War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Roger Sherfield, 1986 [4]

Start off talking about your impressions of the man in Washington and. When you when you met him in Washington what was your impression of him and what were the ideas he was espousing for the postwar period. Well Dodd Niels Bohr I suppose as the. Greatest of suddenly one of the greatest physicists of the age. He had been in. Scandinavia. He was brought out and I was immediately informed about the nuclear work which was going on. He was a man of wide vision and he was immediately struck by the importance. Of international control of this new force which he understood perfectly

and. Felt that every effort should be made to ensure that. All those concerned including the Soviet Union. Should be informed of what was happening. And with a view to. Controlling. The new force he was concerned to speak to the. Leaders of the allied countries. Roosevelt. Churchill. And all those concerned with the project. He. Is ideas tended to bear a little emphasize.

He. Did not express himself very easily in English and it was. Rather difficult to follow. His process of thought. And this was an obstacle. Suddenly in his discussions in particular with Winston Churchill they met a meeting was arranged but it was not a success. The doctor board didn't make himself I think sufficiently clear. And so Winston felt that he was too anxious to inform the Russians and what was going on. And so unfortunately the way the prime minister of formed an unfavorable opinion of his activities. But he came to Washington.

In 1945. And came to see us. I spent several hours talking to him and listening to his views but as I say they were difficult to follow and therefore were he his mission because he certainly saw it as a mission. It did not succeed in the way that he had hoped. Now is that all right. I'm going to ask you to be part of that. How are we doing. Well we think fairly consistent. Could you tell me what happened and then ask you to repeat some of what he said and what happened when he came to see Churchill in London. Well of course I wasn't. But he was a he. And

so Winston Churchill was prevailed upon to meet him many by Professor Lindemann who was the prime minister's chief scientific adviser. And so the meeting was finally arranged and Dr Ball went to number 10 where they had a had a meeting but that was although there was a meeting of persons. I'm afraid there was no meeting of minds as the prime minister felt that Dr. Ball was campaign for wider information disclosure for the possibilities of the new force was up with it was not desirable. He was not desirable to his proposal. Communications should be made. The Russians should be taken up. And I think the prime minister felt that his activities were not

conducive to the visit to the aims of the Lon's And so he was he was tended to discourage the sudden a B. I think he eventually it was suggested to President Roosevelt that these they are does a system of Dr. Borsch should not be taken up. Indeed that his activities should be contained as far as possible. So in Hyde Park memoir there was actually a clause that was in the hot pocket agreement which was a three paragraph agreement signed by

the president and the prime minister of Hyde Park. The president's is now was up clause saying that to the effect that a close watch should be kept on Doctor boy's activities. Since the document was lost on the American side of the effect of this was not the effect of it was negligible. So. When. You. When the news came that Hiroshima. Didn't bomb. What was the reaction last year in Washington at that time. What was your first reaction. What kind of what were you hearing from other people in the embassy.

Well that was it only two other people in the embassy who had had the information about it at the time it came to them as as as a surprise on the shock as it did to the rest of the world. But at that moment they are the uppermost thought in everybody's mind was would it bring the Japanese war to the end to an end. And in the belief that they did it would do this because they used was rigged it was greeted with relief and well with with relief that it's be a successful operation. The the the the bomb had both bombs both the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had worked. And it was soon became clear that

they had had the effect of the back of of making the Emperor tell his generals to stop fighting and have an armistice. So they the they the effect was was totally positive too long. Am I talking too big and took too long I my. I mean again you mentioned before that the bombing of Hiroshima was not all that different from the fire raids in Tokyo. Just discuss down a bit. Well.

