources talk to kill us. The anti Marxist guerrillas controlled part of the country they disrupt traffic and so on. So then they looked at and said it isn't worth it is worth it. So you know it's a cost effectiveness. It's not an imperialism the simply moves every where they calculate they miscalculated in Afghanistan they thought they can take Afghanistan very quickly. They can't get it in six months at there at the most and they count on the kind of resistance encountered. I think if they could roll the clock back and find a normal with it. So what is it now seven years after the invasion they still cannot conquer the country they might have decided not to do it.
What role they play. One goal is a stepping stone of India. Which they would like to control. And there may be a very profound effect on the security of South Africa. And they definitely would like to destabilize South Africa. For obvious reasons I'm going to South Africa's extremely rich mineral rich country. The European continent Western Europe heavily depends on South African minerals. Secondly they call it the control of regimes friendly to them control South Africa they have monopoly on a number virtual monopoly on a number of key minerals platinum Chrome. If they control South Africa we would have to purchase all our platinum and chrome from the Soviet Union. That's very nice market control. What about the corner that
you see this. Well it's also very important because the bulk of the maritime trade in in petroleum goes by the Horn of Africa. These huge tankers can of course was was going out so they travel around Africa. If you look at the map and you see that the heaviest traffic of oil tankers that travels around Africa. So that gives them again a very strategic position of being able to drop the traffic in case of war. Yes I think that China is most well in the china civil uses. I think the principal use of in the china is to be able to encircle China from the south. It becomes a base for the Soviet Union against China. The second utility of it is that the naval
bases in China make it possible to disrupt traffic maritime traffic going to Japan through the Straits of Malacca. So we give them again a stranglehold on maritime routes. They're very conscious of the fact. And they describe it in their manuals strategic manuals as they control the land mass. Their opponents are a sentry strung out around along the rim of the of them and then amass and have to heavily reliant maritime routes so they were very keen interest in being in a position to disrupt maritime routes. So that is their interest to have interest in Cuba because by controlling Cuba they could in case of any hostilities disrupt a great deal of our traffic we have a lot of traffic and commercial traffic going through these routes during the war of German submarines. Right a lot of havoc in that in that region. They could the same do the same thing in South Africa and the same thing in Southeast Asia. Not to mention of course the North Atlantic which is key.
In one of your papers clearly about strategic opportunism doesn't. Preclude a grand marshal showmen describes your visit you go to something and you spoke to them very clearly rather than I think if you read Soviet internal writings on this subject. They make it very clear they have a grand strategy didn't just grab things they grab things attribute to Lety. I quote in my book for example a statement made by somewhat of a knight in 1955 when he was still in good standing with the establishment he heard a lecture by high Soviet official explaining why the Soviet Union is giving military systems to Egypt because that's when the so you begin to penetrate the area. And this official said that the reason we're doing it because Egypt gives us access to the oil resources.
And through control of oil we can exercise leverage over Europe and this grand strategy. You push in one way to get facts in another. This is just playing is not poker playing. And I think Americans are not greatest players and they think of poker. The Russians when they take land when they when they exert influence when they give foreign aid or so on and support terrorist activities they do so certain objective in mind and not just scatter the resources globally there's a lot of Soviet literature on the subject. Which one has to read to appreciate it. Books have recently come out written by some experts who say you know we have to really limit our resources because we have just so much money and we can scatter our resources over the globe. We have to pick our allies in the third world very carefully. But in terms of. US policy what difference does it make whether you believe the Soviet one intention. Secretary Vance.
