War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Ronald Mason, 1987

Now I suppose the first thing really I mean taking it chronologically is as far as Trident was concerned certainly James Callaghan went to ground loop according to his memoirs discussed the possibility of the British modernizing products with Trident with him at home prices. You then got sort of brought into those negotiations when he when James Carnahan returned from Guadeloupe I mean can you just describe for us how you saw that that deals start perhaps trying to subvert the negotiations for the moment because the Callahan administration wasn't being when I first joined minister defends late in 1907 and it was already beginning to be clear that on the table as it was the whole question of a successor system to PL are a sole to the. Immediate success of followers call shepherding. By the time therefore as James can describe his memoirs

we were into something like the middle of 1988. There was a clear decision and as he put it to study a range of options that could offer themselves for the succession system itself so commonplace that that was the time when. Firstly there was some detail studies detail examinations of the whole concept of detentions what constituted What did you have to do to be plausible. What did you have to be to be plausible perhaps for a time scale extending to 2010 2020 and having decided what constitutes determines what are the criteria that should be met. And then along came a team which I was fortunate enough to head which looked at the way in which you would formulate describe solutions that would meet those criteria to terms and that was there for when you were talking about the ballistic missile solution. The cruise missile solution whether a ballistic missiles should be launched from a submarine as indeed turned out to be the

preferred solution all whether it ought to be let us say in a launched cruise missile. So that by the time a size you saw from the memoirs would come to the turn of the of one thousand and seventy eight. Those studies had been pretty much complete. They had been informed with a good deal of information that we've gathered for example from the United States we douse Lugol's together some information from friends. We were fairly clear not over technical minds on the preferred solution and therefore when quite a look a.m.. There were questions such as What if we were interested. Would you be agreeable and so on and so forth. Again the description is taking place that there was no fundamental difficulty anticipated at least by the president and therefore some two or three months later the nature of the

information exchange was formalized. And when we had decided that our database if I may use those words was as complete as we could make it. Then we began to talk very seriously about the possibility of following Trident 1 as the preferred system folder but your successor system at that time from about 1990 on buns. Now I mean the system that you were going for in the end in the system that you were going to try and purchase from the United States was a very very advanced system. It was a quantitative leap up in terms of the technology if you like from the existing system you have what sort of problems were there. How did you go about negotiating with the United States for in the end what was a pretty much state of the art system it would necessarily be put in it because I mean after all you were talking about procuring a system say around about the 1990 Mark.

Now 1995 also compared with the system that you started procuring understanding in 1963. Many generations that of technological development had intervened. Now I think what is interesting one reflects back is that of course it was technically advanced the Trident ballistic missile has on its so-called front dad what we call a multiple re-entry vehicle system the mail system. And there had been some ten years or so earlier the possibility that the British instead of going down the Chevron route would have gone down the ballistic missile route involving the Poseidon. I was not involved. My understanding was that at that time the United States was somewhat less than ready to transfer myrth technology to the United

Kingdom for fear I think of being caught up in Strategic Arms Limitation concerns relationship to the Soviet Union so one of the first thing is that I think we had to satisfy the United States was about total seriousness to have a succession system and that we had a philosophy of Terence which if I may use the words justify the transfer of strategically important technology to a senior partner of the United States in the alliance. I can well remember that that was not straightforward. That was not taken as read. We had to argue that we did argue it successfully. What was the position in terms of any debate about the possibility rather than go to the United States for a prolong this repricing. But actually

to find an eternity partner in Europe say for example the French you had their own system under development. What were the pros and cons and how serious were the negotiations or your thoughts about collaboration like we had. If we can simply concentrate for the moment on ballistic missile options there are two real possibility here's the first is that after the disaster Bluestreak and all that we should regenerate a national capability in this case for say a submarine launched plastic missile that could be very quickly ruled out on the basis of cost. There was only one conceivable scenario that I understood in 1978 which would take that possibility a little. And that was and I think it's rather ironical to think about this possibility in 1987 with all the debate going on about British investments in space and so on. But if we were serious about space. If we were going to if you like work with the French on

what is now become the Ariane launch program. And then in fact there would be the opportunity of developing at a reasonable cost of ballistic missile capability that a say in that case shared between France and. Europe. There was that possibility but in the end the decision was that to get a unique system. And we were already beginning to be very nervous about the uniqueness and the cost of uniqueness of Cheval in this country to develop a unique system would be extremely costly. And I think would carry with it severe risks and penalties. The other opportunities that we knew at the time it is 70 big Ponsonby 778. We knew at the time that the French were developing the M4. We had a reasonable understanding of the capability we had a reasonable understanding of the costs and again in cost effective terms. It wasn't a match for what in the end became the drive which is commonality with the program in the

