War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Jurgen Todenhofer, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES C01022-C01023 JURGEN

TODENHOFER

Reykjavik Summit

Interviewer:

MR. TODENHOFER, I'M GOING TO START OFF BY ASKING YOU ONE OR TWO

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT, WHAT DID YOU AND YOUR PARTY

EXPECT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO BE DISCUSSING AT

REYKJAVIK? WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND TO BE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING

POSITION BEFORE THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT?

Todenhöfer:

We expected what President Reagan and what the American administration

had said before. They said that they would meet in Reykjavik to prepare

a summit. This wasn't a summit, it was a pre-summit and everybody has

been very surprised, I think also the American administration has been

very surprised that the Russians came with prepared papers and now we

have to live with the result of this summit. We wanted that Gorbachev

and Reagan would meet together... We wanted a meeting between Gorbachev

and Reagan and I think such a meeting is always useful but from the

point of view of diplomatic negotiations it's a really very silly thing

to go into such important negotiations without being prepared.

President Reagan hasn't been prepared for it, he had a prepared letter

in his jacket and he wanted to take this letter and read this letter to

Mr. Gorbachev, so Gorbachev said, "Let us discuss now about the zero

solution, about the total elimination of the strategic weapons," and

Reagan accepted that, but he and his team weren't prepared to have such

a discussion, and I don't remember a conference with such important

results where one side has been so badly prepared and where the side

which wasn't prepared accepted to discuss the problems which hadn't

been prepared before.

Interviewer:

OK, THANK YOU, NOW WHAT DID THE PEOPLE IN YOUR PARTY SAY WHEN THEY

HEARD WHAT HAPPENED IN REYKJAVIK?

Todenhöfer:

We heard a lot of things about Reykjavik, at the beginning we heard

that all the strategic weapons would be eliminated in the long run, in

a ten years plan, then we heard that only the ballistic strategic

missiles would be eliminated so the first rumors were very confusing

but we heard also that the Russians proposed a zero solution for long

range intermediate range nuclear weapons, for long range INF and this

was for Germany the big news, but the funny is that in Germany the

opposition, the Social Democrats, said this was a Black Friday because

at the end of this pre-summit in Reykjavik, President Reagan said, "Now

let us go back in our capitals and let us reflect, if you can go on on

the results that we have reached now," and it wasn't a Black Friday for

the Socialists and Europe, it was the beginning of a new time of

disarming, the problem is that I'm a friend of arms reduction, of

disarmament, the problem is that you have really to take the

responsibility, that you take the right weapons away not the wrong

weapons away and I have the impression that, and that's my the most

difficult part for me when I think about Reykjavik that they didn't

speak about conventional disarmament and the problem of the West

Europeans are the conventional weapons. We don't like the nuclear

weapons but we have the nuclear weapons because the Warsaw Pact has a

gigantic convention superiority and there we have a certain amount of

nuclear weapons because we don't have the money and we don't have the

system to build up the same conventional military power as the Warsaw

Pact countries have.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID YOU YOURSELF DO, I BELIEVE YOU WENT TO WASHINGTON AND

COMPLAINED IS THAT CORRECT?

Todenhöfer:

It is correct that I asked a lot of questions several days after

Reykjavik and because some of the positions that the Americans took

during this summit and some of the positions that President Reagan

seems to be ready to sign haven't been consulted. There was no

consultation with the allies and I think if the Americans have

negotiations with the Russians about Western security, they have to

speak with their allies, with their most important allies and they

didn't do that.

Interviewer:

DID YOU FEEL THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED AT REYKJAVIK PLACED THE AMERICAN

NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN SOME DOUBT?

Todenhöfer:

Of course, but the first thing, I'm not speaking now about the

intermediate range of nuclear weapons, Reagan accepted and on this

point we have two versions. Reagan accepted to eliminate all the

nuclear, this is his version, strategic ballistic missiles in a ten

years time... period and this would mean that in ten years wouldn't

have strategic missiles any more and we would have no more INFs and

this would mean that we would have the huge conventional superiority of

the Warsaw Pact without this nuclear deterrents we have now and this

would change completely the strategy of the Western countries. This is

completely unacceptable for us.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT URGING ON THE AMERICANS AFTER REYKJAVIK,

WHAT, I WANT YOU TO DESCRIBE FOR US WHAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS

TRYING TO BRING ABOUT AFTER REYKJAVIK. WHAT WAS IT URGING THE AMERICANS

TO DO? WAS IT URGING THEM TO GO SLOW WITH THE RUSSIANS, WAS IT URGING

THEM TO, WHAT WAS IT URGING THEM TO DO?

