Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Clark M. Clifford, 1981

I have consistently supported our country's policy in Vietnam from the beginning. I recall that in the late summer of 1967 President Johnson sent General Mike Taylor and me to call upon all of the nations in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific with whom we were fighting the war and. I had supposed that that trip would merely confirm the wisdom of our policy. It was a very different experience for me in visiting these countries who were our allies. I found that they did not have the same fear about the spread of communism in Southeast Asia that we had so sharply here in the United States. You recall the General Eisenhower then President Eisenhower had used the expression the domino theory. He was concerned that should Vietnam fall that then all of the other nations of Southeast Asia might topple one after another like dominoes. And we had accepted that theory. So had the Congress

in their vote on the Tonkin Gulf resolution the country in the beginning I think was very substantially behind the policy. I found in that late spring or summer of 1967 that the countries much closer to the problem and we did not have the same concerns as way it made me uneasy it worried me. I wondered made me wonder a little whether or not the basis of our policy was correct. I came back there and along with General Maxwell Taylor we wrote a report submitted to President Johnson. We had long talks with him together the three of us. General Taylor took a rather different view than I at the time I think to some extent I was influenced by his attitude that maybe I'd been attaching a little too much importance to some of these conversations. President Johnson seem not impressed with some concerns that I had expressed to him at the

time. So basically I still supported our country's policy. You know I didn't I maybe didn't do it quite as enthusiastically as I had before. What impact did the Tet Offensive. When you look at your life what is the Tet Offensive when you were if you became secretary. One reason the brain reason that I was not too concerned about the uneasiness I had in the fall of 67 was that the reports coming back from our military and civilian authorities in Vietnam were all exceedingly optimistic about the progress that we were making in the war and it looked like possibly we were getting near the end it was toward the end of 67 that our military said well we can see the end of the tunnel at this time. And there was some talk that some of our

men might even be back by Christmas. That has a great tendency to minimize and allay concerns that you might have because it seemed it was going very well in our favor when Tet came. It was a complete shock to me. I had not known that the North Vietnamese had that kind of strength I might say neither did our military. Neither did the president. I know of no one who anticipated the Tet could be the debacle that it turned out to be. The North Vietnamese moved into South Vietnam. They moved very fast. Many of the South Vietnamese troops were away on leave at the time and it appeared as though an enemy that we thought was close to defeat wasn't at all that it had great strength that moved tens of thousands of well armed well-trained troops and they moved very rapidly on the offensive so that the Tet Offensive created deep

concern in the United States because it indicated the war was nowhere near over. And it even might be that the North Vietnamese were doing better than we in the war. You became secretary of defense for age 68. It's all her fears and worries. We have work to do. What do you mean by that. You have a plan at that stage about what to do with the war. I didn't at the very beginning it was when I went into the Pentagon and I still believed in our policy. I didn't recognize that Tet was a serious setback. But we've had this policy for so long and it had become such an ingrained part of us. But I still believe that President Johnson appointed a task force as soon as I went into the Pentagon and named me chairman of the task force. The reason was that the military had specifically requested

200 6000 more troops be sent to Vietnam. He wanted that analyzed. He wants to determine how the troops could be gathered and sent what the social political economic impact might be on the United States. The first three or four weeks in the Pentagon I gave most of my time to this examination in depth. I know for three full days I spent down in the tank with the Joint Chiefs of Staff where you sit with all of the communications devices that go all over the world. We had long talks. How long would it take they didn't know how many more troops would it take. They didn't know. Would two hundred six thousand. Answer the demand. They didn't know. Might there be more. Yes there might be more. So when it was all over I said What is the plan to win the war in Vietnam. Well the only plan is that ultimately the attrition will wear down the North Vietnamese and they will have had

enough. Is there any indication that we've reached that point. No there isn't. As a result of that kind of interview and that kind of information before the final examination was over and we submitted our report to President Johnson I had turned against the war. I found out that we couldn't win the war with the limitations that we had which I thought were correct limitations. And I thought that all we were going to do was just waste the lives of our men and our treasure out in the jungles of North and South Vietnam. So that. By time I reach that conclusion. I then decided that what I must do would be to get all of the strength that I could because the mere fact that I had reached the conclusion was not very significant because the decision really lay with President Johnson. I remember talking to Harry McPherson and I talk to people in the state like in state department like Nick Katz and back. We began to develop a group

and I know that after a while the question would be very secretly. Is he with us. That means is he part of this group that is organized and dedicated to changing Lyndon Johnson's mind was almost like that. Some very similar expression used in the French Revolution. Is he with us. U.S. and we finally worked together that way. I think I bore the brunt of it because it was appropriate that I should in starting in then within a month or five weeks after I landed in the Pentagon our major aim then began to change the policy of our country in Vietnam. What do you think of restos proposal as he was landing in North Korea. Was that your conversation. Yes it was a question of sharp difference between him and me. Yes.

