War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Aaron, 1986

David what was the decision making process that. Led to the proposal for deep Productions a secretary that took to Moscow in March simply said. Well I think it started out during the campaign with the Democratic reaction to the last apostolic agreement. The basic reaction was that the Ford administration and the Soviets had taken their defense plans and stapled them together and said Here we have an agreement and that it did not really in fact represent any substantial effort to use arms control to improve the strategic balance to make it more stable and to make both sides more secure. With that as a background when we came into office we looked at a very wide range of possible proposals and outcomes to the negotiation and we tried to focus on outcomes rather than on initial negotiating positions so that we can if we can can start again so that if we could focus on

restart the whole thing over again. Well when we came back when the Carter administration came into office we tried to focus on outcomes of the negotiation not initial negotiating positions because we were trying to improve the strategic balance trying to make it more stable. The result was that we realized that for salt to to really accomplish something not simply be an agreement for our agreements say it would have to result in substantial changes in both our force posture and that of the Soviet Union in particular that it would lead to overall reductions and reductions in heavy Soviet ballistic missiles. So in formulating our approach to Moscow we in effect set forth what we thought would be a very positive strategic relationship for both sides. And that really was the genesis of the

Moscow proposals the advance took there. I would say that we used the normal national security council machinery. We had study groups and they developed options. They put those options forward to a higher level sort of what we called the Mini special coordinating committee which is what I chaired and then ultimately to the special coordinating committee itself which was a cabinet level body that was composed of Dr. Brzezinski Harold Brown Cy Vance Stan Turner sometimes vice president the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those meetings I think it's fair to say that Harold and I both with our background and so one felt quite strongly that we should make every attempt to really do something about the heavy Soviet ballistic missiles which we believe posed a threat to our fixed land based ICBMs. We weren't certain or confident that we could get the

Soviets to reduce them. But our analysis showed that if you could have done so they would have brought them down to 150 missiles for example even if they were they would not really represent a new first strike threat to our fixed land based missiles. And with that basic analytical point we both pushed very hard for this kind of approach. So you and Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown were all in accord. I think ultimately big was in accord with it as well but it was basically Harold myself did. Was there any tension in these Cabinet level meetings where warranty and Vance never really held up much hope for a major deviation out of possible. Well did they find it. I never got the sense that they fought hard against

these proposals. Perhaps they had their own private reservations about it but they did not seem to take the position that this was an improper effort. They I think subsequent Adler of us time I mean sorry at Moscow. Once these proposals were rejected quite frankly the secretary of state did not react as though he thought they were nonsense all along. In fact he reacted in a very disappointed matter held a press conference and announced that there'd been a great failure which I think was not a mistake to do that. But that didn't reveal. I think on his part that he was prepared to simply go back to Washington and say well you see I told you so. Were you at the ER at the meeting. He was in the SITUATION ROOM in March 12 when

the Dr. Brzezinski chaired. And I'm sure I was there when Carter actually accepted your plan. My understanding with Dr. Brown made the presentation. Yes that's correct. Can you tell us in sort of first person what what happened what Brown said. Well now Secretary Brown said that the greatest strategic problem that we faced was what to do about the increasing vulnerability of our fixed land based missiles and our intelligence analysis demonstrated to us that at the level of technology that the Soviets were and then if we could have constrained the number of heavy ICBMs and then precluded any number of developments we could have avoided the situation which we have today where we are increasingly worried that the Soviets could carry out a first strike against our land based missiles and destroy them more. This seemed to herald and

to me and ultimately to the president to be a worthy objective for a strategic arms agreement it would bring about greater stability. And so the president listened to him. He listened to I and to Paul Warren. I think the two of them were more concerned about what they're going in position was going to whereas Harold was really talking about what is our long range objective. The president made the decision that this would be a good going in position. And if we could get it a very good outcome as well. And so what did the president say. Well it was it's interesting to get stories I mean know. But I can tell you the truth I don't remember his exact words. All I can tell you is the president decided that what he wanted to do and the critical decision at the meeting was not so much on what the shape of the proposal was going to be.

