War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with William Golden, 1986

Your a you know one from the first day from from my first day of the commission which would have been late in September October 1946 until I left in April of May 1949 a leave extended leave. I wanted to go and see Europe. My wife and I drove around Europe and I came back in January of 1950. I had really not expected to come back. I thought that I had been there long enough. But Louis straws urged yearly entreated me to come back and only later did it become evident to me why he was so eager to have me come back. I think and I did come back then in January of 1950 and stayed until March 19 or 50 and I may be off by AM but I

was right. I could look those up at. But. That's correct. I don't need to. Yeah you could say this is what April. I can't this is maybe six. OK. This is tape to program to 15th of April an interview with William golden at Wall Street New York. I put the T in there because it's very it's always the. First question to us is what was Admiral Straw's assessment of Soviet intentions in the post-war world. And most straws had a. Fundamental and inherent distrust of the Russians. He felt that the Russians were out to achieve world domination. He did not

trust what they said. And he felt that that's say that their intentions were what I have just stated. Was a fundamental and inherent belief and that influenced his. I. Conduct throughout as indeed it should if one believes that then one ought to conduct himself in a manner consistent with that. And he felt that deeply as an article of judgment and faith. He was a very keenly intellectual man but he was also a man of emotional perception. So that. His. His convictions when arrived that were. Firmly held. In some system of American intentions. How does he. Assess American intentions compared to say well and

withdraws as a very patriotic man. And he felt that the American spirit was was. Virtuous and benign and that the Russians were or would say. The opposite polarity at least the Russian government. He was not talking necessarily about this or about the Russian people but the Soviet government he regarded him with complete distrust and the American love of the United States had been a. Blessed country for him. His. Grandparents had come here from Europe and even as others of his grandparents or parents come from we ourselves have come from Europe. This is a wonderful country. So he he was very patriotic. And he wanted to defend it. He wanted to be safe if you will for democracy and progress.

I. Will just ask you to restate it if you don't mind the Soviet intentions again. And if you can the many examples of how many conversations he had with him. Well I don't. Let me say his view of the Soviets was that they were not to be trusted. Now he or he felt that they were intent upon world domination and upon world domination politically and militarily. And let us say. In a political sense and that they were believers in achieving world communism. He was opposed to communism. He felt it was not good for people. And so it may be said to be two elements. One is he did not believe in communism as a system being good for

society. And second. I'm not sure what the order should be. He regarded the Russians as expansionist and aggressors. And untrustworthy and people who would. Say what they thought would be effective to the end they were seeking to achieve. One example perhaps it will illustrate some foundation for this deeply held belief on his part. And I can't tell you where that belief originated. Other than that his background was in Wall Street as an investment banker as you know and probably find out the. Site to give an example. I should say. There were negotiations beginning probably in nineteen forty six right after and maybe

even earlier right after the American at the end of World War II immediately after which it was terminated by the two atomic bombs fired over Japan. Talks were initiated with the Russians looking into some kind of. Agreement for non-use. Let's say for control of nuclear materials. And a peaceful way and for agreements for non-use. And there was something called the axis Lilienthal report. Which later became the foundation for the Baruch plan Bernard Baruch who represented the United States in talks with the Russians and these had to do with. I will try to do to summarize the program but essentially it was a plan which would have limited. Rather severely restricted the use of nuclear. That would have eliminated ideally use of nuclear power for military purposes.

These talks were entered into. He believed that I firmly believe with the best of honorable intentions on the part of the United States which had created this weapon which recognized its hazard which also recognized in the background that sooner or later the Russians would have the weapon. Other countries too. And efforts were made to establish a basis for control. The schools you know where these talks went on for years. With Fabian tactics by the Soviets to keep talking and not to say absolutely no. All the while they were developing their own weapon. And you might say that this was not a matter of good faith to be carrying on the talks without any reference to that. Well he regarded this as characteristic and I think there's a very good basis for that. From the Soviet point of view that was. Very sensible. I say the carry on talks and

maintain an atmosphere of non-aggression while developing your own weapon to catch up. With the other side. And they did that very successfully. Well he would feel this was a matter of duplicity in the way they were talking even as if you go back to Pearl Harbor the duplicity of the Japanese in carrying on talks while indeed and indeed at the very time when they were preparing and then did make the strike at Pearl Harbor. Now if you were a Japanese you would think this was a very clever and successful tactic and it indeed it was an attack on Pearl Harbor it was brilliant. But that's another matter. Tell me some new memories of the early AC and that its objectives. The AC first met after a point the point of the five commissioners to which perhaps I should make some reference now is the personalities of nations who were dealing well they

