Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Le Tran Nhan, 1981

Le Tran Nhan: I got drafted in 1965 in the army of South Vietnam. And I was assigned to...After basic training I was assigned to the First Air Cavalry Division. And...ah...I was sent to Pleiku and then to An Khe to meet the first arrivals. It was the US 101 Air Paratroopers that keep the perimeter for the first to land. And I meet them there. Interviewer: What did you have to do? What was your function? Le Tran Nhan: Actually I was an interpreter to...ah...for like public relations between the US and Vietnamese local officials, interrogating for the Communist the prisoners that we take or whatever that needs translation. And I am around. Interviewer: What about your experience in Khe Sanh ? You had some interesting observations on your arrival. Just tell me the story about that.

Interviewer: [Incomprehensible] noisy planes. Interviewer: Sorry. Cut. Interviewer: So what was the story about Khe Sanh ? Le Tran Nhan: Well the first thing I noticed when we landed in Khe Sanh to relieve the marine...the US Marine Corps in Khe Sanh was that we lost twenty-three helicopters in the very first day we landed. I knew that figure by talking to helicopter crews. And they were shipping back and forth from our base to Khe Sanh . And the firing was fierce there. We cannot...the North Vietnamese troops are in position and so anywhere you get by the entrance of the bunker you get shot. A lot of the time just right in the air, bull's eyes. Interviewer: Let's tell that story again. But mention that this was probably the same number of helicopters that the old South Vietnamese division had. Le Tran Nhan: Yes. The reason I remember that figure was because I used to compare that number with the amount we have in the South Vietnamese division.

Interviewer: We have to start again, actually. So tell the whole story. Tell about when you arrived in Khe Sanh . Le Tran Nhan: When we arrived in Khe Sanh the first thing we noticed was the amount of helicopters gunned down by anti-aircraft weapons of the North Vietnamese division. And we lost on that day what the whole South Vietnamese division couldn’t have: twenty-three helicopters in a single day. Interviewer: Was this a normal observation that the Americans had an enormous amount of equipment and you had very little? What was in general the feeling you had? Le Tran Nhan: Yes. Well, the American troops are fighting like rich men and we are fighting like a very, very poor men. So there is a lot of waste of firepower. OK. And on even like a skirmish or a guerrilla, just a guerrilla attack, three, four guerrillas trying to ambush or snipers... Interviewer: Cut. We just ran out of f—...

Interviewer: Sir, give me another...more thoughts about the um, the Americans and the way they fought and the way that you observed them. Le Tran Nhan: Well, I feel funny for us to see an American in war. A lot of times if he have a guerrilla sniper, three or four guys, he's going to waste like air strikes for half or one hour, or artillery strike or even navy gun supports. And just for three or four guys. If we have to do it in the Vietnamese army, we'll send just a squad and try to d— dislodge them instead of having so much waste. Interviewer: Could you give me an idea, before you told me about the older preliminaries that would happen and which would often result in ambush because there'd me so much activity that the Communists would know. Le Tran Nhan: By talking to prisoners of war, North Vietnamese troops especially, I got the idea that every time the North Vietnamese that are in the area they know where you are going to land before hand just by the amount of air strike. Like they have gunships going to bombard the area. Then they said they are pretty sure we are going to land there. And they just wait there and see. Somebody might get hurt, they are supposed to remain quiet until the troop landed. Then they can have the ambush set up and straight after the ambush. So that is good...ah and air strike is a good indication for the North Vietnamese troops to know that we are landing.

Interviewer: What about this observation. You must have realized this when you noticed it yourself. What would happen when you spoke with Americans about it? What would they say to you? Le Tran Nhan: Well, talking to ah...We don't talk much about the war. In case we are actually involved in that war. And nobody wants to see a war. So many casualties, so many innocent people killed. So we, when we talk we just talk about generalities like life, good beer or movie mostly. We don't talk about the war. Interviewer: What effect did the American presence in the cities with all their money and hanging around bars? What effect did that have on Vietnamese people? What did you think about that?

Le Tran Nhan: Well, we have...We usually looked down on people...We have higher prestige. We respect people more, the intellectuals more. But since the arrival of US troops then they have a lot of people get rich off the bases. So we just frown less upon those people than we usually do, on like prostitutes or bar girls. So there is a trend of accepting them as a social fact more than [incomprehensible] them like we do before. Interviewer: Do you remember the first time that Americans announced they were pulling out of the war, the so-called Vietnamization? Did that have a big impact on your activities? Le Tran Nhan: Well, personally yes. Because I was an interpreter so I'd be, I know I'd be assigned to another unit. So I would be transferred. That is the direct impact of the pull out. And the second impact is when the Americans pulled out we hope we'll get their supplies, or whatever they spend on those American troops. And I felt, Gee, that's good, we're going to have a lot of ammunition to spend so we can play the rich way: instead of wasting human lives you can waste ammunition. And I thought it was good. But I was wrong. Because supply was lacking there then.

Interviewer: Do you remember the election in 1971 of Nguyen Van Thieu ? Do you have any thoughts about that? What did you think about the fact that he was the only candidate? What did you think about the Communists at that time? Le Tran Nhan: Well, as the only candidate I don't think it's a very democratic way of an election. But ah...Well, I don't deal with politics and I think politics is a dirty word because you are playing with human lives. So ah...I don't think it is right first thing to have a single man for an election. And also I don't think much about him – because I don't think he is a good man in any...any sense – but I would support him many time if I have the Communists in hands. If I have to think about supporting Thieu or the Communists, I'd vote for Thieu any time. Interviewer: What did you think personally about the Communist soldiers on the other side? Did you think they were Vietnamese like you or did you think they were under some other control, or what?

