Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Frederick G. Dutton, 1981

OK. You're right. That's very very hard. Yeah yeah. All right there's an expansiveness a sense of confidence and capability at the beginning of the Kennedy administration I think is very much the American spirit in a historical sense a loss of innocence to what they could do day to day they could do things domestically they could turn the country around from what they thought was the sluggishness of the late 50s. They could have an impact on the world. The problem I think was that within that public projection of of great possibilities there was a certain low.

Taking us really President Kennedy had been deeply impressed and set back in a psychological sense by the narrowness of his victory against Nixon. He was there was more insecurity behind sort of the handsomeness in the sense of self-confidence than I think projected to the public. His two first appointments Allen Dulles and the CIA and J Edgar Hoover to the FBI re appointments really suggested the need for continuity the fear of too much change. So what you had was was an outer layer of great. Oh expansiveness of will really and innocence and at the same time a inner core of anxiety insecurity of not being sure. And there's the tension between those two that I think has so much effect on Kennedy policies. The mood in beginning the Kennedy administration is one of the expansiveness of good sense of

will of competence and self-confidence that they could have an effect they could make a difference. They could turn the country around. They could stand up to the Soviets and bring both peace and strength the same time it was one of the lack of sense of limits to a great extent that they did not really realize or and I'm speaking intuitively as well as consciously of that there were limitations on what could be achieved the presidency was open ended all possibilities were a go. And I think that was was really the the main dynamic particularly as as projected to the world to the rest of the world and to our own society. The mood at the beginning of the Kennedy administration was one that there could be a difference there could be effect. We could turn the country around. We could bring to bear the new ideas the new all

resources of people of the whole liturgy really of the new frontier and there was just a lack of a sense of limits. It was it was it. Possibilities were open ended an almost endless fight. Kennedy was certainly concerned about communism he had been a politician through the Cold War period had been a young man and World War Two. He thought military strength was important standing up to first Germany and later to the Soviet Union at the same time I personally believe that by the late 1950s he was beginning to move to think there were there other problems third world problems. The Algerian. Situation that he had gotten involved in and really been the first time he had reached wide attention in one foreign policy field was was both the illustrative and I think important in the development of his own thinking. So yes he was. He was

terribly concerned about any communism but there was also believe that he could do things in the third world he could do things with developing nations. And it was a it was a marriage of both anti communism standing up to the Soviets and trying to OBL for the societies of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America a new foreign aid program. And it was it was the marriage of anti communism unless a more liberal impulse was beyond that that I think really was was what was the departure point of his administration 1061. While he was let's say he was a as a strategist or conceptualize or he was a he. He thought historically I think he was may have been the last president we really had that. I got into that was concerned with self-conscious even about it. At the same time within the man the politician the fairly conventional person a man much more conservative than he's been looked at in subsequent years with the

evolution of Robert Kennedy and the positions of his brother in politics now he was he was he was back there much more cautious ideologically and temperamentally and Kennedy would would have let's say a grand concept expressed in his inaugural address or our American University speech. But at the same time he was a he was a very wary tactician he was he was afraid of over involvement. And it was it was the tension again between the sort of the large ideas the hopeful spirit. And there's this much more almost crayoned internal tactical sense the conflicted in what he was trying to do I think also in terms of Southeast Asia the he thought we should do things there and yet he. He approached it very warily and he would he would he would step up the involvement to very gradually even though it had tremendous consequences beyond the immediate number of people there. Larry point is that foreign policy has to be put in context the priorities of a president it's always

secondary to domestic policy Kennedy always was saying telling Kenny O'Donnell his appointment secretary. I want to get all these foreign visits and all this foreign stuff off my calendar I'm not spending enough time with the Congress and not getting enough done there. I'm not getting out around the country enough. And then what he would find in a new crisis would impinge upon his time and pretty soon he was a back really giving predominant time to foreign policy. So the know the struggle for a president's time between domestic and foreign things is an almost daily fight within the White House among the personalities there within the foreign policy areas certain Kennedy was primarily a European I might even say globalist. With the nuclear period he was oriented primarily towards the Soviet danger in relationship something like Southeast Asia very peripheral in fact 961 Latin America the Alliance for Progress had far more importance in his mind in the amount of time that he gave.

Southeast Asia kept had the Laotian crisis the beginning of the trips to Saigon and yet it was always peripheral vision I think of on his part. When he shook up the State Department the end of November he brought Avril Harriman to take over the near east area and he really thought that he was moving off of his desk and out of his mind and it was a it was a faraway remote. Comparatively an important place in his own priorities. Are you don't know that that's on my mind. Yeah yeah I thought that's it. The White House the president is always preoccupied primarily with domestic politics that's where they gain strength and maintain themselves. Kennedy was always concerned about the extent to which if foreign leaders would take up his time foreign crises would move in