were the the five commissioners shall I describe briefly. The first meeting consisted of David William thoe who had been appointed as chairman by President Truman and he was a Democrat who had been active in TVA and was a very bright man a man named William way Mack who was a newspaper editor from the Middle West Iowa maybe but in the Middle East was not a scientist in any way but I presume trodes in this kind of representative aware of the public sensitivity and public spirited man named Sumner Tepe Pike who had served in various federal government roles and was a bright extroverted man among the roles he had been the commissioner of the Atomic the Securities and Exchange Commission. Very old also public spirited a physicist named Robert Barker. Who was had been involved in the Manhattan district

which was the organization as you know that created the atomic bomb under general wrote a physicist from Caltech California Institute of Technology who a very thoughtful man. And Louis Ross who has banked background had been in investment banking with much international experience who had spent the entire war World War Two in the Navy having started there long before Pearl Harbor perhaps in the very beginning of 1941 or perhaps late in 1940. He had been a reserve officer from World War one period when he had been assistant to Herbert Hoover who headed the. European relief efforts. Food and the like. And he had met Herbert Hoover who became a hero to him as a very young man. I don't know that you want me to go into the caves. Yes the AC was set up by a law

with quite well-defined objectives and responsibilities and limitations. It was set up under what was known as the McMahan Act which had been intensely debated in the Congress versus something called the Mae Johnson Bill the Mae Johnson Bill were given much more authority to the military and the McMahan I gave authority to a civilian body. The purpose of the a c were to. Create were to look after the military and non-military uses of atomic energy and atomic nuclear reactions and the great emphasis was on weaponry. The war had just come to an end. The the McMann Act was passed in the summer as I recall in 1946. And the emphasis was on transferring control and nuclear energy projects from the military where they had

been developed in the Manhattan district of the Army Corps of Engineers under General rouse and Robert Oppenheimer to. Transfer all the authority and responsibility and the properties to a civilian agency. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its purpose as I said. PD was to create weapons. To develop new ones too. But more broadly to develop uses for atomic energy I having very much in mind the development of peaceful uses many of which were. At least anticipated or understood such as uses in medicine and. With. Industrial uses and uses for power even then were visualized in principle. Now. How would you describe animal Stroh's views on civilian

versus military custody of atomic weapons which was very much an issue in this early period. How did they differ in those. Well. I don't recall. What were those Krause's views were on the May Johnson versus the McMann bills at the time. Yes later I realized that his background. Louis straws had felt comfortable with the military. David Lilienthal felt uncomfortable with the military to put it in rather simplistic terms. Louis-Dreyfus had come up as a reserve officer through the military. Was just back then and trusted by the military people as well as by the secretariat in the military such as secretary of the Navy Forestal withdraws was very well respected and accepted and Rose remarkably in the military starting as a reserve lieutenant commander

as I said about the beginning of 1946 actually about three years in 1941. He rose to the rank of rear admiral at the end of the war which is an extraordinary achievement almost but not quite unique for a reserve officer to achieve what's called flag rank in the Navy. And he went through the ranks and there was a Commodore for a while which was a rather quaint title rarely used. And then he was made a rear admiral along with several other reserve officers at the time right near the end of the war. Now that says something remarkable about him and he was very highly regarded by the military in for example the Bureau of ordnance where he was stationed and ordnance has to do with the creation of weapons and both offensive and defensive on armaments and ammunition was called. And he became a very close adviser to the chief of the bureau

ordinance in fact to the several chiefs who rotated through in that time. So he felt comfortable with the military and the military felt comfortable with him as a person who understood let's say the Spirit. He was not however a militarist and he was not a professional military officer. David Lilian's on the other hand had never had. Had never had any military experience and he served his country during World War Two but not in a military capacity. And so then one has perhaps is comfortable with what is known and uncomfortable with what is not known. Further more broadly David Lilium thought was What would be called a very liberal minded person. And Louis Ross with what would be called again an excessively simplistic terms a very conservative kind of person. This is too simplistic to be fair to either because each of them had both keen intellects and warm hearts. But

