War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert Sprague, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES C03005-C03007 ROBERT SPRAGUE

SAC Vulnerability

Interviewer:

SO CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO US WHY THE GAITHER COMMITTEE WHICH STARTED TO

LOOK AT CIVIL DEFENSE DECIDED TO LOOK ALSO AT THE QUESTION OF SAC

VULNERABILITY, HOW DID THAT COME ABOUT?

Sprague:

Well, it came about because when Ron Gaither finally accepted becoming

the director for this study, and he didn't do that until the middle of

May there had been completed a RAND study identified as our 290. And

the chairman of that had been a man by the name of Albert who was a

distinguished scientist and also a recognized strategist in military

affairs. He'd been in this game for now, I guess about 40 years. Well,

his the report of his committee showed that it came as a conclusion

that protecting SAC and eliminating or maybe reducing the vulnerability

was very much more important to saving people than Program. And the

reason for this was that if SAC is adequately protected nobody probably

is going launch an attack and of course that's maximum safety that

these people can have. So when he heard that Ron Gaither had accepted

the directorship and Gaither at that time was also a chairman of the

board of the RAND Foundation, he briefed Gaither and the other trustees

of RAND with what his committee had come up with. And he thought it was

very important that the assignment to the Gaither Committee be expanded

to include both passive and active means of protecting the population.

And all of us bought this suggestion and that's why the scope of it was

broadened and that's indicated by the title of the report when it was

finally delivered which was Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age.

Interviewer:

SO WHAT DID THE GAITHER REPORT FIND IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF ITS

INVESTIGATION ABOUT SAC VULNERABILITY? HOW VULNERABLE WAS SAC?

Sprague:

Well, the Gaither Committee tried to find this out by arranging a visit

to LeMay's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. And it was a larger, quite

a large group that went out the first time. It was the whole steering

committee which was 11 people and some of the other members of the

project. And we had a very unsatisfactory meeting with LeMay. He really

treated it as if it was, he was talking to the Chamber of Commerce. So,

when we get back, got back the fact that we were dissatisfied was

brought to the President's attention by Bobby Cutler who was the

President's special assistant for military affairs and also chairman of

the National Security Council. And it was arranged that a sm-- much

smaller group which included Bill Foster, my co-director and I as

director and the heads of the two of the groups that had particular

responsibilities, and this was Jerry Wiesner and Bill Webster. Jerry

Wiesner was head of the active defense group and Bill Webster the

passive, the active being things like missiles and the passive being

things like fallout shelters. And when we got out there, and I believe

as I remember that this was mid September I think it was September

16th. LeMay had we found out that LeMay had a very large display of the

United States in which were located on the map of the United States,

the 30-line SAC bases which we had at that time. And at each of these

SAC base identifications on the map, there were figures which showed

the number of bombers on each SAC base, the type of bombers and also

had some figures and I asked him what these figures were and he said,

well that was the time it took us to get SAC planes off their bases, on

a very recent exercise. So we looked at it for a few minutes and I

finally said to LeMay, I said, "This is complicated map, I don't know

if I really understand it." But I said, "If I do understand it, I come

to the conclusion that in the event that we only have tactical warning,

that is actually identifying Russian bombers attacking the United

States, crossing the due line in Canada or the seaward extensions not

one of our planes would be able to get off the ground before they were

destroyed. And he didn't seem to be concerned. So I said to the General

you don't seem to be concerned about it. He said, I'm not. And I said,

"Why not." Well, he said, "Come with me, Mr. Sprague." So he took me

into a room which was fairly near the display, where he was receiving

his own intelligence. In other words he had his own intelligence system

with a lot of equipment there and he pointed out to some of the

machines that were reading off messages that were coming in from

various SAC planes that were flying various places around the world.

And particularly flying around the parameter of Soviet Russia and

actually a number of them are overflying Russia. And he said, "I will

know from my own intelligence, whether or not the Russians are massing

their planes presumably for massive attack against the United States.

