thumbnail of Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Lucien Conein, 1981
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The problem when you first heard the series was about your life with me. What led up to it. Well. In February of 1962. Two pilots from the TNI have attacked in Bombay I don't quite follow in Chicago. At that point. The. Officials of our States government did not know how deep this dissension was. Therefore. I want and I talked to a bomb instructor by talk to General Bill coppery General Don friend I talked to.
Here in Kabul and I talked to quite a few of the senior officers in the Vietnamese army. There was not apparent. That there was a a plot. That was anything really serious but there was a certain amount of dissatisfaction of the commanders with the central government. And they made they were dissatisfied with the controls or were imposed on my by the central government. They were afraid to report. For example if they had had a defeat on their day their kills they were afraid of doing that because they were afraid of of getting ball out by the president. So. Though this was a certain amount of dissatisfaction. It wasn't until the fourth of july of 1963
when all of the generals. Most of them were him psycho and they had been invited. To the Fourth of July party at the ambassador's residence. I received word that they were going to be at a nightclub. And they carried him downstairs from the caravel hotel. I was asked to be present. Which I was aware that there they were all of them. And that. I talked to him. Specifically to General Don. And I talked to. Other channels and then this is the first indication that I had that there was really something serious going on that there was actually. A. Coup so to speak being thought of by the senior officers of the Vietnamese army. And this is reported.
And. From then on it was important that we keep track. I'm talking about. We are talking about the United States government. Keep track of all the different elements because ever the generals groups the colonels groups the buddhist groups the there are too many groups and they was to find out which one. Was a serious group. Serious in the sense that if they were going to do something that they would have the resources to do it with. How do these different groups. Well they blended there and these groups planted am. Finally And when it became obvious that the man who was going to be the father figure and also the senior military officer General big man happened. They. Came am under him.
And he was able with. Very smart staff. To. Organize. What. Finally led up to the organizers because we you know it's really a good game. Well most of my. Live shot. Was of drought roundoff. And of course I had other lives. With general no income and in addition of that I was. Getting information from my my. Friend of long standing joke outrage. Just like that. I was reporting all of my yeah it really is around Sunday and I was reporting all of my. Contacts
with the different officers in the Vietnamese Army and the senior officers directly to the ambassador. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Ran a very tight ship. Where. One of the things I was informed by him that I would report to him anytime that I was to have a meeting with whom I was to meet. And on the subject the meeting and I would get his career. Prior to attending any meeting with any senior official of the defamation army and immediately upon returning from the meeting I would report to him verbally that I make up my own written report for the files and they go by by cable or they I didn't have all the details of i'd report and it would be sent back to Washington. I mean like it's good you have you with me.
I know they landed. I have very little latitude in dealing with them except that I was permitted to deal with them and discuss certain subjects within the limits that I was imposed on me by the embassy. When you begin to reassess. Washington's policy he changed why it changed. Right after I don't recall the date. It's the policy of thought Washington trainees. The first indication I had was when I read a what is now the famous hills from cable. Which had come out from Washington D.C. and. Sort of put. My operation of being a reporter into an operational mode meant that. They were seriously contemplating I'm. Abandoning.
The central government. And that we were to continue reporting on them. But the final decision was not in that cable it would. Show the cable all it did was actually. Change from a reporting. Of conversation to one. Now let's plan for action. How did you know that he did you. Know I don't recall ever telling Don about any cable. That you. Were going to tell don't change policy. In any way to you at this stage here in the UK and UK she stays. Giving the green light only in the context. The only time I could discuss any matter of say the grey life so to speak but be upon the instruction of the ambassador
and. I don't. Have. Any files on the basis of the conversation or anything like that so I don't really know. What point. I mean you know that I gave them my brain like prior prison. Upon the destruction of my government. You might recall the atmosphere's was the sense. He. Was for and. I will go. More. Atmosphere in Saigon September October. Of 1963 was one of a complete chaos I felt we had. The
Buddhists. Burning themselves we had demonstrations of the Buddhists we had. Indications that there were other elements. Wanting a coup. There were talks about the colonel's coup. There were talk about a member of the central government wanting to have a coup. There was a talk of the Challenger crew everybody was calling around the place like a bunch of pigeons. And the only thing I can say was that the difficult part was to keep. The reporting travels open. On any. Element that was planning a coup. Or any dissident groups such as actually like Buddhist were and dissidents of the government Iran actively. And this and also to. What should I say. We were
still. Represented to the central government. So it was a very difficult job. But the. Attitude with them the American community. Was the one that was probably the most. Perplexing because. There was a pro group who group. There was I had guys who were. Ham. There was some conflict. With them the. But within the US community there was also a division. There were. Elements with them. Might be used as a
USCIS and they embassy you were. Pro. There was another element. Of individuals who were anti-coup. This is cause mainly because of the actions taken by the central government against the booty. And the individuals. That were. Characterized code or some of the most prominent representatives of the United States government in Saigon. I. Also know. Some of the more prominent members of the United States government were Procope. Do you sense. You're in. Any sense what you give me.
