War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Hans Bethe, 1986 [1]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES B01006-B01009 HANS BETHE [1]

Nuclear Research Before and During WWII

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK YOU A COUPLE OF GENERAL QUESTIONS FIRST, AND THEN TALK

ABOUT MORE SPECIFIC THINGS ALONG THE CHRONOLOGY OF OUR TIME PERIOD.

EARLIER YOU WERE TALKING SOMEWHAT ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL

IMPERATIVE. DO YOU FEEL THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATOMIC BOMB WAS

INEVITABLE?

Bethe:

Yes, I think the development of the atomic bomb was, was inevitable.

And I think the main reason for that was that the principle, namely

nuclear fission, was known to both sides of the great Second World War.

The Second World War was a desperate war. It would have been absolutely

awful if Hitler's Germany could have won that war.

Interviewer:

SO YOU THINK THE FACT THAT ATOMIC PHYSICS HAD PROGRESSED TO THE STATE

IT WAS AT IN THE LATE '30S, COUPLED WITH HITLER IN GERMANY LED,

INEVITABLY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOMB?

Bethe:

Ah, yes. I think that is so. The nuclear physics, in particular the

response of atomic nuclei to neutrons had been investigated since 1935,

mostly by the Italian school under Fermi. They had found very peculiar

results in the case of uranium. And then these results were further

investigated and clarified by Hahn and Strassmann in Germany, who found

that the nucleus of uranium does something entirely different from

other nuclei. Namely, instead of adding a neutron to it, it splits when

it's bombarded by a neutron.

Interviewer:

DURING THE WAR YEARS, AND UP THROUGH 1946, DURING THAT PERIOD, DO YOU

SEE ANY EVENTS AS HAVING BEEN REALLY TRAGIC IN TERMS OF THE LOST

OPPORTUNITY TO PUT SOME CONTROLS ON ATOMIC WEAPONS?

Bethe:

Well, you could think of two. The ah...no I would say three, lost

opportunities. The most important one was the one that Niels Bohr

proposed repeatedly to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill. Namely, to let the Russians know that we were pursuing

atomic, the idea of atomic weapons, without telling them any technical

details...

Interviewer:

I'M GOING TO STOP YOU FOR A SECOND. COULD YOU START AGAIN, AND USE THE

WORD 'LOST OPPORTUNITY'? COULD YOU SAY, 'ONE SIGNIFICANT LOST

OPPORTUNITY WAS...'

Bethe:

OK. The most important lost opportunity was that the statesmen did not

follow the suggestions by Niels Bohr. Namely, to tell the Soviets, who

were then our allies that we were engaged in making an atomic bomb.

This was surely regarded by the Russians as a sign of lack of

confidence. Of course, they didn't have any confidence in us either,

but I think it was up to the western allies to take the initiative in

this matter. And this might have changed quite a great deal. The, as a

matter of fact, it later turned out that the Soviets already started in

1943 on work leading ultimately to the design and manufacturing of an

atomic weapon and they were certainly very much helped by the treason

of Klaus Fuchs, which also we did not know about. Well, that was one

lost opportunity. Another lost opportunity was that we dropped two

bombs on Japan. I think it was necessary to drop one, but the second, I

think, was, could easily have been avoided. I think Japan would have

capitulated anyway. But, by that time, the decision of using the second

bomb was left to the field commander and field commanders use whatever

they have. The third opportunity, which some people now quote is that

we might have stopped pursuing the atomic project after the defeat of

Germany. I don't think that would have been possible. There was so much

momentum by that time in the American development that it would have

been very difficult to stop and General Groves, who led the project was

always deadly afraid of the subsequent congressional investigation. And

the congressional investigation in that case, could have been very

detrimental to the General as well as perhaps to us. Anyway, nobody at

that time in May of 1945, was even thinking of stopping. Except one

person, a Pole on the British missile mission.

Interviewer:

YOU'RE THINKING OF ROTBLAT, JOSEPH ROTBLAT. WE'RE GOING TO SEE HIM IN

ENGLAND...

Bethe:

I see.

Interviewer:

SO JUST TO PICK UP ON ONE THING YOU SAID, IS IT A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PURSUITS THAT ONCE SOMETHING GETS ROLLING IT'S

HARD TO STOP?