This was a problem. I thought it was more of a world wide. Well I mean let's look a problem Ethiopia they are massacring hundreds of thousands of people they're starving them to death. What kind of problem is it for us to solve. They march into Theo they are transplanting hundreds of thousands of farmers from their traditional homes because they all offer resistance to Marxism into other areas and and hundreds of thousands are dying or about to die. How can one say this is something that isn't some kind of a social economic problem it isn't Decorah the Marxism is the problem they're creating it. Ethiopia was always a very poor country. One of the poorest but it isn't what caused what caused the communist to get in there any more than Afghanistan's poverty and anything to come is coming that I think is very naive to think
this way. What's the relationship between the Soviet military as well the military power of course is a key element in Rand's strategy is not the only one as a key element because ultimately the Soviet Union expands through military power either directly or more often indirectly by selling weapons providing weapons providing a strong military instruction by backing government governments and so on and by intimidating through the use of threat nuclear threat. So they're just administrate military weapons I key element of that strategy. The Soviet military build up their weapons in this manner. Well I think they tell us what it meant. We don't have to guess. They have decided after giving the matter a grade of thought in the 50s after sun is that they have decided that UK weapons are the decisive weapons of modern warfare
and that if there's going to be another world war these weapons we decide who wins. Therefore they have developed a dual strategy for nuclear weapons one is offensive the other is defensive often sieve. They have developed a very large first strike force a land based with very heavy throw throw weight and huge fields which in the event of war approaching war would destroy the bulk of our power. And then they have a lot of attention to differences. That is hardening their silos hardening their communications. Providing for shelters for the leadership evacuation programs. Well it's civil defense. Then several levels. One kind for the leadership another for the masses. And very intensive work on strategic defenses.
What is it that's whether they don't believe in mutual destruction that is they don't they believe in that if war breaks out you have to fight it. And protecting yourself from any retaliation is a very important factor of it. In fact there are people in the Pentagon who estimate they spend as much on defense as an as an office and very major effort. Well they have they have the only working system in the world the only the anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow. You really think the Soviets don't want war. Well they don't want to walk up the hill or don't want to either. Of course the aggressor always wants peace. It's war is always imposed on the and the victim. Do you think they placed a high premium. I think they are seeking nuclear superiority. Certainly you don't get it by accident. They have it and they sought it.
How else do you get it. It's like asking whether Hitler wanted superiority in tanks in 1940. He very deliberately wanted to because he believed the tanks would be decisive weapons the war built tanks tanks airplanes and he won. But is it Perry already in an exchange. Victoria's already in that perception of power. Well I think it's both one doesn't preclude the other. You've got questions about it so. Well I think that you use it both for purposes psychological intimidation and for purposes of effective fighting if washer break up. So that is to say the enormous nuclear power which the process tends to intimidate particularly Europeans. But it also would serve for military purposes if war should break out. I mean they have very deliberate plans for a nuclear war.
What. Date to this. To turn to to the Soviet Union meant that they have good commercial relations with the West. They're very important for them to get credits. Technology and so on building a factories in the South you know and did a lot of this did occur under the town. While they can go on basically and do what they want in terms of military build up ideological warfare and expansion the Third World. These were the these were the terms they lay down. Again it's not a question I think they said so not exactly in those words they use more. You know code language but that's what's what they meant. We will we will maintain stable relations with the United States and its allies but we insist on building up towards nuclear superiority. We insist on being able to wage ideological warfare which is basically hate campaigns against the West and insist on being able to support all kinds of revolutionary movements pro-Soviet movements in the Third World.
