Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Edward Geary Lansdale, 1979 [Part 5 of 5]

You know nothing. You're right. OK I want to go back over this. And this

question of how your sign it was arranged in 1965 about her life. Nineteen sixty five. Henry Cabot Lodge has just been appointed by Astor to Vietnam. When asked May to go out there as his assistant to concern myself mostly with the pacification programs that were taking place out there and what he was personally quite up to so I went out there. As his assistant. He told me that his request to me actually had come from President Johnson. So I had the same person to ask him about this and as sensibly a Foreign Service reserve officer temporarily

a little later after I'd gotten out of there there. President Johnson gave me the right to minister. So this was a foreign service type that I went on. I had retired from the military. I went when I got out there and tried to cope with the pacification programs. I found that there are a number of US agencies involved in the war and Nestle would try to work out the US part of the effort by committee and try very hard to to succeed. But we actually had great difficulties with getting true teamwork on the US side. That's because it's part of our government had its own ideas on

what to do and I must say I wasn't good at getting a single guiding. System on the American side working for the Vietnamese. It's certainly no secret that there was a lot of bureaucratic opposition to you inside the American mission. Could you describe some of the problems and difficulties. Thinking back to. My later days how to getting along with different parts of the U.S. side of the effort. I have a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach just in memory of some of the types of things that happened then and didn't get on. I think it was. Very sad thing that happened that we

Americans can't seem to get thoroughly unselfish in and serving our country in such situations and be able to work with each other. I don't know whether some of the Vietnamese habits rubbed off on the Americans out there at the time of mistrust of one another. We didn't have mistrust but we had rivalries we had people very mindful of the fact that service in Vietnam seemed to a burden on careers by American officials and the Americans out there didn't want to have that happen to the horrors that they were very ambitious in their own services. What's this is the profit motive for anybody. And I wore such a wife and or young Americans out there risking their lives and

fighting and dying. I felt that on the civilian I am what I was at the time. Still the far more selfless and works of our possessions brought with us and so on. Do you think you could you could you recall any specific instances or anecdotes in which you you ran into the bureaucratic stone wall. Well there are many incidents of fairly small ones of rivalries of running into bureaucratic stone walls and working with the Americans on Vietnamese at the time. I would just say that. They are American effort out there.

What was more to the effect of so Lafayette and so on and the American Revolution had brought along the corridor were so high for them to this country going on among the court officials was very similar to what the Americans were doing and the way of organization and well bureaucracy in effect and the thanks so that anyone who wanted to get I haven't got a single thing done. I had to run a course of getting up for a month for a number of people to go along and they would be promoted to do the most simple things and I ride them to a considerable amount of that I didn't have any direct orders from Washington about what I do. I didn't have

funds from Congress to expand. I didn't have a clear rule of a line of authority to do certain things so sometimes decisions were made and we would go to get things done and simply be the Bosches people that I've gotten for a month or so. I worked on Iran that we don't want on top of one. So that would just be slowing down the effort. Well it's been an observation made in 1965. After 965. The war had grown to the stage where it was one great big organization against another great big organization and people like you who were taking our personal and individual approach really had become obsolete or had been ground over by these two great bureaucracies because on the communist side it also escalated into

a great big organizational fight do you think that's a fair appraisal. Well the fact that or turn into one bureaucracy accounts and I would have sought some truth but it's only growing. A person who OS already have a towards individual efforts as I was with would be of my wreck and not part of us and would hurt their son. I think the same was true on the Vietnamese side on our side as well as the enemies. But still there was a relationship there that I doctored myself to claim some of the Vietnamese leadership and our mission out there so that

my house to us was constantly a place with an open door to Vietnamese as one of the few American homes. The Vietnamese officials would bring their families to visit. It was one of the places where they felt they could visit socially. And a feeling of atmosphere of friendship and affection but they could admit to some of their problems that find difficult to do on an official counter. What do you think when you look back on those. Can I just take that away from you. This is just like it was for a few days. When you look back on that assignment for 65 to 68 What would you say that you your where your accomplishments and what would you say were your failures What would your balance sheet. Balance sheet on my service and their failures and accomplishments.