The critical decision was how was it going to be presented to the Soviets. And there was some discussion of Shouldn't we call in Ambassador to Britain and give him a preview shouldn't we give him a letter that outlined our proposals so that when Secretary Vantz arrived in Moscow they would have had some time to digest them and they could have some useful give and take. SY didn't like that idea and neither did the president for that matter and they decided that I would go to Moscow and lay it out on the table there and then see what reaction it could get. I think my own experience and previous administrations had been that this was not a good way to go. I think there were others in the room that may have had some skepticism but he was the secretary of state. And Mr. Carter was president so now you say eventually Brzezinski came along when he was skeptical. Now big didn't have any particular view of it. He was very cautious in the early years

on the subject of strategic arms and arms control. He didn't consider himself an expert in the field. I think it's fair to say relied a lot on me. And so if Harold thought it was a good idea and if I thought it was a good idea he generally speaking one long there was a remarkable confluence of the carter's instincts for reductions. And Senator Jackson is that were they in agreement this time. That's not my recollection. Now Senator Jackson had come forward with the proposal that I believe it had been prepared by Paul Nitsa to have that. Senator Jackson had sent the president a proposal in a letter which said what you should strive for is a thousand single warhead ICBMs on both sides. This would be most stabilizing. In other words repeal the multiple independent re-entry vehicle the Merve get

rid of them and let both sides just have single warheads. Well I certainly didn't object to that kind of a strategic relationship and nor would Harold Brown but both sides had invested so heavily in Merv's that we didn't think that was a realistic proposal. So at this at that point we decided not to go forward with that kind of a proposal. But I guess what I was getting is both the Scoop Jackson and the president were interested. We're concerned about all of you were concerned about the havoc. Everybody was concerned about trying to do something to use salt to redress the increasing vulnerability of our ICBMs. We had you know two problems. One was how do we get the Soviets to stop developments that would make them vulnerable. And secondly what could we do on our own. And of course that ultimately led to the next decision. I mean you would have been much more comfortable at the time getting the Soviets to do something about their own heavy missiles that are building our

own building the I-Max to do math is that I mean that's the other way to neutralize the Soviet system. Well the other way to meet them the way to meet the problem of the Soviet heavy missiles and big Merve missiles is to decrease the vulnerability of our systems and TMX of course has two aspects to it. One is it's a great big missile somewhat like the Soviet heavy missiles and the other is that it has to be based in a way that would make it less vulnerable. Those are two very separate things. And when the president decided on a mobile shelter arrangement out in the western deserts that was rejected by the following administration. And of course today we have no system for making them less vulnerable. Did you have a sense at the time of Carter says that he thought of the excellent. Now if you didn't have a real antipathy or an early 77 to

a new weapon system did you get that sense from just talking to me. Well my I think the president's position on strategic weapons was very well summed up by him before he was sworn into office. He met at the Blair House with the chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he said to them imagine that you could design the Strategic Forces for both sides not only just for us but also for the Soviets what would be the most stable secure strategic posture for both sides at the lowest possible level what would it be. And then he tossed out a number he said for example would it be 200 submarines on both sides. He was thinking that they are very invulnerable. That's a low number and so forth. Well the Joint Chiefs of Staff were shocked by this discussion and it didn't take more than 48 hours for the story to get into Evans Novak and to become a

cause celeb. But the president as this president. President Reagan was deeply interested in trying to do something substantial about the strategic arms race not just do something at the margins not just something incremental. And that's what he looked to do. And so he I don't think he was anxious to deploy new or better or different kinds of strategic arms if in fact he could achieve the same result in terms of security by actually having reductions. But he didn't. The efforts to get the Soviets to reduce the number of their heavy missiles in March failed and the higher ceilings were accepted. So the president had to go with the next decision that these rights are some people are right. Because he doesn't let others do with it rammed down his throat. We are at the end of the meeting and June 4th of

1979. Yes. Yes. Well what happened ultimately was the Soviets were not prepared to limit their heavy missiles so dramatically. You have to remember that the heavy missile had always been seen by the Soviets and solved as compensation for the fact that we had all these aircraft and other strategic non-strategic but nonetheless powerful nuclear systems deployed on the periphery of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia and elsewhere. And what happened in Seoul one part of the sort of unstated deal was that the Soviets got to keep their heavy missiles. And we got to keep what we call our forward based systems. Now nothing had changed in that respect as we got in Seoul too. But the Soviets did ultimately accept a supplement on their heavy missiles. It was probably very close to what they planned to do to begin with. But it at least accepted the form of our concern if not the substance of it. And of course the present administration the Reagan administration

is trying to lower that supplement to 150 in effect that they've gone right back to the proposal we made in March of 1977. Now once that kind of an agreement emerged and it was clear the Soviets were going to have a substantial number of heavy ICBMs we had two problems. How to reduce the vulnerability of our ICBMs and there are also those who are worried. Don't we have to respond in kind somehow. Don't we also have to have a heavy ICBM. But that was a very debatable proposition from a strategic standpoint from a political standpoint looking at where the president stood with the Senate. His popularity in the country and all the rest it was quite clear we didn't want to be demagogue on the issue. We didn't want to have to somehow explain that we don't have to have one just like they have. So the decision was ultimately made to deploy the heaviest ICBM that we could build and still for an imminent manned silo that turned out to be the current Macs. I think the president was not happy having to make that decision. But I think he had to bow to the political realities

of trying to get the so-called agreements ratified. So there was a real concern about the vulnerability of our. There was a very genuine concern about the vulnerability of our ICBMs and even though there have been subsequent studies and there's even debate at the time as to whether the vulnerability was real whether the vulnerability meant anything given the fact that we have all these bombers and all these submarine missiles. A lot of people said what difference did it make. Well there are some of us who are fairly conservative on this question and did not like the idea that any major component of our strategic force will remain vulnerable if there was something we can do about it. And I believe there was something we could do about it. In fact there's something we can do about it today. But of course nothing has been done about. What was the primary motivation for the president agreeing to the max Do you think that was the president's primary motive or motivation for green to the max.