Time for us to try me. That's correct because the talent Well we really believe you know we we believe in world stability and getting on with the business of life which for us is isolation of property in pursuit of happiness. Not for them. So for us the town was really an end in itself as you say. And for them it was a tactical device. It's not the first time they use it they used they used the same concept or not exactly the same term. In 1919 20s when they talked about peaceful coexistence but only as a tactical device. The Soviets fear what they were doing that they were just building up to parity in the 60s. No it was simply factually incorrect because it is generally
accepted by 1969 they achieve parity nuclear parity in terms of destructive power warheads and so on. Anything they did after 69 because we pretty much froze our forces in the 70s. Anything they did give them the interest superiority which we only began to realize by the late 70s. We were so convinced that nobody would strife when you cross a priori to succumb to dogma. In the United States Kissinger expressed you know would you do support it. He later recanted he now has different UN at that time that's what he believed. So we just didn't believe our eyes. And at that time they would tell us in the early 70s what they were doing it because they have China on their on their mind. So they have two enemies. But the obvious it wasn't that was not the reason. They they actually have parity by 69 and everything they built after that was meant for superiority. They always talk about defensive defenses because they have great memories of
people and that makes it doesn't they are the largest country in the world or not. How do you become the largest country in the world by being constantly attacked. This is a myth. They are the most aggressive power in the world and they have been for a long time. They have waged wars of conquest from the 14th century on the fourteenth century Russia was as big as Belgium is today and that today they are the largest state in the world they've already well the largest in the world in the seventeenth century. It is for conquest. It's true there was an invasion a porn mission by Hitler. But how many times did they invade other countries Poland for example they partitioned destroyed in the eighteenth century together with Austria Prussia they were constantly itching to destroy the Ottoman Empire they conquered territories from Sweden and from the Persians from the Turks from the Chinese huge territories. That's what made them so large
so this is a mythology. They think such tactics. You know I was talking to drugs. Why do they work so well. They like arms control in general and without specifying or sold one soul to sell three year starter What have you. They like them because. For one when you start discussing arms control Democratic legislators are loath to fund weapons programs because they feel you can negotiate them away in arms control. So they've used that very effectively for the purpose of influencing our Congress to say well let's wait. You know why must we fund this let's wait to see what we can negotiate with. Secondly they have very clear notions of what their needs are and they come into these
meetings asserting their own needs getting them getting them pinned down legitimized and at the same time we don't have a very clear notion of what we want. So they they can for example have a say gry that we will not develop certain weapons system which they have been sold to. We agree not to build heavy missiles. US which is which they have the SS 18. We get a monopoly on that. They very effectively limited in the protocols to Seoul to the deployment of cruise missiles and so on which they were afraid the ABM Treaty is a classic example. They are proceeding with anti-ballistic missile defenses in a in a very big way in the 60s. And when we started doing that they suddenly realized that our technology is more advanced. When they refused to agree to limiting domestic missile defenses until the Congress voted with a slender small majorities and
Senate majority one to fund our own ABM program immediately they agreed to limit it so you know it is that's how they use. They always use arms control one eye on public opinion especially and the legislature in the United States. Do you think I'm struck to free superiority and to inhibit development of certain American systems. Because it because if you have a first strike strategy you have to know what what you're facing and saying so they want to be very clear as to what they face and then to freeze their arms control agreements freeze our forces. We can calculate what you need. This is the problem with their problem with the president's strategic defense system because. They're not certain just how many of their WHAT HAS would get through. And the full
calculation of a strike becomes very difficult almost impossible. Prevention for work starts with the center piece for us. So we get things that make sense. No it doesn't make sense for a variety of reasons. One is that you don't blow yourself up even if you don't have the arms control agreements I mean we haven't had an arms control agreement for years we haven't known each other. Mr want to believe that when you have an agreement like this he's a lawyer by profession and he thinks you can agreement like that that prevent you from shooting at each other but we know we don't have to have an arms control agreement not to show that he shot them because we know in both size how destructive these weapons are. And so that's the first fallacy The second fallacy is with the Soviet Union doesn't attach any quite the same importance to arms control that Mr working Mr. Manston do. They don't even have an arms control and examine agency. Their arms control effort is entirely dictated by the military. And in their literature of which I'm reasonably familiar with