It has to be remember. It has to be. One should remember that there had been some devastating bombing raids on Tokyo fire raids in which tens of thousands people had lost our lives in horrifying circumstances because the effect of the fire bombing on Japanese cities of that time was horrific. So the of the use of a new weapon calculated. To bring full force the Japanese into surrender was what I was thought of as likely to have no more. Devastating effects than for example of fire raids. And in fact fewer people were killed in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki than in the fire raids on Tokyo although that is now seldom talked about in the discussions of the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. You were party to about how to use that bomb when it was ready to demonstrate noires militarily. That was a. Great deal of thought and discussion on the American side in the months before the bomb was ready to drop off for a second time. Now why did we start that again. One must remember that in the previous months some very severe

fire raids had been made on Tokyo and other Japanese cities with a great loss of life tens of thousands of people had died in horrifying circumstances because the effect of fire on the Japanese citizen those DOES was particularly severe. So when it came to the question of dropping a nuclear bomb. It was I think considered that the action that they had that the effects would be little worse than the previous raid. And in fact. The the the the casualties and Nagasaki and Hiroshima were on less fewer than those which and which had taken place in the previous five raid and.

Waiting for that time. What did you hear in Washington about discussions about whether or not to use the bomb here. Well I agree that was a great deal of thought and discussion given on the American side in the months before the day of the use of the bomb on whether and if so in what circumstances it should be used and every alternative such as giving a demonstration or giving information about the bomb and its likely effects was always carefully examined on the American side.

But it turned out that there were formidable objections to all these alternatives and therefore it was decided that the two have to use the walk with a bomb without warning or rather with only a very general warning on the British side. I think that was less discussion of these various alternatives. I think the prime minister was quite satisfied and indeed convinced that if this weapon could be developed it should be used in the belief that it would force the Japanese into surrender which in fact it did. But to say as some people say that it was a thoughtless act and I think is really quite wrong it by a great deal of thought was given to it. You mentioned briefly Prime Minister Churchill.

Think about the bomb. Did he think of it as something tremendous and new or just more firepower for you. Well I'm I I don't think I can answer that because I've never I never discussed it with him or I never heard him discuss it in fact. But I think it's fair to say that he. He whether he was looking for an aid device or weapon which would be likely to stop the war in Pakistan again and use his name. I think he could use that as a prime minister. I was looking for any solution about any device or weapon which would be likely to bring the war to the end. One must not forget that at the time that the bomb was dropped and was stopped. The British were

poised to invade Malaysia and the Americans and British and the allies were poised to invade Japan and it was calculated at that time that that on that day on the Americans Allied side alone in the Japanese operation there might be a million casualties. Not to mention the casualties on the Japanese side all the casualties which the British would suffer in Malaysia. So it's in the light of that assessment which I have just now I did not see at the time nor do I see now any reason to question it. It was in the light of that assessment that the decision to drop the bomb was taken and it had the desired effect. Churchill's consent to use the bomb was required by the

agreement. Could you just tell us. Well he had no hesitation what so ever. Well what happened was that we sought his. Instructions And we received a telegram a proof. I'm sorry again sorry. It's not. We saw the prime minister's instructions. And the prime minister. Sent a telegram approving the use of the bomb and authorizing the British representatives in Washington so to inform the American government that agreement was subsequently recorded in the records of the combined policy committed the beginning.

So there's no confusion. Could you just say what your title was during the war and then afterwards when you're in Washington so we haven't strained during the war I was a member of the British diplomatic service. I served in London as head of one of the European departments from 1930 one of our 19 to 39 to 1942 in 1942. I served as a political adviser first in West Africa and then an allied Panhead core of a force headquarters in the Mediterranean. I then went to Washington in 1944 where I became one of the many ministers at the British Embassy. My title was economic minister and my main function was to act as a

link between the ambassador and the embassy and the many missions joint missions in Washington. But my principal activity was to deal with the politics of the atomic weapon then being prepared for test in the Almagor Goddo does it in that capacity. I was I I was of course under cover in the sense that it was a very secret matter and only one or two people in on our side in the embassy knew about it. And when when did you become orchard's. At the at the end of my official career. My last post was chairman of the British atomic energy authority. By that time I'd left the foreign service. I was

I was created Lord Sheffield in 1964 which was the date of my retirement from the British public service. Industry. OK. Right after the war ended before 1945 how did the United Kingdom look States policy regarding atomic energy. Well. There were two aspects of that. First is that Mr. actually had become the British prime minister. And he immediately took up with President

