War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Dean Rusk, 1988

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES E13043-E13046 DEAN RUSK [2]

Post World War II international relations

Interviewer:

I WANT YOU TO CONSIDER THIS YOUR OPPORTUNITY. ANY LESSONS THAT YOU FEEL

PASSIONATELY ABOUT, THAT THE PUBLIC OUGHT TO KNOW, JUST LET US HAVE

THEM.

Rusk:

Well I might. I've decided to turn things over to younger people and

not brood on lessons too much. Let them, let them make their own

mistakes.

Interviewer:

YEAH, BUT IT'S TOO DANGEROUS... I JUST WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT BEING IN

THE WAR IN THE '40s, DURING WORLD WAR II. OH, THIS IS THE FIRST TAPE OF

AN INTERVIEW WITH DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE FROM 1961 TO '68, I

BELIEVE. OK. DURING THE WAR -- WHAT WAS THE IMPACT THAT YOU FELT

PERSONALLY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB?

Rusk:

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima came as somewhat of a surprise to

me. I was not in that part of the general staff which was in on the

know. But it made a powerful impression. As a Colonel sitting next to

me said, "War has now turned on itself and is devouring its own tail.

From this time forward it will make no sense for governments to settle

their disputes by military means." Well, that was very much on our

minds. It, it, had a, of course a powerful affect on the Japanese

fortunately, but we realized that this was entering a new phase of

warfare and that we have to give fundamental thought to the differences

that it made.

Interviewer:

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO DO IT AGAIN. SINCE WE WANT TO TAKE THE WHOLE

ANSWER AND TAKE FROM RIGHT FROM WHAT HE SAID TO HOW YOU FELT AND HOW

YOU LOOKED AT... WARFARE.

Rusk:

Well, well don't, don't ask me to repeat things because I'm not very

good at that. But where do you want me, do you want me to start the

whole thing over again?

Interviewer:

YEAH. SEE WHAT WE'LL HAVE TO DO IS LESS DETAIL ON IT, THAT YOU WERE NOT

ON THE GENERAL STAFF AT THE TIME.

Rusk:

When we in the General Staff in Washington heard of the bombing of

Hiroshima. It made a profound affect upon us because as one Colonel

sitting next to me said war has turned upon itself and is devouring its

own tail. From this time forward it will make no sense for governments

to try to resolve their differences by military means.

Interviewer:

WAS YOUR FEELING AT THAT TIME THAT MAYBE WAR WOULD BECOME OBSOLETE?

THAT IN FACT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CHANGE THE WAY?

Rusk:

Well, we, some of us had that feeling as nuclear weapons grew and

proliferated but at the same time the United States and other western

democracies made a fundamental mistake. After V-J Day we disarmed

almost totally and almost overnight. By the summer of 1946 we did not

have one division of our Army nor one group in our Air Force ready for

combat. Well, now Joseph Stalin sat over there in Moscow and looked out

across the West and saw the divisions melting away. So what did he do?

He tried to keep the northwest province of Iran, Azerbaijan the first

case before the U.N. Security Council. He converted Eastern Europe into

a colonial empire. He had a hand in the communist coup d'etat in

Czechoslovakia. He blockaded Berlin. He supported the guerillas going

after Greece. In other words, those adventures of Joseph Stalin at a

time when we were disarmed was the beginning of the Cold War. And it

was not until 1950 that we began to build up our armed forces in a

significant way.

Interviewer:

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS OUR ROLE IN THE COLD WAR? WERE WE PURELY

DEFENSIVE OR DO YOU THINK THAT AT TIMES WE MIGHT HAVE EXAGGERATED THE

THREAT OR PROPAGATED THE COLD WAR FEELING?

Rusk:

We ourselves were, as I say, disarmed. Our defense budget had come down

to a little over $11 billion a year. We brought our veterans home in

almost a panic. We were ready for the kind of world that is sketched

out in the Charter of the United Nations. But these adventures by

Joseph Stalin created the Cold War and forced us to take steps to meet

the common danger. And we began by resisting the blockade of Berlin, by

helping the Greeks deal with the guerilla problem and then came the

attack in, by the North Koreans and so things changed almost

fundamentally at that time.

Interviewer:

COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO US, HOW THE, HOW THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WAS

DEVELOPED AND PARTICULARLY HOW, AT THE TIME IT WAS CONCEIVED THAT

MILITARY FORCE COULD BE USED TO COUNTER WHAT STALIN WAS DOING?

Rusk:

Containment was almost an inevitable reaction to the moves that were

being made by Josef Stalin. We simply couldn't sit still and allow him

to succeed in all the moves that he was, that, he set out to take. So

containment was in effect forced upon us. Now we did not think that it

was our job to use military force in all parts of the world just

because there was a threat. But we did feel that we ought to consider

those areas that we considered vital to our interest beginning with

NATO and Western Europe and be prepared to used military force if

necessary in those areas.

Interviewer:

YOU HAD A SPECIAL ROLE, I BELIEVE, IN THE '50s IN CHARGE OF U.N.

MATTERS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

Rusk:

I was the first Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs, yes. In, in the

Truman Administration.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE SINCERE HOPE AFTER THE WAR THAT IN FACT THE U.N. COULD BECOME

A BODY THAT COULD ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Rusk:

We started out on that basis. Although our expectations were probably

somewhat too rosy.

Interviewer:

EXCUSE ME. WHEN YOU SAY THAT BASIS, THEY WON'T HAVE HEARD MY QUESTION

SO I JUST WANT YOU TO STATE THAT...

Rusk:

Alright, will you state it again?

Interviewer:

YOU HAD SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.N. WHAT WERE THE HOPES WHAT

THE U.N. COULD DO AFTER THE WAR?

Rusk:

We tried our best to get the United Nations off to a good start. We, we

participated actively in drawing up its rules of procedures, dealing

with its organizational matters. We wanted a world that was sketched

out in the U.N. Charter, which was a very good, succinct outline of

American foreign policy at the time. That's no accident because we

played a major role in drafting the Charter. But I think our hopes and

expectations were unreasonably high. We, we expected a degree of

cooperation from the Soviet Union that was not forthcoming and we were

bitterly disappointed to witness a, series of Soviet vetoes which

paralyzed the Security Council, and would not allow it to carry out its

functions. And so, although the beginnings of the U.N. were very

optimistic it did not take long for second thoughts to prevail and

settle down into the realities of the real world.

Interviewer:

IN LIGHT OF THAT EXPERIENCE THAT YOU HAD, WHAT JUDGMENT WOULD YOU MAKE

ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF FUTURE, STRONGER, INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF LAW

AND ORDER THAT NATIONS WOULD ASCRIBE TO THAT WOULD REPLACE THE USE OF

MILITARY FORCE?