And if it's I come to that conclusion," he said, "I'm going to knock

the shit out of them before they get off the ground. "Oh, I said " that

isn't national policy," I said, "You know that." He said, "No it's not

national policy, but it's my policy."

Interviewer:

NOW WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

Sprague:

Well this will probably surprise you I was very much concerned about

SAC's vulnerability because if the Russians were willing to make a

one-way attack if they didn't have the range of that time to get back

to Russia and land for example in Canada or Mexico they could

re--destroy our entire retaliatory capability on one strike. And then

what would we have left. So, I was amazed that was his, he would take

that position, but I was relieved, because I was really concerned about

the safety of the United States and its citizens, and its military. And

I thought if we've got a man here that if willing to do that I'm glad

that we have one. 'Cause I'm concerned that otherwise that we may be in

great danger. And I also remembered at the time, which was the reason I

said nothing about it to anybody else and didn't report when I got back

to Washington, was that when a general disobeys orders if he's got, if

he's defeated and a makes a mistake, then he's a bum. But, if he

disobeys orders of policy and wins, then he's a hero.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR A GENERAL TO TAKE THE SAME

ATTITUDE TODAY?

Sprague:

I don't think there is ever a General like LeMay. I think he was--he'd

be my role model of a general.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK HE WAS GOOD?

Sprague:

I think he was excellent. Superb. His training, he gave he was training

his people all the time. And if they did well, he made promotions on

the field even though we weren't at war. And I don't anything about the

our military forces today, except what I read in the newspapers but I'm

convinced it's that time, he was the supreme military officer we had.

Interviewer:

DOCTOR WIESNER'S RECOLLECTION OF THAT VISIT AND WE ASKED HIM ABOUT THIS

PARTICULAR INCIDENT AND HE SAID HE RECALLS SOMETHING SIMILAR, BUT HE

SAYS, THAT HIS RECOLLECTION IS THAT WHAT LEMAY SAID TO YOU WHEN YOU

SAID "BUT THAT'S NOT NATIONAL POLICY..." WAS WELL IT'S MY JOB TO MAKE

IT POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CHANGE HIS MIND", NOW OBVIOUSLY THAT'S

A VERY DIFFERENT ACCOUNT.

Sprague:

Well Jerry Wiesner wasn't even with me when General LeMay made this

comment to me. So he may be talking about some comment that he made to

Wiesner, or somebody else. But nobody else went with me to the

intelligence at that time. I was alone with LeMay.

Interviewer:

AND YOUR IMPRESSION DEFINITELY WAS THAT WHAT GENERAL LEMAY WAS SAYING

IS THAT HE WOULD DO IT OFF HIS OWN BACK WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HIGHER

AUTHORITY IF NECESSARY. OKAY. CAN WE MOVE ON TO THE LUNCH THAT YOU HAD

WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AND GENERAL LEMAY SHORTLY AFTER

THAT VISIT, COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS.

Sprague:

Well, we were to make our report to the National Security Council, on

November 7th. And on November 6th, the day before that Jim Douglas,

Secretary of the Air Force, was courteous enough to have a meeting for

the Steering Committee, obligate their committee and some of his top

military and civilian personnel in his private dining room. And I knew

Douglas quite well, and I could just imagine his position of being

faced with this kind of information. Uh after our meeting with the,

after the meeting that Bill Foster and I had scheduled, to have alone

with the President after the briefing, the Security Council. So finally

I decided to say something, at least give them a warning, so as we were

getting towards the desert I turned to Douglas. I was sitting on his

right and said LeMay was sitting on his left. And I said, " Mr.

Secretary I presume that you know, that if we had a surprise attack

against LeMay with only tactical warning," I said, "that we would not

be able to make a retaliatory strike against the Russians as is

national policy. And he looked me up from his surprise, as if I was an

idiot and he turned to LeMay, and he said, "Well you've heard what Mr.

Sprague said, and it's my knowledge and I guess general knowledge in

the event of a surprise attack of that kind that we would have at least

168 bombers which would not be destroyed." And I interrupted him with

that point before LeMay had a chance to answer. And I said, "Mr.

