War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [2]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES A0404-A0406 MICHEL TATU [2]

Interviewer:

WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV PUT THE MISSILES IN CUBA?

Tatu:

In my view the reason for putting the missiles in Cuba is simple.

Khrushchev wanted to make a point against the United States. Secondly,

he wanted to change the balance of forces, because here we come back to

his exaggeration of the number of missiles he had. He knew in fact that

he had not enough missiles against the United States while McNamara and

Kennedy had started a huge build-up of 1,000 Minutemen against the

Soviet Union...The reason for Khrushchev putting missiles in Cuba is in

my view simple. First he wanted to make a point, to have a success

against the United States. After the trouble he had with his tough

allies in China, and with some opposition inside the Politburo. Second,

he wanted to change the balance of forces, because after boasting so

much about his missiles build-up after his rockets, the reaction he had

was that Kennedy and McNamara launched a strong build-up of American

ICBM, 1,000 Minutemen. In '62, already this was clear, that he was

losing a lot of forces. So he wanted to change the balance of forces by

a cheap way. He had not yet a big program of ICBM, but he had a lot of

European missiles Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, SS-4 and SS-5

of which he had already hundreds against Europe. So he wanted to put a

couple of those, so about 40 SS-4 and SS-5 in Cuba in order in fact to

transform those IRBM into ICBM to have the same effect against the

United States. So that was one main argument.

Khrushchev's Decision to Put Missiles in Cuba

Interviewer:

HOW DID HE PERCEIVE PRESIDENT KENNEDY? DID HE THINK THAT HE WOULDN'T

RESPOND IN A TOUGH WAY?

Tatu:

I think yes, he had a hope that Kennedy will be mild on Cuba. For what

reasons, in my view, Khrushchev had seen two things in 1961. First in

Cuba there was a Bay of Pigs operation which was a failure for the

United States, and an evidence of a mild attitude of Kennedy about

Cuba. He apologized himself. He didn't do anything to help the contrast

of the time in Cuba. While in the same year, in August, 1961 we had the

Berlin War operation, where Kennedy reacted rather strongly. He sent

his tanks, and there was a confrontation so the Americans were rather

tough on Berlin, mild on Cuba. And we have to have in mind that the

main objective for Khrushchev at the time was Berlin. He had to put a

proposal of so-called unilateral peace treaty between Moscow and East

Berlin in order to evacuate in fact West, the Western powers from West

Berlin. So he had the still this in mind. But Cuba and the chain of

balance of forces which we hoped from the deployment of the missiles in

his view was a sort of way to help him put a bigger pressure on Kennedy

on Berlin, but through Cuba it was easier because Kennedy was milder,

had shown that he was softer on Cuba than on Berlin.

Interviewer:

LET ME JUST ASK YOU TO RECAP THAT LAST PART OF WHAT YOU SAID. HE FELT

THAT HE COULD PUT THE MISSILES IN CUBA BECAUSE KENNEDY WAS SOFTER ON

CUBA THAN IN BERLIN. COULD YOU JUST REPEAT THAT PART?

Tatu:

Un-huh. But I have to get back to the '61 year, Bay of Pigs and so on?

Interviewer:

NO.

Tatu:

Well, and so it was better to put stronger pressure on Kennedy in

general and in Berlin in particular by using Cuba, because Kennedy had

shown that he was softer on Cuba because of the Bay of Pigs, than on

Berlin where he had been, taken his tough... a tough stance.

Interviewer:

THANK YOU. THE DECISION TO PUT THE MISSILES INTO CUBA, DO YOU THINK

THAT WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION ALONE OR DID HE HAVE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT

IN THE KREMLIN?

Tatu:

Well, no, in fact every evidence we got later about that is that

Khrushchev was the main decider. It was his own idea, and I think he...

imposed that even maybe on some militaries which were a little bit more

careful about American reaction. We don't know exactly which ones, but

maybe Moskalenko, for example the Marshal of the Soviet Union at the

time was maybe against, but in fact, everybody agrees now that it was

Khrushchev's own decision to deploy missiles in Cuba.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT CASTRO? WAS HE INVOLVED IN THAT DECISION DO YOU THINK?