Was that something had to be done about the vulnerability of our ICBMs. We also had the political issue that the Soviets were deploying these big heavy missiles which have been turned into this great bogeyman from a political standpoint. So he wanted his old agreement and for his solar agreement he had to accept the big impacts. Bear in mind we looked at a lot of different mixes some of them would have been very small and mobile like the current middleman others would have been very large like the current IMAX. Was this big to satisfy the domestic opposition or with the big four to thwart the the the Soviets in the world with any sense that they could use their big missiles for diplomatic good that well the desire to have a big missile that would match the Soviets was motivated on two fronts. One it was motivated domestically because there were people who felt

for parity for perceived parity to be looked like equals in the world we had to have a big missile too. And then of course there were those who genuinely believed that that argument. And so the president I think felt that strategically he didn't need a great big missile to somehow show his manhood. But he did recognize the political the fact that several people did a lot of very important people believe. Well once the decision was made just before the summit. But what does that say about the whole question of how one how the U.S. deals with the Soviets. Does it suggest reassurance and restraint or strength and intimidation. Was it a mixed message. We were communicating. I think there was no doubt that Dr. Brzezinski felt that it was important to make the decision on the size of the missile if not the basing mode

before we met in Vienna. He also had felt previously that it was important to go forward with the normalization of relations with China before reaching another soldier agreement. So I hear from. So I think there's no question but what he felt it was important to show strength not only to the Soviets but to our domestic critics who had now by that time in the history of the administration decided that the theme of weakness was the most powerful they could use against the president. What did the the salt treaty mean. What was good about it. What was forget about the process. But once the document was signed Why was it important. Well I think it was important for several reasons. I think that fact I think the agreement was important for several reasons. First of all

it did carry the process forward to a new level of sophistication and a new level of constraint. You know the arms race that we faced over the last 20 years has been both qualitative as well as quantitative it has represented an explosion of technology as well as an explosion of numbers of actual weapons. And in fact the two have gone hand-in-hand. This was the first agreement that really began to put real limitations not only on the numbers and to bring about some reductions which it did but also to very importantly to control technology. Up until that agreement it was sort of judged the technology was something you couldn't control. How can you control technology. We didn't have that philosophy. Our philosophy was that man makes choices and people can make deals and you can make a deal and make a choice that says we will not pursue this kind of technological avenue beyond a certain limit. So I've always felt that the real importance of salt too is that it

demonstrated that you could in fact in your own interest and in your mutual security interests control technology. There were a lot of spinoffs of that. It gave us a baseline in which to direct our intelligence our monitoring capabilities against Soviet technology. It brought a lot of rules and regulations about the extent to which the Soviets could encrypt their telemetry. It did a number of very important technical but strategically vital things like that and it committed both sides doing it. And I think in that sense it was really a breakthrough agreement and I would hate to see a trashed crash yesterday. I don't know what. I never did talk about Africa. And the Horn of Africa and one of the key questions I think is whether or not Dr. Brzezinski really cared about

the that we get to that. You went to Ethiopia was it early 78. Yes. The president is a Mengistu Mengistu. But what was the purpose of going there. What happened. Well I went to Ethiopia in 1978 because there had been a war raging between Somalia and Ethiopia for some time. Mr. Mengistu came to power during the Ford administration. And at first there was some hope that his revolution against Haile Selassie and the people who had ruled the country for so many thousands of years might well be a reasonably moderate one. It didn't turn out that way. And very quickly the Cubans moved in and pretty soon we had Cubans fighting Somalis in the golden desert and we had in fact an interesting

situation in which the Soviets switched sides. Prior to the war between Ethiopia and Somalia the Soviet Union had been an ally of Somalia. They had been in the base and Berbera on the Indian Ocean. I was sent to Ethiopia in 1978 in order to warn Mr. Mengistu not to invade Somalia because by that time we had changed sides. We were tacitly supporting Somalia not in the war but in terms of its own security. When we start it all over again. OK. I went to Ethiopia in 1978 because we were deeply concerned that the result of the war that had been dragging on between Somalia and Ethiopia would be that Ethiopia would invade Somalia and that the Soviet Union which by that time was now supporting Ethiopia with not only military assistance but the

