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I'd like to start back in the Before we talk about the missile crisis if we could talk a little bit of your time as head of the U.S. in the eyes of her sisters right. There were many people who were in favor of a test Bennett who are marching in the streets and lobbying the government various ways. What was your position with respect to. This. Well I was in favor of the testimony could be verified more a longer part of the autism or real story. We didn't know how the turtles were used to. And sure look the Soviets would be complying with a test run. Oh no. For that reason or opposed to it was a question of national security for you. You're afraid that you know we didn't we weren't allowed to keep testing the biggest serious security problem. No I didn't think I'd be a particular security problem where
we had some improvements to make when we are all on our own missiles or weapons. There was room for improvement. There's always room to grow for there's been no deterioration of your stockpile of weapons. But. I didn't look below there's a security problem. I thought it was necessary that we likely hadn't of them so there's no permit the Soviets to avenge their weapons system unbeknown to us and that's why I oppose a touchdown. I'll tell you concerned it would be difficult to trust. To trust them. You know so I thought it would be. All I thought would be difficult to trust of applying all you feel look we can trust the most we have
out of good means of verifying what they do. There was there was a great increase in the American arsenal 58 61 in the last couple of years of the Eisenhower administration and I understand in 15 when you were head of the ABC. You obtained permission to open another open at another nuclear reactor which would provide Tommy for some of these bigger weapons that were being built. Did you consider it as part of your job as a German. The U.S. just satisfy yourself that the weapons themselves were militarily necessary for the defense of the. North that was not their responsibility of the Tourmalet taller going to commission or the commission itself.
Oh. Or responsibility was to provide the weapons needed by the department the French or to provide the facilities to produce 3 plutonium a new 230 farthing so forth. Slowly we could meet their requirements for the long. Haul responsible or to make a determination was. Just hopeless notion her. Could we start. Right now. So. Do assume. This means. That I ask you that question again. I wonder if you could start your response by saying I was chairman of the chair of the atomic energy. I didn't consider it my Florida question here. Did you consider it your responsibility as chairman of the ATC to be concerned about the military necessity of the weapons you were provided with which I.
Know all is terminal are you talking with your question. That was no more responsible only nor was your response only the question. We were not your responsible new department nor all responsible only willful floral corner. How much to you did you feel the. I think it was the gave the report the intelligence report. Estimate that came out at that time concerning the Soviet missile capability. How much did the did that influence the decisions that related to weapons procurement. And the 58 or 61 period. Why can the National upload were going to years ago long forgotten together report. I think it I think in essence this is what led to the whole missile gap. Controversy in the 1960 election. Especially it said that the Soviets had. A lot of missiles. Just wait. I.
Think especially one where the national estimate we're. Telling the government is always. A large number with the capability to produce wars this is the source for your extensive blood. Well there was a great deal suddenly a lecture in 1960 about the Muslim guy Botho Rosen a lawyer Cody use up and there's campaigns you know saw after he became president and it was a ministration cooler Vonne there was so much more you know. How much do you think the. Faulty estimate really is just of the size of the Soviet missile arsenal. How before were those estimates to us go.