Tatu:

In my view, no, he was not involved. He accepted it. Sorry... In my

view, Castro was not the initiator. He needed some support of the

Soviet Union against American pressures. He needed the help, including

military help, but everybody agreed that he did not ask for missiles in

Cuba. And so Khrushchev had to not to impose that upon him, but he took

the initiative and Castro accepted the missiles. Sorry, you say

missoils or missiles?

Interviewer:

SO WAS KHRUSHCHEV AWARE OF THE RISKS HE WAS TAKING? DO YOU THINK HE WAS

AT ALL NAIVE ABOUT HOW THE UNITED STATES WOULD RESPOND TO THIS ACTION?

Tatu:

Yes, certainly, he made a gamble and he was naive in believing that

Kennedy, that sorry. Certainly Khrushchev was a little bit naive when

he thought that Kennedy would do nothing. But we have to take into

account that he thought that Kennedy had been already rather soft on

Cuba during the Bay of Pigs operation by not supporting the contrast at

the time. So he could think that Kennedy would do the same, and will

not be too... will be frightened to react too much and to make military

operations against Cuba to get rid of the missiles. I take again the

same argument because you can pick it up at the time, if you like.

Interviewer:

SO DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV EXPECTED KENNEDY TO DO NOTHING? TO NOT

RESPOND?

Tatu:

He did not expect in my view such a strong reaction. Otherwise I mean

Khrushchev in my view did not expect such a strong reaction from the

United States, otherwise it's simple, he would just not have put the

missiles in Cuba, because it was a failure or at least a lack of

prestige, a loss of prestige. Which was difficult to bear for him. So

the only thing that what happened later means that he certainly would

not have put missiles, if he had known the, Kennedy's reaction.

Interviewer:

OK. WHAT ABOUT THE NOTION THAT THIS ACTION WAS TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH

ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES? DO YOU THINK THERE WAS ANY

CONSIDERATIONS OF THAT OR ANY OTHER TIMING CONSIDERATIONS ON

KHRUSHCHEV'S PART?

Tatu:

I don't think so, no. After all I do not remember that those elections

were so crucial for, I don't know, for the United States, but for the

Soviet Union. I don't remember comments showing that these elections

were very important. And in fact the decision to deploy the missiles

was certainly taken in the spring of 1962, April or May, in my view.

Even if the actual deployment started in September/October.

Interviewer:

SO YOU THINK THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR REASON FOR MAKING THE MOVE AT THE

TIME THEY DID IN TERMS OF COINCIDING WITH ANY OTHER EVENT?

Tatu:

It is not my impression that this was connected to such an internal

event like mid-term elections in the United States. Maybe if it had

been a... Presidential election, maybe yes it would have an impact.

Soviet Reaction to US Blockade

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT THE REACTION IN MOSCOW TO KENNEDY'S IMPOSITION OF THE

BLOCKADE? WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT?

Tatu:

Well, the first reaction was the first reaction to the Kennedy blockade

was as we have seen in Moscow for many other events, that brings no

reaction. Myself as a correspondent, I listened to that not through the

Moscow radio not through the Soviet press, but through the BBC. And for

about one day, I remember the first day we had no reaction at all. And

it came only in the afternoon, and so it was late reaction and

non-committed also. Just a protest. And for many days, we had we... the

reaction, you know, in Moscow comes after the decisions are made. And

even the information comes after a line has been adopted.

Interviewer:

TELL ME ABOUT OTHER REACTIONS? DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING IN MIND?

Tatu:

If I can analyze the broader Soviet reaction to these the government

reaction to Kennedy's blockade, I will see, I will say, three parts.

The first day there was sort of disarray. No information for one day.