support of Cuban troops that the Soviet Union would also capture recapture the strategic port. Captain bever she says get me started one more time for that. OK. I was in Ethiopia 1978 because we were concerned about the consequences of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia. It had been raging for some time following a revolution in Ethiopia in which Mr. Mengistu Colonel Mengistu replaced Haile Selassie. Prior to that time of course Ethiopia in a very close friend of the United States Somalia on the other hand had been a very close friend of the Soviet Union. In fact the Soviets. Some people said had a base in Berbera. But when the Somalis invaded Ethiopia the Soviets suddenly changed sides. They were supporting these

two. They encouraged the Cubans to come in to support Mengistu and they were kicked out of Berbera. Suddenly we saw the prospect of the worst of both worlds. Not only were the Soviets getting into Ethiopia but they actually might through the Ethiopian army conquer Somalia and get back the base at Berbera. So I was sent out there to warn Mr. Mengistu against invading Somalia. And that presented me with my message. It was not an easy message to deliver because like Haile Selassie Mr. Mengistu kept lions on the grounds of his palace. And in fact he kept the Lions right under his office and as we sat there discussing this subject every time I was trying to make a very strong point I would suddenly hear this roaring underneath my feet and I couldn't help but look down and wonder whether I was about to be lunch. But as it turned out he gave me assurances that they were not going to invade Somalia.

And I think that really was not because of my role but I think that was an important accomplishment in securing our position in that very troubled area. Did the National Security Council see Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia as part of a grand design. I think that we saw when we saw the Cubans go from Angola where they moved in during the late Nixon early Ford administration and then into Ethiopia where they moved in early part of our administration and their activities in Grenada because we were even concerned about that. We saw that as a deliberate challenge to American interests in Africa and elsewhere.

We had discussions of various points with the Soviets and with the Cubans about it. And they took a very cavalier attitude. They said that was of no interest to us and refused to recognize our concerns. I think there were legitimate concerns and that there are two models so look two ways of looking at the Soviet. So simplistically one is a set of pipes is this view of the grand design the the ideological expansionist than the other. But I think the State Department shared Sean and said that they are a strategic opportunity to take advantage of a power vacuum. Now it's hard to place. BRZEZINSKI I think he tilted more towards the sort of the grand design the Soviets on the move for their own sort of deep rooted Soviet Russian Grand Design reasons.

Do think he tilted more towards well. You know in the two great theories of how you interpret Soviet behavior the theory on the one hand that they have a grand design that's slowly unfolding and the other theory that they're simply opportunists to seize the strategic advantage when they can. I think that Dr. Brzezinski probably leaned more to the latter. But you know if you seize every strategic opportunity you can. It doesn't really make much difference whether you have a grand design or not. The only difference really is if somehow you had some clear timetable or you are willing to up the stakes because your timetable couldn't be met and so forth. I don't think it's fair to put the Soviets in the same frame of mind as Adolf Hitler who did have a timetable and did have a grand design for German conquest.

The Soviets really are in a different category it seems to me they believe their system will triumph. They must be they they derive legitimacy at home through that philosophy. They have to demonstrate that the system is triumphing from time to time that makes them very dangerous and it makes them quite aggressive from time to time. But I don't think it means that we're not in a position to respond to it. And when we do respond effectively to to reach an accommodation. BRZEZINSKI wanted to create it militarily with a carrier task force into Somalia. The Ethiopians get across their border but I gather all this came to a head between Brent Vance and Brzezinski and NSC meeting in early October 78. We were there do you recall the tensions are different because you remember what the issue was. I think it was as I understand it the State Department had a

re-evaluation of policy and decided what the grand design was local conflict and then Brzezinski wanted to come in with this carrier task force. Disagree. I mean this was involving Ethiopia. Yeah. And I said No my. As the time as our concerns about the Horn of Africa deepened. It was quite as big wanted to do something that was dramatic to prevent that whole important strategic area from falling into the hands of the Soviets. And so we developed this plan which was to bring a naval task force into Berbera and dispatched me as an emissary to Mengistu both a show of force and hopefully a show of persuasion I might add at that time I also went there with some humanitarian aid for Ethiopia which had been held up and because of the turmoil in that country as a gesture of goodwill as well. Unfortunately the Navy did not want to move a carrier task force into Burbank. And when we had a

discussion of why they said well it would be too vulnerable there. And we said well loanable but you have four teams to deal with this. And they said well you know I said and when we said vulnerable they said well yes the Soviets are there with make 15s. And we said Well but you have 14. I mean two generations more advanced. And they said well they might just get lucky. So this show for us was a show for us that was not supported by the Pentagon nor the Chiefs. They thought it was too risky and that's the reason it didn't happen. Secretary Vance may also have opposed it. I don't recall that with the reading that I've done it's suggested that that is a big wanted to get