The question raised by Mr. Ross at one time was that we could win the war and what we should do is send our troops into North Vietnam and he even had a plan. We would start a naval vessels with Marines and all and we would curve around in the China Sea and then come in about halfway up to Hanoi and then go through North Vietnam and cut a line right through North Vietnam so they no longer could get down into South Vietnam. It sounded like an excellent idea. It was basically fallacious. It was in my opinion a tragic approach to the problem and the background of it was for many years North Vietnam had had a mutual assistance pact with Red China so that if at any time North Vietnam was attacked by ground troops who were attempting to conquer

North Vietnam they could call upon the Red Chinese who would come to their assistance at that particular time. We questioned every prominent South East Asia and Far Eastern expert. They were absolutely unanimous in saying if we invaded North Vietnam with American troops unquestionably North Vietnam would ask for aid from China. It would be given and we would then be embroiled in a land war in Southeast Asia with Red China which had no limitation as to the millions of men that they could put in the field against us. It seemed to me under the circumstances that was the worst possible move that could be gained. Great leader President Johnson's credit he never really seriously considered doing. He also at the same time never seriously considered the military recommendation that we go over and spread the war out in Cambodia

here. He thought only that made it a wider and larger war with more casualties on each side. And so he also refused to spread it into Cambodia as he refused to spread it in the North Vietnam. Let's go back a moment to the task force as we've got in. The taskforce spent two or three weeks investigating all of the factors. With reference to the military demand for 200 6000 more troops I've concluded personally that we should not send those troops in the process I had concluded that we must find a way to get out of Vietnam. I believe I had quite a lot to do with leading the task force in that direction and that was the thrust of the report that we made to President Johnson. The

report was exceedingly disturbing to him. He had felt that we've been heading in the right direction. And now comes a report of this group man in whom he had considerable confidence that we should not only not send the troops but that we should begin to find the way to get out of Vietnam in the process we met daily sometimes we met twice a day. The relationship between him and me became very strained at that time and it remained quite strained there after he felt that when he had signed me to the Pentagon post that I would be a strong resolute supporter of the previous policy. And here I was crumbling before his very eyes and it was exceedingly disturbing to him. At the same time he was impressed by the fact because we've been friends for 20 years and worked very closely and it had a very forthright relationship with each other. It had a very real impact on me because within a

month after the time that I first went there and within a month perhaps after Tet he made his speech of March 31 and that speech was almost a complete reversal of what the speech started out to be as a quick illustration. The first few sentences of that speech in the original draft said I wish to talk about the war in Vietnam. That was the first sentence. By time the speech was written and rewritten. We worked days on it before it was given. The first sentence read I wish to speak about peace in North Vietnam. Just a complete hundred eighty degree turn and then we talked about in that speech as you know he stated he was not going to send the 200 6000 troops but also the great shocker at the end of that speech was when he did something I had absolutely no previous word are warning about. He also announced to the American people at the end of that speech that he was not going to run again. We'd all

assumed of course that he would run. He loved the job he reveled in it. And yet he would reach that decision and announced it to the American people on March 30 first 1968. We go back a moment after that says for it forces that while it was coming to his conclusion it's conclusions. The president also consulted with a group known as the wise men. He supported his meeting with this. What did you hope this meeting would accomplish. He had met with them once before maybe a year before. And there was a group of wise men and some 11 or 12 senior advisors from different administrations had advised him that his course was correct in Vietnam. After Tet I had come into contact with some of them men I knew Dean Acheson and Ambassador Murphy men or men of that kind I'd come in contact I'd found that Tet had bothered them really quite a lot

so far. Additional contacts showed that there were other members who might be in the process of changing their minds from their previous meeting of a year ago. So it was suggested to President Johnson that while this difficult period was going on that he might call the wise men together he called them together they met in the late afternoon at St.. And had a series of briefings and he came and had dinner with them and we spent the evening with the president. The result was all that some of us had hoped far because a substantial number of these men a majority of these men had changed their mind about Vietnam and it was an extra a valuable block in the construction that we were doing in an effort to persuade President Johnson to change our country's policy in Vietnam. Fact is he was so disturbed about the report that he