It was first strong protest, but rather tough in tone. Then we see, and

it is interesting to look at the tightness of Pravda, everyday of this

week. It was tough down with the American imperialists and so on. And

then the second or third day the tone goes down, you know, more

pacifist, and in the middle of the week it is a rather mild reaction,

"We must do everything to save peace," arid so on and so on. "No war."

Then we have after this second low reaction, we have a third one, very,

rather tough, and surprisingly tough on Saturday, the day before the

end of the crisis, I would say. Because in Moscow, you must remember,

we were in advance for about eight hours on the United States. So

Saturday, that means Friday night in Washington, the tone was again

rather tough in the press. The general tone. And only the Sunday when

Khrushchev accepted in fact the Kennedy's proposals we came back to the

low profile reaction, peace, no war and so on.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID THE PRAVDA HEADLINES REFLECT? THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SOME

DECISIONS MADE AND THEN?

Tatu:

Yes Pravda, usually, is reflects exactly the tone and the mood of the

leadership just as the day and the time Pravda is made. That means,

Pravda of Saturday night Saturday morning reflected the mood of the

leadership of Friday night. And the same for the days before.

Interviewer:

SO WHAT WAS HAPPENING WHEN THE HEADLINES WERE LESS TOUGH? WHAT WAS THAT

REFLECTING?

Tatu:

It was reflecting the Khrushchev awareness, I mean the milder tone of

the press in the middle of the week reflected the growing awareness of

Khrushchev himselves, of the dangers of the situation, and of the will

of Kennedy also. He realized little by little, but not at once, that

Kennedy meant business, that he has to do something to give, finish

this crisis, while at the beginning he could consider after all with

good reason that maybe it was just protest by the United States, not

very strong, tough stance. So the more Kennedy showed his determination

the more Khrushchev realized that he has to find an accommodation, So

this was reflected in the tone of the press and also in the, in the

messages which were sent to the Washington, on the on the settlement.

Khrushchev's Letters to Kennedy

Interviewer:

TELL ME ABOUT THE TWO DIFFERENT LETTERS, WHO WAS BEHIND THOSE TWO

LETTERS? WERE THEY FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES REALLY?

Tatu:

Yes, there is exactly two letters, but some official statements in the

meantime, but I understand they were two letters of Khrushchev, one in

the middle of the week, implying a solution a compromise and a second

about Turkey on the Saturday. The first letter in the middle of the

week was certainly Khrushchev's work, his personal Style, everybody

agrees that recognized the way of expressing himself was Khrushchev

himself. And but in my view when Khrushchev wrote this letter he did it

without the knowledge of the leadership and of the Politburo, and he

could only imply what was not yet an official Soviet proposal. So he

implied that if Kennedy give the pledge that he will not invade Cuba he

might be ready to take the missiles out. But in my view this was not an

official Soviet position adopted by the Politburo. While the second

letter sent...But the second letter which Khrushchev sent to Kennedy on

the Saturday, or maybe Friday night proposing and exchange between the

missiles in Cuba against the American missiles in Turkey was an

official position adopted by the Politburo and probably adopted against

the will of Khrushchev. And here we have a very heavy confusion in the

Soviet Union. Because we have in one day or so... the Saturday, first

this official letter proposing an exchange between Turkey and Cuba one

day later another letter forgetting about Turkey and accepting

Kennedy's proposals. And in the meantime an article in Izvestia written

by Magiev who was an important commentator and who remained so for many

years, when Saturday evening Magiev writes in Izvestia that every talk

about the compromise between the missiles in Cuba and some base,

American base close to the Soviet Union is nonsense, should not be

accepted has to be denounced, and the only way of settling the

questions is to have a talk, a general talk about all American bases in

the world. So this is the toughest positions of all, but completely

contradictory even to the first letter of the day about Turkey, and

even more to the, next letter, the next day about acceptation ... of

Kennedy's condition.

[END OF TAPE A0404]

Interviewer:

TELL ME AGAIN ABOUT THE THRID LETTER, WAS THAT, WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF

THAT LETTER? DID THAT AGAIN SEEM TO COME FROM KHRUSHCHEV OR FROM

THE...?