and preoccupy him. He kept telling Kenny O'Donnell his appointment secretary told me on the domestic side that he he wanted to get the foreign matters cleared of his calendar much more than we were doing. But it was not possible you'd always have something new developing a leader either insisting you had to come talk with a new president or some some problem blowing up abroad within the foreign policy area which should have been a minority one in terms of time taken with it but was not Kennedy was first of all I think a European ist globalist preoccupied with the Soviet danger in relationship in the nuclear period. The Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere were of primary importance to him and he gave great attention to it. Southeast Asia was quite secondary even even almost at a lower level than that. He tried to dispose of it to brush it off as a real harem and when he put in an in as assistant secretary for Southeast Asia he

he did not want to get involved he kept pushing for example in the Saigon trip but it was what Rostow not with George Bundy who went there. This was always a matter which which was going to get the secondary attention. I don't think that he focused on it I don't think it was as well understood at the Laotian crisis more an attempt really to move the problem out of consideration rather than really to have a major regional effect. Southeast Asia was far down President Kennedy's list of priorities f the domestic things after almost all other areas of the world that he tried to assign the responsibility Avril Harriman and we respected known a long time and really moved off of his desk and get it over in the State Department and let him get on to what he thought were far larger and fundamental problems before him.

Focusing primarily on Southeast Asia or on Vietnam for example takes the problem out of the context of the scene in the White House there. You're looking at a number of different problems almost every couple of hours there may be four or five parts of the world moving in with tough cables from our embassies or the foreign ministries and all of these matters get considered there in a in A. Oh not offhand way but a intense short focus and then any one of the problems you move out and consider in its own terms as though it really has global significance. It is quite different from how to handle the White House by those people there and how it's handled in the real world. I think that for example the president is not a cannot really be a deep man ESB a man whose intuitions are good his basic value system is correct. He's prepared to take expert advice and related all the time to all these other problems the extend of American commitments abroad the extent of that our economy can can bear the burden of a of an increased commitment to say to

Southeast Asia and the need to keep these problems where I can say in context or in relationship to each other is is terribly important and a book a film of a nation will debate on a given major problem as Vietnam has been fails to see it in both in its international relationships and in just the way the White House psychologically deals with it. A book of film which focuses entirely on one subjects Vietnam Southeast Asia has to be very careful that it does not give a preeminent importance to the immediate subject to isn't in the real world. Kennedy for example in 1951 is he began to to come to grips with the problem. He was dealing with so many other matters first of all this was this is very incidental to him and I think that to think that Vietnam was primary in his mind that he really

was deeply into it fails to reflect quite frankly the lack of real time given to it or the extent of serious important intense conversations. But maybe this is sandwiched between the Bay of Pigs and this meeting was crucial in Vienna where all of the military buildup which occurred that for what was happening in the economy there were other matters that were weighing on him more. And while he would try to come to grips seriously with this are our presidents in a certain sense a more superficial it's whether we like to admit it or not. Kennedy used in his attention to Southeast Asia those people really who were available and free from other jobs to be specific McGeorge Bundy is had National Security Council was primarily attending to the Soviet new European problems. A roster was available as number two man there to go over to Saigon.

All through this problem I think you'll find that the people who are available who are not really handling the what Kennedy consider the overwhelming world problems. It's an example of how Vietnam was so far down in its priorities how much less important whether the less say these people are the best and the Brightest Day as that phrase is come to be known in our public language now. Yes they were my best and brightest means those. Most full of self-confidence about solving problems and doing things. If it meant people who really were experts regional historical authorities on Southeast Asia. No they were not. What Rostov had really been concerned with the Third World Economic Development. And number of other promises was not his specially this was nothing that he had any particular expertise with. Maxwell Taylor the same thing he had concerns in his book The uncertain trumpet about trying to get

into third world military situations. But he had been retired he was brought back. What I'm saying is that I really think that the people who are on the front line of appointments are responsibilities. We're not the ones that were used to begin with and Southeast Asia. OK well people who are assigned to the southeast asia problem were those who were most available could be put on the society but the primary ones with responsibility meet George Bundy's head Nation Security Council staff was looking at Soviet problem Europe. And all through government to the primary ones we're tied down with with the what we consider our main problems in the world. Therefore the people who are available were sent. Or sometimes they had an interest and would emerge themselves a good example when I was in State Department was Roger Hill xmen Roger had a interest in Asia previously. He had parachuted in the end of World War Two and was terribly

concerned about this problem and he pressed his way to a position of some prominence. Whereas normally the person who's head of intelligence office in the State Department would not be getting into the White House staff meetings with the president. He would be feeding up through the secretary of state who then went up but Roger both with the president and then in context with the Congress was was very far forward very much out in front. And he illustrates again the somewhat the randomness of who emerges in these problems who's available who really has the intense interest that there may be great experts specialists who know the economy and society in the history of the area deeper down in the State Department or the CIA or elsewhere. And they really do not come to bear on the political policymakers who are really making the key decisions in the whole process. Well yes he did. To begin with did not have a