Bethe:

It is certainly a principle of scientific, technical pursuits that once

something gets rolling it is very hard to stop. Now, I think you should

distinguish between scientific endeavor and technical developments. In

scientific endeavor, one is just driven by the urge to know. And as

long as something is partly understood, we want to understand all of

it. In technical pursuits, like the atomic weapon, it is very largely

the number of people involved, the hardware involved, the institutional

backing and I may use a present example, namely the Strategic Defense

Initiative, which I believe is a totally fad concept, but it will be

very hard to stop as soon as a lot of industrial work is involved in

it. Industrial companies need work. And so once they are engaged in it,

they will continue. And will very strongly argue for continuation --

Interviewer:

YOU USED THE PHRASE EARLIER OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE, YOU USED

IT IN YOUR WRITINGS. COULD YOU JUST GIVE US A DEFINITION OF THAT?

Bethe:

Definitions are hard to give, but examples are easier to give. The,

well, there are many people in this country who think that when

something is technically possible, it has to be pursued. And

particularly so if it is of a military nature, which might give us a

relative advantage, relative to our competitors. One of the prime

examples which I like to quote is the MIRV. The Multiple

Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle on a ballistic missile. This was

an invention in the United States. We had made some technical advances

in this and so we insisted in pursuing it, even though many people at

that time, which meant around 1970, knew perfectly well that this was

an invention which in the end would benefit the Soviets because they

have much bigger missiles on which they can carry many more warheads

than we can.

Interviewer:

WELL WAS THERE ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE IDEA OF TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE

DURING WORLD WAR II, DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOMB?

Bethe:

I don't believe that anybody was conscious that this was a

technological imperative. I think that we were searching and I think

this goes very broadly, the United States technicians were searching

for various ways to defeat Germany and Japan. And probably the most

important was radar. And I don't believe that, that people said, here

is the concept of radar. It might be some good, might give us some

advantage. But instead they said, we need desperately some way to

counter the German superiority in war planes. What can we do? So I

think this is a different argument than the technological imperative.

Interviewer:

GOING BACK TO THE DAYS BEFORE THE WAR, YOU WERE TELLING ME EARLIER

BEFORE WE STARTED SHOOTING, COULD YOU TELL ME AGAIN HOW YOU HAPPENED TO

COME TO THE UNITED STATES AND WHEN?

Bethe:

I came to the United States in February of 1935. I had emigrated from

Germany earlier. I think September of 1933. And the reason was that my

mother was Jewish and according to the Nazi laws, the child of one

Jewish parent could not hold any official position in any federal or

state government, or German universities run by the state. And

therefore it meant that I could not hold any university position. But I

wanted to be a scientist, so I had to have a university position. So I

emigrated. There was no immediate danger for me of life and limb, but

there was danger to my career. In fact, it was clear that I couldn't

have a career.

Interviewer:

SO YOU WERE IN THE UNITED STATES. WERE YOU AT BERKELEY WITH OPPENHEIMER

WHEN THE NEWS OF THE HAHN/STRASSMANN EXPERIMENTS CAME?

Bethe:

No, I was at Cornell from the day that I landed in the United States.

[END OF TAPE B01006]

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK YOU A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT QUESTION. WHAT ARE YOUR

EARLIEST RECOLLECTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING THAT THE THEORETICAL NOTION

THAT AN ATOMIC BOMB COULD BE MADE?

Bethe:

Well, it went this way. There was first the experiment of Hahn and

Strassmann in Germany, showing a very peculiar behavior of uranium when

bombarded by neutrons, which was then explained by Frisch and Meitner

as indicating that the uranium nucleus splits into two parts. The news

of this was brought to the United States by Niels Bohr in early 1939,

and people immediately began thinking what this may mean. It was very

quickly reasoned that in this splitting, in this fission, an enormous

amount of energy would be liberated. That could simply be deduced from

the measured masses of the nuclei involved, and from Energy equal to MC

squared, which is a very small, and very incidental part of the

picture. Ah, the, so very soon it was shown that indeed a large amount

of energy is released. And then it was shown also on the basis of

previous logical arguments, that in the fission, neutrons would be

liberated. Now if that were so, anybody could conclude if neutrons are

liberated, then there can be a chain reaction. And I believe the idea

of a chain reaction was conceived simultaneously by at least half a

dozen people. All of this was discussed very openly. It was great news.