Rusk:

Well I think the unfinished business of the world is to allow

international law to deal with the vital points which it has so far

failed to do. For example in the use of law and charter to prevent

international armed conflict, as a matter of fact, most nations, most

of the time comply with international law. The United States itself has

more than seven thousand agreement and treaties with other countries.

And in the course of a single year, less than one percent of those come

up for any discussion between us and another government as to whether

we or they are complying with those agreements. So there's a vast range

of human affairs which is successfully controlled by international law.

But we have not yet been able to use international law to at the point

where it is most needed. That is to curb the use of violence among

nations.

Interviewer:

ARE YOU OPTIMISTIC THAT WE COULD USE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THAT PURPOSE

EVENTUALLY?

Rusk:

Well, for the last sixteen years I have been a Professor of

International Law and I'm naturally hopeful that the role of

international law will continue to grow and spread even though slowly.

And, I, feel that in a nuclear world there is no real alternative.

Because nuclear war is simply that war which must never be fought.

The irrationality of the arms race

Interviewer:

GO BACK A LITTLE BIT AGAIN. OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS GREW TREMENDOUSLY

DURING THE '50s AND '60s AND I WANTED TO ASK YOU FROM YOUR POINT OF

VIEW AT THAT TIME, WHAT WAS THE CONCEPTION THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCES

COULD SERVE US FOR. WHAT WAS THEY'RE PURPOSE?

Rusk:

At the beginning we felt that there might be a use for nuclear weapons

which would make sense in the rational sense, in the rationally

considered. But as nuclear weapons grew it became increasingly obvious

that nuclear war was simply that war which must never be fought.

Because a nuclear war would not only eliminate all the answers, it

would eliminate all the questions. Khrushchev put it very well one time

when he said that, in the case of nuclear war the living would envy the

dead. Shortly after he took office President Kennedy called together

half a dozen of his senior colleagues, including myself, into the

Cabinet room and we spent most of a day going through the results of a

nuclear war, both direct and indirect, and it was a very sobering

experience. At the end of the meeting, President Kennedy asked me to go

back with him to the Oval office to talk about something, and as we

went through the door, he with a strange little look on his face, said

"And we call ourselves the human race." Those who understand nuclear

weapons know that they must not be used.

Interviewer:

WE PLEDGED TO EUROPEANS THAT WE WOULD COME TO THEIR AID WITH NUCLEAR

WEAPONS IF NECESSARY TO DEFEND THEM AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. WHAT WAS

YOUR FEELING ABOUT THAT AT THE TIME?

Rusk:

When we organized NATO and faced the large conventional superiority

which the Russians had in conventional weapons we considered that one

response to the, to a Soviet attack on the West would be, would have to

be nuclear weapons. That has been a part of the NATO strategy ever

since. Now let me add that I have never seen any evidence of a Soviet

intention to attack the West in strength. One comes to that threat by

the consideration of capabilities. The military commander in the field

has to give thought to the capabilities of his enemy and the worst that

his enemy can do to him. Otherwise he might face the destruction of his

own forces. But that's a very different thing than, the consideration

of intentions. I myself do not believe that the Soviet Union and its

Warsaw Pact allies have any intention whatever of attacking Western

Europe in force. They realize that will produce the war which must

never occur.

Interviewer:

WHY IS IT THEN WE HEAR SO MUCH ABOUT HOW WE HAVE TO KEEP PUTTING NEW

FORCES IN AND MODERNIZING OUR FORCES IN EUROPE AND WHAT A RISK IT IS

AND HOW THEY'RE READY TO POUNCE AND THE EUROPEANS ARE ALWAYS ASKING US

FOR MORE GUARANTEES THAT WE WILL COME TO THEIR AID. AND OUR LEADERSHIP

IS OFTEN ASKING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO PAY FOR MORE AND MORE WEAPONRY

AND SUPPORT MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY IN DEFENSE AGAINST THAT

SUPPOSED SOVIET INTENT?

Rusk:

We have participated in an arms race, which fundamentally doesn't make

any sense either for ourselves or the Soviet Union because these arms,

which must never be used. But the race occurs because of the, then

necessity for deterrence. For make, trying to make it clear to the

other side that any attack by him is not on and this is matter which

affects the attitude of both sides. And there's the qualitative race in

terms of more accuracy and better capability on the part of missiles

and that continues on both sides. We and the Soviet Union ought to

pause and sit down and bring this arms race to an end. And I hope the

INF Treaty is the first step in that direction.

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO GO OVER THAT BECAUSE I WAS UNCLEAR ABOUT ONE THING THAT YOU

SAID. THE CORE OF THIS QUESTION IS GOING TO BE WHAT IN YOUR OPINION

DRIVES THE ARMS RACE? IF BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT THE NUCLEAR WAR

CANNOT BE FOUGHT, WHY DO WE KEEP BUILDING MORE AND MORE SOPHISTICATED

WEAPONRY? WHY DO WE HAVE 50,000 WEAPONS IN THE WORLD?

Rusk:

Well, that is to some extent, a mystery to me. How.. I'm sorry.

Interviewer:

YOU NEED TO START BY...

Rusk:

We and the Soviet Union have allowed ourselves to get into an arms race

which at bottom makes no sense. But I think each side is a little

afraid that the other side will achieve a superiority in numbers or in

quality that will tempt the other side to deliver a first-strike, to

think that they can get away with something that they could not in fact

get away with. Its a failure in fact to keep the deterrence under

reasonable limits and for that reason, I myself am in favor of the

nuclear treaties which will go as far as one is able to go within the

limits of verification. But its a little bit like a bank balance.

Interviewer:

I'M GOING TO STOP HERE BECAUSE I WANT TO DO THIS AS A SEPARATE

RESPONSE. IF YOU CAN TRY TO REMEMBER TO LOOK AT ME MORE OFTEN, I THINK

IT WOULD COME ACROSS BETTER THAN YOU LOOKING DOWN. I KNOW IT'S HARD

BECAUSE OF THE LIGHTS. I LOVE THE ANALOGY YOU DO WITH THE BANK BALANCE

WANTING TO BE EVEN BUT A LITTLE BIT ABOVE THE OTHER SIDE. SO LET'S DO

THAT ONE AND ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN WHICH IS WHAT DO YOU THINK DRIVES

THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION?

Rusk:

Well, when you ask me that question directly...

Interviewer:

SORRY, THAT'S DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO...