Secretary", I said, "that is not the question." I said, "The question

is not how many planes could be saved, the question is how many would

be in the position to make a retaliatory attack with full crews aboard,

full gas load and weapons aboard. I said, the SAC bases do have

auxiliary civilian bases to which they can go in the event of an

attack. But I said, "that they go with a limited crew, skeleton crew,

no not enough gas on board to reach the enemy". And I said most

importantly "they wouldn't have any weapons aboard." And the weapons

would have been destroyed because the weapons were all at the SAC

bases. And before, this is where I give LeMay top credit. And before,

Douglas had a chance to ask LeMay whether I was still nuts LeMay said,

"Mr. Sprague is correct."

Gaither Report

Interviewer:

SO THEN YOU TOOK YOUR REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON

NOVEMBER THE 6TH. COULD YOU JUST DESCRIBE...

Sprague:

No November the 7th.

Interviewer:

NOVEMBER 7TH, I'M SORRY. COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MAIN GUTS OF WHAT THE

REPORT SAID, WHAT THAT RECOMMENDATION WAS TO THE NEC AND ALSO WHAT THE

REACTIONS OF THE FULL MEETING OF THE NEC WERE?

Sprague:

Well, the recommendations of the report, were broken down into two

parts. The first part was items of top priority. And in the second

group was items of next to top priority. The items in the top priority

had to do mostly with SAC. Hardening SAC, further dispersing it

providing anti-air craft protection to SAC and so on. It had to do with

eliminating the vulnerability of SAC and included in that was improving

the capabilities of our radars. So that they, radars at that time had 2

weaknesses, one was a very high altitude and the other was a very low

altitude. And it was very important that our radars could not be

avoided simply when we were flying very low or very high. In the--in

the second group, were fallout shelters. A nationwide fallout shelters

were recommended, no blast shelters. And the remainder of the

recommendations had to do with the changes in the civilian and military

organizations to have better control in an emergency, more flexibility

and less reaction time. Now, the was only one person at the meeting

which included the members of the National Security Council, except the

Vice-President, he wasn't there, I don't know why, he's a member, a

statutory member, but he wasn't therewith about 65 other be, top people

in government. And the only one who commented, the President didn't

comment, was John Foster Dulles. And John Foster Dulles comment was,

"Well," he said, "it's my experience that in a study of this kind the

group always over estimates the capabilities of Russia and under

estimates our capabilities.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK IN RETROSPECT HE WAS RIGHT ON THIS OCCASION?

Sprague:

No, I don't think so. I did--I did spend and hour and a half with him

after the meeting the Secretary, I don't remember whether he was a

secretary, no, the under Secretary of State was a former governor of

Massachusetts, his name was Herter and I knew Herter quite well, I had

been on one his committees. And I asked him if he would arrange a

meeting with Secretary Dulles, and he said he did. And he and I went to

see Dulles in his, in his offices. And I spent an hour and a half

trying to persuade him that his opinion in this particular case was an

error. That our report was very factual, we had done good intelligence

and I don't believe I was very successful. He listened very politely

for an hour and a half, but I don't think that I persuaded him.

[END OF TAPE C03005]

Interviewer:

YOU SAID IT WAS BASED ON GOOD INTELLIGENCE BUT OF COURSE IT DID

SUBSEQUENTLY EMERGE SOME YEARS LATER THAT MUCH OF THE--MANY OFTHE

ESTIMATES THAT WERE BEING MADE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE

1956-57 TURNED OUT LATER TO BE VERY OVER PESSIMISTIC ESPECIALLY WITH

REGARD TO SOVIET MISSILE AND BOMBER MANUFACTURE, DO YOU STILL SAY THAT

THE REPORT WAS BASED ON GOOD INTELLIGENCE?