I felt that I annoy other Kavos once I like a constant and ready means of Americans and Vietnamese to go through a glass wall to separate them to reach an understanding with each other. This was felt very definitely on the Vietnamese side and I know Ambassador Bunker when I left finally on the middle of 68 that thanked me personally for for accomplishing this. As far as us my son was concerned the failures worth of the war had grown much larger them. And a small an idiot such as and then the vigil or a small group of individuals Americans Good good.

Preponderance of combat to one way or another. My own use for most in the past of American policy was pretty clear cut. There were smaller numbers of Americans involved and when I would voice something from them pastor that that was the only fois at that moment bang heard by a Vietnamese official later their Earth. It was an effect too many cooks spoil it in the process. There are all sorts of ideas being put forward and of people dealing with Vietnamese who who didn't speak with a single voice were given a coordinated voice so that many things were being heard by the Vietnamese at the time. The American and. And this I was not not they had one of the most things

at the time because the White House ever used to carrying out my duties. I'd always had a very clear understanding from the top Americans on the sand of what the problem was what should be done about it what my own part was. And by the later end of the 60s. This was no longer really what was being done. There Americans had too massive an organization there were too many things that needed doing to too many people are linked up with plain Vietnamese and Americans who are trying to solve daily problems and coming to grips with them and coming up with different views to have a clearcut understanding.

There was at George at that time one of the members of your team was someone who was later to become either famous or notorious depending on your point of view. Just as Daniel Sieberg right what was he like in the days when he was working for you. Down Ellsworth who was with me out there a brilliant younger man who who struck me as being a good thinker a man who took many things onto consideration when he was examining a problem and was quite expert at expressing his views afterwards I felt that Ellsberg would give me a very fresh view of the country that was new to him that he was seeing for the first time up close

and looking at not only what was happening at the moment but from my viewpoint took him discussions that he had have in Washington before that that I had quite a depth of scholarly background on the subject. He was at the time he was quite gung ho about getting into contact combat or coming in contact with the enemy and doing something else. Mark and I had to keep explaining that no civilian capacity but he was so eager to get out in the countryside which I was also eager to have do of that the more it the city the better he would understand the situation. He became very close friend of John Paul VI and who was an advisor a former military officer who was one of

our civilian agency economic aide and used to love to run the gauntlet of traveling highways were preceded by ambushes. This list ahead of us. I feel sir part of the thrill of serving out not in any way does it. Have you ever thought about what may have motivated him to steal the Pentagon Papers and publish them. What motivated town Ellsberg to do public say like on papers has puzzled me and some ways and. I think I understand some of those mortars or other roads went. Down tried originally to

go through proper trials you might say to get a congressional look at the executive department on what was in the papers and I know that you want to see some of our senators and congressman. And when nothing happened by has so to speak working within the establishments there was some that apparently felt that they should go public on that the American public deserve what happened after that it was given very much in the public view and I have contact with them but I think only that he was motivated. High sense of principle more of us Americans of us. Well let me ask you this way. As you mentioned he was gung ho and rather hawkish in his days when he was there with you. What changed him from being a

hawk to a if you want to duck. I didn't say nothing after some national period of service so of my to know what influences were on him that caused him to notice and discuss this with him. And I simply don't know. I know that he married again and married a girl who had very strong feelings I think later Doctor himself. I know that. He had have a tendency to observe things in Washington but he had a very different outlook on Vietnam and on the war than we had known then Saigon together someplace in there something that until

now I simply don't know enough about. Looking back you were really involved in Vietnam through three administrations the Eisenhower administration the Kennedy administration the Johnson Street right. Was there any particular way each one operated. Were there any distinctive qualities about different ministrations approaches to Vietnam. That would take time to answer the differences of views on Vietnam and different U.S. administrations was this something out have to reflect on a very long time. I can't give a quick answer. Let me go back to personal thing. You were I think sort of immortalized in a couple of books if you want to use that word. You know one is Graham Greene's Quiet