Rusk:

It isn't easy to explain "Why the arms race?" Each side wants to

balance off the other. Each side, wants, if possible, to get a little

edge on the other. And its a little like a bank balance which, where,

each side wants a plus in its favor. And so that continually feeds the

arms race and then also there are innovations technical innovations

that tend to fuel the arms race. Somebody gets a new guidance system or

somebody gets a new, larger delivery weapon or something of that sort.

Sen. Nunn has complained about the redundancy of weapons in the

American arsenal. We have a great variety of weapons which can reach

the Soviet Union where everyone would think that a relatively few

would, do the trick. But it gets caught up in the indus --

military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned us about.

When something looks like its technically feasible there are people in

our armed forces who want to have it and so but I must say there's a

lot of mystery to me as to why the arms race and I cannot answer the

question directly as to what are all the factors that go into the arms

race.

Interviewer:

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX? DO

YOU THINK THAT IT HAS TENDED TO EXAGGERATE THE THREAT AND HAS AN IMPACT

THAT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?

Rusk:

I think we're inclined to give maximum credit to the other fellows

capabilities and, arm, arms potential. And to minimize our own strength

and readiness. I don't believe myself that the, disparity between the

Warsaw Pact and NATO is nearly important as many people do. But I think

the Russians would have a heck of a time bringing the Poles and the

Hungarians and the Czechs the East Germans to fight with them in a war

against Western Europe.

Interviewer:

THEN WHY IS THERE SO MUCH PARANOIA THAT THEIR FORCES ARE SO

OVERWHELMING AND THEY COULD BEAT US IN CONVENTIONAL WAR AND THEREFORE

WE HAVE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Rusk:

Well, it's probably true if one makes a deliberate calculation ahead of

time because it would be very unlikely that the NATO forces would be

able to repel an all out Warsaw Pact attack if they were serious about

it. And they would not be long, maybe two or three days, before Soviet

forces would be back where the tactical nuclear weapons of the United

States are stationed. No American president will allow the Warsaw Pact

forces to capture those weapons if they were threatened with capture

they would be, they would be used. So all that adds up to the fact that

such an, such an invasion, such a war must never occur.

[END OF TAPE E13043]

Nuclear weapons as a deterrent

Interviewer:

O.K. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU WHAT YOU THINK THE PURPOSE OF OUR NUCLEAR

ARSENAL SHOULD BE AND HOW THAT SHOULD CHANGE WHAT OUR POLICY IS IN

EUROPE IN TERMS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BALANCE

CONVENTIONAL THREAT.

Rusk:

The only rational use of nuclear weapons, in my mind, is to try to

insure that other nations will not use nuclear weapons against us. The

one exception at the moment is the use of nuclear weapons to counter a

massive conventional strike by the Warsaw Pact countries against

Western Europe. But if Mr. Gorbachev could provide Western Europe with

an assurance in some way, that Warsaw Pact countries would never attack

Western Europe then the question of first strike would take care of

itself, it would disappear. Now if we move ahead on nuclear

disarmament, somewhere along the way, there would have to be an

agreement on conventional weapons to redress the balance between the

Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. See, it makes no sense for the NATO and

the Warsaw Pact countries to stare at each other across that dividing

line in Europe. With such large forces on each side, they could do the

same thing with far fewer forces than they have now.

Interviewer:

ARE YOU SAYING THAT RIGHT NOW AMERICA IS PLEDGED TO DEFEND OUR VITAL

INTERESTS AROUND THE WORLD INCLUDING EUROPE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WITH

NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Rusk:

I have not been aware that we have committed nuclear weapons to the

Persian Gulf. I would doubt very much that they would be used in that

situation.

Interviewer:

OH, IT WAS JUST THE CARTER DOCTRINE WHERE HE SAID WE WOULD USE WHATEVER

FORCE IS NEEDED.

Rusk:

Well, I think that was an exaggeration.

Interviewer:

YOU MADE A COMMENT ABOUT HOW YOU FELT THE EUROPEANS WOULDN'T WANT TO GO

TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BECAUSE THEY WOULD REALIZE WHAT THE

CONSEQUENCES WERE. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THAT?

Rusk:

Our friends in Europe tend to rely 100 percent on deterrence. And they

think less of what would happen if deterrence failed but I'm quite sure

that if we got into an actual situation of an attack and a

confrontation of armed forces on each side that the heads of government

in Western Europe would be very reluctant to turn their own countries

into a pile of ashes for trivial reasons. I think that if they looked

at the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons they would not be

gung-ho to get started on that trail.

Interviewer:

IS IT HARD THEN FOR US TO REALLY MAKE CREDIBLE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT

IN FACT WE HAVE THIS POWERFUL DETERRENT FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? HOW

COULD THEY BELIEVE THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD REALLY WANT TO INITIATE THE

USE?

Rusk:

The Soviet Union has to give thought to the presence of those nuclear

weapons in Europe and the, unlikelihood that an American president

would allow them to capture those weapons. If you want to put it, in

one way the Soviet leaders must take into account that we Americans are

god-damn fools and that those weapons might be used and so they have to

take that into account. As a matter of act, the chances are very high

that if there were an all out attack on Western Europe there would be

nuclear weapons in the play. And that is something that Soviet leaders

know and I think would cause them to hesitate, to launch such an

attack.

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. YOU'RE SOMEONE WHO

HAS LIVED THROUGH A TIME IN WHICH THAT RISK WAS BROUGHT TO THE

FOREFRONT A LITTLE BIT STRONGER THAN USUAL AND PERHAPS RELATE THAT TO

OUR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TODAY WHERE WE HAVE TINDER BOXES SET

OUT IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD.

Rusk:

The most important single thing which one can say about this post-war

period, is that we have now put behind us more than 42 years since a

nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. Despite many serious and even

dangerous crises which we have had during that period. I think the

leaders on both sides recognize the that nuclear war is simply not to

be fought. And that has been a saving feature in this post-war period.

After all, dur, the most dangerous crises we've had since 1945 has been

the Cuban Missile Crisis and we came through that without the use of

nuclear weapons. I think that is a strong proof that nuclear war; is

not likely to occur. I'm, I'm sorry that so many of our young people

are being battered with doomsday talk about nuclear matters. Much more

than the traffic will bear, much more than is necessary.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT WE CAN REST ASSURED THAT BECAUSE WE'VE HAD 42 YEARS

OF PEACE, LIVING WITH ALL THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT WE SHOULD

CONTINUE TO RELY ON THAT FORCE IN THE FUTURE TO KEEP PEACE?

