War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Glenn Kent, 1986 [1]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPE E03001 GLENN KENT [1]

Creation and Mission of the JSPS

Interviewer:

GENERAL, CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHY THE AIR FORCE WANTED A JOINT STRATEGIC

PLANNING STAFF IN THE LATE '50S, EARLY '60S?

Kent:

In the late '50s there was a growing unrest within the planners of the

use of nuclear weapons. That we did not have a single integrated office

plan. That is a single plan of how we were to make use of atomic

weapons. And the whole idea that we should do something about it was

made real by Secretary Gates who finally decided that that was one goal

that he would set during his tenure as Secretary of Defense. That he

would rectify this situation and quote, have a single integrated plan

for the operational use of nuclear weapons. There was some resistance

at the time from the army and particularly from the Navy about such a

plan. I think the Navy was concerned about the fact that this would put

the Air Force in a dominant position about planning for the use of

nuclear weapons and also they were fearful of the fact that it would

put them in a dominant position about the requirements for nuclear

weapons and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. To alleviate that,

Secretary Gates was very careful to say that the Joint Strategic

Planning Staff that he envisioned to generate, formulate this single

integrated office plan would be quote, an allocation process. In other

words, they were to focus solely on the bus...matter of how to make

best use of the weapons allocated. And would not be in the requirements

business. That would properly be dealt with at the Pentagon in a very

complicated way with services at JCS and the OSD.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU JUST BRIEFLY TELL ME THOUGH FIRSTLY WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE

SITUATION PRIOR TO THE JSTPS?

Kent:

Well there were several plans. There was...There were several plans.

One a plan by SAC and then with the advent of Polaris, a plan for the

use by...and finally a strike plan by... And I think it was

self-evident that we should do better than that. And while one could

allege there was coordination...in fact it was not an integrated plan.

Interviewer:

WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO THE NAVY PEOPLE WHO FELT THAT WHAT SAC WANTED IN

PARTICULAR WAS TO RUN THE WHOLE OF THE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND TO HAVE A

STRATEGIC COMMAND?

Kent:

At...at times within the Navy the did offer the criticism that this was

a plan by the air-force to have a Air Force commander head of all

strategic forces. In fact a strategic nuclear command or whatever the

name was. That according to my recollection was really never the intent

of the Air Force. The people in the Air Force that were dedicated to

help Secretary Gates achieve this single integrated op plan were

General White, the Chief of Staff; General Gerhart, a three-star

general, head of plans and operations; and some action officers like

myself. And at no time, and I was very much involved in that process,

at no time did I ever hear any, the chief or General Gerhart even voice

such an aspiration. And that's not to say that someone else can say

that somebody else in the Air Force might have said that. That that was

certainly the official position of the Air Force. And it was no

Machiavellian intent. It was just as simple as that; that we will have

a single integrated plan to make best use of the forces allocated.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE AIM OF THAT PLAN AS FAR AS YOU KNOW? WHAT WAS THE KIND OF

INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN TO THE PLANNERS IN TERMS OF HOW THEY

SHOULD DECIDE TO USE THOSE WEAPONS?

Kent:

The original instructions in the...way to the planners to develop that

single integrated office plan was simply make best use of the forces

allocated. Then there were some instructions after that or guidance

after that that would give meaning to what was meant by best use. But

if you... The whole idea and the whole concept is captured by the idea,

make best use of the forces allocated. Best use was in those days

considered some kind of "optimum mix" between attacking military

targets and urban industrial targets.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE A PERCENTAGE GIVEN OF THE AMOUNT OF DESTRUCTION THAT WAS

EXPECTED?

Kent:

But, if there...if there were, it was very muted because of the fact

that how could, if I tell you make best use, do the best you can with

the forces allocated, then it's redundant to tell you what you must do.

Because you're supposed to, your charge is to do the best you can with

forces allocated. Now in later years those, that general guidance and

in my view unfortunately became more and more detailed. And so finally

it almost resembled a requirements plan. And I think that was a

thing...a phenomena that came later and in my view, not a useful one.

Weapons Planning Requirement Calculation

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU WERE IN THE WEAPONS PLANNING DIVISION OF THE US AIR FORCE,

WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS BY WHICH REQUIREMENTS WERE

ARRIVED AT? HOW DID PEOPLE DECIDE HOW MANY BOMBERS WERE NEEDED AND HOW

MANY BOMBS WERE NEEDED?