Louis Ross would be more skeptical. And David Lilienthal on more hopeful I would say about the virtuous conduct of human beings that. When you got the time to check crisis the Berlin blockade. Do you think that newer stores would've liked to have seen the military take over custody. Of the Taliban. No I do not think so. No I think that was that was a race to judicata as it's called the act had been passed that McMann bill was perfectly clear. And I have no recollection of any effort or even an expression of trying to change that nor as a matter of fact do I think. Nor do I think that Louis ROIs really would have wanted the military to be in control of what though he had great confidence in them. But I don't think he would have. Wanted the custody

and control to go back to the military. But I don't know that as a fact. I don't recall ever having any such discussions whether my reading was when I got to know him very well. We had. Offices immediately adjacent. It was like this room a little room in between sets of that. And then his room I was in an office or perhaps a Cyzon. There was a small secretarial office with his secretary in mind in it. And then there was his office which was very much bigger of a quarter of the top of the building that became the a building that had been the U.S. Public Health Service building on Constitution Avenue. So. He and I knew each other very very well. He was a man not easy to get to know well. I don't want any of this in the sense that he. He was not a trustful man. He was a

very. Close to himself kind of person. And he. He would be very genial and indeed in his manners was courtly so courtly that some people found it excessively courtly on occasion. But he was a very private man and. He would not speak at length about his feelings except about specific subjects. Now I have to know him very much better. I met him in the Navy. I had not known him in Wall Street tall but I met him in the Navy. And did some work with him for him really. He was much older as temporary additional duty as it was called. And so that was how when he was asked to go on the atomic energy commission in the summer of 1946 knowing that I wanted to spend part of my time a large part of my time on non remunerative but interesting and useful activities. When I got out of the

Navy I thought he didn't want to get back into the old ruts but rather he kept doing things that I'd had in mind to do. It will be interesting. He turned to be and he called me and I recall I was actually at the Grand Canyon. And I asked whether if he accept the position on the ABC and there's an example of his courtliness of mine life I would. Would you Bill come and help me get it organized maybe come for three months. Well I think he would have accepted the job without my advice and certainly without my assistance but nothing would have interested me more being interested in science and in military affairs and in international affairs by reason of World War Two service than to be there in this most thrilling and exciting new enterprise. They're referring to the sandstone test of 1948 in the area. And we talk after half. An hour in the Central Pacific. Certainly the bulk of the

American I say the bulk of the American specialists in the use of the testing of weapon nuclear weapons were at that test at one time or another and some of them were there throughout the tests because there were several bombs tested. So that. When being asked about whether that was the only American atomic bomb team I'm not sure that was the term used. I really didn't think of those in those terms. And I would not doubt that by going to Los Alamos and elsewhere if in some way the Marshall Islands had been isolated that a team could have gotten together that could have assembled and used the weapons but it would have been very much a second or third team. Certainly the leaders were out there although some of them went back and forth.

About some intensely. Personal Reflections really of what it was like to be out there in this and what was the atmosphere. The atmosphere was of course expected. And while the for arranging for the test took quite a while quite a number of days in fact went into week some of us who were there and had a leisure time and a picture of that being in the atoll then we go swimming and we go around to some of the some of the little islands or islands and there were palm trees on them. And one fellow in our group named Jack Kli scientists and engineer California climbed up a palm tree and cut out the heart of Palm. And that was the first heart of Parva I've ever eaten and it was taken under somewhat dramatic circumstances but many of us would be I had had leisure time to be out

swimmy things of the sort while we were back on shipboard making more specific. Plans and activities. So the atmosphere if not leisurely was at any rate not tense this was not wartime. Every effort was made to be sure that nothing went wrong. And so we will inspect the site where the tower was to be on which bomb was to be detonated and things of the sort. General atmosphere was one of intent as you would expect an intense interest. And devotion to an objective interest in how the test would come out including the efficiency of the test because it wasn't just a question whether the bomb goes off or not. It's also a question of what the yield is and what the effect is on structures. There were tests made on the ground various kinds of structures were set up at various distances from where the bomb will be detonated the

tower to see what the effects were. So there was an intense interest and esprit de corps. And. What about when I would call it. Presenting I was representing the ABC one of the representatives. And I was also represent the the Bureau of ordinance of the United States Navy in which I was still a reserve officer having been a reserve officer on active duty throughout World War 2. And when I was going to the sandstone tested team to the Bureau of ordnance which is the. Was then the part of the Navy that was concerned with the development and distribution of weapons and armor to have me go out there and report for them. And I was very glad to do that with getting in a little active little active duty as a reserve officer. To recall any discussion with the military out the other side scientists. So yes but we're all one of a group of scientists in the military. I mean there