So, in January of '39, we all were aware that a chain reaction was

possible in uranium. Then it was only one more step to put these things

together. The chain reaction would release a lot of energy, and so if

you could make it go, you could convert this energy into power, and

make power reactors. And if you were able to make the chain reaction go

very quickly, then you would get an explosion. Intense. The possibility

of a powerful explosion, more powerful than anything we had known

before. That was pretty well common knowledge among physicists in this

country, in England, in Denmark, and in Germany. There was a meeting

in, I think it was in March of 1939 in Washington. This was one year of

an annual meeting which took place in Washington, sponsored by the

Carnegie Foundation. Carnegie Institution, I think it is called. This

meeting usually was open to the press, but because of the possibility

of a nuclear weapon, the sponsors of the meeting excluded the press

from this particular session. And that particular session, as I said,

probably in March of '39, it was generally discussed that this

discovery could lead to a weapon of unbelievable power.

Interviewer:

WAS HEISENBERG IN THIS COUNTRY FOR THAT MEETING?

Bethe:

Heisenberg came to this country long after that meeting. I believe we

probably would not have invited him to that meeting, because it was

quite clear that there would be war between Germany and the West very

soon. Heisenberg came to this country in July of 1939, and maybe it was

June and July, I'm not sure. And came mainly for a scientific visit,

but while he was here, there was a good deal of discussion of the

possibility of using uranium to make a powerful bomb. And I think at

that time, he was quite willing to talk about it. He shared our opinion

that probably was, there would be war. He said at that time that he

thought Germany would lose the war. He did not want to stay in the

United States, even though a very attractive offer was made to him by

Columbia University.

Interviewer:

SO WHEN HE WENT BACK TO GERMANY, AND ATOMIC BOMB RESEARCH STARTED IN

THIS COUNTRY, WAS THERE A FEELING THAT THE SCIENTISTS IN THIS COUNTRY

WERE COMPETING DIRECTLY WITH PEOPLE YOU KNEW, WITH HEISENBERG, WITH VON

WEIZSACKER, WITH THE GERMAN PHYSICISTS?

Bethe:

There was a feeling in this country that we were competing directly

with German physicists. Some of whom we know quite, quite well. And one

of the main motives for us to go into the project was to be first.

Interviewer:

HAVING KNOWN HEISENBERG AND SOME OF THE OTHERS, DID YOU FEEL THAT THEY

WOULD WORK WILLINGLY FOR THE NAZIS OR WHAT WAS YOUR CONCERN?

Bethe:

Well, we knew that Heisenberg was against the Nazis. But we also knew

that Heisenberg was a patriotic German. Much later on, it was

investigated in detail what happened in Germany and there were quite a

number of competent scientists who wanted very much to make an atomic

bomb. One of them was Harteck the first person who was able to produce

large amounts of heavy water. And heavy water is a material which may

be very useful for making a nuclear reactor. That we knew only later.

But we were sure that there would be enough Germans who would be

willing to work on it. It was later on said by Heisenberg that he never

wanted to make an atomic bomb. He only wanted to make a power reactor.

And in fact he was very astonished when he heard about the explosion of

the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. His first reaction was, "It's

impossible. No country can do that so fast."

Manhattan Project

Interviewer:

ALL RIGHT. I WANTED TO ASK YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT YOUR DAYS AT LOS

ALAMOS. DO ANY STORIES COME TO MIND THAT ILLUSTRATE THE CONFLICT

BETWEEN THE SCIENTISTS AND THE MILITARY PEOPLE ON THE MANHATTAN

PROJECT?

