War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with William Fairbourn, 1986

When you first hear. About you know your mission. How was it described to you and if you could just describe getting your first together. I first heard of my mission in a televised speech by the commander in chief then President Kennedy. And can you describe what you do in the next few hours. When I heard of his schedule of the speech I called all of my commanders together to listen to it. And that. Action Set up a what I consider the the ultimate in in planning effectiveness if you can have your group. Here subordinate commanders all together and your staff all together. And I did. With few exceptions do. You start from the very genesis of

national policy to the part that you're going on and progress through the planning phases to to prepare yourself for the part that you and your forces are going to play. You are all sitting there and watching Kennedy's speech. But he didn't say going to you. No no he sketched out the problems in terms of the threat as he as he first saw it and what the. Cubans or what the Soviets were doing in terms of the equipment and the forces that they were moving in the direction of what your feeling was when you and the others sat there watching the president speak. Our I think our first feelings. Were that we needed an evaluation of of Castro's capability to control the entire Cuban

spectrum of participation in this. And. We prepared our plans with the knowledge coming in piecemeal on a piecemeal basis as to what the Cuban reaction might be and what their capability is to to react to. To our intercession in their internal affairs might be. When did you get your order to say. Did you get the news. Call get where you start this wire. What is described like. This. Let me organize my thoughts for I start talking there.

At the time. When the president's speech was scheduled all subordinate commanders. Had been ordered to report to me for contingency planning. I think it went without saying that they knew what the objective would be but we announced the objective. After the president had given us his message and

at that time I had my warning orders to. Commence planning to mount this force out in the in accordance with the standard plan which required us to. Round out the force of this size in 72 hours. Our flagship was as far away as was up in Fort Lewis Washington and they were the last naval elements to join us. So the planning went forward completely orderly and the only. Problem that we. Have to do where we had to vary. From

those things that we knew we had to do like the tonnage of ammunition and so forth to be moved is that we did not get initially the amount of of. Civilian cargo transportation that was needed to move our explosives. Across the highways and to our ports of embarkation which were. San Diego the Silver Strand. El Toro. There were a total of five points of embarkation. These are what I'd like to hear very clearly. Firstly you know what your mission was. You got together. With you. My mission was to sail within 72 hours with

the task force to exit the Panama Canal to be prepared to seize in Santiago to seize Santiago and the march on Havana. OK. Let's get that just moving. OK let's do that again. OK sorry. Just wait for the last. Many days with that after the president's speech. You got your wish.

Well I had it at the time that the president spoke. You got that moment or so. Well yeah I had it in dispatch form. Maybe you could start with if you could start with the same time that the president was on television or something we received or shortly before that we didn't know with the press. No. OK. The mission assigned to me was to mild out the forces assigned within 72 hours. Prepared to transfer the Panama Canal and shipping signed and to land seas Santiago and the march on Havana

and the ships. There were List him. There were about forty seven amphibious types. About the same number of supporting types of gun fire carriers and so forth. There were the troop list the total troop list was. About 17000 ground troops and about eight thousand aviation troops and another twenty five hundred supporting forces not under my command.

For instance there was a CIA detachment that was not in there. That's an example. So I don't know what that total is up to. I didn't add it up in my mind but that's all something in excess of 30000. But the exact troop list will be available at Quantico. And what happens when you go through the air. Now. Of course while the situation as we proceeded changed from day to day when we got. Through the canal. The commander of the amphibious force and myself were ordered to a conference up in Norful with the commander in chief the Atlantic. And we were asked if

we had sufficient forces to accomplish the tasks assigned if we had any shortages. I said generally with the situation as it now is we have adequate forces but we have enough supplies but we don't have enough gas and we didn't get an additional and additional fuel supplies that was left hanging in the air with a rather facetious remark that well you can capture the gas that you don't have and responded with a facetious mark her remark that I don't think it's has the right octane rating. And that was left hanging. And what was your plan can you briefly describe to us the operation

it. It would have been an assault landing on the north west flank of Santiago the seizure of San Juan Hill as Teddy Roosevelt did it modernized the consolidation of a beach head to include. Santiago and San Juan Hill and then re-organisation to march on Havana and our feeling on my conclusion was that the Cubans would resist bitterly for Cubans or until their nose was bloodied maybe for a couple of days