Rusk:

I think there's a good chance that these 42 years demonstrate that

nuclear powers are not likely to resort to nuclear weapons because

they, after all they know something about their destructive power. No

I'm very optimistic about the prospects of avoiding a nuclear war. But

I wish I could be optimistic about our being willing to cut down the

nuclear arms race to reasonable proportions. We could, we could achieve

the benefits of nuclear weapons, if there are any benefits, with just

several hundred on each side, rather than the tens of thousands that we

now have on both sides. But I'm optimistic that we'll be able to avoid

nuclear war.

Interviewer:

SOME PEOPLE HAVE QUESTIONED THE MORALITY OF KEEPING THE PEACE BY

RELYING ON THE THREAT TO OBLITERATE THE WORLD. HOW DO YOU FEEL?

Rusk:

Well, that is, that is an important question. Keeping the peace is one

of the, one of the very great moral obligations of mankind. We should

not be in the business of killing off each other. But how you get peace

is a more complicated question. You cannot get peace simply by wishing

for it. You cannot get peace by unilateral disarmament, whereby the

armed battalion will march and take what they want in a short run.

Peace has to be built brick by brick. It has to be earned. Sometimes it

may be necessary to sacrifice for it. But we must never back away from

the objective of preventing war. That is the, one of the principle

moral obligations of the human race.

Prospects for future disarmament and peace

Interviewer:

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO DESCRIBE THE WORLD THAT YOU WOULD LIKE US TO MOVE

TOWARD, THIS WORLD IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD ONLY DETER NUCLEAR

WEAPONS RATHER THAN OTHER FORMS OF MILITARY FORCE AND THAT WE WOULD

ONLY HAVE A FEW HUNDRED ON EACH SIDE.

Rusk:

It would be very difficult to negotiate disarmament to that extent. But

I think we must keep at it and try our best to move in that direction.

But these..

Interviewer:

I'M SORRY. WHEN YOU SAY THAT, YOU HAVE TO SAY WHAT YOU'RE REFERRING TO.

O.K.

Rusk:

Nuclear weapons do not fire themselves. They are fired by human beings,

and usually, one would expect, about something. The overwhelming need

in this present world situation is to try to avoid crises, like the

Cuban Missile Crisis, to try to resolve regional disputes in such a way

as not to involve armed force the road to peace is a road which must be

marked by the, by the settlement of, outstanding political issues. To

remove the causes the war rather than to think that weapons themselves

cause wars. And so we should concentrate bit by bit on the regional

differences that tend to stimulate wars. Not, not only between the

great powers but between the lesser power, smaller countries.

Interviewer:

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO BE ABLE TO STATE THAT YOU THINK WE SHOULD MOVE

TOWARD A WORLD IN WHICH THERE ARE JUST A FEW HUNDRED WEAPONS ON EACH

SIDE AND THAT THEY ARE ONLY USED TO PREVENT, FOR DETERRENT USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Rusk:

As far as I am concerned I would go just as far in reducing nuclear

weapons as the capabilities of verification would permit. If one could

show me how you protect yourself against hiding these warheads away in

salt mines in Utah, in Siberia, in the Hunan province of China. I would

go for nuclear, for zero nuclear weapons tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock

because it's obvious that the American people are less safe today than

they were when no such weapons existed. But I cannot imagine any system

of verification that would protect against such hiding away of

warheads. So I think that we are likely to at the very best come down

to a few hundred missiles on each side which could clearly carry out

the only rational use of nuclear weapons which is to prevent nuclear

weapons being used against us.

Interviewer:

SO YOU WOULD LIKE TO GO AWAY FROM THE SITUATION IN WHICH WE USE THE

THREAT OF USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AROUND THE

WORLD BE IT AGAINST A CONVENTIONAL FORCE OR A NUCLEAR FORCE?

Rusk:

I've, I've talked about the impossibilities of starting a nuclear war

among the great powers. But I think it's equally true that, if a

nuclear power used nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power, that

country would wear the mark of Cain for many generations to come. We

must not expect that nuclear weapons will be used by a nuclear power

against a non-nuclear power just, would have no purpose and the effects

would be disastrous to the country that was using them.

Interviewer:

HARKING BACK TO YOUR EXPERIENCE ABOUT DEALING WITH CRISES UNDER

TREMENDOUS PRESSURE THAT RESULTS WHEN SMALL GROUPS OF MEN HAVE TO MAKE

DECISIONS ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT, NOT KNOWING WHAT'S HAPPENING ON THE

OTHER SIDE. DOES THAT MAKE YOU MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE FACT THAT WE DO

HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SORT OF ON SHIPBOARDS AROUND THE WORLD, THAT WE

HAVE SUCH BIG ARSENALS IN THAT THEY ARE ON SUCH IMMEDIATE ALERT?

Rusk:

I am not concerned that an American president would give any real

thought to the use of nuclear weapons on our own initiative. I've seen

several presidents in action where, in theory, this option is on the

table and could be considered, but I've seen them all reject that idea.

Now we don't have nuclear weapons around the world, that are not under

the control of the President of the United States. And we have

elaborate safeguards against their accidental firing, or against their

unauthorized firing. And so I don't lose much sleep over the prospect

that some general, or admiral, or someone would launch nuclear weapons

without the President of the United States.

Interviewer:

I GUESS WHAT I WANT TO KNOW IS AFTER YOU CAME THROUGH THE CUBAN MISSILE

CRISIS, DID YOU FORM SOME OPINION ABOUT WHAT IT'S LIKE TO ACTUALLY HAVE

TO MAKE THOSE LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS FOR THE WORLD, OR FOR OUR TWO

NATIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE?

Rusk:

During the Cuban Missile Crises we learned some what to me were,

valuable lessons. I think both we and the Soviets came out of that

crisis more prudent, more cautious than we were before we went in. And

we came out of it with a recognition that we must not allow such crises

to develop because they're just too damned dangerous. Now, now that

mood does not necessarily transfer from political leader to political

leader over time. And so we have to be careful that sort of sense is

maintained. But we both had a chance to look down the cannon's mouth

during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We did not like what we saw. And so

that made a profound impact. As a matter following the Cuban Missile

Crisis the two sides negotiated some very important agreements and made

considerable headway, in so doing.

Interviewer:

MAYBE YOU COULD TELL THE STORY ABOUT DRIVING THROUGH THE STREETS OF

WASHINGTON DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. WHEN YOU THOUGHT ABOUT THE

WESTMINSTER SHORTER CATECHISM.

Rusk:

Oh, yeah, I see. Well we did not think that Mr. Khrushchev would use

nuclear weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis but we could not know it.

And therefore we had to take that into account as a possibility. I

remember as I drove through the streets of Washington during that

critical week and saw people walking along the sidewalks and driving by

in their cars. My mind went back to the Shorter Catechism, the

Westminster Shorter Catechism, which I had memorized as a young boy.