Sprague:

Well, when I say that the intelligence was accurate enough for the

Gaither Committee to make intelligent the recommendation I'm talking

about that. I'm not talking about the accuracy--ex-act number of

missiles of military intelligence. The thing that we were interested in

at particularly was what was the--in US equivalent dollars what was the

Russian effort in the military area. And I think these figures were

quite accurate. And what our estimates were that after World War II, in

1946, we had a--we demonized almost entirely. And at that time, the

Russians had tremendous ground forces, great supremacy in that area.

They didn't have anything to offset our air force or our navy. And they

set about and shortly after '46, they set about remedying this. And

the, our estimate effort was that you, the Soviets military effort in

1950 was three times our military effort here as a result of our

complete demobilization. The Russians continued to increase their

effort year by year until in 1957, at the time of the Gaither Report we

estimated that we were spending about 40 billion dollars a year on the

military and we also estimated that the Russians were spending about

the same amount. Now, the reason ours has gone up substantially during

those 7 years was the Korean War. An during the Korean War, our

actually, our actual military effort here, wound up beyond what the

Russians were spending, but then it dropped back. It had gone up to

somewhere around 50 million dollars a year, a billion dollars a year,

and it dropped back to about 40. So at 1957, our estimate was, and this

is a basis of a lot of conclusions in the report that we and the

Russians were spending about the same equivalent dollars in the

military effort. And that the Russians were continuing to increase

annually by a steady rate. But our estimate was all we knew here. That

we were not going to increase, we had dropped back our military effort

from the Korean War we were spending about 14 percent of our gross

national product to 1957, when we were only spending 8 1/2 to 9

percent. And our estimate was it'd be difficulty, difficult if there

wasn't immediate threat to sustain more than about that percentage of

gross national product annually, and that's true today. And we further

estimated that will the greater percentage that the Russians were

spending and we estimated they continue, that we and the Russians would

have about a balanced military posture in 1972. And that came out on

the timetable which is included in the in the report. And as a matter

of fact it turned out to be very accurate. And the study that the

Harvard group made you've seen the book, is that in 1972, I, and their

military, our military organization and theirs were about equal.

Although were very different, the Russians had emphasized their ground

forces much more than we did. But we had off setting strengths and

submarine missiles and so on.

Private Meeting with President Eisenhower

Interviewer:

LET ME MOVE ANYWAY TO THAT SECOND MEETING THAT HAPPENED AFTER YOU

PRESENTED YOUR REPORT TO THE NSC. CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

AND HOW YOU HAD A PRIVATE MEETING OR MORE PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE

PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT...

Sprague:

Yes. Well after we got back from Omaha I talked with Foster at

incredible length and he was the only one I talked with, he was my

deputy. And I said, what we learned, what I learned in Omaha, was so

dangerous that I thought it, would not be safe to include it in

information given to 60 or 70 people at the November 7th meeting. So we

got a hold of Bobby Cutler again telling the problem, why we were not

going to include it, and asked for a private meeting with the President

after the main meeting. Bobby Cutler agreed. He arranged it, the

President accepted it. So immediately after the report had been given,

five of us were involved in giving the report, Bill Foster and I left

the group and were taken to the Oval Office. When we got there, the

President was seated his desk, but he also had in the room which I

hadn't realized he was going to have, he had the chiefs of staff for

the four services, the army, navy, , the army, and navy, the Air Force

and the marine corps. Also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and in addition to that Don Quarles who was Undersecretary of Defense

for Research and Development. They were standing at the wall, there

were only two chairs in the office, so and Bill Foster joined the group

and I sat down, opposite the President. And I spent 15 minutes

explaining why in our opinion SAC planes could not make a retaliatory

attack at that time if we only had tactical warning. And to my somewhat

amazement, he didn't any of his military men whether Sprague, he I was

crazy or not. And nobody made any comment. There were no comments made,

no questions asked. And I've never been more uncomfortable in my entire

life. Perspiration began to run down my face, I was sitting there in

front the President telling him that his national policy couldn't be

implemented in the event of a surprise attack. And nobody said

anything. I think I suffered for about a minute, not more than 2

minutes, with the perspiration running down my face when I finally said

to well, "Mr. President I don't think Mr. Foster and I can contribute

any more to this meeting. And I'd like permission to leave." He didn't

even respond to that. So without waiting more than about 15 seconds, I

got up, walked out, Foster followed me and that was the end of the

meeting. Now, apparently, something did happen. And that was the good

part of it, in spite of the leaks to the press, and the President was

very disturbed about that. Within a very few days, it was less than a

week SAC had a third of their planes in the air, 24 hours a day. And of

course could have retaliated because it couldn't have been destroyed.