Truman the question of the international control of this new force nuclear energy. The president was responsive to that. And they they. Mr. Atli President Truman and the Canadian prime minister Mr. Mackenzie King who was a party to the atomic energy arrangements which had been set up at the Quebec Conference meeting in Washington to discuss the question of international control and they reached an agreement that it should be a commission and the United Nations under the United Nations should be set up and that that should be the forum in which the whole question of controlling this new force should take place. The prime minister was also concerned with the bilateral arrangements

for the exchange of information on atomic energy which had been built up during the war and there was a strong desire on the British side for that collaboration to continue into peacetime. And so the second objective of his visit was to set in train arrangements for reviving or establishing the conditions of collaboration which should prevail after the war stopped. You know what. What were the conditions of collaboration that were in fact right after the war. That. And at the end of the war that the. They were a very large number. Practically all the available scientists and engineers who

were working on the project or were concerned with the project in England had been transferred to the United States and was spread through the American establishment dealing with the dealing with the development of the bomb so that they the the position was that all our effort in terms of people was concentrated in the United States and that was under the under strict security conditions that was a pretty free exchange of information. And British scientists made a substantial contribution to the success of the project. The British would like were wanted not necessarily that precisely that organization which was a wartime one but they wanted arrangements which would provide for the free exchange of information on the physics and

on the engineering and on the scientific and technological aspects of the problem. Now there was an answer that was no such desire on the part of the United States because mainly because they that it was that was a feeling in the Congress that this new force had been developed solely by the not the by the United States that it involved a secret which could be kept a monopoly which should be preserved and therefore that no information of any kind should be given in relation to this project to any other country including the United Kingdom. Let's just one thing.

Are you OK when you or is. You just gave a real good description of the United States point of view about not wanting to share what was the United Kingdom. Why point you view there. The United United Kingdom point of view was that it that the documents which showed the United States agreement to this collaboration continuing in some form after the war. And and indeed the prime minister President Truman and Mr. Mackenzie King had signed a document in November 1945 to that effect. And it was the combined policy committee to work out proposals for that purpose. Well the combined power was a subcommittee of the combined policy. It did just that and did come forward

with some proposals which would enable the collaboration to continue and the exchange of information to continue. But the when it came to for discussion to the combined policy committee the the American representatives through the proposals out and said we could not agree to them by that time of course the Congress had made its views perfectly clear. And the Mann Act was going through the Congress at that time. You see the United States proposals now. Why what was their identity. Cause they were led by Vacca about bhai's by refusing to agree to them by Abbado's the American representatives said they were sorry. I couldn't agree to these proposals. Was not in accordance with our policy to have collaboration in this form and that was also the view of the Congress and so expressed in the

One-Act you work on the advisory committee to see me. I was a member of the subcommittee which worked through the winter. Let me. Yes. No. No wait for the wind to drop. You don't have control over the week. Now I don't know I can't time. I'm not that well connected. Yes. Let me start by saying that you were a member of this. I was. I was a time when the second after I stopped

obviously my. Sorry sorry sorry. Now I was a member of the subcommittee which combined policy committee which which worked out these proposals. The other members were General Groves who is the chairman of the Manhattan Project and the other third member was Mr. Lester a person who was then Canadian ambassador in Washington and subsequently prime minister of Canada. We worked through the winter. We worked out these proposals that were some many difficulties but about working out a bilateral agreement in that time. But we did put forward some proposals to the combined policy committee which as I say were rejected by the American representative when you were working in the subcommittee. Was there much difficulty in coming up with a proposal with Rose

that was that was no difficulty in the sense that General Groves and Mr. Pearson and myself knew each other extremely well and were fully aware of each other's problems that word difficulties abide about come making a bilateral agreement at that time. One of them was that the three governments agreed to present proposals for international control to the United Nations and now for a bilateral agreement might have look a departure from that policy. Also we were thinking of a Since most of the information was of high security value. We were thinking of an agreement which would be an unpublished agreement and that would have run counter to