The first question of which is, "What is the chief end of man?" Well,

in the catechism it had a theological answer, but I remember thinking

about that question and realizing that this most fundamental of all

questions, "What is life all about?", had become an operational

question before the governments of the world. And that made a

considerable impact upon me.

Space and Strategic Defense

Interviewer:

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN

TECHNOLOGY THAT ARE LEADING US TO BE ABLE TO THINK ABOUT DEVELOPING

WEAPONS THAT WE COULD PUT INTO SPACE.

Rusk:

As far as putting weapons into space is concerned, I have some rather

primitive and fundamental ideas. Back in the 1960s, we developed a

basic treaty on outer space subscribed to by all the nations of the

world. And, it is clear under that treaty that outer space was to be an

area reserved for peaceful corporation and scientific exploration. We

called astronauts, and cosmonauts, envoys of all mankind. We agreed to

make available to everybody the information that we got out of such

space activities. We prevented any nation from claiming outer space

bodies such as the moon, as national territory. We prohibited the use

of space for weapons of mass destruction. Now, the world was dreaming

at that time of a clean outer space. And I would hate to see us spoil

that dream by stationing weapons in outer space and moving the arms

race into outer space. I have serious doubts about its feasibility

anyhow. But my feeling is that the SDI proposals are politically

inflammatory, militarily useless, economically absurd and aesthetically

repulsive. And I hope we never go down that trail.

Dean Rusk's impressions of Mikhail Gorbachev

Interviewer:

YOU MAY REFUSE TO DO THIS BUT THAT WAS A VERY LONG ANSWER AND I THINK

IT'S A VERY GOOD ANSWER. I WAS WONDERING IF YOU COULD GIVE US A SHORTER

SUMMARY OF THE EARLIER STUFF ABOUT THE OUTER SPACE TREATY?

Rusk:

Well, I'll let you I'll let you shorten it if you want to.

Interviewer:

WELL, IT'S HARD FOR ME TO DO THAT. I DON'T WANT TO CUT INTO YOUR

STATEMENT. DO YOU...

Rusk:

No, I don't, I don't, I really don't like to try to go over material.

Interviewer:

THAT'S FINE. O.K. I WANT TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

THE QUESTION IS, WHAT SHOULD WE MAKE OF GORBACHEV? IT SEEMS LIKE THIS

IS PROBABLY THE MOST BIGGEST CHANGE THAT HAS HAPPENED IN EAST-WEST

RELATIONS IN A LONG TIME, THE WAY HE'S TALKING ABOUT THINGS. WHAT'S

YOUR TAKE ON HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND?

Rusk:

I think we ought to approach it carefully and, oh, I'm sorry.

Interviewer:

MAYBE YOU'LL WANT TO START BY SAYING WHAT YOU THINK IS MOTIVATING HIM.

Rusk:

Mr. Gorbachev has aroused a good of speculation about what he's trying

to do and what he's all about. I think we have to approach that with a,

an open mind but with a certain amount of care. He obviously has some

problems at home in his own country. But he also may be opening up

possibilities for better relations and agreements with the West and

with the United States. If so, we should not let the slogans of the

Cold War stand in the way. But on the other hand we must keep our wits

about us. After all, Mr. Gorbachev is a dedicated communist. He has not

thus far seen fit to give up any of the loot that his predecessors

gathered along the way, and he's very active in places like Nicaragua

and Angola and other places around the world. So I think we ought to

give him a chance but we ought to keep our eye on what he does and not

just on what he says. He's a very able man. He's very good at public

relations. He's different from his predecessors in important respects.

So let's give him a chance, take those chances which are promising but

keep up our guard.

[END OF TAPE E13044]

Foreign policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union

Interviewer:

IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND

SOVIET UNION ABOUT?

Rusk:

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union derives

from the activities of the Soviet Union outside their own country. As

far as communism in the Soviet Union is concerned, we've lived with

that since 1917. And we haven't fought a war with them over that

subject. But when they reach out to control other nations, and impose

their will or their system on other nations, that is a concern to us.

And we have to be, we have to be careful about that. In a sense that is

a part of their own ideology. The Marxist/Lenin view that communism is

the way of the future, and that in due time the whole world will be

communist. But we can't accept that and we can't accept the outward

activities of the Soviet Union to bring that about.

Interviewer:

IN WHAT WAYS ARE WE STILL IN CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TODAY?

Rusk:

We have today regional issues with the Soviet Union in places like

Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cuba. Some of these hopefully

can be resolved. But there cannot help but be a degree of competition

between the two of us in the third world. See our view is that ah. ..ah

where there's a nation which is concerned about its own people and is

cooperating internationally, that there's a situation that's in the

interest of the United States. But we do not like a situation where

various countries become clients of the Soviet Union and engage in this

world-wide effort to spread their system. And so that leads to

unresolved conflict. I hope some of them can be worked out in the near

future.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK BOTH SYSTEMS OF BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN SORT OF MESSIANIC

IN TRYING TO SPREAD THEIR INFLUENCE AROUND THE WORLD SORT OF THE WAY

THE GREAT POWERS HAVE ALWAYS DONE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAS

USED FORCE TO TRY TO IMPOSE ITS IDEAS?

Rusk:

That... it may be possible that Soviet critics of the United States can

point to situations where they think we abuse the use of force. But

from their own ideology, anyone who stands in the way of the world

revolution is an enemy. And so that makes it very difficult for us to

resolve these problems with them. But on the whole, if you look back

over the entire post-war period, the policy of the United States, has

been rather grand in character. It is... no one really thinks that we

are interested in taking what doesn't belong to us. That we're trying

to overrun their countries. I think that's generally felt around the

world. By the way one tends to exaggerate the use of nuclear weapons as

a political tool. Because most of the countries of the world can live

in complete assurance that the United States is not going to use a

nuclear weapon against them. And so that doesn't translate into

influencing places like Burma, or Uruguay, or Malaysia, or some place

like that. The role of nuclear weapons has been greatly exaggerated in

that respect.

Interviewer:

THE SOVIETS SAY THAT WE WANT TO BE NUMBER ONE IN THE WORLD AND DICTATE

TO OTHER PEOPLE. WE WANT TO BE THE NUMBER ONE MILITARILY. AND THAT THEY

HAVE BEEN CATCHING UP WITH US AND HAVE HAD TO IN ORDER TO HAVE THEIR

OWN SAY ABOUT THEIR OWN DEFENSE.