And that every meeting of the National Security Council on continental

defense, and I attended both meetings on continental defense because I

was adviser to the National Security Council. Bobby Cutler, very first

thing, stated too to the National Security Council, how many planes SAC

had they could get off the ground within the time allowed by tactical

warning. And in nine months the number got to over a 168, which was,

which was the figure that Dulles had given me at that luncheon meeting.

So something was done about it.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU AND BILL FOSTER MUST HAVE BEEN RATHER BAFFLED AND HURT BY THE

PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION. WHAT DO THINK HE WAS THINKING...?

Sprague:

Yeah...Well, there's a fact of life which has always existed, and still

exists, and was reason he did so well, so poorly in the Korean War. No

subordinate will have to tell the boss that he's wrong. And if you tell

the head of the Kremlin, you'd probably sent to Siberia. And that's a

national trait and that happened in the Korean War. The top generals in

Korea and the administration in Washington were never told how bad

things were going and what could be done there to correct them. And I

know this because, Hermann Kahn you've probably heard of him, the

Institute made for--he's a man that wrote... talking about the--

Interviewer:

YEAH.

Sprague:

He made four trips out Korea himself at his own expense. And he came

back and said, he said that he had talked with top people there and the

colonels and the captains and he said, the colonels and the captains

knew what we wrong and knew how to correct it. But the generals or the

top never did, and neither did the ones back in the United States. This

is just illustrating the point. Well, supposing you're president of the

United States, and you've got Army, Navy, you've got a big military

staff and costing billions of dollars and a character, not even--not

even a military man north from a civilian comes in and the national

policy for Christ's sake. So I wasn't surprised, no. I wasn't

disappointed or surprised I expected it.

Steering Committee Leaks Report

Interviewer:

BUT THERE WAS SOME DISAPPOINTMENT BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE REPORT OF

THAT...

Sprague:

Oh that's a different matter. You're talking--

Interviewer:

WELL I'M ASKING YOU WHAT...

Sprague:

Your question was directed toward this particular meeting.

Interviewer:

YEAH I KNOW THAT'S FINE...WHAT WAS THE REACTION AMONGST OTHER MEMBERS

OF THE PANEL TO THE WAY THAT IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED?

Sprague:

It...Some of the members of the panel, because of Dulles comment at the

end of the we begun, November 7th and because it was generally known

that Eisenhower was not in favor of a fallout shelter program felt that

the some of the main recommendations of the report were not going to be

carried out. And they took it upon themselves to try and the President.

The report was top secret. There was no announcement to the Press that

there even was a report or there had been the meeting or any of the

recommendations. And they leaked this information and the

recommendations out to the public very shortly after the Gaither

Report. And the President was very much upset. And I don't blame him.

And I wasn't a part of that, because it's important I think for the

President to be able to get a group of qualified citizens to make an

objective study. And there's no strings to any of the particular

services. And it's up to him to do what he wants to do with that

report. It's his report. He was the one that approved it. And it's up

to him to decide whether he wants to tell the public about it or not.

It's up to him to decide what he wants to implement and what he doesn't

want to implement. Now, you may not like it, and I was very concerned,

that this having happened, that Eisenhower would never have another

committee of that kind and possibly other presidents wouldn't.

Interviewer:

WHO WERE THE PEOPLE WHO DECIDED TO LEAK IT?

