War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Clark Clifford, 1986

What was the defense options open to President Shimon. In any 1947 this is when the Soviets were trying to extend this influence in the eastern Mediterranean to Greece and to secure their option to what would help the options were very limited. It was an area in which the United States had not had any previous experience. It had always been under the aegis general control of Great Britain and suddenly the British notified us in December of 46 that they would no longer be able to support the Greeks and the Turks. Then the formal message came over early in nineteen forty seven and the British said that they could not extend economic or military aid to Greece and Turkey but they hoped that we might assume that burden at that particular time. We had no military resources in the area to draw from it.

We had as you know greatly reduced our armed forces. But President Truman reached the conclusion that if we did not come to the aid of Greece and Turkey then no one else would. And if the Soviets obtained a foothold in that area of the Mediterranean then they would control the southern anchor of the defense line between eastern and western Europe. So President Truman went up in March and gave a speech to the joint session of the Congress in which he said it must be the policy of our country to come to the aid of those countries who are under pressure either from within or from without. And we must do it and we shall do. And Congress came in to line in that regard and appropriated the money

and Greece and Turkey were say else they would have gone right down the drain as far as the Soviets. I always get a surge of pride in that important center in Athens where the statue of President Truman is erected it says by a grateful people for whom we saved our liberty. None after the president dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was his deepest wish that. Yeah. In March of 1947 he did not consider it.

That's after he dropped it on Nagasaki and Hiroshima he hoped that it wouldn't ever be used militarily again. That was his hope and he did not approach crises. In Eastern Europe or in the eastern Mediterranean. From the standpoint of it might possibly necessitate the dropping of the bomb that was not in his mind. If it had taken military assistance in Greece and Turkey to prevail he would have sent conventional military forces there. But keep in mind if you will that he did not make his mental processes known to the Soviets. So when he announced the Truman Doctrine they had no way of knowing whether he would back that up with the use of the atomic bomb or not. And we had it and they didn't. The world was in awe of the enormous destructive force wrecked upon

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And I have no doubt of what that played an important role in the soviets deciding not to push us too far. Did you have a valid personal role in drafting the Truman Doctrine can you tell me any stories about the drafting. Well yes as I say I happened to be in his office when the first preliminary message was received from the British and it caused great concern to him because for 200 years our policy of our country had been not to be involved in alliances of that kind. And taking over the protection of an area so foreign to us as the Eastern Mediterranean. However we'd had a year and a half of constant aggressive Soviet expansionism. And I think he felt strongly

that if anybody was to stop them he would have to in the drafting of the speech. Subsequently there has been some criticism of the breadth of the language you used. I think we used the right language at the time it was my function to do quite a lot of the drafting of that message and we wanted to inform not only Greece and Turkey but Europe and the Soviet Union and the world as we now had entered the 20th century and we were going to fight for freedom in the world. And I suggest to you that the Truman Doctrine enunciated in March of 47 sent a surge of hope around the entire globe where there really hadn't been any hope before. So it achieves its purpose. If you can just tell me briefly what the Marshall Plan sets out to do.

The background of the Marshall Plan is very interesting. As soon as the Second World War was over it was President Truman's fond this way so that we could work out a series of agreements with the Soviets. There had been agreements of Yalta and it terror and it Potsdam in the year following the close of the war which ended in August of 45. The Soviets went about violating most of the agreements that they had made and the pressures began to build up in Western Europe. Pressures on Greece that I've referred to a lot of pressure on Italy pressures on France the Netherlands Belgium Great Britain in addition to open and avowed pressure to develop what was known as the common term that was the creation of a communist cell in these various countries

from which then would spread out communist operatives. Europe was prostrate after the war. If they were going to be able to recreate their industry and their way of life and stand up against the pressures of communism they were going to have to have economic help. I attribute the major thinking to the first brain of Dean that he was really the author of the concept of the Marshall Plan. Fact is he came over to White House one time and I sat in with him and President Truman when he discussed the concept and said that he was going to go to some place in Alabama and make a speech. And he thought he might try this concept of economic aid to Europe as a trial balloon.