and then they would generally support our operations. At least they would not interfere. But that is no longer the case. Now I know why don't you. On the basis of their conclusion that we had that Castro really had not crystallized his control of the Cuban nation. And also we didn't hold the Cuban military in too high regard. What was your feeling when you heard that you wouldn't have to carry this mission with it. Yes. It was one of general relief initially but then the

feeling started to ferment in my own mind that well if we don't do this now it's going to give us problems later. And that feeling grew and grew. And Vietnam was the problem later. What relationship is with what you've done with you. Well I feel that had we been successful in Cuba that Vietnam one would never have occurred with the support active support of the Chinese Communists and the active and passive support of the Soviet Union. They would have would have seen that we were determined and

our determination would have prevailed there. With the relationship between North Vietnamese and the Cubans. No I don't think there's any specific relations at that time and I doubt that there is. Now there may be. I mean as a member I'm talking about about the mob the venturesome attitude of the whole communist structure. They prob they back and they fill and they test and they don't take they're not given to taking chances. Doesn't that give us a sense of.

The same question that tell me the way. Where are you planning to. Do. It. Well the. Plan on landing on a narrow front with. Assault battalions and call them followed and trace by artillery and armor and so forth the standard landing plan which could be modified by signal allows the situation unfold and then to secure. An Operating Base

and advance by Echelon. And we had really no. No plan for linkups if we were to link up in the vicinity of Havana with the Northern landing force which consisted of the 2nd Marine Division and three Army divisions. Give me a sense of the whole invasion force that were. Briefly describe where they are who they were with. Well there was an armored division from Fort Hood Texas. There was an Airborne Division from Fort Bragg. There was a corps headquarters from

Fort Bragg the second marine amphibious force from North Carolina in Cherry Point that consisted of the air ground team Marine air ground task force was my staff that was the. And then there was my force on the southern landing force. Which I have described. How many people in total involved in this and very well as I can to remember back that far back about 120000 altogether. He told me that again. Give me that list and say 120000 approximately we're ready to

take you right to the force the northern landing force consisted of approximately 120000 troops organized. Into a an army corps consisting of one armored division one Airborne Division and. The marine. Now there were one armored division one Airborne Division and then there was an Infantry Division that was three three division Corps and the Marine air ground task force. I mean all of your men as well. Know. Could you tell me gave without hesitation if you could go

into it I think that is the troop list included more or less standard Army Corps consisting of in an armored division an Airborne Division One Infantry Division and other essential force troops supporting air plus a Marine air ground task force consisting of one Marine Division and the Marine Air Wing with their supporting elements and the total number of the total number amounting to a hundred about 120000. And then and then my. Made of our logistic deployment capabilities and John here used to be my G-4 And I think you'll bear me out in an in that conclusion you

OK we're only going to take it I ask you again to describe it to you. That's all right. But that same thing about the number of divisions that were coming in from. Your people. Altogether in the northern mining force consisted of a more or less standard Army Corps consisting of an armored division an Airborne Division. And an infantry division. Suitably reinforced by my standard reinforcements for a total of about a hundred and twenty thousand men. My force. Consisted essentially of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade which was then not standard. Now is standard. Totaling about well say

32 33 thousand men built essentially about a reinforced Infantry Regiment. And what was the plan. Can you give us a sense of what would have happened if all these people had got the word out quickly they think they could have done it. They were. I I felt that the Southern landing forces initial mission the seizure of Santiago would be accomplished within 48 hours. The reorganization would depend upon the casualties. Suffered and the attitude of the Cuban people. But within a matter of three or four days we would have been able to launch our advance on Havana.

The casualties would have been moderate throughout. And then one of dropped off to essentially zero. What does that mean casualties. Well moderate casualties that's a generic term. What it means to me that. Was. If it was a diversion that he talked to me with your voice you were wrong that that if it were a diversion that fact was not known to me. But that's if I had been the next higher echelon commander I would have not let my self know that it was a diversion because that the Luud sheer enthusiasm for what you're doing.

What sort of casualties were you expecting. I was expecting moderate casualties and I'd define moderate casualties as those that you could sustain with the forces you had. For a ten day or two week period which would be long enough to start your replacements rolling into the into the system. I don't know what the replacement plan of headquarters Marine Corps was for this exercise. These are all strange euphemisms to me. Your replacement plans are about people's lives. That's right. Well 10 percent of your force. But. That's a that is a is a

factor. That. May change with the theater of operations the length of your supply lines and all sorts of things will condition it. So you're saying that this operation you lost 3000. That's. Where. That number is. Those are reasonable numbers. You say in your own words well I would say that we were prepared to accept moderate casualties which I would define for this purpose as 10 percent of your active strength or about 3000 men in the south and 10 percent of 120000 men on the north.