Bethe:

Well, there was a certain amount of conflict between the military and

the scientists with variations. Oppenheimer, the director of the

laboratory, got along quite well with General Groves, who was the

overall director of the Manhattan Project. But, on a small scale, there

were conflicts. We sometimes were troubled by the over zealous guards,

who guarded the entrance to the technical area and who guarded the

entrance to the Los Alamos Project as a whole. We were troubled by

incompetence on the part of the military. For instance, the military

ran the power plant and we had requested a power plant of a certain

size and the military, of course, didn't know what we were supposed to

do. And so the only use of a power plant they could think of was to

power light and therefore, they put into every office one bulb of 300

watts up in the ceiling, so that it would produce a minimum of light

where it was needed, but use the maximum of electricity. Of course, we

wanted the electric power for our experiments, which needed a lot of

it. We were somewhat surprised, again, with the electricity that the,

the frequency of the alternating current which we were getting, was not

60 cycles per second, but it was 65 or so. Why was that? Well, first of

all, what consequence did it have? We had lots of electric clocks and

they were racing ahead, gaining about an hour each day. And so we

complained about it. So, the sergeant who was in charge of the power

plant said, "Well, you people tell me that as the power goes down from

the power plant to your experiments, it loses some wattage, some power

rating, and so I wanted to compensate for that. And so I thought it

would be good to give it higher frequency." So we concluded that he

didn't know much about electricity, and still was put in charge of the

power plant.

Interviewer:

I HADN'T HEARD THAT STORY BEFORE. THAT WAS INTERESTING.

Bethe:

I like it.

Interviewer:

WERE THERE ANY SECURITY PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF, DID THE SCIENTISTS FEEL

THAT THEIR WORK WAS HAMPERED BY THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS?

Bethe:

Ah, I didn't feel that way. I didn't feel that our work was hampered by

security requirements. The point was that we had strict security with

regard to anybody outside so we couldn't talk to the people at the

Chicago laboratory or the Oak Ridge laboratory, and so on. But

Oppenheimer had made it a condition that internally there should be

complete freedom of exchange between all the scientists. And so we

internally, we could have as many discussions as we liked and since we

had scientists of all possible fields in the laboratory, we were

convinced that any question we could ask could be answered by somebody

in the laboratory. In addition to that, we had a few outside

consultants. Notably John von Neumann who came in every three months or

so, and who gave us a lot of news from the outside that was technically

important for our progress.

Interviewer:

YOU WERE AT THE TRINITY TEST?

Bethe:

I was at the Trinity Test. I was not in among the group which prepared

the Trinity Test, so I was not there preceding the test. But some 60 of

us were taken, the group leaders generally, were taken down to the

neighborhood of the Trinity Test. I think we were 20 miles away, but it

may have been only ten. Ah, so we were deposited at a place from which

we could observe the test very well, and, but, were not directly

involved in the direction of the test.

Interviewer:

WHAT ARE YOUR STRONGEST MEMORIES OF THE TRINITY EXPLOSION?

Bethe:

Well, it was an awesome site. It was incredible and even if we had,

even though we had carefully calculated beforehand how much energy

would be liberated, we knew that there would be a very bright ball of

fire. One thing we had not thought about was that the ball of fire

would drag up a lot of dust from the desert, and that, therefore, we

would get an immense cloud of whirling dust with strong light in it.

So, it was somewhat different from what we, from what I had expected.

But the main impression was that it was tremendous.

[END OF TAPE B01007]

Perceptions of the Soviet Union

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK YOU SOMETHING ABOUT THE PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION

DURING THE WAR. I KNOW YOU MENTIONED EARLIER ABOUT BOHR TALKING IN LOS

ALAMOS. WAS THERE A FEELING THAT THIS WEAPONS, THE ATOMIC WEAPONS WAS

BEING DEVELOPED PARTIALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT TO EMERGE AS THE

ENEMY ONCE THIS WAR WAS OVER? WAS THERE ANY COGNIZANCE OF THAT?

Bethe:

To my recollection, there never was an idea, at least among the Los

Alamos scientists that the atomic weapon was being developed partly

against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we followed the progress of

the Soviet Union army, after Stalingrad with great enthusiasm, very

much admiring their courage and competence, and I think until nearly,

well until the end of the war, it never occurred to us to consider the

Soviet Union as an enemy.

Interviewer:

WHEN IN YOUR RECOLLECTION DID THAT PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION

BEGIN?

Bethe:

The perception of a conflict with the Soviet Union began in the fall of

'45. I remember in fact, one journey from Los Alamos back to Cornell to

discuss the future of the physics department here when we were very

much disturbed by the constant attacks by the Soviet... the Soviet

officials on especially, on England. The...