Tatu:

Well, in the last final days of the crisis we have two Soviet letters

signed by Khrushchev. One published Saturday morning in the Soviet

Union about an exchange Cuba-Turkey. And the next day we have another

letter by Khrushchev, which forgets completely about the previous

letter on Turkey and mentions only the acceptation of Kennedy's

proposal. You Americans give a pledge that you do not invade Cuba and

we take our missiles back. In fact we know we knew later that Turkey

wasn't completely forgotten, because there was an implied understanding

that Kennedy will sooner or later withdraw the missiles from Cuba. But

officially nothing was said in the settlement at the time. And for the

Soviet population, for the observers in Moscow this was a very confused

situation why this Saturday's message about Turkey, which was never

again mentioned in any document of the Soviet Union about that.

Interviewer:

SO THAT THIRD LETTER, WAS THAT BACK FROM THE SAME SOURCE AS THE FIRST?

WAS THAT KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF TALKING THAT FORGOT ABOUT TURKEY?

Tatu:

I think the third letter of Khrushchev which accepted the Kennedy's

proposal was typically Khrushchev's own idea, and my strong impression

is that Khrushchev just followed the line from his own personal message

to Kennedy in the middle of the week through the last final letter

accepting the Kennedy's condition which were in fact in, the Kennedy's

proposal was announced to his own invitation ... during the week. So,

and he decided to forget about the Saturday's letter because it was not

his own idea, and it was imposed upon him by the Politburo. He didn't

approve certainly these documents.

Resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

OK, WHY DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV AGREED SO QUICKLY TO REMOVE THE

MISSILES?

Tatu:

I think Khrushchev agreed quickly and probably after two or three days

of hesitating he agreed to withdraw the missiles because he saw

Kennedy's determination. He understood that he made a mistake, that

Kennedy meant business, and he would have a huge crisis, maybe war with

the United States which nobody wanted, and maybe also an invasion of

Cuba. And so he lost Castro and these would be a big, and even bigger

loss of prestige for him. So probably personally he decided he would

have to swallow the pill. But he had some trouble to get the Politburo

onto this line. And so it took him two or three days more. I think in

fact, Khrushchev seemed from Moscow at the time, by the observers, by

the journalists, by the diplomats, the main breakthrough came maybe

Wednesday or Thursday when Khrushchev admitted for the first time that

he had deployed missiles in Cuba. And my impression was that it was

already a big loss of prestige and the beginning of the end or of the

concession because they denied so strongly before that they had any

missiles. So when you lie and then you have to admit that you lied and

that you... your opponent was true, you suddenly become much less

strong.

Interviewer:

SO ESSENTIALLY HE FELT LIKE HE HAD TO CUT HIS LOSSES BEFORE THINGS GOT

WORSE?

Tatu:

Yes, yes, because yes, Khrushchev had to make concessions, because

otherwise he would have either a world war, which was completely unable

to consider in any way, not only because it was a terrible thing but

also because of the balance of forces, you know. What we heard, in

Moscow at the time was that the American submarines, the first Polaris,

were exchanging messages between the sub and the center in Washington,

Pentagon about the targeting that in clear without crypt -- cryption,

the messages went to the table of Khrushchev, that these sub has Moscow

on line, on target. Another one has for Kiev and so on. And I think

this was in... intentional certainly. So that was the first reason. The

balance of forces was completely unequal and the second was that even

short of war he...they would have, there was a strong a strong

possibility of an American landing on Cuba, or even an air raid and

very bad things for Castro, and this would have been a very a strong

loss of prestige for the Soviet Union.

Interviewer:

WHO INSTRUCTED ALEKSANDR FOMIN TO MAKE A DEAL IN WASHINGTON THROUGH THE

CORRESPONDENT JOHN SCALI? WAS IT KHRUSHCHEV DO YOU THINK THAT

INSTRUCTED FOMIN TO TALK TO SCALI?