the issue arms control is almost the strategic literature plays almost no role. You know it's not that far from being a centerpiece not even on the periphery of their considerations. It's Putin acting. All these talks are just it is pure tactics or arms control negotiations for them attacked us or have been so far to it. What I've just said so it's a way of inhibiting weapons developments on our side. There's a lot of discussion during the Carter years about whether or not we should like to talk this behavior around the world. Do they worry about the same question. No I think they would be perfectly happy to control because it serves their purposes. And without individual and they have never allowed it to inhibit special talks I mean we were you know in Vietnam and fighting their allies. And when we agreed to. So they have allowed that to inhibit because they see such
enormous benefits from it for themselves that it's almost irrelevant what we do. They would still want them on their own terms that is. If you take what does this mean for the US or with us as we consider a new person. Well that strategy does not just comprise nuclear weapons nuclear weapons one element in it. First of all let me say that it is very difficult for democracy to conduct a grand strategy because our executive does not control the media does not control the economy and science before. So we can't really conduct a grand strategy but we should know that they do. And until you know that you can't really conduct a skillful counter strategy even without it within our terms. But if you're talking about nuclear strategy that is you have to realize what they are very serious about the
use of nuclear weapons. That means you have to maintain parity at all times and you have to to the extent it is technically feasible develop defenses because we inhibit a first strike. If we succeed in developing a good SDI system. The Soviet nuclear arsenal would become a deterrent Arsenal retaliatory arsenal and not a for a strike force. And that's very desirable I think. But it does if we think that they're going to seek superiority in a first rate capability then we should seek superiority universe but you know you don't need to I think parity is enough. I mean superiority presumes a bit do you in that you stay frozen. I think we should keep up with them and no point allow them to think that they could win a nuclear war. What does what do your views dictate for talks with Marshall Sherman says the
people who think the way you think the logical extension is that you simply can't do business with the Soviet negotiations. You mean I'm controlling general control. I mean they look entirely you have to realize this question of what I think is what the facts tell you. We have lot of experience after all. I mean we know do you know an unknown quantity. We know for example that they have been dead set on a long against on site inspection. We also know that EX-PRES believe that without on site inspection control agreements and utterly verifiable and let's assume these are facts. Well I was saved these are facts and you can also say the Russians are not really serious of an arms control because we cannot take them on their faith that they are conducting tests of a certain within certain limits and so on. So it isn't. I'm not I'm not saying that they are not possible the arms control agreement
Sirus agreements with them but so far they have not been possible because some of the basic elements have been missing. So can we risk the security of this nation and trusting Soviet leaders. They don't have such a good record. You know they are not controlled by my free press by legislators at home by public opinion. They can almost anything they want. We have to verification for example. You can make deals with them provided you know what the deals are. If you realize that you cannot have eternal peace with this particular system you can still have some very good agreements but you have to enter into them of open eyes and not be naive about it. What was your thinking in the late 70s about the consequences if you were rejected. You see this is a great catastrophe. On the contrary I work very actively to have to reject it. I had lectured around the country
against So tonight John to comment on the present danger which was very much against it. So far from it I have welcomed. I welcome the demise of so to President Carter said time and time again that we live in a secure world but without being insecure and more dangerous doesn't mean more dangerous as it is is now Mr. and Mr. Carter left office six years ago. And I don't see is any more dangerous and with than it was then is it. I think it's a myth somehow that these pieces of paper assigned to the Soviet Union make us more secure they don't. But the military plan our military planners said that they could live with it because at least it gives them an indication of what they have to bear against the limit. Is the defense responsible for security. Well I don't know what was in the mind of sector defense but it seems to me the sexual defense
cannot disagree with this president can he. And certainly not and neither can the chiefs of staff. They have to agree or they have to resign where one member did resign general round he resigned and went into open attack against Assad too. There were some others but clearly the president who picked those people would agree with him. It has no. So you know if if you mean to say that anytime the Pentagon agrees with the president the Pentagon is right then you have to agree to the same thing with Mr. Weinberger who thinks just the opposite of what Mr. Brown thought. But I don't you know every president picks people who are in accord with him who follow his policies. Didn't you feel this would just unleash more of an arms race. You know I don't think so I. And it hasn't happened in effect. I mean I don't know Simister
want his view. Mr want you on the one hand believes that we have such an accumulation of nuclear weapons in the world that we are ready to blow each other up 20 or 30 times and then he believes unless you limit this the world is a more dangerous place. Know what I mean 50 times more dangerous and 30 times of couple it to blow yourself up. Makes no sense. So if indeed his presumption is premises right there that the world has a 2030 I don't know how many times more weapons we need to blow it up it really doesn't matter what the Soviet Union does how many more weapons does it. So we have people of hundred times to destroy the world. It's just a waste of money on his part is not more and more dangerous. But do you think in your papers. They wouldn't necessarily create when they haven't.