Interviewer:

COULD I ASK YOU TO START THAT SENTENCE AGAIN. YOU STARTED TO SAY YOU

WERE VERY DISTURBED BY THE CONSTANT ATTACKS OF...

Bethe:

Yes. We were disturbed reading in the newspaper that Stalin...

Interviewer:

I'M SORRY. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO START AGAIN BECAUSE I THINK MY VOICE

WAS STILL THERE WHEN YOU STARTED...

Bethe:

We were very disturbed, I was very disturbed reading in the newspaper

in September or October of '45 of the constant verbal attacks by Stalin

and the lower officials of the Soviet Union. Especially against England

at the time. And later of course, there were also attacks on the United

States. So, in my recollection, the cold war began by verbal attacks on

the Soviet Union against the two main Western powers.

Interviewer:

DURING THE WAR IN LOS ALAMOS, THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIETS WERE AS AN

ALLY. GENERAL GROVES HAS SAID, AT LEAST IN HIS MEMOIRS, THAT THERE WAS

NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS OUR ENEMY, NOT OUR ALLY.

Bethe:

I was aware that General Groves considered the Soviet Union a potential

enemy. In fact, as I remember it, he considered them as a worse enemy

than Nazi Germany. And I suppose that this idea was shared by many

people in the military. I later on learned also of the experiences of

some military missions of the United States in the Soviet Union when

they were delivering goods to the Soviet Union but at the same time

were very much mistrusted.

Interviewer:

OK. DID YOU, LIKE NIELS BOHR, DID YOU ANTICIPATE THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS

WERE NOT APPRISED OF OUR DEVELOPING ATOMIC WEAPON, THAT AN ARMS RACE

WOULD ENSUE ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER?

Bethe:

I was not aware of that during the war. However, I was very much aware

after the war that the Soviet Union would acquire nuclear weapons in

the near future. We estimated then, in five years. And I remember very

vividly that I expected that maybe in ten years, there might be a

nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU SURPRISED THAT THAT HASN'T HAPPENED?

Bethe:

As of now, I am not surprised that this didn't happen because the

statesmen were sufficiently wise to know what a nuclear war meant. And

so I think we should give credit to the statement of both sides that

they never ever came even close to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

Reaction to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and End of WWII

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU HEARD THE NEWS THAT THE BOMB HAD BEEN USED IN HIROSHIMA AND

THEN IN NAGASAKI, COULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR REACTIONS AND YOUR FEELINGS

ABOUT IT?

Bethe:

Well, my first feeling, I'm sorry to admit was one of pride. That

probably this would end the war. And that we had contributed so much to

the end of the war. My second feeling came after we saw the, the films

which had been taken over Hiroshima a little later by our planes. And

the destruction which we saw on these films was really absolutely

terrible. And although we had calculated it beforehand, just what the

destruction would be, seeing it...

Interviewer:

I'M SORRY, WE HAD SOME NOISE IN THE HALL...

Bethe:

I think a seminar is finished.

Interviewer:

IF YOU DON'T MIND... LET ME JUST ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN ABOUT YOUR

REACTION TO THE NEWS OF HIROSHIMA AND THEN NAGASAKI.

Bethe:

Well my first reaction to Hiroshima was that, was a feeling of pride.

This would probably end the war, which we all wanted very, very much.

And pride because we had been instrumental in bringing this about. My

second reaction came when we saw films which had been taken, by an

observation plane which flew over Hiroshima a few hours later. And

which photographed the terrible destruction of the city. We had

calculated beforehand how much destruction there would be, but seeing

it on the film, seeing it more or less directly was so much more

terrible. And then the later reports of course, were even worse.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT THE NAGASAKI BOMB?

Bethe:

The Nagasaki explosion did not make a great impression on us. At least

on me. I knew it would happen. I, and it was overshadowed very quickly

by the Japanese surrender. That was the great news.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT THE REACTION TO NEWS OF HIROSHIMA IN LOS ALAMOS IN GENERAL?

I HEARD SOMEWHERE THAT PEOPLE HAD THOUGHT THEY WERE GOING TO HAVE A

CELEBRATION BUT THEY REALLY...

Bethe:

I know very little about the rest of the, about the reaction in Los

Alamos generally. I don't recall even the plan of having a celebration.