weren't we weren't really distinguished particularly. In the mass onshore. It was very little distinction. I don't think of it in those terms anyway. I knew both. We were a team. I was I was asked by the Atomic Energy Commission to go to the sandstone test. And I was delighted to be asked. I don't think I had to ask to be asked but that was quite evident. It was the AC was a rather small group of very very high quality and strongly motivated people at the time and it was quite evident that I would have liked to go and see a bomb test and I was asked to go to represent the commission and to observe from the point of view that I had someone who attended virtually all

meetings of the commission and in my role as assistant to Louis craws the commission meetings except for a very few that were called executive sessions were attended by very few people other than the commissioners and the general counsel and the general manager general counsel was Herbert Moxey general manager with Wilson and there would be some others sometimes called in for specific issues on the agenda. My role was one of being assistant to Lewis. Reading all the papers sitting behind him at the table occasionally passing him a note and being alert and being very very intrigued with the whole operation. I was in. 1946 I was. Thirty six or seven years old and it was and I'd been interested in science all my life and this was the highest and lowest level. So.

It was not unnatural that I should be one of those who would go for the A C to the test. Many others went from different divisions such as the engineering division of other weapon design division and the like. Actual explosions. Yes right. Oh yes indeed. We are on shipboard we were told to face away from where the explosion would be. We were provided with the blackest of black glasses which I still have to wear kind of rubber to really covered all our eyes not just this sort of thing but our eyes were closed very black and we were to face the opposite direction. And then of course the countdown came and when that went off it was. The thought came to my mind that others would use the expression as be independently. It's a greater light than a thousand suns through closed eyes or through closed eyelids. These black glasses facing the other

way. The illumination was just dramatic and you see by my manner now it remains with me almost 40 years later. Others will describe I think in rather similar terms. But the idea of a thousand suns occurred to me and I know that's the title of a book and the just independently of occurred. That was my experience. Any conversations with scientists of any of the stories you could tell us about sounds really thoughts. Well I you know I've stopped to think about it. I might have some and come to mind. I hadn't thought in those terms. Yes it was. Well no no.

No. Interesting vignettes really come to mind. We were all pleased with what happened. And I I went back before all the tests were completed partly to report because the communications channels weren't trusted on such matters as the yield at the light. Switch to the decision to deploy aircraft to detect evidence of Soviet surveillance targets versions the decision by others for us to go. Ken can you tell me a little bit about the background and explain his answer. It's come to my church. And. The way in which he sort of pushed this policy finally you know. Yes I can. And was wrong. It was a remarkable man as the number of these people were as Certainly Robert Oppenheimer was and certainly

David Lilienthal was in a very different way. And Mr. Rose was very alert and creative. He. Was also having come through the Navy and seen how the torpedoes the Navy had built up stocks up prior to Pearl Harbor failed to work after they were first put into use immediately after Pearl Harbor. They failed to work because they hadn't been adequately tested during the. Pre-war time and they haven't been adequately tested because of shortage of funds. And these are expensive devices and the Navy wanted had limited funds everybody has limited funds. And instead of testing the weapons they took them apart and put them together and assumed that they would work. Now this was of course a very this was a very serious problem at the time and many submariners had the harrowing experience of firing the torpedoes having them go back at the appropriately hit the target and not detonate or go under the target and not for

that matter. It was very conscious of this throughout World War Two and advocated strongly testing. And he was a skeptic and he felt that that don't just rely on reports. They ought to work. That's a bit of background and I think may have some bearing when the Atomic Energy Commission was started very shortly thereafter. He wondered about what arrangements the Manhattan district had made for monitoring the atmosphere and seismically to detect whether and when another country which could have been the Soviet Union successfully tested a weapon. And inquired and found that there were no such provisions and he persisted in this this was the kind of thing that would interest him intensely. Partly because of a military background and he was the leader he got the idea there was no opposition in the atomic