the article 102 I think it is of the charter of you now the United Nations. So there were some formidable problems but nevertheless we were able to come up with some puzzles which as I say when a relative were not accepted. So at that point when these people were not accepted it was true. Well when we got this turn the British got the turned on from the American side. But Mr. Atlay then I wrote a an important memorandum. A state paper reviewing the whole course of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom on Tom told me again today and he sent this to the president

but he never got a reply. Which is a curious result of saying that the British and the United States were still close allies. They go on on all day that the consequence of that breakdown of rule of the relationship in this field was that the United Kingdom then saw that there was no alternative but to embark on a full scale program of atomic energy development. How important was the role of the United States Congress in

determining whether or not collaboration would continue. I would say that it was decisive. I was particularly in the Senate you start again you start by saying the opinion numbers. Yes. I would say is that the attitude of the Congress particularly the Senate was decisive in this matter. They were a number of senators who were quite convinced that they had the United States had a monopoly in this field and that. It was an American secret which could be kept. This was not the view on the British side. We were. Quite aware that the Russians.

Would develop. A bomb. Possibly in five or six years. That was likely. I would say that the attitude of the Congress was decisive in the breakdown of the relationship and the atomic energy field between the British and American governments particularly in the Senate with a number of senators who felt strongly that the atomic. Energy the bomb. Shall we say was an American secret an American monopoly which should. And could. Be kept as an American monopoly. That was not the view on the British side.

Our scientists were sure that the Russian scientists were capable of developing an atomic weapon but and that probably they would do this in a time scale of six or seven years. In fact they were quite correct but the Russians achieved it in a shorter period than had been anticipated. Did you feel like the United States was fighting the British adopting this policy. Well Kelly we were very disappointed. After all we were close allies and we were working very closely together in other fields of defense and in a whole range of policies of

rehabilitation and reconstruction in India and Europe and throughout the world. And it seemed strange to us that in this one field the door was slammed in our face. It seemed like the United States at the end of the war was almost too big for his breeches and words. No no I don't think so at all. I think that that was a it was a it was a strongly held conviction by the legislature that this was of something which I which should be kept American monopoly. As a matter of policy and they one of the things which I think disappointed us was that the wartime agreements were never disclosed to the Congress

at the time the Mann Act was going through the legislative process. And it has been said by one or two of those were involved that had they known about it the McMann act would have taken a different form. Personally I don't believe that. I think that that was the feeling in the Congress. And and in other some of the American scientists as well. For example Dr. van of our Bush was certainly not in favor of continuing collaboration with the British in the circumstances. So my my own view is that is that they all died was a significant fact that probably nothing would have changed the attitude of the Congress at that particular period. As you try to summarize briefly.

The essence of the problem between United States United Kingdom after the war are via a bilateral agreement. You can give that a shot. Are we talking about. We've gone over it already but you can try to summarize the difficult. The on the British side that was a great desire to continue the collaboration which had existed in the atomic energy field at the end of the war. For several reasons. First of all the British felt that they had done the preliminary work which convince the American side that a nuclear bomb was practicable. They had also given all that information to the United States who have then of course the development had to take place in the United

States because it would have been absurd to risk this sort of activity to a German bombing and so on so that it was agreed that everything should be done and do not consent. So. The UN on the British side they felt that they would need and they were entitled. In fact as a part of our contribution to continue to receive the scientific and technological information which would enable them to develop their own project on the American side. The feeling was that this was the year that the Americans had done all the development work they were tended to forget the inputs the British input at the beginning of the program that they they're done all the

development work that therefore they should obtain the benefits both in the defense and the industrial field that it was the information which could be kept secret could be kept as an American monopoly and which therefore should not be divulged to any other country. And that in any case as far as the British was concerned the agreements which had been made were basically for war purposes there was no obligation to continue the collaboration. And I think possibly in some American minds that was not too great anxiety to see another of of of the atomic program developed in another country. I think.