Rusk:

I think the Soviet Union claims that they have a job of catching up to

do. That may be true on the economic side. But I don't think that it's

really true in strategic terms. We have not established a colonial

empire such as they have in eastern Europe. We have been in a position

of live and let live so long as they're willing to do so. I think their

propaganda more or less picks us out as enemy number one. When the

problem is they have themselves created the basis for that enmity, for

that hostility.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT WE OUGHT TO HELP GORBACHEV? WOULD IT BE GOOD FOR US

IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE THE STRONGER RIVAL ECONOMICALLY?

Rusk:

It would be in our interest if Mr. Gorbachev succeeds in reorganizing

the Soviet Union and putting it on a more livable basis. We have no

interest in the grinding poverty that exists in some parts of the

Soviet Union. We I think would be more than willing to compete on the

economic, social, political scale and not on the military scale if they

would let us do it. I'm rather hopeful that the changes that Mr.

Gorbachev thinks is needed for his own purposes at the Soviet Union

will have a beneficial effect on their foreign policy and on our

relations with them.

Interviewer:

HOW COULD THAT HAPPEN?

Rusk:

I'm in favor of an increase of trade with the Soviet Union. Provided we

take from them which we ourselves need and can use, such as minerals,

and for... forest products. Not just vodka and caviar. But I'm rather

opposed to our shipping them high technology in exchange for just

loans. Because those loans are in effect a subsidy to their economy. We

ought to work out a trade based upon goods for goods. And services for

services. And I think on that basis I'd be glad to see an expansion of

our trade with the Soviet Union. And there's some signs that is going

to be possible.

Interviewer:

GORBACHEV HAS TALKED ABOUT HOW THERE REALLY ISN'T A CONFLICT BETWEEN

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US ANYMORE. AND WE OFTEN TURN OUR ENERGIES

AWAY FROM THE MILITARY SPHERE TO WORKING TOGETHER ON COMMON PROBLEMS

LIKE ECOLOGY, AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, HUNGER AND SO FORTH. WHAT'S

YOUR FEELING ABOUT THAT?

Rusk:

I think there are some problems which are common to all mankind on

which we and the Soviet Union can profitably work together. The

environment is a prime example. They have done some very interesting

things to protect the environment in their own country. And we ought to

exchange experience on that as much as possible. Then I think the field

of health and disease. We and they can profitably work as closely

together as possible. On the foodstuffs, I think we have along range

interest in the ability of the Soviet Union to as with everybody else,

as to producing more food. Because the. ..the numbers are such that the

growth of the human race means that we're going to face an increasingly

severe food shortage. And the Soviet Union used to be the bread basket

of Europe. Well we ought to encourage them I think to grow more food

and if we can find ways to be helpful, through technical assistance or

otherwise, we ought to do so.

Balance of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union

Interviewer:

MY QUESTION IS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE TRUST OURSELVES AND OUR

MOTIVES IN THE WORLD, AND WE CAN'T QUITE TRUST THE SOVIETS, WHY

SHOULDN'T WE STRIVE TO BE SUPERIOR MILITARILY? HAVE THE POWER TO BE

ABLE TO COUNTER ANY POTENTIAL MOVE ON THEIR PART. WHY SETTLE FOR THE

SITUATION OF PARITY?

Rusk:

The idea that there is such a thing as nuclear superiority, is

illusory. We've reached the point where there's no such rational

concept. Secretary George Marshall used to say to us, "Let's don't

start talking about our problem as a military problem." Because that

tends to turn it into a military problem. And the use of a military

option must always be the very last resort. And so I think we should

proceed on the basis that we're not looking for places to intervene.

We're not looking for chances to employ our armed forces. But we look

at every other alternative first. And be very reluctant to use our

armed forces. I might say that I know something about the decisions

made by the United States to use its armed forces for the last 50

years. And on no single occasion has that been at the initiative of our

own armed forces. Our armed forces are not belligerent. They're

reluctant to take action. And I think that's a very wholesome and

healthy situation.

Interviewer:

YOU HAD MADE A COMMENT IN ONE OF YOUR SPEECHES ABOUT HOW WE HAD TO

LEARN TO INHABIT THE SPECK OF DUST. AND I WANTED TO RELATE THAT TO MY

QUESTION ABOUT WHY... THAT I CERTAINLY WOULD FEEL SAFER IF WE WERE IN

CONTROL, THAT WE'RE CLEARLY SUPERIOR MILITARILY. IS THERE SOME LESSON

THAT WE HAVE TO LEARN?

Rusk:

I don't think that we can aspire to a build up on the idea that we can

ever be militarily superior in this world. As a matter of fact the

relative power position of the Soviet Union and the United States as

being diminished by the spread of power among so ma... so many places

in the world. There are just a lot of things that they, that we and

they cannot do militarily. And I think that's all to the good. No Henry

Kissinger once said, "what on earth is nuclear superiority?" It just

makes no sense to think in terms of being number one, anymore than...

well, as a matter of fact, we never have been number one in a real

sense because even when we had a nuclear monopoly so called, we had

only a handful of nuclear weapons in our stockpile, and we knew that

Mr. Stalin, by espionage, had learned how few we had. And so we've

never really been number one, and don't really aspire to be, or should

not aspire to be.

Interviewer:

THE PART, DIDN'T KISSINGER SAY, "WHAT IN GOD'S NAME IS NUCLEAR

SUPERIORITY?"

Rusk:

Yes.

Interviewer:

I THINK YOU SAID MILITARY.

Rusk:

Did I say, military?

Interviewer:

YEAH, YOU WANT TO JUST DO THAT PART OF IT.

Rusk:

When we think about being number one we ought to remember Henry

Kissinger's remark that "What in God's name is nuclear superiority?"

That is a very searching question although he tended to back away from

it later on. But it just makes no sense because only a few hundred of

these dreadful weapons can wreak indescribable horror upon the other

side. And yet we have tens of thousands of them. So we are in a wholly

irrational situation.

Interviewer:

WHAT DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO DO ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE? DO YOU

THINK THAT...WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO

CONVENTIONAL FORCES? AND HOW DO WE ALTER IT BY EITHER... SOME PEOPLE

SAY WE SHOULD BOLSTER OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE AND BE WILLING

TO SPEND MONEY. IS THAT WHAT YOU THINK TOO?

Rusk:

I was a member of the NATO foreign ministers when we took the first

step in the late sixties to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union

on conventional forces. But we realized at that time that these would

be difficult negotiations because the Soviet Union undoubtedly believes

that for its own purposes in Eastern Europe it needs a substantial

force in Eastern Europe to ensure the loyalty of the countries of

eastern Europe. And there is a... the high probability that the scale

of forces that they feel for their own purposes cannot help but be

perceived as a threat to NATO if they faced west and started marching.