That's in fact what happened are going to pass. That's right it's exactly what they did the day they build it up to the present level which they might just satisfactory. It gives them a consumer preponderance and they like to freeze it. Now they have a throw away preponderance of two and a half to three times. And that's what they would like to freeze it at and this is why they are very much in favor of of perpetuating so to a non ratified accord. This exactly what happened. But then somehow the notion that they are just as soon as so too is not ratified. They start manufacturing massive nuclear weapons is absurd. They haven't done it. Peter you know what. You are members of radio present danger. This was war writings. Sure because those like myself who believe the Russians are the war fighting strategy believe that we must have one too. That is there's no point in sticking to a strategy which they don't and does not share. So if
indeed it is true that the Soviet Union has a war fighting strategy need a strategy of a preemptive strike in event of war then it is not enough to threaten the Soviet Union with destruction of a civilian population have to go after military targets and political targets. Which indeed is what has happened. I mean in our development of our weapons. Why do you think Carter. I think this has to do with with the with Team B which I was a member which was set up by the director of central intelligence George Bush in the fall of the summer of 76. There were a lot of people in government who were getting worried about the Soviet buildup and they felt that the agency was minimizing it because the agency was the Central Intelligence Agency was victim of mirror imaging. They believe that the Russians share our
own view namely that you want to have enough of these weapons you have enough there's not one million more because they don't serve any utility they only retaliatory. They serve a deterrent purpose not a war winning purpose. And the question was if the Russians have obtained in 69 parity with us why do they keep on developing new systems particular fourth generation which they deployed in the 70s with these awesome weapons the SS 18 with 10 Merve warheads. So the director of central intelligence the point of this group. Ponytail was in it and there were others experts and it was a it was a secret panel when it's reported this day is highly classified but the general result leaked to the press that we concluded that the Soviet Union indeed had a war fighting strategy and is building up its forces to give effect to this strategy. Well the Carter administration really came in rejected this. But Brzezinski the National Security Adviser appointed a panel to study this and this panel came up with very similar conclusions within a couple of
years namely So it is indeed preparing to fight in you know. And on this basis President Carter issued PD 59 which was quite a rational document which said Very well we have to accept this as a fact in ourselves be prepared to fight. This. This kind of a war. And this of course is also President Reagan's promise. Why do you think they wanted Afghanistan because it is a stepping stone to the Persian Gulf and to the Indian Ocean and they thought this is they had a pretty good control over it. There was some sort of messy Muslim fundamentalists who are making trouble and they will be able to occupy they I think the schedule is between three and six months. Well once a quarter in Afghanistan they cut the distance to the Persian Gulf for their planes and rockets by half. And secondly they surround Iran because we now can approach around from the east as well as from the
north. And they are at the very doorsteps of Pakistan. So strategically Afghanistan is very important. It performs the same role that ultimate owner performs in East Asia. It performs the same role that Mongolia Outer Mongolia performs in East Asia but they already had it. They already had a regime that was sympathetic was hostile. You know it wasn't but it couldn't manage it just wasn't in control. There was this rebellion and they thought that the regime wasn't effective enough and furthermore the regime of I mean was beginning to flirt with the West. And that's something they don't forget. So they killed him in gangster type murder and replaced them with a man who they thought was reliable whom they now are going to replace They have not been able to find the right formula. They're actually very inept but they're extremely brutal. How do you relate the Soviet interest in Afghanistan in relation to their interest in
the Horn of Africa. Well they pick strategic areas in the world you know Middle East South Africa Central America Southeast Asia. They're the strategic points where they explore they are very cautious. They push they see they get resistance they get resistance they withdraw. They take the time. These are two areas in the center Americas another area where they're very active. And these things are not necessarily directly related but they're all strategic points. Their strategic cities for economic reasons because Afghanistan get you closer to the oil Middle Eastern oil and South Africa because it gets you closer to the mineral resources of South Africa are very important in the wealth of mineral wealth of South Africa. If you control South Africa itself you know control South Africa and Middle Eastern oil. It has Europe at its feet. Without firing a shot
because Europe cannot survive economically without Middle Eastern oil and the mineral resources South Africa therefore Europe will become very accommodating to the Soviet Union. So your demands that you have dropped out of Neda was so on the euro may have to accommodate them. That's their tactic. They prefer much prefer this to fighting. So you asked me at the beginning. They want war no they don't want war they want to get their objectives this way. Central America is important because there they can cause a lot of trouble to the United States threaten the United States at his doorstep. And if they are successful the United States may very well decide to withdraw its troops from Europe because it has trouble close at home or it may want to strike a deal. Say you give us the Middle East we will pull out of Central America. This kind of deals they say they're perfectly prepared to make no sacrifices sudden he says but you let us have Afghanistan. You see the 70s.