Todenhöfer:

Here you should ask a member of the German government, I have to

control the German government, I'm a member of the Parliament and the

Parliament has to control the government but as far as I'm informed, we

had certain questions. One question was, "What about the conventional

superiority, why haven't you mentioned the conventional superiority,

why didn't you find a solution for the conventional threat for Western

Europe," and the second question was concerning this complete

destruction of all the ballistic missiles, strategic ballistic missiles

in ten years, or even of all the strategic weapons, all airplanes and

other weapons in ten years, and I think that this was the position of

the other allies too and in another point, several governments have

been backing the Americans especially as far as the zero solution on

the intermediate range nuclear weapons was concerned Here we had a

common position, this wasn't my position, but there existed a common

position.

Double Zero Solution

Interviewer:

CAN I STOP YOU THERE AND ASK YOU ABOUT THE, WHAT IS IN ENGLAND REFERRED

TO AS THE "DOUBLE ZERO." IN OTHER WORDS THIS IS WHAT EMERGED WHEN MR.

SCHULTZ WENT TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1987 AND ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE

SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND MR. GORBACHEV SAID, "WELL IF YOU ARE WORRIED

ABOUT THEM, WE'LL GET RID OF THEM TOO." DID YOU AND YOUR PARTY WANT

SHORTER RANGE MISSILES ELIMINATED OR WOULD YOU HAVE PREFERRED TO MATCH

THE SOVIET'S CAPACITY IN THAT AREA? WERE YOU UNHAPPY WITH WHAT

HAPPENED?

Todenhöfer:

I think this question is not fair because I don't want weapons at all,

I would like the Russians to take their convention superiority away and

then I would say we don't need nuclear weapons any more.

Interviewer:

ON THE SPECIFIC POINT OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SCHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE

CAME UP WITH.

Todenhöfer:

You said, we would like perhaps to match and to have weapons, you don't

like nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons for us are a necessity against

the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, a necessity to

guarantee our freedom and our common liberty in Western Europe, but we

said of course, the first zero solution the government our government

said, the first zero solution OK we are going to accept it. I think all

the governments who accept this first big zero solution concerning the

long range INF see the big risk they take, because it has a decoupling

effect concerning the United States, but to take also the weapons away,

the missiles away with the range from 500 kilometers to a thousand

kilometers was... a new problem, nobody had asked that before, it was a

new problem because it allows the Warsaw Pact to concentrate in a

crisis its armies and its troops on certain points and the Western

countries would have no possibility to make such conventional

concentrations impossible and there was no need to take the... one away

or to sign a treatment and to accept a second zero solution and I must

say the Western Governments have been backing the Americans concerning

the zero solution for long range INF and also my government has been

backing this position, but as far as the second zero solution from 500

to 1,000 kilometers was concerned, we didn't back, my party, the

biggest party in Germany, the party didn't back this solution because

it destroyed something which is very very important in an alliance, the

risk sharing in Europe. We were told by English politicians that they

were quite happy with the double zero solution because now the World

was going to construct a fire wall with a range of 500 kilometers

around Germany and we ha-to continue to live in this fire wall and you,

you're very happy to live outside this fire wall the Italians are

living outside this fire wall, but we Germans, whenever a military

crisis could exist or could start in Europe, we would have to have

short range or shorter range missiles from zero to 500 kilometers. You

will live in the happy positions that no land based missile will after

double zero solution, will be able to reach your country, and perhaps

you understand the feelings of German politicians but also of the

German population, if I tell you that I think that in this case, not

only the Americans let us alone, also your government let us alone,

also the French let us alone.

Interviewer:

LET US DOWN, IS THAT WHAT YOU MEAN? CAN YOU START AGAIN, IN NOT JUST

THE AMERICANS.

Todenhöfer:

I wanted to say... In this case or as far as the double zero solution

is concerned, not only the American administration didn't back our

position, didn't help us, also the British Government, the French

Government and all the other Governments we asked for support let us

down, and there is a bitter feeling that we see now that you are in a

much better position as far as your security is concerned than our

country, and there is a bitter feeling to see that our risks in Europe

are much higher than the risk of our friends, they are still our

friends, of the Americans, they take the weapons far away to the United

States and destroy them there but there is also a different risk

between us and between the British people, the French people, Italians

and I don't think that it's good for the alliance.