He did and it received rather surprisingly favorable comments in the press throughout the United States. President was very concerned about it because we had spent. Hundreds of billions of our treasure in the second world war lost hundreds of thousands of men and he was not sure that the American people would support a play war ending in 1945 here now in 1948. You wanted to go into this very expensive program. You didn't know whether the Congress was able to do it or not. So after the original reaction to it was rather good we went to work in writing the preparatory outline of the Marshall Plan and then preparing much of the speech that would be given. I had the hope that President Truman's name would be associated with it. But when I mentioned that to him he smiled a little at my youth and inexperience and said No anything that went to the Hill with the name Truman

would die unborn. He said let's think about that after it was worked up almost to the final dotting of the I's. He decided that the speech should be given to General Marshall who was secretary of state and Marshall made the commencement address in the spring of forty eight at Harvard and it was an enormous success and three days later it became known as a Marshall Plan and been known ever since. And it went right through the Congress because every Republican on the Hill if he wanted to could vote for the Marshall Plan or he certainly couldn't vote for the Truman. Was just going to I'm going to on still the questions about the Atomic Energy Commission. If you have. What you remember about the early days of the ABC and

President Truman's relations with the ABC and think of David Lee and Bill in particular as the chairman. I sat in on those meetings because the president gave me the assignment of interviewing prospected of members of the first atomic energy commission. So I sat in and had pretty much the feel of how he felt he had an important decision to be made. Up until that time the only use made of this new discovery atomic energy had been the military you know the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was his fervent hope that this great invention could be used for the benefit of mankind and not for the destruction. So he decided basically that he wanted civilian control of atomic energy and not military and military work very hard for

saying that this was the great weapon of the future and they would be able to develop the president turned that suggestion down put it in the hands of a five man commission headed by David Levy and tell you I might say made a super Herb chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and it was the president's instructions to them to utilize the major efforts and name of the commission into developing peacetime uses that is developed for industrial energy for medical purposes. Also of course the military would be involved within the limitations that the president set so that we could begin to develop as a military weapon also. But throughout the Truman administration he constantly maintained civilian control over it and did not let the military get in possession of this new weapon.

Think about this. Only that after some time they had been manufacturing them. I think the president was rather startled that so few weapons had been made. Perhaps the topic Energy Commission was taking his position a little too literally that they just give attention to the civilian uses of atomic energy. So I think he felt that we should be developing it militarily on a more extensive basis and that was done. I remember at the very beginning when we dropped the bombs on Hiroshima Nagasaki which forced the Japanese surrender. It was extraordinarily tense waiting period to see what the Japanese could do would do

because we only had two bombs we had dropped them both. Just repeat for me the president's reason for initially discouraging military planning for the use of atomic weapons. Well I think maybe that is possibly something of an overstatement. I don't think he minded. They're making plans so long as they weren't actually beginning to carry out such plans. I think he understood having been a military man himself that there are always future studies going on in the military war plans in the event wars entered into but what he was going to do was to confine the military to the suggested plans and not having them actually begin overt

plans and constructions. To increase the possibility of the use of atomic energy in war. It was his expressed hope again and again that the only atomic bombs that would ever be dropped in the history of the world were those that had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You hope that they would never be used again. So he was constantly in control of the military. See that they didn't go further than he wanted them to go. Can you remember what it was like what the atmosphere was like at the time of the check when there was the coup de time in the spring of 48 in February 48 and 10 men got together from the president banished. Yes. As I said before the

president was so hopeful that we could work out plans with the Soviet Union instead. You may remember that during the closing days of the war and thereafter they started in they took control of all the nations on their western bretheren Latvia Lithuania Estonia Bulgaria Roumania Czechoslovakia later later Hungary Yugoslavia and this was of course a matter of the deepest concern. We had hoped to Checco Slovakia could remain independent. When the coup took place and they moved in and Czechoslovakia in effect fell to Soviet domination it emphasized the threat of Soviet expansionism and made the president more conscious of the fact that we were faced

with this constant in X Froebel plan of the Soviets to expand communist control throughout the world. How did President Truman assess the conventional strength of the Soviet Union at this time. Well he thought it was very great. During the war we had our factories running a full time basis. We shipped literally mountains of material for the Soviet Union. We sent every kind of war material we sent you. We sent food and supplies of all kinds. So although the Soviet Union had 20 million casualties in the war when the war was over they were at peak military strength as evidenced by their very aggressive campaign they made from the east in the closing days of

Hitler and the Third Reich. So he had a very real respect for the Soviet military power. Our power had dwindled rather rapidly. Our men were glad the anxious to get out and wanted to get home and take up peacetime pursuits. But in that whole period behind the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union and the rest of the world was the existence of the atomic bomb. There was no defense to it. We were the only nation that had it and it played an enormous part although we never threatened to use it was in the minds of all thoughtful men all over the world. The station assessed the carry 10 intentions of the Soviet leaders. Time and which time is this.