And what about the fear of being that we are in the United States thinking the Americans side. Government. Officials were very concerned about security. At this particular time. We're talking about 1945 46. That's of course where leakages of information both from the United States and from Canada and days they were agents Russian agents and they certainly communicated valuable technical information to the Russians. But the

two countries work. Closely together and that when the negotiations were resumed for collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom they. Those who were on the American side were not anxious for such collaboration to be a new and had a good and valid reason. Biased are saying that the British security was not good. And unfortunately. A number of instances. Folks just Aponte Corvo. Mr. Donald McLean defected at various times during this period of discussion and each defection either put brought the discussions to a

close or prevented them coming coming to us as being successful. So you may say that they did the security although lax lappet lack of it on the British side was on was a significant factor in holding up and delaying the resumption of collaboration in the atomic field between the two countries. Matthew just say that last sentence there's some reasons that you can say that lack of security they. So one could say that the lack of security or security lapses perhaps on the British side were a significant factor in in holding up the discussions between the two countries for the resumption of collaboration in the atomic field.

When you said again. Sure. So I say. One could say that the of the bad security or security lapse is on the British side and the atomic energy field were a significant factor in the negotiations between the two governments for the resumption of collaboration. The wise ask you were you're still you're in Washington. What was the point of view of the United Kingdom about

if there was one. What was your view about the possibilities of that route. Well the British government of athletes government were extremely. Concerned to achieve a system of international control of atomic energy with Shadd I think it was suddenly shared by the United States government. The commission was set up and the United Nations to deal with this matter. The United States worked out a proposal for international collaboration and a committee which was which was which Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Liliane tall were members of

Mr Baruch was then appointed by President Truman to lead the American delegation at this commission. Mr. Baruch had some ideas of his own which tended to stiffen up the attitude the American attitude and therefore made perhaps in negotiations more difficult. But I think my view at the time was that it would be extremely difficult to get the Russians to agree to any system of international control because it would involve supervision essentially at that time by British and American. And they were very unlikely to be very reluctant to accept their control measures which would be necessary in order to make the system work so bad. And so it turned

out the commercial did prove to produce some proposals which were vetoed or turned on by the Soviet Union in 1947 or 1948. So but one could also say that however unlikely it was that their negotiations would have succeeded. The proposals for international control of atomic energy where the casualty of the Cold War. Tell me about that. Well there were the negotiations. In the United Nations where clearly a

difficult one because the system of control would have meant that time supervision mainly by the British and American and the Russians were very unlikely to accept that degree of control as indeed the subsequent events. Have confirmed over and over again. However I think one can say that whatever the prospects of good or bad of these day these negotiations were as they became in fact a casualty of the Cold War. Want me do it again.

Again to be safe. Just the thought. That just reading this was just a little did you feel the failure of the plan was really a turning point and opportunity that was tragically at that point in the development. I don't think that in the circumstances of the time line I don't think that unless the is time and having regard to the United States as a Jew and the Russian reluctance to accept measures of international control a reluctance which has been abundant proved in subsequent years I don't think that the the prospects of the negotiation for a

system of international control were very likely to succeed. But. In any case the onset of the Cold War made such agreement really impossible. In other words the negotiations were a casualty of the Cold War. In those sacrifices I think it is wrong to say it a misleading to say that a great opportunity was missed. An effort was made to bring about a system of international control but the political and circumstances were such that in fact it wasn't a feasible possibility at that time and effort was made. It did not succeed for reasons which are

quite quite evident. I think. That's what we're going to see. Well I was and I'm asking you this very briefly and then we're going to change. All right. Well I was in London in 1939 for 1939 242. And of course there were there was a considerable amount of bombing at that time. But at the at the early part of the wall that the bombs were under the fire bombs are relatively small and they could be. Fairly easily extinguished. I was living in a house in London I had a housekeeper and another servant and we had what was called a sterile pump. Which was we use for

putting out fires. And two or three of one of the one of these descender is lodged in the ceiling of my living room. And so we got the sewer pump and my housekeeper worked the pump and I put out the fire. And this happened on more than one occasion. I was walking home one night and I knocked down my street and I saw his friend of mine's house on fire. So I went and got my stirrup pump and had the great satisfaction of putting out the fire and his grand piano. But these were these were. Small incidents which were widespread throughout the country of course later on in the war there and senders became much more powerful bombs became more powerful and therefore the prospect of the ordinary citizen putting out his own fires became

much rather restricted. How did the British government leaders especially the prime minister reassure you growing reliance on atomic weapons as an instrument of United States military and foreign policy in the late 40s or early 50s. Well I was a. I think both governments. Were in. Let me start again. How.