So these... it will not be easy to work out an agreement on

conventional weapons. But I think we have to try and we have to, we

have to get some headway in that field before we can get very far in

further nuclear disarmament.

Interviewer:

YOU DON'T THINK THE SOLUTION IS FOR US TO JUST BUILD UP OUR

CONVENTIONAL FORCES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET LEVEL?

Rusk:

If we tried to build up our NATO forces including our own to the level

of Warsaw Pact forces, it would be a highly wasteful and hopefully

unnecessary if we can get an agreement for them to reduce their own

forces substantially. No, I think we should not turn ourselves into a

military camp if we can avoid it. Because we're not that kind of

people. And that's not the kind of society we want or the world we want

to live in. So I would hope that we would not try to equalize the

Warsaw Pact and NATO forces by massive build up of NATO forces. It

would be, it would be, it would be wasteful.

Interviewer:

DOES THAT MEAN WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO

BALANCE THOSE FORCES?

Rusk:

Under present circumstances of the scale of nuclear weapons we have in

Europe which we have, tactical and otherwise, helps to reduce' the

threat of the overwhelming conventional strength of the Soviet Union.

But I think really our best reliance in that field is the is the lack

of intention on the part of the Soviet Union to launch an all-out

attack against Western Europe. I just don't believe they have that in

mind.

[END OF TAPE E13045]

Budgetary issues affecting national security

Interviewer:

I'M CURIOUS ABOUT WHETHER IN THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS IN

THE WORLD TODAY WHETHER IN A SENSE THE COLD WAR IS ENDING AND WHAT'S

RISING IN ITS PLACE ARE A MORE COMPLEX SERIES OF A POTENTIAL ISSUES

BETWEEN LOTS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS THAT ARE DEVELOPING. AND WHAT YOU

THINK WE OUGHT TO DO ABOUT THAT?

Rusk:

Future historians will marvel at the rapidity with which colonial

empires disappeared, and over a hundred independent nations arrived on

the scene to take their place. This complicates our own foreign

relations considerably because we have to take into account the

attitude of more capitals, many more capitals. Before WWII you could

talk to about seven capitals, and you would have covered the continent

of Africa. Now you've got to touch base with 50 capitals. So well there

are 159 members of the United Nations. We started out with 51. So that

increases our diplomatic burden very considerably. But that's all to

the good, I think. Because I think there's safety in numbers. Safety in

a world in which no one or two powers can divide the world up and

exercise control over it. That would not be a role that the United

States would find comfortable. And so I think that development is on

the whole good. Although some of these tiny states are not viable. And

we could look forward to more regional cooperation among the, within

the third world. But I'm content with the way that problem is

developed.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT OTHER POTENTIAL REAL POWERS, SUPER POWERS? CHALLENGES FROM

JAPAN, CHINA, AND SO FORTH.

Rusk:

There are some third world countries that are far more important than

others. For example Japan is a dominant economic power these days.

There's India with hundreds of millions of people. There's Brazil which

is determined to become the United States of South America. We ought to

develop our relations with such countries on a fair and equal basis.

And learn how to live with them and not be in conflict with them. And I

think we'll find that is relatively easy to do and should give us a

comfort for the long run. I don't think there's much chance at any

country, including the Soviet Union, wants to buy into the problems of

India. Because their problems are too numerous to count. They...

they've done a pretty fair job in taking care of their own problems.

But on trade matters, we have some, and will continue to have some

sharp differences with Japan. But we'll have to work at those and try

to work them out.

Interviewer:

IS THERE A SENSE THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS HAVE ENOUGH INTERNAL PROBLEMS TO

CONCENTRATE ON THAT WE DON'T NEED TO BE IN CONFLICT ALL AROUND THE

WORLD?

Rusk:

I think that is, that is true. I think, I think it is true that the two

superpowers have enough problems of their own so that they could be,

they could spend most of their energy and attention those, and not go

prowling around the world looking for other places in which to

intervene. It is still to be shown that is indeed the... judgement that

Mr. Gorbachev derives from his own analysis of his own situation.

Interviewer:

ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT THE RELATIVE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE UNITED

STATES VIS-A-VIS OTHER NATIONS, AND WHAT SHOULD OUR NATIONAL PRIORITIES

BE WITH RESPECT TO THEM?

Rusk:

I am very concerned about the massive public debt and the deficit that

we've run up in our national finances as well as the very negative

trade balance. It bothers me that we have almost tripled our national

debt in the present administration. I personally believe that the

American people, even though they might vote against it or speak out

against it, the American people are sensible enough to pay taxes if we

have to pay taxes to get our situation in order. And I would expect

that in the next Congress or two, we'll be seeing more revenue

producing steps taken. But to me, there are so many tasks which need

attention and which will cost money in this country that we've got to

give thought to how we, how we manage our own affairs. For example to

me the biggest drug prob, the biggest threat to this country in the

late '80s is the drug problem. I consider that a more serious and

urgent problem than our relations with the Soviet Union for example.

It's going to take a major effort and perhaps a good deal of money to

get that problem under control. But it will, it will eat us up if we

don't, if we're not careful and so to me that's an urgent, overwhelming

issue. But the United States has weathered forty Presidents and we'll

weather some more. It has great resilience and strength in our

constitutional system and I think, we'll, we'll work our way home when

we, when we decide to do it. And I believe myself that the time to

decide is now.

Interviewer:

WHAT SHOULD WE DECIDE. WHAT IS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL

SECURITY AND OUR INTEGRITY?

Rusk:

Well, you know, the large deficit that we are running is itself a

threat to our national security. We've suddenly become the largest

debtor nation in the world instead of the largest credit, creditor

nation. We are depending upon foreigners to carry our debt for us, to a

considerable extent. Well, that creates a dangerous situation because

if they ever start withdrawing their funds on a large scale, we'd be in

very serious trouble. So, I think national strength is a combination of

military, economic, political, and social and morale problems of the

American people and I would hope that we could get to work on those in

the next Administration.

Lessons of the Nuclear Age

Interviewer:

IS THERE ANYTHING, JUST LOOKING OVER THE DOMINANT LESSONS IN THE

NUCLEAR AGE THROUGH YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE THAT YOU FEEL VERY PASSIONATELY

ABOUT. A MESSAGE YOU WANT TO GET ACROSS?

Rusk:

To me the principle and simple and fundamental issue in the nuclear age

is to be sure we never use these dreadful weapons. I take some

satisfaction out of being able to help add to the 42 years since a

nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. Now there have been lots of

mistakes made and there have been lots of crises that are not resolved,

but that is the, by all odds, the most important thing we can say about

this post-war period and I think there's a very good chance that

situation can continue.