Tatu:

I think the deal which was talked through Fomin and Scali was certainly

Khrushchev initiative. Because we know that Khrushchev used these sort

of channels to have a quicker approach to the American decision center

and also maybe because he didn't want to get through the foreign

ministry and through the Politburo maybe, so he wanted to have his own

personal diplomacy, to go quicker to the objective and also because he

wanted to test some ideas. And as far as I understand, the deal of

Fomin-Scali was along the same lines as what was in his letter so that

was certainly Khrushchev's own decision.

Interviewer:

THE MISSILES OF THE UNITED STATES THAT WERE IN TURKEY WERE OLD. THEY

WERE CONSIDERED TO BE OBSOLETE. WHY WAS IT IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIETS TO

MAKE THIS EXCHANGE, THE MISSILES IN TURKEY FOR THE MISSILES IN CUBA?

Tatu:

Well, in... the question of Turkey and Cuba was, I understand a topic

for debate among the Soviet leaders you know, Because their main

preoccupation was where the old American bases in Europe and so on

close to them. But we must say that Turkey was more important for them,

because you had three types of American bases with IRBM at the time in

Europe, one in... there was one in Great Britain, one in Turkey, and

one in Italy. But only the Turkey base was able to hit Moscow with

Jupiter or and... Thor missiles which were...which were there. So it

was normal that the Soviet leadership was a little bit more concerned

about Turkey. It was much closer to them. But at the same time the some

people could say that it is too cheap to pay only with Turkey the

withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. They thought that it would

be better to get more from the United States and other bases also.

Interviewer:

SO YOU THINK THAT BY DEMANDING THAT THE MISSILES IN TURKEY BE

WITHDRAWN, EVEN THOUGH IT WASN'T REALLY AN EVEN TRADE IT WAS SOMETHING

THAT THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENT COULD POINT TO AND SAY, WELL WE GOT

SOMETHING?

Tatu:

I think yes, the Turkey, the Turkey-Cuba exchange was also useful for

the prestige, because at least they could show that they got something

and something equivalent to the withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba,

there was also a withdrawal from missiles...while the end result of the

crisis was different because there was no talk about American missiles

being withdrawn from anyplace, except that this was probably an

understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev but Kennedy wanted that to

be kept to be kept secret.

Political Consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

OK, DO YOU THINK THE SOVIET LEADERS TOOK KENNEDY'S THREATS OF INVADING

CUBA SERIOUSLY? AND DO YOU THINK THEY CONSIDERED WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN

TO THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA?

Tatu:

I think they took seriously the risk of the Soviets, took seriously the

risk of military operations from the United States against Cuba.

Whether a landing or bombings, but anyway something very unpleasant not

only for Cuba, but also for them. We must not forget that the Soviets

were at the time very strongly involved in a polemic with China, but

also with other communist movements communist parties, about the

support to national liberation to the fight against imperialism and so

on. And Khrushchev was always accused to be soft on that. Especially by

the Chinese. So he got involved in the last... in the last two or three

years very heavily on the side of Cuba, even more than what he wanted

at the beginning, and he felt that if Cuba disappears, if Castro

disappears he will have a very strong political consequences. So I

understand that explains why after at the end he accepted all... one

thing which was after all important for him, the non-intervention of

the United States against Castro.

Interviewer:

YOU SAID THAT IF CASTRO DISAPPEARED FROM CUBA THAT WOULD HAVE HAD

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR KHRUSHCHEV. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE

BIT IN MORE DETAIL?

Tatu:

The political consequences of disappearance of Castro, would have been

important for Khrushchev internally and externally. Internally because

this would have given strong arguments to his opponents inside the

Politburo. We know he had quite many who criticized his d鴥nte policy,

his being too soft with Kennedy and so on. And these began in 1959,

after the Khrushchev - Eisenhower meeting in Camp David. Externally he

had the trouble with the Chinese, with the Albanians who at the time we

must not forget were full members of the communist movement. Played a

role in all communist meetings, the last one being in 1960, and who

were already developing a strong politics against Soviet so-called

revisionist and pacifist policy. And disappearance of Castro would have

strong argument for the Chinese to criticize the Soviet leadership.