got from the individual wise men that the next day had the military and State briefers in to see him personally to find out why it was that they might possibly have misled the wise men into the belief he learned from them that that they'd given a fair briefing in that the wise men had been terribly concerned about the results of Tet the same thing to you personally. You recall after we got this. Only that he thought that it was an unusual and curiously abrupt change of position. He was suspicious of it. He wasn't ready to accept it as it had been given. He thought that there might have been some diabolical plot so that the briefings might have been planned or framed in some way to impress the so-called wise man. That's why I think it was the very next day called in General Abrams and three or four others and concluded that

the briefings had been fair. But he did not want to change the policy has been a policy that he lived with. I was with him one time in Cam Ranh Bay when we'd been at the the meeting in the Philippines and he had them all air together and he said Gentlemen I expect that you'll nail a coonskin on the wall. It's an old Texas expression and he wanted to win the war and he wanted them to win the war and now here was a group saying Mr. President stop trying to win the war. Start cutting back. Don't send any more man. We think you ought to get out was a very bitter pill for him. Did he suspect you. Well it was a very wise man. It's possible. I don't think he ever charged me directly with it but

it's possible that he felt that I might have been expounding my views to them in an effort to change their opinion. I think he probably learned that after a while it wasn't anything very secret about it. The secretary of state proposed this time for sure. Well I mean you agree with that proposal. You think we should go further. Yes civil rights Dean Rusk and I have been friends for a great many years since the Truman administration when he proposed that partial bombing halt. I was an altar boy opposed to it in that form. I felt that it wouldn't do the job correctly. I thought it was piecemeal. There were some of those who thought that it might be offered on the basis that it would very likely be unsuccessful. And then the president and his chief advisers could say to the American public we see

we've tried everything and it hasn't worked. So now let's get on with the battle and if the military wants more man let's send more men and let's get on and win the war. You think the president really wanted to escalate the war after that offensive. Do you think that he saw this scenario the same way to us. I believe that the the president was hoping stale was to win the war. We've been at it from the time that he took office in November of 63. And here we were now in 68 and he very much wanted to win it at the same time when his top advisors began to turn. It seems to me that he didn't have much basis then. To go against that

advice and accept the military and put all those men back in there also may be even more important. He was exceedingly sensitive to the attitude of the people. That's when there were marches in the streets and big bonfires and young people opposing the war in Vietnam many of them leaving the country even giving up their citizenship to avoid it. There was the question of getting the man you were going to have to call up hundreds of thousands of reservists to do this. There was great concern that the people would stand for it. It was going to cost billions of dollars more at a time when that would have been very very unwise because we were beginning to see the first symptoms of inflation setting in. So there were any number of factors there were also some political factors some of his Democratic adversaries had begun to

question the war and we had an election coming in November of that year 968 there were a number of factors that made him very uneasy about developments we got specifically to the speech the speech is very interesting. When I watch 28 I didn't stop oh stop it you know you're right. With this question as often times happens after an event that was as important as Tet there will be different theories offered after an evaluation has taken place. The military made a determined effort to make it appear as though it had been an American victory. I have never been able to accept that at the

time of Tet the American people were supposing that we were winning the war and then this massive attack by the enemy that was not supposed to have had anything like sufficient strength to bring off that offensive meant that the war could go on forever almost. And I construed it as exceedingly serious setback for our cause and that in my opinion was very definitely the attitude of most of the American people at the time. I think you talk about a good thing. March 28. Meaning which you met with was let's do one the very fierce and review the speech the president was good with words there very well. What was your reaction to free speech. With reference to the March 28 meeting on the speech that was to be delivered on March 30 first in order to understand the significance of

that meeting you have to know that from the time the Tet was over and from the time we had the task force operation during the month of March the sides on the debate stiffened and sharpened some persons around the president felt that we should get on with the war that we should send more troops and stay with it until we won. Others felt as I did that this had been the final indication that the war was not going to be won and that we should begin to find the way out. With the speech coming the importance of that speech became paramount. Some meetings were held. Efforts were made to persuade this person and that person to stand up under pressure and so forth Let's persuade the president to make the decision to begin to get out of Vietnam. Finally the morning of the twenty

eighth came in we met in the office of the Secretary of State Dean Rusk. There were five or six persons there at the time. We started in and we went through a draft of the speech. I thought the draft was dreadful. I thought that it was harsh. I thought that it talked about the continuation of the war. It talked about Ted how Ted could be resolved. There was some suggestion about sending some of the man not the whole two hundred six thousand. To me it needed much changing much Amendment. So what was started out as a speech merely to go through and polish it became a deep seated divisive policy meeting until by the end of the morning the whole matter was absolutely at sea again. There really was no speech some of us felt so strongly