Le Tran Nhan: Well... Interviewer: So tell me about what you thought about the Communists you were fighting with. Le Tran Nhan: Well, I think the Communist troopers they don't have a soul of their own. They are so much brainwashed. And...'cause I have experience with ah...prisoner of wars that wants to help us to locate caches. We send them on our patrol to locate those caches, ammunition dumps and also supply dumps. So I treat them like human being, or brother. They sleep in the same tent as I do, if we've ever got a tent. They stayed with me whenever and wherever I go even in back, back in the rear. Le Tran Nhan: So I got quite friendly with them. And they talk about how great North Vietnam is, how great the [incomprehensible]...ah, you know, the freedom, how much freedom they have. But once I take them to Saigon on, after several operations we fear that we can trust them enough. So they give us a leave, one or two days off, and go back to Saigon and show them the street, so many Hondas, you know, motorcycles around. They couldn't believe it.

Le Tran Nhan: They even touch the wall of the sky...well, it is not a skyscraper but, well, a tall building, say: "This real?" They couldn't believe it Saigon was so rich com— and they keep tell me after that that Hanoi is much better. I was born in North Vietnam. I was born in Hanoi . I know what it looks like compared to Saigon . And they kept telling me that, even they saw with their own eyes that we have so many Hondas, that we have so many freedom of movements and not too many police around, and they keep telling me Hanoi is better, they have more freedom, they have refrigerators, they have cars about. So I don't think they have a soul of their own. At least not a discerning soul. Interviewer: Let's cut.

Interviewer: What was your reaction to the s— signature of President Thieu on the Paris Peace Agreement ? What did you think about the future? Le Tran Nhan: Well, I think about the peace treaty: Anybody who sign with the Communists, no matter what kind of treaty it is, is stupid. You talk about SALT II, you talk about SALT I, or whatever, because they never respect out of so many treaties they sign: the Helsinki , the Yalta pact. They never respect it, so why you want so why you want another pact? Because we have to respect it. And we are fooling our people if he signed it. So I think he...I don't think Thieu 's a stupid a guy, so he knows it. I think he was forced to sign that treaty. Interviewer: What about the land grabbing that happened after the signing? Did you witness any attempt by anybody to grab land? Le Tran Nhan: I read it in the newspaper but I don't see anything or know anything about it.

Interviewer: Now, the war continued in 1973 . What was the main difference? Was it the bombing, or was it morale, what was the main difference in 1973 for fighting? Le Tran Nhan: Well, its main thing is morale. Interviewer: Let's say. If you say, In 1973 the main difference is... Le Tran Nhan: Well, in 1973 the main difference is the morale of the troops because... Interviewer: Think we better stop... Le Tran Nhan: In 1973 the main thing is the morale of the troop. Cause a lot of people think we are going to have the ah...peace in the near future so nobody want to be the last dead of the war. And they try to play it safe. And ah...even the discipline, we have some problem with discipline too. Because the commanders, they have the same mentality. They don't want to be the last dead. So they just try to play cool and ah...the reaction of the troops and the commanders is the same because he is such a coward and we...ah regard them in low respect. So we have some kind of discipline, but not much. After the treaty was signed, but after like three months afterwards they realize there is no treaty. So the...we keep up the fight again. Interviewer: What about the resignation of President Nixon ? Did that have much impact?

Le Tran Nhan: Well, from reading the newspaper – the Vietnamese newspapers in Vietnam, yes, because he was what we called a hawk. He was for the war. So if he resigned, if the leadership of American is confused, then it's also confusing on the Vietnam policy of the ah... American government. So it does have some impact, especially when the last request for economic and military aid was delayed so long. And we know we need, out in the field we know we need supplies right away. It can't be any delay. So it does have some effect, negative effect, on the war in Vietnam. Interviewer: Cut. All right. Interviewer: Who...what happened when Ban Me Thuot collapsed? Where were you and what was the impact of that on you?

Le Tran Nhan: Well, I was in Vung Tau training center. I was an instructor then. Because after the American troops pulled out I was reassigned. I got two purple hearts, they can't send me to the field so they send me to a training center. Signal training corps. And ah...after graduation I was hold back to he an instructor there, for the telephone communication system. Interviewer: And what happened to you during the period from the middle of April until the end of April ? How did you...did you keep training people instructing people or were you in Saigon then or? Le Tran Nhan: Yes, I was training on the very, even on the very last day of April we are still training. Although we have reports that Long Khanh was lost and ah...North Vietnamese troops is pushing toward Vung Tau , we don't have any anti tank guns. And I was told there is about thirteen tanks were rolling toward Vung Tau . And on the 30th of April the military commander of Vung Tau was gone. Le Tran Nhan: So I knew there is nothing much we can do. And I set out with some of my students, some of my trainees to try to go to IV Corps because the IV Corps wasn't touched. So we think we have better resistance there. But I couldn't make it to the IV Corps. On the way I was picked up by the Vietnamese navy. And they told us there is nothing left, so you'd better get on our ship and go. And I lost contact with my family then. My family still remains in Vietnam.

Interviewer: Okay. Cut.