Interviewer:

I'M GOING TO BACK UP A LITTLE BIT AND ASK ABOUT WHAT WE WERE TALKING

ABOUT BEFORE THE TAPE WAS NOT RUNNING. IF THE UNITED STATES HAD SOMEHOW

GOTTEN CASTRO OUT OF CUBA AT THAT TIME, WOULD THAT HAVE ENDANGERED THE

FUTURE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AS FAR AS, FROM KHRUSHCHEV'S POINT OF

VIEW?

Tatu:

A: Sure disappearance of Castro would have created an embarrassment for

the Soviet Union just as bad example for any communist leaders in the

world, just as an evidence that Moscow is not able to support, to

protect his own friends and that so-called movement of history goes

back, you know, and so they don't like that at all.

Interviewer:

OK, THANK YOU. WOULD YOU SAY THAT EITHER SIDE, THE UNITED STATES OR

RUSSIA COULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE WON THIS CONFRONTATION?

Tatu:

Well, in terms... in term of prestige of the general image which was

given to the world after this crisis, the clear winner was Kennedy.

Because in Moscow for example, we were not used seeing the Soviets

accepting to undo what they did to withdraw missiles and even more for

example to lift the to show these missiles to American observers, in

order to check it you know. At the time they were even more sensitive

than now about control, about prestige and so on. So it was clearly a

failure for Khrushchev, and he had to pay for that in terms of the

Chinese criticism after that. We must not forget what the Chinese said

accusing Khrushchev of being adventuristic in the first place when he

deployed the missiles, and capitalisurist... capitalrunt, in the second

place when he...when he just conceded in front of the Americans. So

that was the general comment in the communist movement. But if we look

at the things in a longer range one can argue that Khrushchev made a

gain with Kennedy's pledge not touching Cuba and allowing Castro to

stay there.

Interviewer:

COULD YOU START AGAIN.

Tatu:

But if we look at it from the longer perspective, I can understand the

arguments of people who say no after all Kennedy made a gain because he

saved Castro. And if we see what happened...

Interviewer:

I'M SORRY, YOU SAID KENNEDY AND YOU MEANT KHRUSHCHEV --

Tatu:

OK. But if we look at the longer, from a longer perspective, I think

one can argue that Khrushchev made a gain because he saved Castro. And

if we look what happened in the next 20 years, 25 years, Castro is

still there and now he has some cousins in Latin America all things,

which after all would maybe would not have been possible if Khrushchev

had not gotten this pledge. We do...we do not know. Maybe Kennedy would

not have invaded anyway. But suddenly if he wanted to invade he was

prevented after the Cuban missile crisis because of his pledge.

Interviewer:

OK, WE JUST HAVE A FEW MORE HERE. WHAT EFFECT DID THE MISSILE CRISIS

HAVE ON SOVIET DESIGNS ON BERLIN?

Tatu:

The interesting question is this interaction between Cuba and Berlin,

because we must not forget that one of the main objectives of

Khrushchev during all those years was his challenge on Berlin. Either

as a so-called peace treaty operation with the East Germany, either

because he wanted to make some gains against the Western presence in

West Berlin. And so he tried everything, and in my view Cuba, the Cuban

gambit was a new approach to the...this Berlin problem. So and I think

that this is confirmed by the fact that after the Cuban missile crisis

this was finished by Khrushchev's challenge on Berlin. In fact, nothing

happened anymore on Berlin, and his claim about the secret peace treaty

was quietly dropped and never revived again by himself or Brezhnev. So

in fact Kennedy made a gain here. Because through his firmness in Cuba

he probably finished the crisis on Berlin.

[END OF TAPE A0405]

Interviewer:

TELL ME THAT STORY AGAIN ON CAMERA ABOUT THE HUMILIATION INVOLVED WHEN

THEY TOOK THE COVERS OFF?