American and I think you're you're a figure in the ugly American called Colonel Hillandale. How do you feel about becoming a fictitious character in that way. Well my feelings about becoming a fictitious character or aura Donna fired with various novels and so on. Some of which came out while I was still quite active and tried to do things I felt. First of all that was very harmful to the fictional characters or character to earth and part of some of the things I was trying to do and one of them on the quiet American or the ugly American. Pitted the character against the ambassador and others of the people who was actually trying to work over time in

places. Cause may some personal difficulties and harmonious working relationships. Maybe Italy and parts of the character were were completely untrue. The things that were doing it was a composite character with others being drawn on examples so that there are there are things happening that are what puzzled me at the time but also made it quite difficult for me to work. I wish I'd never done mine while I was still alive and incidentally they themselves were way ahead in this game. The Indian ambassador when I was in the Philippines told stories about made being mixed up with Mike's eyesight there and how he got elected this president of.

Syria knocked on Cambodia. It made a movie and what a hero. A member of. My or Royal Navy telethons. That bust of a sort of a stupid American spy who happened to have my name. And beat up for the. Attentions of a daughter of one of the ambassadors. And. I remember that chanting all I was told had passed out some more stories. There were problems and my going to the second one really in the old days was afraid that I would try to bring in free elections and to Korea the things that I I had put as I was meeting people and talking to and they were reacting Why didn't I say what it's for and then tell me there are some what do you think about the Quiet American. It's

a book. Graham Greene who wrote The Quiet American apparently had some very strange notions about Americans. I recall one of the things in the laws of. Using air conditioned bathrooms affected the potency of American males Well I think the rest of the book was about as true as that knowledge. Well here's a last question for you and or maybe we'll give you a moment a reflection of it what looking back on this great experience tragic experience what do you think the lessons of Vietnam are what should we have learned from you. The lessons we learned from Vietnam and the Vietnam War. Or first of all that we should always be true to our own principles

American ones the ones from our own history the ones that we instinctively tend to follow and are away from my friends and so forth. But our our long range in themselves. We felt that. Their strong viewpoint that. That taught us not to ever look upon ourselves as a world policeman. I don't think that's the point at all. I think that if you have a more sober thought us to be true to our own principles throughout. I think that the separation of military civilian authority. It showed for Matt Moore and thought on strategy from the military and to our political leadership and I

think that what happened to us was that in Vietnam we had presidents we had. Whatever else you think of London. Johnson then Richard Nixon. They were professional politicians. They were from a very tough breed of politicians and America and yet they they were who were commanders in chief were national leaders and the war in Vietnam. Fighting it. And a military one. While they are opposition they played an online shop and others in the Politburo on Hanoi were fighting up as a political war. And. I cry inside thanking that our tough expert

politicians never use their political sense and the way we waged war in Vietnam. I don't think that if that ever. I felt that this was their subject. Politics was a thing made of in Vietnam. If ever you side with the war would have been very different. Well can I just ask you for a comment on the fact that I'm in laser water and Jap were Vietnamese in Vietnam and we were Americans and yet and if we reversed that how well would the Vietnamese do if they were trying to wage a war in the United States and it was we were I think the Vietnamese use our political war in the United States. I'm not going to say that they directed all of the popular dissent that was expressed here

but they certainly had some influence on it. I don't think that the initial VC movies up for the start of the early 70s are ecologists and so on just came out like Topsy into this country. Someone dug them out of here and got them up with commie university and so on and that's what happened in the United States was almost identical with what happened then metropolitan France and then Paris. And earlier wars the timing was so Vietnam and voids and what's later on they took great credit for taming tainting mouse strategies over to fit hitting an enemy at home which was different than mine ever done. So I lost my chance ok I think that's I think that's fine unless you have any other

questions. I think what you were driving at was. That we could have won and get into such things as a war crime trials after World War 2 until forced to. Work for political employment. I'm ready to go too far with that. Thank you. You need to mike John. Yeah OK. There's a few of them. Now. I'll just be talking to you. This is your. If you would just listen. Yeah don't talk back don't talk. That's all about general took me three years to make a

couple.