Interviewer:

WHEN THE WAR ENDED. AND EUROPE, THE MISSION OF LOS ALAMOS WAS

ACCOMPLISHED. THE WAR HAD BEEN WON, DID YOU FEEL ANY OBLIGATION NOW, AS

A SCIENTIST, TO INFLUENCE POLICY?

Bethe:

Many of us, when the war had been won, thought of what to do next. And

the, we were convinced that we knew a great deal more of the possible

effects of a nuclear war and that we should therefore tell the people

of the United States what these effects would be. And that we should

never have an atomic war. That there should never be another nuclear

bomb set off in anger. So, many of us felt it our obligation for one

thing, to travel around the country and give speeches pointing out the

dangers of nuclear war and for another thing, advocating international

control of nuclear weapons. We also felt that we should try to

influence the government and in particular, the Congress. There were

very massive, groups where very large numbers of scientists who went to

Washington and stayed there for considerable time in order to talk to

Congress and testify on nuclear weapons. Our main aim, our main aims

were two. In testifying to Congress, our aim was to get civilian rather

than military control of nuclear energy. And in general discussions, it

was to support the plan to have international control.

Interviewer:

SO DID, IN YOUR ESTIMATION, DID THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB FOSTER

A NEW KIND OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY MAKERS IN

GOVERNMENT?

Bethe:

Yes, I thought that the...

Interviewer:

WHY DON'T YOU START AGAIN.

Bethe:

I thought that policy makers should consult scientists from now on,

until further notice, very thoroughly about the nature of nuclear

weapons, what to do with them, how to control them and that scientists

should be consulted.

Interviewer:

THIS WAS A NEW DIMENSION.

Bethe:

This was a new idea. We had never asked to be consulted by the

government, except in the plans to set up the research laboratories

during, during the war. But it was a new idea to be consulted during

peacetime.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE BIKINI TEST WHICH HAPPENED APPROXIMATELY THE SAME

TIME AS THE BARUCH PLAN WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE UNITED NATIONS --

WAS THE BIKINI TEST DETRIMENTAL TO THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL?

Bethe:

I didn't think so at the time that the Bikini Test was detrimental and,

but I can't tell.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK, DID YOU AGREE WITH THE FEELING THAT CONTINUED TESTING WAS

NECESSARY?

Bethe:

I didn't think the Bikini Test was terribly necessary. We had

calculated what would happen to ships at sea under the influence of an

atomic weapon, and I didn't think that it was essential to test that.

However, I had no real objections to that test, but I also wasn't

asked.

Interviewer:

WHAT WERE YOUR FEELINGS THEN ABOUT THE BARUCH PLAN AND THE CHANCES FOR

ITS SUCCESS?

[END OF TAPE B01008]

Was an Arms Race Avoidable?

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK YOU, DO YOU THINK THAT AFTER THE WAR, DURING THE TIME

OF THE BARUCH PLAN, WAS THERE ANY WAY THAT IT COULD HAVE SUCCEEDED? WAS

THERE ANY WAY THAT AN ARMS RACE COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED AT THAT DATE?

Bethe:

I certainly do not know whether an arms race could have been averted in

1946. I think the plans of the U.S. government were good. I think it

was certainly worthwhile to attempt to make nuclear weapons

international. The original as developed by the Lilienthal Committee,

was a very generous and good plan. And this was endorsed by Dean

Acheson, who was then Undersecretary of State. It was made somewhat

less promising by Baruch, who then presented it to the United Nations

because he emphasized the punishment for any violation of the plan,

rather than the positive sides of the plan. It could have been

presented let's say by Mr. Lilienthal, or by Mr. Acheson in a way which

would have made it much more attractive. Nevertheless, I believe it was

a foregone conclusion that the Russians would reject the plan. The

Soviet Union had started work on nuclear matters and nuclear work was

back in '43. Quite a long time ago. They were terribly insistent on

their own determination of their fate on the right of each nation to be

it's own master, and against a super-national agency. So it probably

could not have succeeded. On the other hand, one should remember that

there was a technical commission appointed by the United Nations, which

considered very carefully whether the Lilienthal Plan had, I purposely

call it the Lilienthal Plan and not the Baruch Plan, could be

implemented. Ah, the commission, I think had eleven members from

various nations. And in the end it agreed on a report, yes, the plan

could be implemented. And I think it is very much to the credit of the

Soviet delegate, to have persuaded his government to let him agree to

this. Then the political people, of course, rejected the plan. I think

there was little possibility that it could have succeeded. It was

important that essentially all the Western countries were in favor of

the plan. The United Nations at that time, of course, had a majority of

countries which were in the Western bloc. That has changed very greatly

by now. But, I think it was quite, quite a compliment to the Lilienthal

Committee that all the Western countries endorsed the plan.