Interviewer:

NOW ON ONE SPECIFIC POINT, WELL ON MANY POINTS BUT SPECIALLY ON THE

POINT OF THE PERSHING IIS, CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD TO GIVE WAY, NOW WHY DO

YOU THINK HE GAVE WAY ON THAT, PERHAPS I SHOULD ASK CHANCELLOR KOHL,

BUT AS YOU'RE IN THIS ROOM...

Todenhöfer:

I personally think it's the same reason, we got official signs that the

Americans would be ready to accept that the Germans would have the

right to keep their old Pershing IA, but we had also very clear signs

that the Americans and the other allies would never accept that the

zero solution would not be successful because the Germans would keep

their Pershing IA and these signs were so clear and after these moments

where we had the impressions that we were completely alone in Western

Europe when the Western countries, when your government showed us that

your government was backing the double zero solution, the French showed

us that they were backing the double zero solution, I think that

Chancellor Kohl said, "It was enough," and he didn't want to get this

feeling again and to fight again for a certain amount of security for

our country and after several weeks or some months just to see that the

British and the French and the Americans would leave us on our own

again and I think that's the main reason. I don't know exactly what was

working in his heart but I think this is one of the main reasons.

[END OF TAPE C01022]

America Acting Against German Interests

Interviewer:

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION] THE FINAL QUESTION HERR TODENHOFER, DO YOU

THINK THE AMERICANS HAVE PROPERLY LOOKED AFTER GERMAN INTERESTS? THE

AMERICANS PRIVATELY TEND TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS ALWAYS GET SORT OF

AXED WHENEVER THEY TALK TO THE RUSSIANS, THE GERMANS ALWAYS GET... NOW

DO YOU THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE LOOKED AFTER THE GERMANY'S

INTEREST PROPERLY, OR DO YOU THINK THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH

THEIR OWN POSSIBLY RATHER MORE SHORT TERM POLITICAL NEED TO HAVE A

QUICK FIX, HAVE A QUICK THING THEY CAN PARADE AT HOME AND THAT THEY'VE

NEGLECTED GERMANY'S INTEREST AS A RESULT?

Todenhöfer:

You know I've had, during the last years after the deployment of the

Pershing II and the Cruise Missiles, I had to fight these fights during

this time. I have police around my house years and years. My children

see more policemen than other people, it is because I had to fight for

the deployment of the Pershing because everybody said we need this

flexibility and this coupling effect to improve our strategy and I

don't like missiles, I don't like weapons, but I make no difference

between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. I have told... that

and we had very close contacts with the Americans, they are still our

friends like the British are still our friends, and the French are our

friends, that's the reason why I'm so disappointed. I think the

Americans, the American administration in Reykjavik and after Reykjavik

has accepted certain results which are in the interest of the United

States but not in the interests of my country, and I am very clear when

I say I know exactly what I am saying when I say, the risk, the

military risk, the risk of a war, the risk in war time after the zero

solution will be much lower for the Americans, but much higher for the

Germans, that's the result. We have lost... and something and I

understand partnership and alliance in another way. For me an alliance

is I am ready to defend the interests of my friends of my allies, but I

expect also that our best allies, the Americans, the British and also

the French, should fight for our interest and I don't know, we are now

in '87 what will happen in the '90s when other young Germans will have

to take decisions. If they will really say our security is really

guaranteed by the United States, I say, yes, I say, yes, even if I see

all the things that happened during the last ones, but I'm not sure

what the next generation will say because I tell you, when you read

that everybody's happy about the dismantling of the weapons, that's OK,

because people don't like weapons but I think that a lot of people have

realized that the Americans didn't care that much about the German

interest and I repeat one thing for us, one thing is crucial, the most

crucial thing for us is the conventional disarmament and the Americans

aren't interested to solve this problem because they cannot be attacked

by conventional army. They'll solve their problems when they get an

agreement with the Russians to take the missile away or to reduce the

number of strategic missiles by 50 percent, they don't have the problem

of conventional weapons but we have it and we have it now in a much

more dangerous way than we had it before Reykjavik.

[END OF TAPE C01023 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Jurgen Todenhofer, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-pr7mp4vw3t

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Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Todenhofer, Jurgen, 1940-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 4e5b29157d9f8c84a8b819c907850cd42c0e1282 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Jurgen Todenhofer, 1986,” 1986-12-16, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 3, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pr7mp4vw3t.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Jurgen Todenhofer, 1986.” 1986-12-16. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 3, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pr7mp4vw3t>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Jurgen Todenhofer, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-pr7mp4vw3t