it here. Vance wanted to see this as a local problem and not in terms of he's best term and that resist the things that are one not to deal with that militarily Radzinsky you know written that salt lie buried in the sands of the argot that had taken a more aggressive action we would have would not have the feeling of weakness among the Congress wouldn't have been there. There may have been a treat. Do you have a feeling that. I think he was out of the feeling that he wanted to speak up. He wasn't afraid of speaking up doing something. I didn't think it would hurt so or probably thought it would help so what was his really what was what were his feelings about the relationship of what we did or didn't do in the book of crisis

to the prospects of a solid degree. Well I think that speaks of strategy and his view was in turn. I think that's Vega's approach to how you build congressional support for a sold agreement was to show that it was the result of tough policies of dealing firmly with the Soviet Union and responding strongly to efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to either expand their power or undermine friendly regimes or to prove their geostrategic position. I think side's view was that you can't get a solid agreement through the Congress unless you have a positive political atmosphere but you don't have a you must have a constructive sense of engagement with the Soviet Union. Well the facts were that we were having a number of very nettlesome regional problems with the Soviets as they made an effort to expand their power and influence. And you

could choose whichever school of thought you wanted but unless the Soviets showed some restraint we weren't going to be able to get to that positive atmosphere which I think sy correctly considered to be an essential element of getting Senate approval and unfortunately confrontation would only produce that positive atmosphere if it worked. And so it was very important to try to select the proper ground for doing that. My only regret about the Ethiopian mission and the conflict in the Magadan is that we didn't make more of the success that we had because in fact Mengistu was perfectly right in being able to reclaim the territory that had been lost to the Somali invasion. We didn't make enough of the fact that we got concessions out of him or assurances out of him that he was not going to go further and go into Somalia. If we had

made more of that I think it would have looked as as it was as a very positive development for stability. Unfortunately the result was that it didn't add much to the situation. If we'd had a big confrontation. I'm not sure we would have gotten that assurance he didn't have to give it. Was that Dr. Brzezinski concern that by taking forceful action we might jeopardize that. I think he was less concerned that that would happen. I think his view was that if we didn't take forceful action in some of these situations like Afghanistan and so forth. So it would be jeopardized anyway so that there was no way to accommodate to increased Soviet pressure and expansionism. I think that jejunum was good. It was a fair judgment. I happen to agree with him. The issue always was in my mind. Where do you draw the line. It's very important to draw the line. Place we when you draw a line in the place where you can't

win or where even if you win it isn't very clear or it's ambivalent. Then you end up with a kind of a mishmash that could be politically damaging. David would you sense that. BRZEZINSKI Well what was more important to having a full agreement or confronting the Soviets were necessary on the table. Well I think his biggest priorities were always the security assets and that meant in his judgment. So I think his biggest priorities were to advance the security of the United States. I think he started in office as someone who believed in arms control and believed in the thought process. I think he was also deeply concerned about growing evidence of Soviet assertiveness. I think he believed that the time was fine but it had to be reciprocal and it had to involve restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. And as

events unfolded in the course of the administration I think we all saw that Soviet assertiveness at a number of areas was running contrary to their desire for a detente that was expressed exclusively in terms of arms control. And when we got to that point is when you had the great falling out in the administration you had Cy Vance and Paul worki on one side saying that arms control should be insulated from these other political developments the horn of Africa Afghanistan what have you. And then you had Zbig saying no this is all one part. You can't have a differentiated policy towards the Soviet Union. You have to have a unified policy and I think that at that juncture certainly after Afghanistan it's big felt that you could not go forward with the this ratification not because it would affect

because Afghanistan would affect the prospects of ratification but because you simply can't do business with the Soviet. I think you know you have to still go after him I mean you're going to interview him. OK. Casey gives me ten minutes. I see the line all along was hey this is not we're not looking. But the American people and their representatives in Congress will make it. I think Dr. Brzezinski was very reluctant to link Soviet behavior in a place like Afghanistan with the strategic arms agreement. I mean he understood the overriding importance of avoiding nuclear war and I think he believed that the solid agreement contributed to reducing the risk of nuclear war. But as he frequently put it Soviet behavior does affect the political atmosphere within which we can do anything whether it be strategic arms negotiations or trade or

cultural arrangements or sports. And the Afghan invasion was such a blatant disregard for the entire international community it was such a wanton act of aggression that I believed he felt that would have been a mistake to go forward with ratification even if the Congress would have been willing to do so. Of course it was not wanted. What are the reactions to the Soviet observer. That's one of our reactions Piers was to hasten the normalization with China. What did the National Security Council. It's a big see in that normalization. Did he see this as as part of the tilting towards the Soviets. If so how did he differ from the State Department.