Southeast Asia background himself that he had been a Soviet expert our ambassador there long history and European interest but he was a man who could supposedly shake up state bring the best available to it. There were problems even there he worked well with the White House staff as is generally known in Secretary Rusk. Had their differences Rusk had a China India Burma theater background from World War 2 and even with Harriman in charge there was there was a certain splintering of fragmenting of the policy recommending process that gives the president choices but it also causes quite a bit of static in the process and that was just another of the many of the pages in operating day to day difficulties. In the early stages the Vietnam problem. Yes I do I think there was an attempt by the president to get someone who really would take

charge of the area. I don't think it means that the president himself really wants it moved into into the middle of his desk to prominently the day. It was more of the Avril Harriman has got this problem he's a he's a sturdy long time policy maker knows the political aspects of it and he will take this one over and handle it even with Harriman However the problem continued to grow and sort of eat up everybody who got involved in them. Right. I brain Harriman and into responsibility for Southeast Asia certainly gave it a new importance. It gave someone the president personally had confidence in someone who had the clout to have effect. Whether talking with the Defense Department or the White House staff or within the State Department Harriman was it was the number one man in the view of the president everyone else and when when he was given responsibility for

it it certainly meant that it was it was upgraded in importance. When the first year the Kennedy administration there were a number of factors which were toughening his position to begin with at the personal level Senator Kennedy had a President Kennedy was the start over. I think back in the 50s there were a number of factors in 1961 which were leading President Kennedy to toughen his positions internationally. It was with Southeast Asia just one example of that. You had the Bay of Pigs failure and we had to react and show strength he was trying to prove that he was not a callow inexperienced young president. You have the meeting that he had in Vienna with the crew lectured him as though he were a schoolboy. He immediately came back from there called for a big military build up in our own terms. There was a development of the green bird

exercise for counterinsurgency. You had a man here who had a certain inclination to macho to begin with and everything in his first year of the presidency really told him to be bolder be tougher. I think that's not just him I guess one of America's problems and generalizes is that there's a need to be to show we're tough whether it really is desirable or not. In any event that was certainly the profile that first year how much that really affected what he did in Southeast Asia. I'm not sure of myself I think that it it had some effect but I I am not sure the Southeast Asia at that stage was not considered too incidental. That's not an apology for the Kennedy period I'm just suggesting that it was it was not really focused on the inattention or the inadequacy of real careful close intense prolonged scrutiny of a problem like Southeast Asia is what leads what can really be a problem over and on the edge of the president's attention suddenly coming you know

intimate with far more importance than he ever realized because he didn't see it until it was until it already grown into a very large and not terribly handleable problem. Certainly one pressure operating on President Kennedy in this period was the need to prove that he was not soft on communism that this is always a pressure that works on Democratic administrations and particularly after the McCarthy period in the Cold War of the 1950s. I think by the early 60s that had was somewhat less intense and as a pressure but it certainly was there it was. You could see it in terms of Southeast Asia you could see in terms of the Soviet relationship Castro and the Caribbean. There was a need to prove that he was he was standing up to communism wherever it came along that we were not going to lose a another part of the world as we supposedly lost China.

And I think that this is however in my opinion is a unfortunate constant in American politics that there are certain things that politicians in our society. One is they have to be tough in to they have to be any communist and they have to be idealistic and then they have to be pragmatic and if you say those four things you've got a lot of conflicts going on. OCONNOR insurgency the Green Berets were a made good television. They was rather personalized smaller scale to be understood. A lot of macho It was a dramatization I think of it. It handled things both in the Kennedy's personality and it also handled the things that we Americans were I would say were more engineers and scientists were more were good game makers rather than the historical conceptualist CE and the Green Berets sort of fit in at the you know

the turning of a screw. I think there needs to be more recognition of the extent to which our politics and policy in the Kennedy period you know like you're like right. Yeah well I think there needs to needs to be recognize that politics and policy making is is so much adding on to what's already gone before a president is really not that free of the historical continuity. Kennedy could not make too much of a break with Eisenhower to in terms of the world where he had been only a senator he was perceived as a young man had been a world figure he could make certain changes but he felt that he was more of a gradualism more of a Adding on to what had gone before. And that would particularly apply to what was perceived as a secondary problem an area like Southeast Asia.

Speak more broadly though I just think that in terms of the Vietnam problem or most things of the present comes to bear on the inattention the limited views the lack of the most informed people being there these decisions which we think are so consequential we look and read read the newspapers. Young men go off to die for Washington really or are done with far less confidence and insight than anybody begins to think in and Vietnam is a classic example number one in the last 20 years on that. The selection of. I'm sorry but the selection of logic illustrates how presidential pointers are so often made. He was a Republican. He was already in a sense over the hill politically or as a national figure. He was a safe appointment to make at the same time President Kennedy could look like he was being bipartisan and picking and experienced

older man Kennedy. It was a heads he won tails he could lose that. If the problem worked out fine the pres the United States could take credit for the problem didn't work out right. Well he turned to a distinguished member of the opposition party to go out there and handle it. It was a safe appointment even if not maybe a particularly brilliant one. I guess right now. Going up is room tone became a nice one.