The number who would return to duty would probably be. All half the casualties that you sustain. What was what did you do then you got through the. Way in her career. And then we were told that we might be. Kept in the Caribbean for an extended period of time. And what were our recommendations so far as our employment for over an extended period. So I got together with the. Amphibious task force commander who accompanied me to Norful and then a plane assigned to me. I had my own. Airplane for that purpose and we decided that

we would keep one third of the force in training on Vegas island we would keep one third of the force at sea and we would keep one third of the force visiting liberty ports because our presence in the Caribbean needed to be advertised and liberty port liberty calls were a good way to do that. And that plan was approved only one went into execution. You're talking about now after you agreed to remove the missiles. Know that was the period of waiting for what true chef was going to do that was that was and we did and we completed I guess almost 1 1 cycle that our Liberty took place in. Well we had several several liberty ports.

Our training was on hand vehicles. And we made everybody had to make a practice landing on on a course we umpired standard training problems. We practiced with our new body armor. This was the first time that we deployed with body armor. We had some some new anti tank grenades and so forth we needed to familiarize with. We did riflery qualifications and so forth. What do you think this whole. Invasion force force was for real. Was it a. Psychological pressure. You're asking me to now make an

evaluation which I don't think was really ever made on the national level. If you read. From. From. What's been written about Kennedy both the Kennedys Robert and and Jack I don't think you'll find an answer to it even in anything that has been written. Then what did you feel. I felt it was for real. Can you put that into your work. What was the mood. You talked about being loaded for bear. Give us a sense of how you felt. Well I visited every element of the task force I'd make a. Command visit to to somebody ashore or afloat on a daily basis. And I would bring them the latest tactical picture as I saw it and it was

it was accurate on the basis of the reports that I was getting. We had people actually we had people ashore. In Cuba that were who were making clandestine. Reports to us so we knew pretty well what was going on there. And we had reports of aerial reconnaissance submarine reconnaissance. And I even made a personal reconnaissance myself of our preferred landing beaches as I was returning from our Norful visit. And until that from my from a twin engine transport plane and we were molested we weren't bothered. What was the mood on this. What was the mood among your officers and. It. Was one I'm very serious. So there's no

they leaned on on every every word that I said on every visit that I made and I was very truthful and forthright with them. And when they had to practice and so forth was the discomfort of body armor and so forth. And that first body armor we had was pretty cumbersome. And they they themselves had seen whole blood loaded and coffins loaded. And they had. Their first aid training and been stepped up on their shipboard indoctrination and so forth and they there. They were ready. There was no question about that. Just like. There wasn't any sense it's hard for me or for anyone.

Sure wasn't there wasn't was 25 years later feeling the news. Was there any sense that this was not for real. Paradise. I think that they were there. You. Know I I think you may. Kennedys that speech of Kennedys is has been preserved because I've seen it once. Since then my wife and I've looked at it and I think you get a pretty good sense of what he was preparing the country for. My own personal feeling was that I had been given a mission that I should be prepared. In all seriousness to carry out because we had had

Well of course we were. In the process of increasing our participation in Vietnam and we were orienting our our training toward the far east. What was the. What's your feeling about the role that. My my. Feeling has really generated is is different now than it was then. I felt that the disparity. In. Weapons or the superiority that the weapons that were in the

possession of the United States would make Cruise chef blink. I was convinced that when we came back that that was the reason that he hadn't blinked. But in in my planning. As an officer for the Center for Defense Information since I retired. I've come to realize the increasing inflexibility of nuclear weapons as a means of making your national will credible. And as we

approach the equivalency that credibility becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. However mature contemplation of what did make Cruise chef Blake had led me to conclude that it was the conventional force that we've described. Plus the naval blockade that really made him blink and the motivating reason for coming to that conclusion are the fact that he continually improving that deployment for a six month period

all of which time he was looking down are looking up at the superiority. Nuclear weapons wise that the United States possessed and he even went so far as to put night lighting devices in there so he can continue improving the sites with impunity. But just as soon as it became evident to him. That he was facing a conventionally superior force that he blinked and the timing I think it was a reasonable period from the time that he could get a report on those coffins and that whole blood. On the docks and