Well I think Dr. Brzezinski viewed the normalization of the relationship with China as a fundamental strategic interest to the United States. It was his judgment that despite the tragedy of the postwar history of our relationship China and the United States had had a long history of cooperation and mutual respect. Unlike the relationship between many European powers and China the result was that he felt we should go forward as fast and as far as possible in establishing a normal relationship both for its own sake in terms of the stability of Asia and for the what he felt to be constructive effect that would have on the Soviets in coming to terms with us on strategic arms and other kinds of problems. Felt and I think correctly that you will never have peace in Asia without the cooperation of China and that many of the tragedies Korea Vietnam might have been avoided if indeed we could have preserved our relationship

with China. In any event it was quite clear that we had an historic opportunity to solidify the opening made by Dr. Kissinger and the next administration. And he was determined to solidify it. But he wasn't really more in terms of the security aspects of the relationship when he was in favor of dual use technology. He was in favor of encouraging our allies to sell weapons. I think he was also deeply concerned about Soviet pressure on China. And I think he judged that the internal situation in China might well change depending on the degree to which the Soviets were able to put pressure on them and it was quite clear that part of that that was quite clear that the Chinese needed a form of security relationship with the West not explicitly the United States that will strengthen their hand in dealing with the Soviets.

And for that reasons big support and dual use technology sales to the Chinese he encouraged our European allies to have a military supplier relationship with China and we did a number of other very important things that would give the Chinese confidence not only of their relationship with us but also confidence in standing up for themselves and their relationship with the Soviets. Was he involved in the timing of Doug's visit to the United States. Yes but I don't know. I mean did he feel it was him. Did he worry that when the visit was at the time or very near the time when Brezhnev was going to have to come to the U.S. and the same that meeting between right now that would have been later that would have been later. What was he going to do in January. Was it within a month. Think came in

December. Right. What was the hope that that the result would be signed. Yes there was there was hope that the soul could be concluded in late December early January and is a BIG looked the dung tramping visit as extremely important in solidifying the relationship. For two reasons one it would have been important agreements were to be ratified in effect by the visit. But even more important this was the first visit here by a Chinese and he was very sensitive to the fact that every American visitor a high ranking visitor had always gone to China instead of any Chinese coming here. And this was a repetition if you will of the of the Chinese imperial relationship with the outside world. He felt it was time to reverse that. And it was time to tell the Chinese that he wanted a reciprocal

relationship. Then you are going to have to visit us as well. Can we cut this right now for a moment. Yeah. Well talk to me. Was anybody worried. BRZEZINSKI worried that that danger is coming to the United States would alienate so close to it that when they opened the sadness that it would jeopardize the South Korean. Or do you think it would have. I never heard any arguments that improving our relationship with China whether that be the normalization agreements themselves or the visit have done shopping would somehow derail the solid agreement. It was our judgment that the Soviets had an important strategic interest in the solid agreement and that that would transcend that relationship being normalized with China. And we recognize that they were neuralgic about it but

I don't believe anybody thought that this was going to somehow stop Seoul. In fact to the contrary I think we thought it might well encourage the Soviets and try and be more accommodating and so how did the NSC perceived Soviet involvement. All right. Well it was unclear to us exactly how much Soviet influence existed during the time of the Iranian revolution. The two to party existed it was underground. Its exact scope was not clear. The Soviets did have assets there. And as we were thrown out we became increasingly concerned because we had no source of influence whatsoever in the country. And so there was a deep concern that in all the turmoil and revolution the two party Soviet agents of influence might rise to the surface there. I think in the end it turned out to be a misplaced concern whether inflammatory

broadcast every American Soviet empire the Soviet Union during the revolution did try to whip up as much anti-Americanism as possible. It was only after our hostages have been taken at the embassy that we really leaned on the Soviets and said listen this is a deeply unfriendly act and you ought to shut it off. Now that they moderated that to some extent. How did how did Brzezinski see the invasion of Afghanistan. Did you see it in the framework of a grand design or that it was simply that they always trying to maintain a pro Soviet regime against the Islamic Jihad. Well I think Dr. Brzezinski his view of the invasion was that it might have been precipitated by instability in the country by the fact that increasingly the Afghans wanted to be assertive of their own independence and ultimately then

the Soviet backed communist party elements in the country acting against that. I think it started out that way. I think he saw it that way but it was pregnant with strategic implications because it did move the Soviet Union much closer to the Gulf. It was a flanking movement on both Pakistan and Iran and we were deeply concerned that it might only be the first more steps particularly given the fact that Iran was in such a state of disorganization and turmoil. Could we have defended it. Could we have defended the Persian Gulf if we had we looked at the question of whether the United States alone could defend the Persian Gulf. And the answer to that is not in the sense that we can defend West Germany or the United States itself. It's a very long ways away. The Soviet Union is very close. The geography however does permit the possibility