Kent:

Well, the question of how many bombers were to be purchased is a very

complex affair. There are inputs into the Air Force from CINCSAC. There

are competing demands within the Air Force for these resources.

Whatever resources are available to the Air Force to by tagfighter

wings, for example. And uh... the Secretary of the Air Force has an

input, but more importantly the office of the Secretary of Defense has

an input into those deliberations and also the congress. So there's a

very complicated iterative somewhat at times, illusive process that

determines and the reason I'm saying that is to disabuse the idea that

somebody writes down a requirement based on a target list and hands it

in. That comes a mandatory order to order B-52s. It just, it simply

doesn't work that way. And one can argue, Well, was the output of that

process correct or not. And people will argue on both sides of it that

the number of B-52s was too low. Or others that it's too high. And what

the right what the right number is an eternal debate. And it went on

then and still continues on all major weapons systems.

Interviewer:

BUT ISN'T IT TRUE THAT ONCE YOU'VE GOT THE BOMBERS THAT DOES TO SOME

EXTENT DETERMINE HOW MANY BOMBS YOU HAVE?

Kent:

I certainly will agree that once the bombers or being purchased then

there is an onus to say, I should make this effective use of those

platforms which represent a tremendous capital outlay is possible. And

I was in the weapons plans division and the given was there was this

many B-57s, B-47s, and B-52s. And certainly a prominent factor in my

deliberations at that level was to make effective use of the platforms

that had already been purchased. Now, whether that number

was...platforms was right or not this is another question. But when it

comes down to my particular part of the scheme, why it was make

effective use. As a matter of fact, not only the Air Force went on that

basis, but so did the Navy. And we would sit and say well we can load

80 percent of the B-47 and the B-52s and you can load 80 percent of

your aircraft that come off of carriers. And so we divided up what in

our image was the deficiency.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE ANYBODY IN THIS WHOLE PROCESS WHO WAS TRYING TO RECONCILE THE

NUMBER OF BOMBS AND BOMBERS WITH SOME GOAL?

Kent:

Yes, there were. But if I then told you that their answers were

conclusive and persuasive and that everybody that looked at it came up

with the same answer would not be correct, of course. I mean, yes,

people looked at that.

Interviewer:

[REPEAT QUESTION]

Kent:

Oh, there were people in those days asking how much is enough. I don't

think that it was all that systematic and well ordered. And certainly

the people that were asking how much is enough, the answer varied with

the groups and obviously the Secretary of Defense has an input into

that. It was not a well ordered process at least according to the

standards later set by Alain Enthoven in later years.

Appropriate Levels of Weapons Allocation for Air Force Targets

Interviewer:

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO DESCRIBE HOW YOU COUNTERED THE ARGUMENTS OF

GEORGE RATHJENS AND GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKY WHEN THEY WENT DOWN TO OMAHA IN

THE FALL OF 1960 AND THEY GAVE THIS VERY CRITICAL REPORT ON THE SIOP TO

THE PRESIDENT AND YOU WERE ASKED TO COUNTER IT?

Kent:

Well George Rathjens and Dr. Kistiakowsky did visit Omaha in late...

Interviewer:

1960.

Kent:

Well, it was either late 1960 or early '61 because the it... The JSTPS

was ratified by Secretary Gates on 18 December 1960 and it was sometime

after that that these gentlemen made their visit out there and came

back with a rather negative report of what was going on. I felt that

the report was not justified. While they can argue about criteria for

damage and matters like that, to my recollection they never did

translate that in any persuasive way that we were not making best use

of the force out there. You see, because a plan is a matter of

addressing weapons. And they did, to my knowledge, they never made a

persuasive case that SAC was not uh...making best use of the weapons

allocated as was there charge and their job. Mainly I think their

arguments had to do with total requirements. But since that was not the

business of JSTPS I felt much of their criticism was simply not

relevant.

Interviewer:

GIVEN WHAT THEY WERE SAYING IS THE SIOP HAS GOT OVERKILL BUILT INTO IT.