being loaded to our ships in Panama at the time between that occasion and the time he made his decision was it was a reasonable period for him to conjecture and and do what he did. Give me that answer in a shorter version. Maybe you could start your story. Loading. This. Thing and. You feel that in some way that plus other conventional force was available. You can see where my age is right. Well as you know we were

en route to Panama. We were ordered to to take what actions we could in their re-enter in the interests of psychological warfare. And we had deliberately left the coffins behind and we had left blood behind because it wasn't available and the medicos wanted to fly it to Panama anyway. So we loaded the whole blood and a hundred coffins onto the carrier Jima and dockside in Panama and made sure that there was a good audience to see it. And then we sailed. Time went by enough

time went by for Khrushchev to digest that information and it finally has become my conclusion that he blinked because of the conventional opposition that was staring him in the face and not the nuclear opposition that was facing him. Well let's see we didn't clear. We didn't clear that loading of that stuff in Panama with anybody we just went ahead and did it and told our boss the queen done it. And he just as your soul and soul acknowledged and we never knew whether he liked it or not. You get over do the invasion

and that has been in my view sadly overdone. And I the a thing the stationing of carriers off the coast of Nicaragua and so forth. I think has discredited our national will immensely the what are the lessons do think the essential lessons of the Cuban missile crisis that we know and remember tell us the essential lesson. I think there are essentially two of number one and. We must evaluate and recognize the limitations. Of Nuclear Threat or nuclear blackmail

in a situation of essential parity. Number two we should not overplay our. Intentions in terms of exhibiting our our national will to force our. Demands. Upon a force with whom we are not at war with sensually.

No. And I and I think there you've got to not to measure. You've got to better have a better understanding of the role of the. Press and media plan then either you have queried me on or that I have expressed explain but because we actually we didn't have a. Media plan. I forwarded all of anything that I wanted to say press wise to to our common superiors in Norful. And and I was never quoted and I was never quoted when we got back to San Diego on on anything. Matter of fact I was never even interviewed.

Can you tell me again maybe now that we're warmed up a bit we can ask you this question again and your initial sort of orders were how you were and what you heard and what you did in the next two or three days while the commander in chief alerted the nation and alerted me simultaneously almost simultaneously. We were told what to do and the length of time we had available to do it and we were to mound out these forces which I have described within a 72 hour period prepared to transit the canal sees Havana or sees Santiago march on Havana.

Units reported to me commanders reported to me for planning coincident with the commander in chief's television message and our planning cycle started. OK. I'm sorry to hear of you. Can you tell me the same story again and I say commander in chief President Kennedy. Some people in other countries. Commander the commander of the for the armed forces. And if you could instead refer to something you said earlier you say he said the troops for two years you could say well you know I think you said there were three. Could you give me that.

I don't know if I get my arms and X is mixed up. It's good it's just I just like to try to get it if you want me to. This is. What you want me to start you can start saying they are. Here. The commander in chief the president. Well coincident with the commander in chief's address to the nation that same address informed me of what my mission was going to be was followed very shortly by a troop list which I was permitted to to recommend modifications to it consisted essentially of the marine amphibious Brigade an air ground

team built around a reinforced Infantry Regimen reinforced the Marine air grew about thirty thousand people including essential supporting forces. My subordinate commanders report and for planning coincident with the commander in chief's address and in planning and loading continue around the clock in a strictly conventional manner as we have done in many exercises except that we were now loading. Actual gasoline actually explosive actual allowances of weapons and spare parts or emergency rations. The whole gamut. And that

continued until we were loaded. Seventy one hours later proceeding out of the San Diego channel. And where were you. What were your orders. My orders were to seize or seize. What the hell are we. What more are we fighting. My orders were to land on the coast of Cuba seize Havana. Land on the coast. My orders were to land on the coast of Cuba seize Santiago and march on Havana. What chance do you think you got a.