Sprague:

Well, I know this is pretty well known, uh. The two that implemented

this was my co-director Bill Foster, who felt very strongly about it

and Paul Nitze. Paul Nitze was not a member of the steering committee,

but he was a very knowledgeable and important member of the project

staff. And was one of the project staff that attended many of th--

morning meetings of the steering committee. And it was Nitze and Foster

who decided that something ought to be done about this. And this was

implemented by a dinner at Foster had at his home, with Nitze and

others were similarly sympathetic and felt that there was--things

wouldn't be done, well they were done. And this certainly delayed to

some considerable extent implementing some of things that were finally,

implemented. The best if anybody wanted to go into this was a man by

the name of Roberts, who initially released a lot of the information.

But then there was a Harvard professor by the name of Halpertman, who

in July 1960, which was say nine months after the meeting, prepared a

paper, was 33 pages long, that went into this whole business of leaking

the report and the President's upset about it and what happened.

Rivalry between Military Services

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE SERVICES AT THIS

PERIOD?

Sprague:

I think it's a good news and bad news story. There had always been

rivalry between the services. It begins of course with each service

wanting the maximum amount of money from Congress. Well in order to get

the money, the way everybody wanted a big in the atomic nuclear act.

And the army wanted to be, have it's own air force, and so on. I think

that as one very good point and that is that the only real competition

that you get over military service is during an armed conflict. That's

the ultimate result. So the only competition you can have in peacetime

is competition between the services, And I'm sure if there hadn't been

competition between the services, that the submarine missile program

would never have been implemented. That was the Navy's answer as to how

to get in the nuclear act in a big way. And a lot of people thought

that was impossible because the Navy did a wonderful job. And that was,

I think entirely the result of competition for money for the Navy. Now

the bad part of it is that each of the services have their own

intelligent service. We have the CIA which is the, it to be a

centralized objective intelligence organization. But the Navy had it's

separate intelligence, the army has it, SAC has it as you've heard. And

each of these, the inclusion of each of a service intelligence agency

is to emphasize or de-emphasize targets which will give their service a

more important position.

U-2 Reconnaissance Planes

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT WAS GOING ON WHEN THE ESTIMATES WERE PROPHESYING THE

SO-CALLED MISSILE GAP?

Sprague:

No, that would not, give you the answer on that one. And that is the

most fantastic thing that was done in that period. At one of the

meetings of the Pilling Committee which was called the Technical

Capabilities Panel, Dr. Land of Polaroid suggested that if we could

build an airplane which would fly say at 70,000 feet, beyond, Russian

then existing missiles could bring it down, and supply it with

sophisticated photographic equipment that in this way we could break

the iron curtain and tell exactly where the Russian air bases were and

were their missiles were. And how many they were. The chief engineer of

Lockheed at that time had designed a highflying airplane that could fly

over 70,000 feet. It never had been built. It was slow, it had large

wings and presumably could fly over Russia without being brought down.

Land had decided that he could build or his company could build, design

and build sophisticated photographic equipment which could take

pictures from 70-80,000 feet, with fine enough definition so that they

could tell what the Russian military installations were, where they

were located and also and find enough definition to detect their

missiles above ground missiles. And the Russians had them all above

ground by that time, because of the iron curtain wall. This

recommendation of Lands was made at one of the morning meetings of the

above the I'm sorry...It was the steering committee. The steering

committee and I was a member of the steering committee met every

morning. In other words, to me had a steering committee just as the

Gaither Committee did. So was supposed to supervise what was being

done. And Land made this suggestion at; one of the meetings, early

mornings of the steering committee of the Committee. And of course it

was enthusiastically approved. I think it was through Goodpaster who

was a military adviser to the President about that time. General

Goodpaster. The Killian and Land...

[END OF TAPE C03006]

Interviewer:

HOW WOULD YOU ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT THE ESTIMATES THAT WERE BEING

MADE IN 1957 OF PROBABLE SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITY IN THREE OR FOUR

YEARS TIME TURNED OUT TO BE SO WRONG LATER ON?

Sprague:

I'm going to ask you to ask me that again.