Yeah you're feeling that you're losing your cool. Yes. I am. During this period. I met with you know again you. Had the power of. One afternoon I I believe about three or four hours. I say when I met with nobody I knew that he did all the talking I did all the listening. And I had a feeling that he was. There at the convention trying to convince me that everything was under control. Why me. I do not know. But I'm sure that he knew from his secret police reports that I had been. Meeting. With the generals there. It was obvious that I've been doing a lot of traveling. And I think that the reason that he talked to me was try to convince me that everything
was all all right. And I regret that I didn't take a tape recorder. For a four hour dissertation. What their government was doing and how well it was dying and about the Republican Guards. How they were fighting the comments I regret I didn't have a conversation over that because it would be a very good report to have looked. At the mood of no again here. Hard to describe it as a very intelligent very articulate and the vitriol he spoke beautiful frame. Thing. And. My impression. At the time was I wonder if he really knows what's going on around him. I
felt. Personally. That. The government had been I had isolated themselves. The important person of the government of course you know didn't get. You is only the political advisor to his brother. There. I have previously traveled with the will get you. Around the country. I was not the first time I've ever seen it. That's the last time I shot a lot. You live her. Life. I. Only have. On. 2 or 3 occasions I feel that. I am my life might be in jeopardy. Especially when I would have this secret place parked out in front of my house or sit down behind a
tree down the street from me and I might I would drive to the embassy have somebody follow May I have knew that they were on to. What extent I do not know. Anything else. It would have been a VCM set up and I would have been another statistic as they'd have done anything to me I would have been they were and have been a VC of so I and I would have been another statistic to tell you that's going to mean that you have done. Your good deeds. When I would have meetings with the General about. The meetings were drowned they arranged ahead of time and it would be in a dentist's office which is all right. Except that I had to
have my teeth prepared in the dentist office other in case that the secret police for a check up they could see that I had been legitimately at the dentist office and. What would happen. General Dom arrived. I had a time I would. Follow and I would sit down in the dental chair and have a little of. My neck a little. That get around my neck. I have my mouth wide open and I have that and I. Would have a meeting. So in case that anything happened I was being treated. General Don with his snake out the back water door and get out. That's the way the media many of the meetings were held. You remember when you told. Me you know states where.
Yes it was just when I first told. The generals upon instruction from the ambassador that we the United States government would not. Torture nor would we. Support. The coup. I am the same sort of equipment. What have you. That was. In September. Or early October of 1963 and I conveyed a message. And I recall those instructions from the ambassador. And they were very special. You're with me. Here. You. Go. I had a meeting with big man.
When the first week of October 63 if I recall. And members of the meeting with Big members more. Feeling. Out of one another. I am conveying his. Message. To the United States government. His message. Was that he did not want any U.S. participation in the coup. There were a time. He wanted early recognition. Of the US government. Of the. New government. Much of which. He also. Spoke about the options that were left open to him. As it pertained to DNA.
One. Of the options. Was that. They would be able to. Allow GM to go into exile. The other one was that. They would. Have to. Kill. You. I reported immediately. Her I was the last time. That I ever discussed. Or had any discussion about that the GM. Until the day that I happened. Was No. Communication from United States Jackie. Yes there was a immediate attraction and there was a. Objection. I watched it I reported the guard the station I have a big banner about the possibility that
one of their options was to eliminate them and knew. There was an objection came in immediately. From Washington DC when this was reported and this was conveyed. To the general. I don't recall at this time I went to General Campbell. Or if it was through General Don that I conveyed the message to big man. But I had very definite instructions. About. What was there. At that time. They were. Either. Not thinking specifically of the details of eliminating yet they were. Looking at different options. And when they came about to. Come up to a decision. The best I could.
Having a lot of part of October of 1963. The commanding general of Mike the. Informed. General Don. About. The coup. That the United States government would not support a coup. And I have. After this I had an emergency meeting. With General Don. And the first reaction of the travel was that. Somebody had leaked. The information that had been passed to me. Through other channels.
There was no such thing as leaking because. The commanding general might be a member of the country team was also a member of the. Intergroup what the ambassador would be privy to all of this type of information there was no type of no intention of denying this senior officials who had to make decisions. Left but any information but the generals. Considered this as possibly a security breach and it was at this time. That I received definite instruction. From ambassador lives to inform the general that we would not port. But. Yet you say.