Tatu:

Well, there was another humiliation for Khrushchev after the crisis

when the missiles were brought away on ships, on Soviet ships to the

Soviet shores. There was a control by the United States and some

discussion about that, the Soviets refused direct control on the spot.

But when the ships moved, the American, the Soviet ships moved, the

American ships went along and this time the Soviet seamen had to lift

the cover of the missiles to show to the American seamen on the other

ship, you see, these are our missiles and the Americans could count how

many and so on. And I think that this was another humiliation for the

Soviet leaders knowing their sensitiveness, their feeling of prestige,

which was probably even more at the time than now. And that's why the

Soviets never mentioned this particular detail to their readers in the

press.

Interviewer:

HOW DID THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AFFECT KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION IN

MOSCOW? DID IT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT?

Tatu:

The meaning for Khrushchev stature later? Some... people argue with

good reasons that in fact the humiliation of Khrushchev after the Cuban

Missile Crisis was the first element which brought his elimination from

power two years later. And I think there are good reasons because it

gave new arguments to his opponents inside the Kremlin, to the Chinese,

and at the time the Chinese had some

Interviewer:

YOU WERE TELLING ME ABOUT HOW THE MISSILE CRISIS AFFECTED KHRUSHCHEV'S

POSITION IN THE KREMLIN.

Tatu:

Well, some people argue with good reasons that the Cuban Missile Crisis

was the first element of the chain which brought Khrushchev down two

years later. And there are good reasons for that because it gave new

arguments to his opponents including the Chinese, but also inside. What

we saw after that for example, in 1963 was a new and strong attack

against Khrushchev internally on his domestic policy and especially as

far as Stalin and de-Stalinization is concerned. A few months after the

Cuban Missile Crisis, in March, April 1963, all the Politburo imposed

on Khrushchev a very tough line against the rightists, they were not

yet dissidents at the time, but they were the liberal movement inside

the party and the writers... particularly, with very strong attacks

against anything liberal, which was something quite new and completely

different of what Khrushchev said for example in November 1962.

Interviewer:

DID THE MISSILE CRISIS HAVE AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S

POSITION?

Tatu:

The crisis did not have an immediate effect on Khrushchev's position,

but it is true that it was the first element of the chain which brought

him down two years later. And in fact a couple of months after the

crisis in March-April, 1963, we had in Moscow a very sudden outburst of

criticism against any liberal writers not the dissidents, because we

had no dissidents at the time, but all the people who had been

identified with the strong anti-Stalinist policy in the cultural

movement. Yevtushenko and the like were under very strong attack, and

we're quite sure that Khrushchev was not supporting that you see. And

certainly it was connected to the loss of prestige and of power which

Khrushchev had to suffer.

Interviewer:

OK. DID THE MISSILE CRISIS ALSO LEAD TO A SUBSEQUENT MILITARY BUILD-UP

IN THE SOVIET UNION?

Tatu:

One main consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the Soviet

military build-up which was decided certainly at the time and at least

a few years later with -- when Brezhnev came to power, but we know the

remark which was said to McCloy from the United States by Kuznetsov who

was at the time in the foreign, the Soviet foreign ministry, who said

to him, you will never do that to us again, which meant that the

Soviets realized their very strong inferiority in terms of strategic

weapons, and they decided that they had to compensate for that, and

that the way to do that was not by sort of quick fix like Khrushchev

did by deploying IRBM medium range weapons in Cuba, but just to build

ICBM for the Soviet Union and to build it by thousands hundreds and

then thousands like the Americans had done. And then after that

certainly also it encouraged the military to ask for more in many other

areas, and this explains partially, not completely the very strong,

very militaristic policy of Brezhnev... Although I am not quite happy

with that, Brezhnev would have been interested in it anyway. But

because he was, and the regime was. Along this line.