Interviewer:

ALL RIGHT. I'LL ASK YOU A DIFFERENT WAY. DO YOU THINK IT WAS THE U-2,

THE ACQUISITION OF THE U-2 THAT MADE THE BIG DIFFERENCE AS FAR AS

SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT WAS CONCERNED IN THE LATE '50S. IS THAT THE MAIN

FACTOR AND IF SO, WHY?

Sprague:

I...it's my personal opinion that was the reason and the only reason.

And I think that because prior to that time we had no success in CIA,

in breaking through the Iron Curtain. We didn't know where the Russian

missiles were located. We didn't know exactly what they consisted of,

and we didn't know how many they had. When powers started to, well,

when the U-2 overflew Russia's for four years, they knew we were

getting that information. And they...their program was stopped, I think

for about two years until they could place their missiles on the

ground. They were then on the surface where they could be destroyed

with two to three pounds over pressure.

Interviewer:

SO IT WAS THEIR KNOWLEDGE THAT WE KNEW WHERE THE MISSILES WERE THAT IN

YOUR OPINION STOPPED THE SS-6 PROGRAM WITHIN ITS TRACKS AND THEY WAITED

UNTIL THEY HAD A MISSILE THEY COULD PUT UNDERGROUND?

Sprague:

Well, they certainly knew we were overflying them for four years. And

they're intelligent people. And they must have known we were doing it

for a reason, and that reason was to find out what was behind the Iron

Curtain.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY ELEMENT OF AIR FORCE SELF-INTEREST

FOR EXAMPLE, AS YOU WERE DESCRIBING EARLIER ON INVOLVED IN THE WAY --

IN THE ESTIMATES THAT AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE WAS PRODUCING?

Sprague:

Well, there may have been but I don't think that was, and I don't think

in that, in this case that was the important element.

Interviewer:

OK. JUST TO GO BACK TO SOMETHING THAT YOU SAID EARLIER WHEN YOU

DESCRIBED GENERAL LEMAY'S POLICY FOR PREEMPTIVE ATTACK ON THE SOVIET

UNION, DO YOU THINK THAT WAS THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TOO SECRETLY?

Sprague:

I certainly do not. The President was a very organized man and he was

used to having plans made for large organizations and he carried that

through to the Presidency. And I'm absolutely certain that the

President...

Interviewer:

YOU DON'T THINK THAT GIVEN THE PERHAPS POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF

HAVING FORMALLY A PLAN FOR PREEMPTIVE STRIKE THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL AS TO WHAT WOULD

REALLY HAPPEN?

Sprague:

No, I don't think there's any possibility of it.

Interviewer:

SO THE UNITED STATES...

Sprague:

I sat...I sat in on too many meetings with the President on continental

defense, and I also was very close to the senior executive in the staff

of the NSC, and I'd read all the... all the important papers, and I'm

absolutely certain the President had no at all.

Interviewer:

AS FAR AS YOU KNOW WOULD IT HAVE BEEN PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE FOR GENERAL

LEMAY TO UNDERTAKE THAT POLICY? TO, OFF HIS OWN BACK, ON HIS OWN

AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE AN ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION?

Sprague:

Well, he had the planes and he had the missiles, and I can't really

speak with authority on that because it may have been leaked. You know,

though, it was always my opinion, with the question, if the Russians

ordered a massive attack against the United States whether the people

massing the muscle, or the people manning the missiles would carry it

out....Because they knew if there were a retaliatory attack they would

be subject to being killed and their families. So we're talking about

anything as devastating as that toward the... Will it be carried out? I

have some doubt whether it would be. That's just a personal opinion,

but...

[END OF TAPE C03007 TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Robert Sprague, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-rb6vx0686p

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-rb6vx0686p).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Sprague, Robert C. (Robert Chapman), 1900-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: c030394059d8d1fe048f186618ca7d4c6adfe326 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert Sprague, 1986,” 1986-03-05, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 8, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx0686p.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert Sprague, 1986.” 1986-03-05. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 8, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx0686p>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert Sprague, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-rb6vx0686p