Yes. At first it was thought here in this country that would we would be able to reach agreement. It seems so logical. We had worked together so closely with the Soviet Union as allies during the war and it was a feeling that because of the relationship that had been developed that we could do the same and work toward peace. It was not to be the Soviets did not wish it. They had their own plans for their own area and how they were going to build up a bulwark of nations as a protectorate against some future excursion from the west. So that as time went on the president became more and more convinced that the great foreign policy problem of the United States was the Soviet Union. And he expressed it in that manner. He treated it that way in the campaign of

nineteen forty eight. He assured the American people that this country would do everything in its power to stem the advance of the Soviet Union that is that we could reasonably do. We recognize the difficulty of it. Commented on the fact that the Soviets had made an effort to penetrate our government here and the FBI was very busily trying to find communist spies in this country. It was that kind of a period in which the administration and the American people were beginning to accustom themselves to the fact that for as long as one could see looking into the future the Soviets were going to be a problem. I regret to say that's the way it's been ever since. This conversation is about Jews of Stalin did you have it. Well yes when he came back from Potsdam he was rather euphoric

about the meeting and he said he had an expression one time he got picked up by the papers he said you know I rather liked old Joe which was rather startling statement I think Stalin had been proved there had perhaps five to 10 million people to their death some incredible number of that. But he felt that they got a long way out. Stalin came over for instance in Potsdam when he first was there. I think maybe his first day to pay just a courtesy call and President Truman invited him to stay for a luncheon where they had about an hour and a half talk one on one. So he came back encouraged. But the next year brought constant disillusionment to him about the attitude of the so then he knew that we had a problem on our hands and we would have to face up to it. The play telegram which.

I have some recollection that in the spring of 47. The Soviets were engaged as I say again in this expanding policy of theirs and General Clay was in Germany and my recollection is not too clear on that but I think that he sent a telegram pointing out a number of activities in which the Soviets were engaged and calling our government's attention to the fact that we had better face up to the realities of Soviet aggression. Yes it was in the spring of nineteen forty seven. And General Clay in the telegram pointed out activities of the Soviets which showed So

clearly their aggressive design. The president took it seriously and the policy of the administration then was to recognize the realities of Soviet expansionism and face up to. One thing. I think that he wanted to develop a plan whereby we could increase the political readiness of our country and the strength of our country without having just to rely upon the possession of the atomic weapon. So in that speech in March of 47

he asked the Congress to approve a plan for universal military training. The idea was that young men getting out of high school would serve for a year in the military learned the basics of military service and they could leave and go into a trade or go on to college but that we would ultimately form an enormous pool of millions of young men who already had rather men free military training. The Congress turned it down. The reason was that the mothers of America didn't want their sons to be involved in any such program in the political vicissitudes of the plan were too apparent to the members of Congress. Also the president asked for a Selective Service Act so that men could be drafted. I was turned down. I think a third request he made was for us to

begin to cooperate and make substantial contributions to the actions of the European community at the time. So it was felt that this was a step in the direction of additional preparation for our country. We didn't accomplish very much. And say why specifically his plans for universal military training were rejected. It was our understanding after he offered it in talks that he had with congressional leaders and in speeches they made and positions that they took that the program was unpopular in the first place the young man did most of the young men did not want to do they didn't want to give that year.

Also the mothers of the kind of young man didn't want their sons to get into the military service even for that year of training. Keep in mind that we'd been through the Second World War and the concept was at the time was that we had prevailed over Hitler and the Third Reich and now we had the United Nations and we had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that was coming into existence we had a number of programs and as a matter of fact there were really wasn't going to be any more war. So there was no need to go through this. But the public response to the offer or suggestion of universal military training was exceedingly negative. It sounds so that he was disappointed in.

But if you can't get support on the hail from the leader and you can take NOS counts of committees and so forth which he did at the time and he found that he could push it as hard as he wanted to and speak all over the country and all and he wasn't going to get the Congress to pass a universal military training. Now later in other years they've come up with a different concept that is that boys be drafted into government service for a year after finishing high school that they then would have the choice of either going in the military training or going into some peace time trade under the aegis of the military. Even even that doesn't get enough public support to go through. Time the blockade of 1948 was a very dramatic time.

The Soviets contrary to the understanding that had existed between the three powers suddenly and without any real warning blockaded Burley. One intriguing part that I don't know it's ever been discussed before is two of the president's top military advisors recommended a plan of attack the presidential. The plan was to get a train to arm the train with the most powerful firepower that has ever been assembled notified the Soviets that the train was going to start from a certain location and it was going to go to Berlin. Now results could occur. One is under those circumstances they might decide to let the train go through to Berlin and the blockade would have been broke. If they said no

the train will not be permitted. The train would try to fight its way through and if the Soviets stopped it it would be construed as an act of war. President considered that advice and rejected. It was dangerous to speculate of course of the fact he decided instead ultimately upon seeing if we could not with the improved science of the AIDS supply BERLIJN by air a wondrous concept at the time or plane to reach the stage that it had now. So they took these bombers and they flew 24 hours a day and they supplied them with food and fuel and all of the necessities of life and it went on for eight or nine months. We supplied that great city entirely by air. It was a distinct and devastating public relations