Interviewer:

I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO GET INTO THAT, BUT DID THE MISSILE CRISIS LEAD

TO THE PARTIAL TEST BAN OF 1963 RATHER THAN A TOTAL TEST BAN? DID THE

MISSILE CRISIS PLAY A ROLE IN THAT?

Tatu:

Well, diplomatically the consequences of the crisis, I see two of them.

One was the agreement on a direct line, a hot line between Washington

and Moscow because it is true that the crisis showed a very big lack of

communications. I remember very often, you know, the letters of

Khrushchev to Kennedy had to be published in Pravda or broadcast by the

radio in order to get quicker to Kennedy. Because through the

diplomatic channels through the embassy with coding and so on it took

hours which was too long for us in such a crisis. The second was the

test ban treaty which was in my view ripe or ready, because we must not

forget that in years before, beginning in 1958 already there was a big

exchange...diplomatic exchanges about the test one country did a had a

unilateral ban and then it was broken and so on and so on. And also the

two powers were ready to have the test only underground at the time so

they decided to formalize that. And...and maybe it was a consequence of

the crisis because in fact it created a better atmosphere for dialogue.

And Khrushchev was under attack on many subjects, but I think he was in

agreement with the others on the fact that we must keep a kind of

dialogue with the United States on many subjects because otherwise the

situation could be too dangerous.

Interviewer:

DID THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS FRIGHTEN BOTH COUNTRIES ENOUGH THAT THEY

WOULD START CONSIDERING A TOTAL TEST BAN AND WHY WAS NOT A TOTAL TEST

BAN POSSIBLE AT THAT TIME. IT SEEMED LIKE A POINT AT WHICH BOTH SIDES

WOULD HAVE SAID, OK, WE CAME CLOSE. LET'S STOP.

Tatu:

I'm not very familiar with the American position at that time, but in

my view even if the crisis brought the 2 countries together to make

some accommodation on some issues, I don't think the time was right for

a full test ban. Because in fact the Russians, in my view, as well as

the Americans thought that as long as we have to live with nuclear

weapons, you have to test them some way. You are...you are not going to

stay with machines with devices which in five years from now will look

very obsolete. And which can't be replaced by the way by smaller

weapons, smaller warheads and with maybe a little bit less destructive

power. So if...my impression is that the two powers were not ripe for a

full test ban. And in my view also they...the partial test ban treaty

was already greeted as something. A very important step already very

useful in itself. Because after all, you know before that all the tests

were in the atmosphere with and there were already...people were

starting to protest for ecological reasons.

Interviewer:

WAS KHRUSHCHEV HOPING FOR A STRONGER AGREEMENT THAN THE PARTIAL TEST

BAN? WAS THERE PRESSURE ON HIM NOT TO...

Tatu:

Officially the Soviet's propaganda and Khrushchev himself said that he

would have preferred a full comprehensive test ban treaty, but you

know, the same as they say now and before, we are against any nuclear

weapons; we are against any weapons altogether. And they tried to put

the charge on this...on the partial test ban treaty on the other part.

But I'm not convinced that the Soviet military and the Soviet

leadership would have been quite happy to have no test at all.

Interviewer:

WAS KHRUSHCHEV PUSHING FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE BAN? WAS THAT SORT OF

HIS SWAN SONG AS HE WAS LOSING POWER? WAS HE TRYING TO MAKE ONE MORE

GESTURE TOWARDS PEACE?

Tatu:

I don't think that Khrushchev was very focused on a full test ban

treaty. His propaganda for all the years during this period was full

complete total disarmament. And there was under United Nations

surveillance. He had big plans. So his objective was not

especial...particular...uh...particular area, but a more general

picture which was certainly more propagandistic than of real value.

[END OF TAPE A0406 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [2]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-k35m902801

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-k35m902801).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Tatu, Michel, 1933-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 69a834180ecbf114b034e4a564120855d3690a9d (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [2],” 1986-03-26, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 27, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-k35m902801.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [2].” 1986-03-26. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 27, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-k35m902801>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [2]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-k35m902801