United States. A contemporary a similar tain is commonality which would allow the United Kingdom not to say to take roughly 7 or 8 percent of the total miss our production of the United States wanted for their own needs. To take that off the missile production line. There could be no question but that that was far and away the most cost effective way into the future. Describe the solution and the reasoning behind it. I mean just now. I suppose in terms of cost efficiency and everything but I mean were there any other political considerable Yes areas that were over there were major problems which continued Anandi continuing. The whole question of you know what is an independent does the great British public in fact perceive a British independent deterrent because clearly you have a submarine which is largely British manned by British targeted by British Prime Minister with front

ends that are prescribed to be British and therefore the only thing that is American really is in fact the is in fact the carrier of the missile. I at least but certainly this was a political judgement dieties were satisfied that that was a fair tradeoff that it would be perceived as a pitch independent of terror. Now as we now look at the present situation as we went on there was then the strategic decision when I was still in office in 1982 83 to transfer the major servicing of the tritone asylum to King's pain Georgia. They were entirely responsible respectable reasons for that. The savings from sleuth very significant sums virtually 8 percent of the total program cost. I must say that I had to at that stage worry about whether perceptions of Independence were being affected. I could see considerable technical advantages coming out of a Kings Bay basing on a king's pay service

but at that stage I was beginning to be concerned about perceptions as I say of Independence. Now when we come to what I would call the rather silly leaks of some two or three weeks ago I can't for the life of me believe that the British government is entered into a situation of what I believe believe was called on one occasion a must buy those nice lend or whatever have you. I think there are some clear well-defined servicing arrangements. The simple facts of course are these that with the Trident to Missa with the improvement of technology viz the Polaris that will be independent of the regular servicing of the regular changing of subsystems and so forth. But we've had to experience over the last 20 years they resist much more natural independence in technical terms on the way ahead for trying too hard or long to come up the question of independence now from a slightly different problem or different angle because

several people mainly in the United States have said to us recently that in fact. The commitment of the British independent nuclear deterrent or strategic forces to Sark is now Bangala just a fiction and so is the method by which the United States is in what is a curtain behind which this transaction can actually type price. I mean what would how would you comment on what I think the principle that we might address is this. There can be no doubt about it that when Triton 2 is operational the opportunities for flexibility of dedicating a capability you say to second targets is much greater than we have with Clarus with Jeffrey in technical terms. In practical political terms I do not believe in fact that really you would have changed the situation quite fundamentally. What I have in my mind is this. In

the end its a weapon of last resort and its a weapon of last resort. Nationally which only the prime minister of Great Britain can in fact authorize and I simply find it very difficult to believe that there is a scenario where the British prime minister would authorize the leasing of what is a strategic system. Set in the theater nuclear context. I just do not for one moment believe that I think Gagnon what I might call technical terms. If you set off what is a strategic weapon system in the context of say of a warning shot in the theater the possibility of a misinterpretation by potential adversaries of that to my mind is very very considerable indeed. So I would have thought there are really very very substantial arguments against in fact an equation on the day of a British

strategic force with a stay at a nuclear capability. Now that of course if I may say so takes you on to thinking about an intermediate nuclear force. And there we are now surrounded by what some people believe to be an impending intermediate nuclear forces agreement. What has happened as you know. Is that as the negotiations over IMF have gone all has they have gone back to thinking about the twin track decision of 1979. So in fact we've evolved I think an increasing gap between the United States pillar of the alliance and the European pillar of the alliance. There has been more and more emphasis on the part of the European allies that flexible response doctrine must maintain that a nuclear force capability. And there have been arguments in the media that these will continue to be met Let us say by the

diversion of the United States Poseidon force or Trident 1 force come to that although in the future perhaps of the French and the British strategic forces. For the reasons that I've already given I think that is very very implausible. We are already beginning to talk about having got rid of the Pershing and cruise and when I left Greenland was here the forces do we need it or we had extraordinary interest in the difficult political way ahead because I think in the United States and indeed in Western Europe I suspect the public are not prepared simply to take with one hand and give with the other. And therefore I think the United States will have very very clear ideas as to what theater nuclear force modernization must mean. It will most certainly mean sea launched cruise missiles it perhaps would almost certainly mean standoff air launched cruise missiles. Now if that

analysis is roughly ride do the European nuclear countries Great Britain and France believe that that is the optimal way ahead. I think we are. At least approaching a crossroad at the moment that some of the traditional assumptions about so-called extended deterrent the reliance on very broad reliance of the European a pillar of NATO on an extended nuclear umbrella from the United States more and more people are calling that a will to commit into question. I hope I hope we are wrong in calling that commitment in into question. But I can see an almost inevitable trend to say in the context of what the United States themselves are encouraging which is that the European pillar of nature should be stronger. Let us build up a stronger conventional defense in Europe but probably.