THERE ARE TOO MANY WEAPONS ALLOCATED. THERE ARE TOO MANY TARGETS. THAT

MEANS WE'VE GOT TOO MANY WEAPONS. WE CAN DO WITH FEWER. THAT WAS THE

GENERAL LINE OF THEIR ARGUMENT. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT ARGUMENT?

Kent:

Well, if their argument was that there are too many weapons allocated

to some of the targets or perhaps to many of the targets... all right.

But I repeat that it was not my recollection that they ever said, well,

say take some of those weapons off of here and put them in another

place. Part of that problem is the difference between sure or safe and

sure kill. Military planners are apt to air on the side of sure kill.

And if there's a target there, why since there's uncertainty as to how

hard it is and matter like that they may err on the side of sure kill.

If you, on their other hand, if you're trying to save something, you

err on the side of sure safe. And I think there was an element of that.

What I guess that what bothers me is that anyone can find fault with

what somebody's doing. And probably be correct. But...but by and large,

I think that their criticism, the type of criticism that they fostered

was unwarranted and not really productive.

Interviewer:

BUT DO YOU THINK, REGARDLESS OF THE CRITICISM OF THE JSTPS, DO YOU

THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE ACHIEVED ITS GOALS WHETHER

THOSE GOALS WERE DETERRENTS OR PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES OR WINNING

A WAR, WHATEVER THE GOAL MIGHT HAVE BEEN DEFINED AS, WITH FAR FEWER

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN IT HAD IN 1960? THAT

SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE ISSUE.

Kent:

Well, there is a question of, you know, how much is, that goes back

again to the question of how much is enough. Could we have maintained

deterrence on fewer weapons. I hesitate to speculate on that. We can

have a, we can certainly have a cut of fat today. And now we believe

that we could some how or another reduce our, both countries could

reduce their stockpile by 40 percent. All types of negotiations we

think about in Geneva and that our security is still maintained and I

thoroughly agree with that. I don't today believe that anyone could

make the case that we need what we have today. That both countries

could reduce their arsenal of weapons...

Interviewer:

BUT WE HAD GREATER MEGATONNAGE THEN THAN WE HAVE NOW.

Kent:

Well, there is always a question of megatonnage. Megatonnage is a very

bad...very bad measure of merit because it's really equivalent megatons

that counts. And I think on equivalent megatons we have more warheads

today. And more warheads is a more... is a better major if you have

been looking for one single simple major than the total megatons

because...

Interviewer:

AND HE'S GOING TO SAY, THAT TO ME SIMPLY IMPLIED THAT SAC HAD FAR MORE

WEAPONS THAN WAS NECESSARY TO DO THE JOB.

Kent:

Sometime after the...

Interviewer:

ASSUME WE KNOW THE REPORT. WHAT BASICALLY WAS YOUR REPLY TO THAT

REPORT?

Kent:

Well the Kistiakowsky / George Rathjens report was very negative and

perhaps even scathing in their assessment of the planning that had been

accomplished out there on the SIOP by the JSTPS. In my view...

Interviewer:

COULD YOU JUST SIT BACK PLEASE...

Kent:

In my view, they blew things completely out of proportion. I don't

remember the details of that report. Certainly, if one's fishing he can

find something that he can make a case about. But to try and make a

case that the planning out there was less than perfect is easy to make

But to say that it wasn't good to me, was not correct. As a matter of

fact, I had the action within the air staff of what do we do about this

report. And found that in one particular instance, an important one,

that they had their figures completely wrong. It's my recollection that

they never collected those. But as I recall there was a flurry about

that and it died away as....as most people you can find fault with what

somebody's doing. But it's little harder to say, here's the better way.

Interviewer:

SO THE AIR FORCE DID BELIEVE THAT IT WAS JUSTIFIED IN LAYING DOWN THE

KIND OF MEGATONNAGE THAT IT WAS LAYING DOWN ON THE TARGETS THAT IT HAD

THERE AND SO ON?

[END OF TAPE E03001 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Glenn Kent, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-m03xs5jp5k

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Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Kent, Glenn A., 1915-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: e1cb84c65fabb44e0dc353a6aea5f2c96fed9570 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Glenn Kent, 1986 [1],” 1986-03-13, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 16, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m03xs5jp5k.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Glenn Kent, 1986 [1].” 1986-03-13. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 16, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m03xs5jp5k>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Glenn Kent, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m03xs5jp5k