Both governments regarded the development of atomic weapons as essential. How about if both governments. Me start again. Both governments regarding the development of atomic weapons by the United States and indeed by them by Great Britain as essential to the security of the Western world as a as a means of a policy of deterrence was accepted by both and there was no question on the British side at that time that they were very strategic bombing or should operate from this country. And Mr. Hadley agreed to the stationing of American bombers in this country.

There was no dispute about it. It was regarded as an it was a natural development on the islands. So there was no difference of view on this between the two governments or for that matter. After all this was a period in which NATO had been was negotiated and came into force. And I think on the official side of course our people in the United Kingdom who opposed this policy thought it was a mistake and misguided but the official policy was quite clear and there was no disagreement between the British and American governments on these on this major question. Some one had been quoted as saying

right after the war the United States and he were mobilizing Europe. The only thing the Soviets needed in the Atlantic Ocean were boots boots the atomic weapon of our time and things. It depends what period you are talking about. If you if you were talking about nodding 45 46 there I think the consciousness of the atomic weapon was probably not decisive. The relationship between with the with the Russians they were still talking to them and all all through that postwar period in 1940 take up to the time of the almost up to the time of day the

Berlin airlift. They didn't the discussions between the for power discussions were continuing. Now admittedly that we're going from we're not going well on the prospect of agreement. Reseeded the attitude of the American government to change to the idea of the possibility of an American Russian understanding diminished. But nevertheless the the the the circumstances I'm in to that dreaded I think most misguided to talk about Russian boots walking through Europe at that time this was not just the atmosphere of the day. It's a Portland to try and put oneself back to the second such as is very difficult. But the idea

have been perhaps what was it was that risk was the spread of communism and so the communist parties of the older countries. But the idea of a love of some military operation was ready quite out of the now nobody's minds. So what I would say is that they they they have the doctrine of deterrence and the feeling that perhaps atomic weapons were the one thing which could stop a war or prevent a war breaking out developed and and in the late 40s and from then on. About class you have

recollections about dealings with United States officials I guess whether the time of the folks arrest we were in close discussion with the United States about renewing collaboration arrangements on various bases. We by that point on the British side we had laid the foundations of our of our atomic program tickly of course all based on the military and on the civil side and that we were reluctant to go in for the full day for weapon development and the building of expensive plans before we had explored the possibility of a partnership arrangements and the

development of atomic weapons particularly. And so we were doing that. And I can say that were obvious difficulties in the way of reaching agreement on this matter. And I can say that the way that the negotiations would have succeeded. What I can say is that the folks fair I put a stop to negotiate oceans and they were not resumed for another couple of years. And then on a different basis as you briefly say in negotiations were taking place here. We were in negotiation with the United States from nineteen forty seven on. Exploring various ways in which the collaboration in the atomic energy

field and the exchange of information could be resue. At the time of folks arrest. We were in close discussion with the United States for the renewal of the partnership particularly in the field of atomic weapons on the British side. We had reached a stage in our program at which further decisions were needed. The building of expensive plans. If we need to continue the development of the weapon on our own so it was sensible to find out if we could not reach an agreement with the United States which would enable us to share the burden. I can say that the difficulty is in these negotiations. I do not know whether they would have

succeeded if they had continued. What I can say is that the folks have put a stop to. This. Yes. Well yes I was I was with that early on that occurred when. I was president and all those discussions. All right we're going. OK tell me about it. How did he react when you find the weapons might be used. What happened was that did that was the crucial moment in the Korean War when the the the allied forces were in retreat. The Chinese having

crossed the yellow ribbon fours and over the president gave a press conference which in which his answers could be construed as as foreshadowing the use of the atomic weapon in certain sections as in the Korean War the news of this press conference reached the house of commons when they were in the middle of a debate on foreign policy and caused consternation in among the members of parliament to both parties. Mr. Hadley acted very quickly here. He's sent a message to Ms Truman saying could he come over and talk to him about this and some other matter. And Truman and I met the president replied in the affirmative. And he actually was able to announce this at the end of the debate in the House of