The generals never specifically said what day. That the coup was going to come out. But what they did do was to tell me that I was not to leave for a certain period of time. Also that I was a former ambassador a lot. That he was not to leave during this period of time. While I was. Funny about all there. Was that the ambassador alive had been called back to the United States for consultation with the president of the United States and he was scheduled to leave. When I informed the generals that he was scheduled to leave I said Oh well that he better not stay maybe he better go at that because of the president Jim knows he's supposed to leave to talk to the president and he stays. Maybe. They will know that something was wrong.
When we don't worry about parking. Oh. He says it was a notion he said. General Mike Yes if they felt that. I didn't mention terrible arguments like. This or the career of the. Commander General of the U.S. might vary. When he told. We had all gone. But the United States should not back. I believe that. I had the emergency meeting with General Don immediately afterwards asked me what's up. There. Because this was the first official indication that we would or would not back the coup. It was only at this
time then that I went back and told him that we would not stop to. Hand. Them. And that's one. I don't mean other meeting. Prior to the coup they told me that. I would not. To leave town. Did you sense in the army do you think. If they go they. Have no indication of that because. They. Attitude or general big men are very simple. He didn't want any U.S. participation and they're cool. He wanted nothing to do with the Americans until after the coup was successful and then he wanted recognition by the United States government. Let's go on to lead you to the story first.
Did you try to just describe what she was really highlights of your experience for example. I think you know who was about the place where you have your story. How did you keep track of what. We did. When the actual Co. Was being started. General Damas dentist came to my house and told me it left a message that I am to proceed immediately to the General Staff Headquarters. In Saigon. Well. We had through other sources through. Military sources through back the. Indications that troops removing. And troops were heading toward Saigon it normally would be coming to Saigon and there was
all types of activity. Now this is normal that they would have this because every dip I meet had a U.S. counterpart on all Shure wireless man of was in a unit and these units immediately around Saigon. Were on the move. So they knew that something was up when I got the message. To report. I went home. Got into uniform. And proceeded immediate. But my God on my side. Took my jeep but the Radio Hour. And proceeded immediately to the general traffic court. I got there. And there had been there was a meeting going on in the General Staff Headquarters involved. They commanders. Hand down.
This time. Big man announced. To the commanders that they were going to have a coup. Back the coup was wrong. There was one problem. We had a very important visitor. Who had just called noted yam that morning. And he was up at the airport while the coup was in progress and. How everybody was trying to get him to leave before they had to close the airport down. And. The admiral laptop. And went to Hong Kong on the way that everybody heaved a big sigh of relief specially General Donald had to escort him out to the airport to. Hand out. The coup was on. Immediately. The coup was on. I. Had. To
type street in case I had a radio communication. I also had telephonic communication to the embassy when they had cut the telephone lines and the PTT. Which is their. AT&T Ma Bell of Saigon. They left they have a safe. Line open. They also left a line open to the power lines open to the General's quarters and I was out of my quarters so I could call my house to see that everything was alright. That time. My family was home and I have a team as of as a Special Forces around the house guarding it. I was relieved to find out that they were there. And the first. Thank God that happened. Big man. Comes over to me
says. Look. If we fail in this school you're coming with us and I said where we're going he said we're going to the roof. Bruce means we're going out another hails. I don't like that one very much but. I was committed. I could get away that. I was there with them. Was your joy your whole life. You know. Are they and they have advice that they would have would be more in a political sense now. We're going to call him all the former ministers. We're going to send for the vice president. We want a civilian form of government. When do you think you're going to recognize it. He will leave me
representing the United States where you think the United States should direct my actions that's not up to the United States until he have accomplished your purpose and it's accepted in the world community. We run. A. Camera Roll for 15 and at this point and camera roll for 16 begins tomorrow 416 0 5 5 5. When I was. Going back after a lodge arrived the third week. Of. August 1963. I was at that point that. I had indications that he was in charge.
And that there would. Be. Continued rails are under his control. With the general. To find out their plan. That. They should go and their intention. This is true because I was a very dramatic change right. From the beginning in my heart. It was a very dramatic change but a master life came from the previous. Sort of. Unknown. What was going on what. The intention of the United States was except for the. Continued reporting. And squabbling that was going on within the American community. Life really took over. When a bastard. Came. To Saigon.