about. Then other drafts were prepared. We were very fortunate in having an ally in the White House Harry McPherson extraordinarily able man who felt that we should withdraw from the war so that as the draft proceeded I think his influence was an important one and by time we came to the final reading of the speech. The speech had changed very materially until it was no longer the war like hawkish speech that it had been much more conciliatory than it had been and even contained in it an offer to begin the kind of negotiation that some of us wish for so heartily yacking. When we finished the meeting of March 28 and the Office of the

secretary of state the speech was almost completely at sea. He was to give the speech just some three days later on the evening of March 30 first. So in that three day period there was a furious effort made by each side and discussing it with the president. We had to continue to have meetings each day and bringing others in who had influence on the president in an effort to wean him away from the harsh draft that had been read and present a more conciliatory approach to the problem so that by the time we sat down in the cabinet room on the afternoon of March the 30 first to go through the final draft. The effort at persuasion was referenced President Johnson had pretty well been

completed and he had become persuaded that the draft that was more an amelioration than the other should be the draft that he should select. I had learned that that was to be the draft if we were to go over I'd learned that from Harry McPherson that morning and I thought that it had been a signal victory and when we went through the speech I thought that I might hear objections from those who had opposed that particular draft but I think they felt that the battle was pretty well over and that proved to be a polishing speech. He said nothing however about the paragraph that he added which he announced that he was not going to run again. What do you think prompted him. So you think the capture of rivalry is do you think it's offensive.

I think not each person has his own theory about it was a very important and dramatic decision that he made. I attribute 90 percent of the credit for that decision to Mrs. Lyndon Johnson. Keep in mind that 10 years before he became president he'd had a very very serious coronary. I know his doctor doctor said that's the worst coronary of any patient he ever had who lived and President Johnson lived and the repair was reasonably good. But it went through this very very difficult five years. And Mrs. Johnson wanted to very much to retire she didn't think he'd live through another term. She just kind of kept at it day after day week after week and I think she had more to do with persuading him than anybody else. I think all these others are political concerns the war he'd fought through all of those he was a very tough

man. And those those didn't frighten him he expected the job to be tough and he would have gone right on with it. I think she persuaded him to quit after he gives a speech on March 30 first as you know this is a forcible revolt with sending American troops. Where did we was taking American polls. Basically what was already what you see as your role. Your task directing American policy for the Defense Department. That's. What that decision really meant and I think a few of us sensed that at the time it was a decision of profound importance. It meant that he was not going to go on and try to win. That's what it meant and it meant then that if he turned down the military request for the 200 6000 and he put this conciliatory language in to

try to start negotiations then it became our job to do everything in our power to find some basis to start the negotiations. And as you may remember within or within a week after the delivery of the speech we had a signal from the North Vietnamese that they were ready to start the talks. But one thing I think we have clarified here. Weren't you the one who made you know it's been two and six years for us. That is possible. I don't remember the details of it so long ago but we had a series of press conferences all during this critical period and thereafter in which we tried to stay a bit ahead of the policy and enunciate the policy that the president might move toward that wouldn't be too difficult for him to move toward

rather than just have a breach between the White House and the Pentagon. And it seems to me that at some time we began giving out signals that that this was not going to be done. I do not have a recollection of announcing that the 200 6000 were not sent prior to his march to 30 first speech. But after his voice in the first days you mentioned that he may not have mentioned it in the thirty first speech. I think I did it quite promptly after that and then began to direct the administration's attention toward negotiations and how important that would be and the means by which we could get the talks started. But when you hear when you say that. Yes camera right up to it or in the camera's 668. Sinking did no t a Ted camera rule 6 6 8 sound twenty

six thirty seven scene fifteen take five. In the speech of March 30 First the president did not make any specific remark regarding the two hundred six thousand troops but it was clear to some of us that he was not going to send those troops. And in order to end speculation about as promptly as possible after he spoke I had a press conference and announced. Formally. That the 200 6000 troops were not to be sent. It ended all speculation. I had no playback from the White House. It seemed appropriate that it should be said if that's what he meant and I assume that that was what he meant from the tone of his speech on March 30 first.