of if you will drawing a line in the sand and saying if you cross over this you will meet a determined American resistance and that American resistance would have had to be I think most people think nuclear to be effective. Did you have any sense. Did you ever discuss this with Kerger. He writes that you know our reaction will be the military and not necessarily in a place of the Soviets choosing which is very reminiscent of the first of those massive retaliation. The president I believe fully understood that the Carter Doctrine carried an implicit threat of the use of nuclear weapons. That is why the language broadly speaks of all means or something of that sort. And that phraseology was not because we were being coy

it was because we were being clear. And I think that the president understood the importance of what he was saying the start the Soviet brigade Cuba. How is this discovered and does this represent a big intelligence failure to be accountable. Well the brigade in Cuba flap was precisely that a flap that kind of basically substantively meaningless issue that takes on a very great political importance. Substantively the intelligence community had simply lost track of the fact that there were some combat elements in Cuba that like many Soviet combat elements. It had a little skeleton

headquarters that called itself a brigade and that it trained once or twice a year. It was different in a somewhat different form it was leftover from the Cuban missile crisis but it had remained in Cuba in different forms since that time. And with the deployment of intelligence assets to the strategic questions to Vietnam to any number of other issues they basically had lost track of it. And in nineteen seventy eight we began to get some indications that there was some strange activity there that we hadn't noticed or that the intelligence community had not noticed before. It was the White House that kept asking What is this what is this. Find out more about it. Unfortunately the answer came over Labor Day weekend when almost no one was in town and the decision was made to immediately inform the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who

for his own political reasons went out and announced it as though suddenly the Soviets had made a massive troop deployment to Cuba. And then of course the fat was in the fire. We were already in the process of beginning to skirmish over salt. The campaign of 1980 was already under way with charges that the Democrats were weak and this was seized upon in that context. Do you think that was his input. Well what kills sort of I think saw was killed by the invasion of Afghanistan. I don't think there's any question that despite all of the problems despite the Cuban brigade despite the seizure of the embassy in Tehran and everything else when we did our nose counts it was clear that we had to within two or three votes ratification. And we had a half a dozen senators who

said listen if you need my vote in the last you know if I can be the last vote I'll be the last vote in a situation like that you can have the highest confidence you going to have pretty good confidence that you're going to prevail. And Bob Byrd had planned to have the debate begin in January as soon as the Congress got back. In fact we were going to try to have the vote before Christmas and because of the press of other business it was postponed. I often wonder what would have happened to the Senate to the Democratic Party and to the president if in fact we'd had a ratification vote if all these senators and walk the plank for Saw. And then the Soviets hadn't invaded Afghanistan as they clearly were planning to do. When the president said I've learned more about the Soviets in the last two weeks than I did now and my entire previous career that's really what he was talking about. They had either no comprehension or no regard whatsoever for the relationship that they were supposedly trying to establish with the United States that could not have been a

more destructive thing than to ratify assault and then invade Afghanistan. That would have been the end of arms control not just for two administrations or two terms of a president as we've seen now. But I think it would have been 30 years before we had another arms control agreement. Some people who feel the Soviets have gotten so frustrated by going out in the fall on the missile brigade happens on that they give it up and saw what happened there what they wanted to do anyway had there have already been ratified they would have found a way to achieve that. I think the Soviets were in a bind. They felt for whatever reasons they had to move in Afghanistan and were determined to do so. They were hoping against hope that maybe they could get the Seoul agreement ratified first and they could have their cake and eat it too. They rushed out and told everybody immediately Oh we we didn't kill salt the Americans did and we just went ahead with this because it was already dead. You know they went

around say told everybody Soviets went around and told everybody Salter's already it was already dead before we went into Afghanistan. That just wasn't true. That's just nonsense. The president even before he was sworn in met with what is presented for us. Right before the president even came into office. He met with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the members of the Joint Chiefs in order to discuss fundamental military and strategic questions. And I think his basic attitude was made clear in that meeting in which he asked the military chiefs if you had an opportunity to

design the strategic forces of both sides not just ours but the Soviets as well. What would you want. How would you design it. What would be the lowest level of strategic forces that you would have on both sides and still have a stable and secure America. And he at that point went forward with it. And at that point he said for example what if we only had two hundred subs launched strategic missiles on both sides on the grounds that those are the most secure and most survivable. That of course caused great consternation among the Joint Chiefs and it wasn't more than 14 hours before the idea that Carter wanted to unilaterally go down to 200 submarine launched missiles was in the newspapers via EVANS NOVAK. But the fact of the matter is is he proposed what would we do if we wanted both to go down. And I think