Since the commitment to the unique quality of nuclear deterrence may easily today at least be stronger in Western Europe than it is in the United States then it seems to me and we beginning to see this move along with the argument the arguments for enhanced nuclear cooperation between Britain and France do seem to me to be presenting themselves on the stage today you know a way that I suspect would have been unthinkable 10 years ago. Well you keep in touch with the developments that take place in trying to come actually talking to you know trying I just want I just want to know. You keep in touch with the developments that are going on at a reasonably high level in the British government and among British French manufacturers. I mean could you tell us what if there had been any concrete steps toward some form of new go of collaboration between the British and I don't think I can tell you that I would be very surprised to see evening if my thoughts that I've just shared with you were unique to

me. Be very surprised and do you. The collaboration between France and the United Kingdom and what would you what you feel I would write about there is at this time a very very considerable move to enhance cooperation in defense matters between the countries of NATO Europe in particular just several weeks ago that was at the highest level a fairly intensive discussion between the secretary state's between senior civil servants to enhance Anglo-French cooperation and defense matters for a very very good sensible pragmatic reasons sharing development costs sharing production lines and so on. I would be very surprised if into the future the possibilities for cooperation stopped at conventional weapons systems. I would be very surprised if the for cooperation in certain areas of nuclear matters weren't exposed and in the context of

the nature or likely nature of the IMF agreement I would be very surprised if there weren't on the table at the moment the possibility of France and Great Britain collaborating on an air launched cruise missile solution to the theater requirement. Right is that all right. Yes that's fine. I mean actually going on from that it would be I don't know if you feel you can do. Say this but we need somebody to say probably I mean there's a nuclear planning group meeting taking place or just taking this taking place now in the United States now. And it's their task to again as you say think about the future in the light of what the proposed on Earth deal is going to suggest. What do you think their preferred solution perhaps would be what you think. I mean I think clearly they've got to

they've got a lot of pressure on their and their minds from public opinion as you've already said. What do you think the solutions are that they will come out with now. I suspect the preferred American Solutions will in fact be a sea launched cruise missile. And the air launch cruise missile that the. Enhancement of for example the F-111 capability standoff missile will be a very serious candidate as indeed will be the B-52 launched cruise missile but I would see the F-111 solution on the sea launched cruise missile coming to the forefront. Now if that analysis is roughly right are we in Europe. I would find it very very difficult I think to run an indigenous. A bilateral sea launched cruise missile program it would be

extremely expensive for the requirement for the theater requirement and therefore I think what we were talking about as a possibility is all of the European intermediate nuclear force having a degree of symmetry with the United States F-111 improvement program with the B-52 improvement program. OK. That's what I'm about. Then I need I need some assistance. Well I think that's right. Yes yes is it what are you content back there Ben. Yes I can tell is that too much on tape. Oh no no no no no and I would want what you love you for who you are. Oh yes I have because of that you know

what you are you know what the question is. Yes like that. I do have very considerable reservations about the way in which the intern immediate nuclear force limitations the negotiations the form of the likely form of the agreement has evolved. I think it is worthwhile just reminding ourselves that cruisin pushing the decision for deployment wasn't simply as is often announced a response to the Soviet deployment of SS 20s. It continued to be in response to a perception of tremendous conventional asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and in fact NATO alliance and that conventionally symmetry certainly hasn't diminished with time. And therefore like the Irishman you know who wouldn't start from here to get then I

would feel much more attached to an IMF agreement if I was running parallel to that agreement on the very short range systems nuclear systems on the battlefield letters even more. On arms limitation in the convention there. To reduce the numerous offensive air power of the Soviet Union to reduce their immense offensive reland power of the Soviet Union to change in fact the defense offense balance between the Warsaw Pact and later so that until and it's going to be extraordinary difficult because the amount of relieve ridge that need to has on the Warsaw Pact leverage to encourage the Warsaw Pact to reduce these asymmetries that leverage is very very small. If you take away the nuclear element. And so what I am concerned about there for two things. First of all have we really got the tools the equipment to

encourage the Soviet Union to move towards a more stable balance in and around the German border. And the second thing that I'm worried about. And I do have some sympathy with my military friends. Is that. All of us basically have some scripts scription to the lack of utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are there to deter them. Not that we all hope to God to be used but on a scale of utility. Then those nuclear systems that belong to the intermediate nuclear forces the use of them for example as a demonstrator shot. To tell an adversary that in fact enough is enough and that there is now a significant danger of escalation. The endpoint of which is impossible to predict then the utility of the intermediate nuclear forces threatening in fact some of the most significant resources let us say

of the Soviet Union. That undoubtedly to my mind is much more plausible than the use of a short range nuclear system on the battlefield or indeed obviously of a strategic system where none of us believe we could possibly escape the catastrophic consequences of out and out escalation.