Interviewer:

IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAY SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE WAR

YEARS AND THE PERIOD OF TIME FROM '39 TO '46. ANYTHING THAT YOU FEEL

WAS MISUNDERSTOOD GENERALLY OR ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT?

Bethe:

I would like to say one thing about the war years. It was a desperate

war. For two years, two and a half years, at least the Nazi Germany was

clearly dominant. They had conquered the Western countries on the

continent. They were marching essentially without much resistance into

Russia. There was a great danger that Nazi Germany would win the war.

There was therefore, I think every justification for the scientists of

the West to work on ways to defeat Nazi Germany. And this is something

which today's young people do not know anymore. They do not realize

what Nazi Germany was like. That Nazi Germany was devoted to destroying

all the values of Western culture. And resistance against that was

essential. The, in addition to this, as far as nuclear weapons were

concerned, we had every reason to believe that Nazi Germany was hard at

work developing nuclear weapons. They had highly competent physicists.

And a highly competent industrial base. We later on found out at the

end of the war that they really had not got very far. But we couldn't

know that. During the war, there was an encounter between Heisenberg

and Niels Bohr which has been very much talked about, and this was

totally unsuccessful. They were afraid of each other. Heisenberg tried

to tell Niels Bohr that Germany was not trying to develop nuclear

weapons. Heisenberg wanted Bohr to transmit this to the allies, but

none of that became clear because Heisenberg was very much afraid that

any such message would be transmitted to the Nazi command in Germany

and thereby might cost Heisenberg his life. And certainly his job. So

he was very, very unclear. Bohr on the other hand, was aware of the

possibility of a nuclear weapon, and totally misinterpreted the sketch

which Heisenberg gave him. Bohr thought that that sketch indicated the

German plans for a nuclear weapon. In fact, Heisenberg sketched a

nuclear reactor. And Bohr didn't understand this. So, it was a most

unfortunate encounter. And, it was not clear to Bohr just what

Heisenberg wanted.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT WE HADN'T TOUCHED ON THAT YOU WOULD LIKE

TO? IF YOU HAVE AN AFTERTHOUGHT?

Bethe:

Well, I was aware when the hydrogen bomb was proposed in 1949 that this

would be a perpetual danger for mankind, as indeed the atomic bomb was

already. But, it certainly is...

[BACKGROUND COMMENT]

Bethe:

It certainly is a great multiplication of evil if you have bombs that

are a hundred times as strong as atomic bombs already were. Already the

atomic bomb meant a complete difference of war from what it used to be.

In war, including the Second World War, if you made a plane attack on

another country as the Germans did against Britain, if you had losses

of ten percent in such a sortie, it was unacceptable, because neither

the machines nor the men could stand that. With the atomic bomb, this

changed, because a single bomb destroyed Hiroshima and again, a single

plane destroyed Nagasaki. And by going to the hydrogen bomb, a single

plane would destroy the biggest cities in the world. This was terrible.

It also meant after the invention of the ballistic missiles, that

missiles were powerful enough to carry one million tons of TNT to an

enemy country. And as we have learned in the last two years, if enough

such missiles with hydrogen warheads are used against cities, it may

mean permanent damage, maybe permanent destruction of life on Earth. I

don't believe that it would go that far, but it will go very far and

recovery from such a war would take many years.

[END OF TAPE B01009 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Hans Bethe, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-gt5fb4wv7b

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Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Bethe, Hans A. (Hans Albrecht), 1906-2005
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 962a24e5d3cc9b6f0a4f81964419fd77bc76629a (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Hans Bethe, 1986 [1],” 1986-03-12, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 18, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gt5fb4wv7b.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Hans Bethe, 1986 [1].” 1986-03-12. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 18, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gt5fb4wv7b>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Hans Bethe, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gt5fb4wv7b