Well I count Pearl. Oh there were Mormons to be sure. They gave us trick concerning book 3. Most movies were more based long hard intelligence because we had very little hard to overdose on what was going on for the Soviet Union at that time. I think the most emotional or moral judgement of what might be a big role along a very specific knowledge of what was happening. Do you think that given the information that was available at the time that the estimate was justified. No I don't think show or think. Just look at the emotional missile gap was not just a fart. It was huge for political purposes
when it was used where we could reduce the Pentagon. Both are normally wrong. Do you recall your feelings this time you were concerned about this. I know I didn't take yourself back. Yeah a lot of my. Room was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Book. Well I was deeply disturbed. After a series of hearings and testimony from the military people from intelligence people there was no specific heart of diligence concerning their saws or compositional Soviet o missile of war and of course when he turned out. A few months later lost much more
and morally wrong. But is he sure your responsibility was to provide. Well you see charm. That was one of the responsibilities of course you want to go to commercial loan. Thus the area of responsibility. Of which providing their. Disposal nuclear material resources will be one of the reasons. Extensive laboratory of designing new weapons and doctoring assured should override any of areas including peaceful uses of the album or so forth. Oh I thought was one of their responsibilities. Many people feel that from that time the generalized press
a bit naive in terms of the Soviet threat. Can you give us your feeling. Generalized or well do you know why even all. Shortly before the end of the Lord ministration would be here at Camp David would question off. His people sort of circle heard of functional role there. We had extensive talks. No no no you are. Could you give us a bit of a sense of. What. The feeling was moving quickly so we. Know he's flawed. Go to regional understanding know or know early on which rules loom controversial
on a she saw him fall. Oh many issues are more under dispute. Crucial on a few world call who should have made court for extension of the trip. If you won't be going to show it mostly was resolved for one of those former conference in which there were no communique up there you may remember that. So you think there was no sense for you. I don't know what top of that Eisenhower was. I don't wish to argue. You didn't feel that generalize. Our top wasn't concerned about the Soviet threat. What I mean. Whatever you think. I think you have the story of one case very wrong. I ask you who started to ask you do you say that. Answer that last question. You used generalized her stance that he's clear.
The question again. If you could refer to generalized. So you were concerned that the General Eisenhower week was not tough enough because this morning all I thought George and Laura was fully alert really to the thought he'd lived for many years as commander shaping present he was fully alert because he would not know you. He knew the dangers. Oh no I think no problem properly I'm sure. Just one last question on this let's move into the period of the Cuban missile crisis concerning that test ban all the talk about the test back in 1960. What were your feelings then about the demonstrators and the bad people people. Marching in the streets and the people I was like. There are some I would think it is not you
just ration pushing for a test bed you think they are naive about the threat. But the danger because you could very. Well they were there were concern birth control because she was going on the contaminated sort more the fault. For I believe the dangers were exaggerated Lou really were there. They were. Naive in those mortars Lay did not record noise in the sauce today. Oh ok being able to verify on a stronger stomach you were made. That it was essential that the United States to keep testing was that part of it and when you did the test you continue to do.
Research. Well it was not as necessary to test for two reasons war news for the improvement of the weapons and the others to be sure a little bit of the weapons of your own and your possession or no purity. Just ignore the person enough to serve through for those two purposes.
Series
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Raw Footage
Interview with John McCone, 1986 [1]
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-jq0sq8qn6m
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Description
Episode Description
John McCone served as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) during the Eisenhower administration from 1958-1960 and Director of Central Intelligence from 1961-1965. In the interview he focuses on the earlier period, discussing his responsibilities as AEC Chairman, which included fulfilling certain of the weapons and production requirements of the Department of Defense, but not establishing those requirements or deciding how to use the materiel. He also comments on the faulty missile gap estimate in the late 1950s, which became a major issue during the 1960 presidential election campaign, and which he says the Pentagon used for political purposes. He expresses complete confidence in the manner in which Eisenhower approached the Soviet threat, denying any naivete on the president's part, and explains why he (McCone) opposed a test ban treaty that did not include a method of verification of the Soviet nuclear program.
Date
1986-03-04
Date
1986-03-04
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
Military Forces and Armaments
Subjects
Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963; Nuclear weapons -- Testing; nuclear weapons; Presidents -- United States -- Election -- 1960; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; Soviet Union; Berlin (Germany); Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969; United States. Dept. of Defense; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971; United States
Rights
Rights Note:,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:All,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
00:14:00
Embed Code
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Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: McCone, John A. (John Alex), 1902-1991
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 283a5b68a26849f32f4df70f03bad83c69cc620f (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:08:40
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Citations
Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John McCone, 1986 [1],” 1986-03-04, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 3, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-jq0sq8qn6m.
MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John McCone, 1986 [1].” 1986-03-04. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 3, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-jq0sq8qn6m>.
APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John McCone, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-jq0sq8qn6m