Interviewer:

A LOT OF NUCLEAR STRATEGISTS THINK ABOUT THE REASON THAT WE NEED 25,000

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR ARSENAL HAS PARTLY TO DO WITH BEING ABLE TO

DEVELOP ELABORATE STRATEGIES OF COUNTERFORCE AND SO FORTH. OF BEING

ABLE TO USE THESE WEAPONS TO PLAY A GAME OF CHICKEN OR BRINKMANSHIP

THAT THEY ARE WHAT BACKS OUR MILITARY POWER AROUND THE WORLD IS THE

USABILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPON AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT YOU THINK

ABOUT THAT.

Rusk:

In a discussion of nuclear questions a good deal of phony theology has

developed. I would include in that the notion that there can be a

limited nuclear war or there can be a general nuclear war from which

one side can emerge with some advantage. I even think that this

counterforce strategy makes no sense. The, the idea in that seems to be

that if we aim our missiles at only their military targets that will

send them a message and they will then leave our cities alone. Well the

best way to send a message is to pick up a telephone and talk to

somebody. And you try to envisage a telephone conversation between the

President of the United States and the First Secretary of the Soviet

Union about the counterforce strategy and you're immediately in the

world of the bizarre. You I think also that we are guilty of

exaggerating the accuracy of missiles. You've got the geodetic problem

of exactly where the target is on the earth's surface. You've got

variations in the magnetic and gravitational fields of the earth.

You've got the wobbling of the earth on its own axis. You've got

weather conditions at point of launch and point of impact and I

personally am very skeptical about the ability of nuclear weapons to be

precise within a hundred yards of their target. There are all sorts of

phony discussion in this nuclear field and I want to keep it down to

the very essential fact that this is a war which must never be fought.

Interviewer:

HOW BIZARRE WOULD THAT CONVERSATION BE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE

GENERAL SECRETARY?

Rusk:

Well, let's think of that conversation this way. The President picks up

the telephone. "Hello Mr. Secretary, this is the President speaking. I

want you to know that we've just launched a several thousand of our

nuclear missiles, but I want to emphasize that we are aiming only at

military targets and therefore we hope that you'll reciprocate by

leaving our cities alone. How many did you say we, you ask that we

launched? Well, we launched about 5,000 but there will be some misfires

so let's say 4,500. What targets? Well, of course your missile sites,

your submarine bases in Murmansk and Vladivostok. And by the way Mr.

Secretary, since Moscow is your central command and control center, I

want to keep this conversation short so you can get down in your

bunker." You know, can you imagine what such a conversation might be,

just leads you into a crazy world. And so I don't give any credence to

the counterforce strategy.

Interviewer:

I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT BECAUSE THOSE KIND OF THEORIES ARE WHAT

MANY PEOPLE HAVE EXPLAINED TO CONGRESS. WE NEED TO HAVE WEAPONS TO

PURSUE. CONGRESS HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IN ORDER TO MAKE OUR NUCLEAR

DETERRENT STRATEGY CREDIBLE WE NEED TO HAVE THOSE KINDS OF LIMITED

OPTIONS. NUCLEAR OPTIONS. JAMES SCHLESINGER WAS A BIG PROPONENT OF

THOSE. WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS SAY? WHAT SHOULD THE PUBLIC SAY ABOUT TO

THE PEOPLE WHO ARE THE EXPERTS WHO SAY WE KNOW HOW TO TAKE CARE OF

THIS?

Rusk:

There's a lot of bad advice being generated by so-called experts in the

nuclear field. By people who don't understand politics. A friend of

Einstein used to say that he was a genius in mathematical physics, an

amateur in music, and a baby in politics. Well, there's too much of

that going around these days. I think, the Congress itself is allowing

itself to become complicated by some of this discussion. I been, I

listen to the hearings that are held in the Congress these days. You

know I think we ought to ship all the fluff off of these problems again

keep our eyes on the main, the main purpose and that is to consider our

nuclear force as simply a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons

against us and to scrap most of this esoteric discussion of what, this

nuclear situation might be.

Interviewer:

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THIS IS SUCH AN ABSTRUSE

ISSUE, IT'S VERY HARD FOR THEM TO UNDERSTAND. THEY ARE TOLD THERE IS A

THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND WE SHOULD BUILD UP AND MATCH IT.

Rusk:

I think the American people are wiser than we give them credit for. If

we will explain to them what the problem is I think they have sense

that we have needed to strengthen our military capability in the last

several years. But that we should not go overboard about it and turn

ourselves into an armed camp. I think that, my guess is that if it is

fully explained to them that they will react against moving the arms

race into outer space. I think they are opposed to the known waste in

our military establishment. I believe that at the end of the day they

prepare to pay more taxes for the things which have to be done on a

national scale such as the war against drugs and things like that. But

I have great confidence in Americans at the grass roots. I do not

accept the theory that foreign policy is to be run by the elite. I've

seen a lot of the elite in my day and I think that in terms of

practical judgments, sense of direction, common sense that there's not

much difference between the elite and my country cousins in Cherokee

County, Georgia.

Interviewer:

DO YOU SHARE WITH EISENHOWER THE SENSE THAT THERE IS UNDUE INFLUENCE ON

OUR POLICY ON THE PERCEPTION OF THREAT AND SO FORTH AND WHERE OUR

NATIONAL RESOURCES, OUR MONEY GOES AND FROM THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT?

Rusk:

I think we have some problems in our Defense establishment still. For

example the inter-service rivalry where we have the three major

departments, vying with each other. Back in the Johnson years, the

asking price of the three services usually came to about $120 billion

and the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of Defense and President

Johnson would work to cut that back to about between $70 and $80

billion as something which we could afford. Well I have the impression

that here lately the Secretary of Defense has put forward the asking

price of the three services rather than a critical examination of what

was really necessary. And I have a feeling that majors and lieutenant

commanders are searching through the bottom drawers of their desks

looking for ideas that have long since been disapproved in order to

learn how to spend that kind of money. I may be wrong in that. I hope

I'm wrong but I think the American people are capable of accepting

common sense on these things.

[END OF TAPE E13046 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Dean Rusk, 1988

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-pv6b27q08r

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Credits: Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Rusk, Dean, 1909-1994

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 294626420a5e2d3e40fb8387abdde4ac9930518a (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Dean Rusk, 1988,” 1988-04-13, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed January 15, 2025, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pv6b27q08r.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Dean Rusk, 1988.” 1988-04-13. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. January 15, 2025. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pv6b27q08r>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Dean Rusk, 1988. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pv6b27q08r