Success. At that time. The chances of success were 100 percent unquestionable. Can you give us a sense of what is expected. I expect the opposition to be moderate to heavy. Initially I felt the Cubans would get a bloody nose within a couple of days. And from that point on they will either be receptive. To our intrusion or they would not object to it. Were you frightened were just as you take yourself back 25 years as a hero. Know theory first and then I guess what was it like. Do. You feel the world is on the edge of a massive war. No I did not and I felt that the the

young commander in chief was actually proceeding with caution. More for us I mean some people say. Robert McNamara when he said to us he went. From the Pentagon whether to wake up in the morning. I never felt it was the feeling among your people you yourself. The feeling was one of the this is what we train for. We're dedicated to the defense of our country and if this is required let's get on with the show. You were you must have known about the nuclear threat. Of course we did. So we sent missiles back at the Soviet Union as well as the ones that were Iraq. United States. Missiles. What did you feel about.

The nuclear threat. There was nothing I could do about it but there was something I could do about the readiness of our conventional forces. I didn't lose any sleep over it and I don't believe I'm being braggadocio in saying that because I had been dealing with the with military operations conducted under the threat of nuclear weapons since 1946 since the dropping of weapons on Hiroshima. Did you have any nuclear tactical nuclear weapons in you were. They were they were not. We were ordered not to take any nukes with us. That would be for later echelons.

And I know in your. They were a normal part of your area. Well for instance if the all the weapons that we had at that time were the honest John rockets could be either conventional warheads or nuclear warheads and we didn't have any honest Johns with us. They weren't in my troop list. Maybe in many ways it's easier for people like you and the other Marines. Are on a mission to accomplish and to perform. Easier for you than for some of these guys sitting in the criminal mastermind. Well I don't know. McNamara was a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force in World War Two. So he should have had some feel for it. I mean easier access. Being worried about. The threat of nuclear war. Now. You guys. Guys by.

The way. With everything they strategize. I don't think there's much difference between being killed with a nuclear weapon or a conventional bomb. We're concerned about the safety of your family or certainly. Did you think my. Actions with respect to my family. Were standard I think I assured myself that all of the families all of the parents of troops and barking. Would be taken care of in their. Housing either government quarters or civilian housing that they were then occupying.

We we checked that out completely lame. We were on temporary duty. And they. My family stayed in the quarters at Pendleton for them for the period of this. I know that me quite a few Americans left the big cities and headed for the hills and that's where there was really a lot of fear among the populace. I'm evident to me. And I've never felt that way why have they know that we never reached that. Neither side would ever use this wasn't a problem that I could deal with. Hadn't had 25 years to develop the antipathy toward nuclear

weapons. I think we are at that stage we were considering food we dealt certainly with nuclear weapons but we considered them battlefield weapons. And a different order of magnitude than you ever dealt with before. And I sat for. Several months on this reorganization board. I think I mentioned it may have mentioned that to you what's considered the changes in weaponry tactics techniques formations and so forth. And that's what we came up with the helicopter assault force which gave us the capability to concentrate rapidly accomplish our tasks and then disperse and within five years. And of course we had I had in my force. The first capability to

do that that had ever been deployed the Jima and I had the one battalion helo listed in battalion landing team and my task organization and I was using that in my. Plan that was what was to be a reserve unit to exploit or to reinforce the rest of mine. It was really my secret weapon and that would in my judgment would have would have made the the Cubans they would have folded when they saw those helicopters sailing over the horizon. They were not inclined to want to protect their homeland to that extent. So you weren't concerned about any of those nuclear missiles being fired during an invasion earlier.

Yes I was. But we had standard formations that where you could you could except say the casualty of one battalion landing team the launch and we had to see echelon concept which makes provision for dispersion. And we were still developing. We're still practicing with it. But we had it in our organization that means the concept as well that disperses year combat elements so that you don't lose more of any given combat element than you choose to lose to a single nuclear weapon. And of course you you come up with a with a normal size weapon and you can determine what that dispersion

should be. If you military people who are been involved in combat come around get a sense this is the last question to this you that you now have the role of nuclear weapons that are for defense reasons. There's still many military people who haven't changed their thinking in this way. Why do you think this is what you think is necessary. The the planning. Within the Defense Department and within the services has not kept pace with with national policy. Our national policy has completely laid down and says in unequivocal terms that we

are prepared to reciprocate and that any strike that's made on us by an adversary that we're not going to make a preemptive strike. But every year the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense still go up on the Hill and say we do not forswear a first strike because we want to leave for them say this. That's what they mean. They want to leave that question mark in. The minds of their potential adversaries. Weinberger keeps repeating himself saying that we are not planning a preemptive nuclear war

but we are planning to adequately respond. He used several terms and so forth to do