energy commission looking into it and he found that indeed there was no program for monitoring to determine and he thought it was very important and the commission agreed with him very important that the United States know when the Soviets had a success with the weapon. There was very little interest in the subject. Partly because the general belief was it was going to take the Russians a long time. General Groves especially felt that the American achievement under his leadership was so great that the Russians wouldn't duplicate it for 10 years with the number I heard him use that time if at all. Some people said and those straws did not have any such illusions. He felt it was very important that we have. An alert system and he pressed as he went through certain of the military departments went to Secretary of the Navy Firestar and found. All incredulous but then checked and found the there was no monitoring system. He pressed that one should be

established. It was still. There was there was no opposition to this but there was no great enthusiasm for it. The military who would have had to carry out the program primarily with aircraft. For monitoring the atmosphere with absorbing devices which would pick up radioactive material in minute amounts and could record it. The military wanted to use its money for other purposes. They're always short of money doesn't matter how much they have. They want more. That's not just not just the military people in general who believe in their causes feel that they need more money than they get and more supply. However that may be. There was very little interest in the military areas and they had to be stimulated and pushed somewhat which they were from the higher levels and a strong push this committee was set up representatives of the appropriate military departments. And as I recall at

the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission after the very beginning I was the representative of the AEC on that committee to push ahead if you will to stimulate the creation of. A monitoring system which was conceived primarily as being a system of having aircraft constantly flying and with absorbing devices. A man by the name of elist Johnson Dr. Ellis Johnson. Noti and the Johnson who was at the Carnegie Institution of Washington a scientist of somewhat. Long hair variety are very patriotic and a very capable man had worked throughout the day with the Navy in World War Two and mines and wrote a classified book called mines against Japan. Alice Johnson was called on to head this monitoring program as the scientific head under the military direction and straws pushed this

little committee of which I was a member pushed and it took probably two years and just about because the monitoring system was put into effect not very long before the Soviet weapon was detonated. In August 1949. Now you know I say this I say who knows whether they detonated one earlier that had not been detected but the general presumption is that they hadn't. At any rate the monitoring system didn't detect the radiation which was. Definitely determined could be from no other source in the Soviet Union and no other source than a nuclear fission device. And. As a consequence of that the whole effort here in the United States was stimulated and we got to the question of super bomb the hydrogen bomb as it's now called. If I said

enough about long range detection it was a very I think history will show that it was a very important contribution by Louis draws which would not have come into being until some indeterminately later time had it not been for his vision initiative and persistence and the respect in which he was held by both the civilian secretaries and by the military. It because not to have known that the Russians had that made a bomb could have led to very serious adverse consequences for the United States one of which could have been the Soviets getting a hydrogen bomb before we did. And that in my opinion and the opinion of many people not everybody would have been could have been disastrous because it would have permitted the Soviets to threaten the United States in a manner which we would have. Had to knuckle under to and to say that we had more atomic weapons which were not a very

large number at that time anyway. It's not an adequate answer to a weapon that has a thousandfold or could be more for the potency. Just take you back to that explosion what was the reaction of those close to that site. So you're only actionable to the Soviets the right device at some point. Well I as I said I was in Florence Italy. I was on my with my wife we were traveling around Europe to see Europe. I had left the a c in. April or May May and 1940. Nine and I had a vivid recollection one day in Florence that was a communist parade a big communist parade. We were and my wife and I were impressed with the fervor of the people in this parade. And it was not only in favor of communism. It was against the United States and it was for the Soviet Union. It was

quite interesting in retrospect and I looked over my wife's travel notes on that at the time and I remember going to see I was so impressed with this I went to see the U.S. Information Agency the head in Florence at the time if you know what about this. I didn't get a very meaningful or satisfactory response but the person there was not a very high level one. And then the right the day after this very impressive. Communist parade. I saw big headlines. The space you know in the Italian papers which I don't speak Italian but you don't have to see Truman announces Russians exploding atomic power. And that was what I referred to earlier as. Stimulating me to intense feelings. And I stayed up that night. My wife fled our hotel room there in the. Square in front and I was just so stirred by this

and I really should go back and say that before I had left I should go back. I'm sorry to do this in this form before I left in April or May of 1949. There had been repeated talks about developing a super question of the super with a capital assets that was called was on the Los Alamos program every year Los Alamos the the laboratory at Los Alamos the weapons lab would produce an annual program for the year ahead and this would be approved or modified by the Atomic Energy Commission on that program. Many many items appeared. Question of developing a super was always on it but in a very low priority. And there was no pressure to make it a higher priority. As with everything else not only funds but manpower scientific manpower limited that seemed to be no great rush. That's the background. And that's the way it

was when I left in 1949. Low low key continue work but at a low level. Of. When I read that the the Russians have exploded a weapon so long ahead of what was expected. I thought instantly we must proceed with the highest intensity of effort to develop the super weapon if it can be developed. IF IF IF IF. Let's talk about that program some. Way. Super. What do you say. Focus right now what role Admiral Stroh's played in the decision to develop. The super. And. Then the decision to undertake a crash development program. Well he played a very leading role because I think that's true. Yes yes. Louis Strawson