Commons and calms the atmosphere. He then went to the United States with a group of people and we had I was with him at that time. We met for four days at the White House and on the presidential yacht we covered the whole area of a big agenda. But I'm not but on the principle reason for which they actually had gone there was no discussion at the conference until the very end when the communique was being drafted. When the president the prime minister went to went to the president's study and had a 20 minutes private conversation. And when they they came back they the president said well we've reached an

agreement that we won't use this weapon without consulting each other. Well this was it was ran actually counter to what he told the Congress and was what it would say if it had been put in the community could have created a quite a difficult situation on the Hill. So. So there was some discussion that communique was altered in such a way that the president said that he would of course let us know if he was thinking of using it. And we said that we would it could have gone. I forget the exact words of of the communique anyway. It was enough to enable Mr. Atli to come back and tell the House of Commons that he was completely satisfied with the president's attitude and it was enough for Mr. Truman to order to

satisfy the Senate that he hadn't given too much away to the British. So that was the end of the crisis right. Starting from the point where Mr. Hadley went to the United States to be with Truman briefly the result. Well the was day Mr. Atlee went with a large party of visas to the United States and met with Mr. Truman and Mr. Dean Acheson and others for three or four days. At the end of Day of the discussions they have the question of the use of the atomic weapon was discussed between the president and the prime minister in private. And the president then came

out and said that they had agreed to not to use the weapon without consulting each other. This was something which would have run had it been published would have run counter to what the president's been saying in public. So it was modified form of words was put into the communique sufficient to enable us to actually to go back to the House of Commons and satisfy them that he had got assurances from Mr. Truman which he found. Completely acceptable and which enabled miss Truman to satisfy Congress that he hadn't given the essential freedom to use whatever weapon was necessary for American defense without consulting anybody. But I have

you you want me to try again. You know I. That's why it's not a question yeah that's your way. You would ask us to what it is. I don't know what Judge I I did it when it rained the first hydrogen bomb or the first bomb first hydrogen bomb. Comparing it to the first version. I can't really answer that question. Briefly what you told us in the House we're going to get behind the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when you were in Moscow. If you could just really briefly go through the. And before you started last you what was your title then. I was a chairman of the British of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.

That's the equivalent of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I happened to be in Moscow leading a delegation from the British atomic energy authority to for discussions with the Russian atomic energy commission. And I was in fact staying at that point in the embassy. They I would not have known that I was a Cuban Missile Crisis had I not been in touch with the British Ambassador. As far as the Prussians I was dealing with it made no difference to the program or to the arrangements which were for my my tour. It's also so happened that at the height of this crisis

I was I went to the to a performance of Boris. Good enough to start again the crisis. I went to I went to a performance at the Bolshoi Boris. Good enough. At which the part of Baris was being taken by an American base in the on the Russian side they because they presumed him was entertaining Rumanian premier. Well I start off again. All right so that's why you want to start again by saying I. Raised this again. I think when you're at the height of

the crisis I went to a performance at the Bolshoi Boris. Good enough. It so happened that the power of Boris was being taken by an American base in the Bolshoi where Khrushchev and the casino and the other members of the present him entertaining their Rumanian counterparts and I was a Rumanian official visit the day Khrushchev and his colleagues remained in the box for the entire performance and after the performance Khrushchev went behind the scenes and had a long conversation with the American base. They passed on.

I wondered at the time when the how the business of the Soviet Union at the height of this crisis was being conducted because that means Khrushchev and his colleagues appeared to be absolutely unconcerned and all the time in the world to listen enjoy the opera and to go behind the scenes afterwards. Of course it's possible I suppose that they had already decided on that course of action to withdraw all day. Turn the ship's back from Cuba. And so we're taking that decision. Nevertheless it was a