that it showed that he came to Washington determined to make some changes just as the current president has been interested in the most sweeping forms of arms control. So was Jimmy Carter. And that really was his fundamental orientation. He was concerned about the survivability of our land based forces he was concerned about all these strategic questions. But I think he fundamentally felt that you had to try to get beyond those questions and try to get nuclear weapons back to a minimal part of the American security posture if you could do the same with the Soviets. What was Brzezinski what did he push came to be known as P.B. 15 counter-force darker. What was that. Smith has written that it was the caps don't have a policy of seeking to shape for a year. What was his policy. How do you know that. Well I always viewed PD 59 as a kind of

maverick. You know Mr. Reagan I never felt the 59 was central to the president's policy or for that matter. Dr. Brzezinski as each administration had come to the point of having its own strategic doctrine and from that standpoint I think as big was anxious that the Carter administration make its imprint on nuclear strategy he had no preconceived ideas that I was aware of about what that strategy ought to be. And as a result of what we did was go back and look at the so-called Slesinger doctrine. Now in fact Piddy 59 doesn't go very far beyond the Slesinger doctrine and the Slesinger doctrine was designed to say what would we do if a nuclear war actually happened. Would we push the button and let everything go or would we try to have some more limited response. PD 59 tried to answer that question and it said yes there should be a

limited response and we should have the command and control that would make it possible to have such a limited response. In other words the whole philosophy behind it was to try to keep Armageddon or catastrophe from happening even if nuclear deterrence failed. Now a lot of people have misinterpreted that as saying what the PD 59 called for was a warfighting doctrine that the only way you could have deterrence was an ability to conduct small strikes and a protracted nuclear war that was not the basic philosophy. That's the philosophy now. BT 59 has been taken and used for that purpose. But in my judgment the real origin of it was in the event the worst happens. How do you keep the total end of the world from happening. How do you do something more limited now. It's been overtaken by people who say the only way you keep the worst from happening is to be able to have a limited response fight a nuclear war etc. etc.. So I think it was very much in line with the idea of

trying to reduce the consequences of the fact that we live in a nuclear world. You represented President Carter on trips to Europe early 78. Were those political pressure building up against them about what happened. Would you say what was the answer. Well I was sent to Europe after the neutron bomb fiasco in order to deal with the rising concern particularly in the part of Chancellor Schmidt about the Soviet deployment of SS 20s. It was the long range intermediate range of nuclear weapons that were targeted at Europe and for which we had no effective counterpart. Our reaction was initially that this is nothing new. The Soviets had SS threes and fours and fives all of which were intermediate range nuclear weapons. And this was a modernization. The right response to it we felt was American central strategic forces and the submarines the Polaris submarines Poseidon submarines that we had

assigned to secure. Well Chancellor Smith's response to that was to give a speech in London in which he said you've got to respond to the SS 20s now and in the light of the problem of the neutron bomb where nobody in the alliance covered themselves then in glory we felt that it was very important to respond to this fear on the part of the Europeans. And it was very deep. I think the fear we're going to have to get out. But let me just let me just finish this. The Europeans had seen us go through Vietnam they seen us go through Watergate. They were deeply concerned that strategic arms agreements would either lead to a condominium or a lessening of the American commitment in Europe. And so when the SS 20 started to be deployed with the Soviets they really wanted an American response. And the problem was in trying to get them all together because while they wanted an American response they didn't want to take very much responsibility for themselves. And my job in going to

Europe was first of all to tell Chancellor Schmidt and the president of Italy and the president of France Margaret Thatcher and so forth that yes we were really going to respond and then to go back and tell Jimmy Carter Yes Chancellor Schmidt is really going to accept it because you have to realize that the neutron bomb fiasco was not in decisiveness and Jimmy Carter's point from Jimmy Carter's point of view. It was the fact that at the last moment the Germans said we can't be the only ones to deploy the neutron bomb. And Jimmy Carter's reaction was Well I'm not going to push it down your throat. And that really was the basis of it. And then when Carter talked with Schmidt he said listen I'll take all the responsibility but I'm not going to you know put you in a position where we're forcing you to accept nuclear weapons. Now when we came around to the problem of dealing with the long range intermediate range missiles it was very important to keep everybody working from the same sheet of music so that we didn't have the same

neutron bomb fiasco all over. And that was my job to try to keep them all marching together. If the Neutron Bomb Bomb flap would have been less necessity to modernize they have attacked the weapons. I think from a political from a political standpoint if there had not been the neutron bomb fiasco there would have been less requirement to respond to the SS twice with these deployments for a military and strategic standpoint. Those arguments and pressures would still exist but it became an overriding political concern that the alliance be able to take a nuclear decision and not be intimidated by Soviet propaganda or by demonstrations or anything else. And that was I think the prime underpinning of the decision that was announced in December of 79.