He let everybody know of course and Sharjah and he was the boss and you better oh execute is orders without hesitation or murmuring or you were out. It's just one less. If you feel when you hear it it's here. How did you know. When. The crew. Was coming towards that sand. About. I forget the time about five or six o'clock in the morning of the second. President gam. Called. Him for the first time. Talked. To big man. All the other telephone call. That GM had but the general was always through. General Don. GM refused to talk to big men except
that one time. When that call came through. Big man. Said something to the fact that he would not. Accept their surrender. This is your menu. As long as the Vietnamese were shooting at one another. Therefore. They. Get upset that there would be a ceasefire around 7 o'clock in the morning. This was the. Complete indication that the generals had won. Cheika. At that point. All the generals. I am a few have Iran all of a sudden people start coming out of the woodwork I had
seen before and went out on a. Patio. Large patio at the joint general staff. Headquarters. And. Their. Big man was receiving congratulations In fact I think they promoted a couple people right on the spot from colonels to brigadier general. I don't know that stars are flying around. Majors are becoming lieutenant colonels colonels retiring generals and generals were getting another star. And. We. Were under the impression. At that moment. That JAMA still have the power. Big man. Asked me. How long would it take for me to get an aircraft. To Saigon. First of all he wanted to use a U.S. aircraft not a Vietnamese air craft that this
was not in the book. But this shows a direct report. So I call the embassy. And I asked him to say. All of that jam. Is going to surrender that was over with. There's still some sporadic firing. Some units have gotten the word. But. For all intents and purposes are over with. Why him. And how could I get a U.S. aircraft. I was advised by the embassy. That the United States. Would. Desire. That GM accept the first exile of. The first nation that was going to grant whether it's the Philippines or Japan or France or. Therefore they wanted. It would take 24 hours to get a proper aircraft. From Okinawa. To Saigon that could overfly
any of the other countries for example if they were going to fly from Saigon to Paris that the aircraft would not land say in Caracas shape in Rome. So much so that he would stop at some country and as public a second political side they wanted him to be flown directly to the net first nation that grabbed it put it bam. For example. The Philippines who had been very simple would not have had to have had a special aircraft. I thought this. Time. They made him. Ask for his said I am an. Escort to. MPG. Get the meter emptied. And he took off. The back way. Toward the power. AMD. Four or six armored cars were
dispatched to the palace itself. After. The big man left. Everybody started cleaning up the place because we had been drinking beer going to is. He going to be alright. And I think. After the big mental outlook. After big man. Leapt J.S. Yes. I want to apologize. Through a back way. I noticed a way had to clean up everything we had to leave. So they were preparing. For Dan's arrival they had a table with green cloth. They had the vice president there to take his dismissal. I'm. Never going to bring him the camera at this point.
I knew what they were going to bring in the cameras I better get out so I went home. While at home I received a telephone call from the embassy. And they said. That they wanted me. This was on direct instruction from the highest authority. To locate him and to. Pick Shar went back out to the joint general staff. And they were all county. Officers Club where they were interrogating the ministers of the former government. This. Time. I asked. About Jamie and. I talk the big man personally. And he told me that they were they had committed suicide and that they were behind the joint general staff that I want to see them. But no I didn't want to face them. I felt very disappointed. That they had
gotten off on that type of start. Because original plan was that GM would go out of the country. To leave the story. And of course I do I know and I never for a moment forget you. I never met for a moment believe that they committed suicide because I asked where it happened. And made them say why they committed suicide. But the Catholic Church are strong. Being a Catholic I know that. If anybody had committed suicide at a Catholic church and a priest held services that night that that's a story would hold water and I so stated. That.
Series
Vietnam: A Television History
Raw Footage
Interview with Lucien Conein, 1981
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-n58cf9jf16
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Description
Episode Description
Lucien Conein was an OSS officer in Vietnam in the early 1960s. He recalls the events leading up to the coup d'etat on November, 1963, which resulted in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem's government. Conein reported plans of the coup to Ambassador Lodge and recalls the US government made it clear to the planners, ahead of time, that the US would neither support nor thwart Diem's overthrow.
Date
1981-05-07
Date
1981-05-07
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
War and Conflict
Subjects
United States--Foreign relations--1945-1989; United States. Government organization and employees; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'tat, 1963; Buddhism and politics; United States--History--1945-; Intelligence officers; United States--Politics and government
Rights
Rights Note:1) No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the responsibility of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project.,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
00:43:41
Embed Code
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Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Conein, Lucien
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 70d2519bd2e927ad46581a12a52575b1123abc7d (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:44:38:21
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Citations
Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Lucien Conein, 1981,” 1981-05-07, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed December 18, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-n58cf9jf16.
MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Lucien Conein, 1981.” 1981-05-07. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. December 18, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-n58cf9jf16>.
APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Lucien Conein, 1981. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-n58cf9jf16