There were still those who very much wanted to the military still thought the matter was hanging fire. That ended it after that statement was made publicly. There was no further comment about the two hundred six thousand troops but was it your intention doing giving the president his options. No it was to interpret what he had said and I felt that it was the correct interpretation. And as long as I felt that that was his policy I felt that I had the right to enunciate it with the reaction I had none. Yes change very much. Well. You visit so readers you look at your crush and you think that way. My attitude toward the leaders of South Vietnam

went through a change through the years. I met them when I first went out in 1965 on an intelligence mission and I got to know them better in 1966 when I went back and spent quite a lot of time with them in 1967. My attitude then was that they were doing reasonably well under very difficult circumstances. They've not been very well trained for the task. The country was torn apart with this war and this massive American presence was exceedingly dislocating as far as their economy in far as their people were concerned. After a while though I found out something existed that helped me reach my decision regarding Vietnam. I found out that they had a different goal than the United States.

I found out that really what they wanted was for the United States to take over the war. They wanted just to pay for the war and they want to just fight the war they want us to furnish the armament they wanted us to furnish the man. And as the war progressed her eyes. I was so anxious for it and I reached the conclusion that they were not anxious for it and because they felt that as time went off that very likely the strength of the North Vietnamese would diminish and these South Vietnamese leaders would be able to consolidate their own power so that they could stay in power. And if by any chance the war were to end suddenly during the time they were there they didn't know what their own situation was. So toward the end. Have the period that I was giving so much attention to. I concluded that we were working at odds. Here we had on a law that I was absolutely sure did not

want the war to end and we wanted it very much to end and I made comments and statements. So I became exceedingly unpopular with the leadership in South Vietnam. But you think your differences with Johnson. Affect Us. Yes we've been really very close friends for a great many years and when he came into the president say back in November of 63 the first day he called me over to talk about the White House and the organization of the White House and I had a long and close relationship with him as an informal adviser. And there were other positions that he wanted me to perform that I thought weren't appropriate under the circumstances until I went on into the Pentagon. But when we reached this point

after Tet and went through this extraordinarily difficult proceeding of changing a policy that our country it had maybe for seven or eight years and he was reluctant to change the policy. I felt it was my responsibility to keep at it as hard as I could to change the policy. It disturbed him a lot and it affected our relationship unfortunately and we weren't near the friends afterwards that we were before. Now he did not doubt my sincerity. He didn't doubt my loyalty to him. It was just that I'd put him through such a terribly difficult period and he couldn't quite forgive me for what kind of a worldly kick it was if

he was one of the most fascinating men there ever been in government. He was a man of enormous power. It he. You sensed it. It exuded from him it just started out and spread all out he'd walk into a group and you sense that power had come into the group. He loved the presidency he loved the exercise of power. He had the best concept of the potentiality of the president of I guess maybe of any president we've ever had. He knew the presidency while he'd been in the house he'd been in the Senate he'd worked with various presidents and he utilized the tools of the presidency exceedingly well. He got along fine with Congress he knew how to get his program through. Lyndon Johnson had the best domestic program of any president we've ever had. It was certainly it was as good as that of Franklin Roosevelt and he would have been one of our most illustrious presidents

had it not been for the tragedy of Vietnam. And I think maybe he sensed that he was caught up in one of those great decide asters that occur not only to countries but occur to the world. And he could not extricated himself from it. A very likable man you had to go through periods in which you might disagree with him and then. For days or even weeks no call would come in very cold and all but after a while the list of people with whom he conferred and confided got smaller and smaller and smaller and there were many times in that period that he and I might disagree and he got over that period of resenting it till we came to this great issue of looking back a little bit.

Looking back I would love you's very obviously States. I've been asked from time to time what my present opinion is of Vietnam and we look back on it now from the vantage point of the nineteen sixty eight for instance in 1981 13 years. I can see why we applied the principle to Vietnam. It appeared so clearly to be another effort at communist expansionism and I think we had the right theory. But it's very clear to me now that we misapplied this was not an effort on the part of communists to expand and commune

ize all of Southeast Asia. Instead of being a conspiratorial effort on the part of the Soviets and the Red Chinese it really. By looking at it carefully later on it really was more of a civil war between North and South Vietnam. It is my belief that our country made a mistake by going into Vietnam. I think we would have done better to stay out. We could have watched it a while and had we watched it longer. I think we would have seen it more clearly. Countries make mistakes we made an honest mistake countries to a great extent are like human beings they'll make honest mistakes. We made an honest mistake. I feel no sense of shame about it nor should our country feel any sense of shame. We felt we were doing what was necessary. We had nothing to gain by going in we asked for no territory. We asked for no

advantage. We went in because we thought we were doing it for the purposes of the nations involved and really for all humanity. It proved not to be a sound basis. That's very good.