Well it was dangerous not because of what the Russians did but because of what we did. We were highly demoralized in the 70s because of Vietnam. Domestic problems of various kinds. And the Russians watch this very carefully. And when they see a country demoralized like this and then they tend to get get more aggressive. Under President Reagan whom whom they saw as a strong leader was seen as a strong leader who has revitalized America they've been in a much better behavior. They have not come in in any aggressive. They've committed no aggressive actions. So the danger is that when we become weak disoriented isolationist that's when they strike when we are when we stand tall and where they know they have to contend with that then they're much more cautious. So the 70s were dangerous but not because of them but because of us what we were doing to ourselves.
Series
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Raw Footage
Interview with Richard Pipes, 1986
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-rb6vx06c0n
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-rb6vx06c0n).
Description
Episode Description
Richard Pipes was a history professor at Harvard University who took part in the 1976 Team B study of the Soviet military threat and later served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs on the National Security Council staff from 1981-1982. In this second interview, he discusses Soviet thinking on military and strategic matters. He believes Moscow chooses its objectives around the world carefully because of its limited resources, then presses as far as it can until it meets resistance. The Soviets' strategic buildup of the 1970s, in his view, was a drive for superiority not just parity, and their interest in any arms control arrangement is purely tactical, designed to hinder U.S. weapons programs and freeze their own superiority. From this he offers thoughts about what it all means for the United States and how Washington should formulate strategy accordingly. Third World issues are also discussed. His opinion on Afghanistan is that the Kremlin views it as a stepping stone to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Concluding, he notes that the 1970s were a dangerous time, but not so much because of what the Soviets did as because of American demoralization and its effects on U.S. policy.
Date
1986-12-05
Date
1986-12-05
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
Military Forces and Armaments
Subjects
Afghanistan; China; Ethiopia; Horn of Africa; Mozambique; Angola; South Africa; Soviet Union; United States; Detente; Communism; Civil Defense; Nuclear arms control; nuclear weapons; United States. President (1977-1981 : Carter). Presidential Directive 59; Soviet Union. Treaties, etc. United States, 1972 May 26 (ABM); United States. Congress; Committee on the Present Danger (U.S.); Nitze, Paul H.; Vance, Cyrus R. (Cyrus Roberts), 1917-2002; Sakharov, Andrei, 1921-1989; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 1928-; Bush, George, 1924-; Carter, Jimmy, 1924-; SS-18 Missile; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II; Warnke, Paul C., 1920-2001
Rights
Rights Note:,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:All,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
00:40:37
Embed Code
Copy and paste this HTML to include AAPB content on your blog or webpage.
Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Pipes, Richard
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 832015bdfacf66a832700c2134ce32f319446d06 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
Citations
Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Pipes, 1986,” 1986-12-05, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 8, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx06c0n.
MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Pipes, 1986.” 1986-12-05. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 8, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx06c0n>.
APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Pipes, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx06c0n