defeat for the Soviet Union. They'd said we're going to blockade Berlin and Berlin just went right on because we were supplying them by air and they could shoot down American planes. That's a real act of war. After eight or nine months without any warning one day they just lifted the blockade. But it had been an enormous asset to the United States and other free nations that they had tested the Soviet resolve and had won. They did actually. Why did the blockade and essentially what they did. They were losing the blockade was meaningless. And for a nation to say we are going to blockade Berlin and then beyond the able to do it and have no way of stopping our air lifts in the bird land short of war they finally concluded that they had a real loser on their hands. And the Soviets are exceedingly

pragmatic when they have a loser. They just charge off their losses and quit. In the in August and in July as well President Truman chose he approved of the decision to send atomic capable B-29 stewing. And this was July August just off of the beginning of the blockade. Do you recall why he approved that decision. Why did he send it down. I don't have a I don't have a recollection of that. I perhaps wasn't involved in it but I have no recollection. They're also full of 1948 in the middle of the Berlin crisis Secretary Forrestal was making plans towards the increase of the atomic weapons and I wondered why Truman. He was beginning to turn around he was beginning to accept his advice can you tell me something about Forrestal and also how Truman was being

swayed in that direction. You tell me. I'm not sure that President Truman was swayed the whole period of the Berlin blockade was an exceedingly Hintz theory. When Soviet said we're going to blockade Berlin and then we chose to violate that arguer and breach the blockade with our airlift. It was a very tense period between the two countries. One didn't know the Soviets might someday inform us that no American planes would be permitted. What happens and all through that period. There was a threat of an ultimate confrontation and forest all another civilians over in the military just wanted to prepare. In any event for any contingency one of the

contingencies might possibly encompass the use of atomic weapons. But what they want to do is to be ready in the event that any such decision of that kind was made. My recollection is that President Truman permitted them to make the plans but I'm quite sure that at no time did he ever really think that he would ever give the order to drop. However it's entirely possible that the fact that we were making plans in that regard could have been upsetting to the Soviets. You just don't know how much one country knows about another. There aren't very many secrets that are kept. How did the how did just tell me issues. How did they figure in the president's 1948 election campaign. Did they figure it.

I think they did know. I think that he had made such a firm commitment that comic energy was not to be used again militarily. I think it was not really an issue. Foreign policy was an issue the Republicans tried to hang a communist badge on the Democrats. They were not successful in that regard. The president during the campaign of forty eight took a very hard position regarding the Soviets and said that we were confronting them. We understood the problems that they were presenting and that we would face up to them. We continue to try to get along with them but we were learning more about them all the time. So I would say that it was not really an important issue in the 48 campaign. Adelphia today I'd rather have the president with that today.

I think that in many instances he talked about peace and he worded it in different ways about the responsibility of the president to explore every path to peace that a president should go to almost any lengths to avoid war. We've seen what the Holocaust of the Second World War had done. So it's a typical speech that he was making during that period. Let's use the three minutes that I think how did the U.S. atomic bomb figure in talks with the Europeans about the birth of nature. Yeah. It was there they were glad to be protected by the umbrella of atomic energy. The greater emphasis however was put upon the development of conventional strength. Each country was to make a contribution. The

major value of oversimplified was NATO's said to the Soviet Union attacking any one of our allies in Europe and you have attacked the United States and you are at war with the United States NATO has kept the peace for some 38 years in Europe. Did you recall any conversations with President Truman about some of Churchill's speeches. No I don't recall. You will remember that in the spring of 1946 Mr Churchill came to the United States and went with President Truman out to Fulton Missouri where Churchill made his speech at Westminster College a famous speech it was it was called the Iron Curtain speech. I don't remember any particular remark that the president might have

made about any private conversation that he had with Churchill. I was on that trip we made the trip by train so that the two men can get better acquainted. So it took us a week to go out and come back and they discussed many subjects. But I never remember him specifically referring to that I think that Great Britain and the United States understood each other quite well. They had participated in the development of the bomb. You know oh the White House didn't take part in that the State Department did that to some extent. The Defense Department was involved but the White House personnel did not personally take part. Only that I think it was quite shocking to him as it was to others. We had this

wonderful posture of being the only one that had it. We hoped that we'd been able to maintain sufficient secrecy so that none of our secrets would get to them. That proved not to be true. Fact is too that the Soviets appropriated all the top German scientists and treated them very well and put them to work. But it was a surprise. We knew they were working on it but still it was a shock.