Louis draws who had been very conscious of Louis Ross is interested in new scientific and technological developments as a matter of a general turn of mind and so he was more mindful of the possibility of creating a super weapon it by no means certain that it could be. But he was interested and his mind was such that if something could be invented he would be interested in encouraging its invention even matter so horrible as a thousand times more or less a more potent weapon. As to is concerned there would be that if we don't get it the Russians will get it. And so he would be interested in that even if he was interested in better torpedoes and the like. And it was not that he was militaristic or had any idea of invading and taking over the Soviet Union but rather that he had the feeling that the Soviet

Union was as a matter of policy trying to win the world away from the Democrat from the Western world from the Democratic world. Now he was therefore very conscious of the superweapon. And I was very intrigued with the two as one would have been early a period about the possibility of creation of an atomic fission weapon that super was called a fusion weapon. So. He was he was more. Interested in and alert to this than any of the other commissions except perhaps Professor Bakra who is a physicist who had been at Los Alamos certainly was also conscious of it. Now. That I would say is the background of sensitivity that straws had. He was not pushing for particularly for a more active development of the super prior to the detonation of the Soviet weapon in August of 1949. And it was at that time that I thought the detonation of that weapon would just eliminate

the opposition to any development of the super because there were intensities of interest straws which would put more emphasis on super development than some other members of the commission. And people would. So there was a spectrum of opinion about it. And the bulk of the opinion was negative was let's say was very low key on the development of the super whereas Lewis draws on this relative scale of the spectrum was that the ultraviolet and I'd say David Lilium thought would have tended to be at the infrared end because he didn't he was a man of virtue and kindness and he would prefer to believe that such a thing couldn't be done. I'm I'm I'm being somewhat figurative here but I think that suppresses the difference in temperament. Now while there were debates over this they were not very intense or serious until about went off the Russian bomb. At that point I thought that the

debate would cease and that everyone would see the importance of the Americans having the H-bomb a super if it could be developed before the Russians got one. And who knew that the Russians may already be working on one even while they were working on the fission weapon and maybe they were. In fact I think there's some good reasons to think they were because they did detonate a hydrogen bomb so soon after Pearl Harbor that maybe that was a concern. Well it turned out that there was very strong opposition on grounds that you will hear from some of the scientists and you probably heard from Robbie that I think we're not. Shall I say where we're strongly influenced by emotion even by scientists who we think of as rational superadded I'll say it's fun if you remember.

Straw's reactions to what you see scientists. Yes. The general during this period of months after the Russian bomb was detonated and before the January 1950 decision by President Truman to go ahead with intensive efforts the general advisory committee was asked to express its opinion and they came out unanimously almost Sebald was not present against efforts to develop a super weapon and there was some separate opinions such as the ráby and Fermi one and Robert Oppenheimer who was the chairman of the general advisory committee which was a very respected Bolly of the leading scientists. Oppenheimer there's some evidence of. Not ambiguity but of a duality of view in things that he has written.

Oppenheimer is a complex character that's not I take it to be a subject of my comment. That was a remarkable man. At any rate there was the opposite the general advisory committee came out against emphasizing development in the superweapon Luistro has led efforts to. Develop it anyway and the Atomic Energy Commission voted 4 to 1 with straws being the minority opinion not to intensify efforts on the super. After a while there was another vote by the Atomic Energy Commission and Gordon Dean a member of the commission voted with Louis Raso that became 1:57. And I think at that about that time the president President Truman appointed a small committee of three which has a name which I don't recall

consisting of the Secretary of State Dean Acheson the. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. And the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal to advise him on what to do about this. They had a working group of staff people of course the course all on the record on this. I'm sure you Brad. But I would like to take you back a little bit. Yes. I had to go. On. Camera draws about. Louis straws and some others of course quite well. Carl Compton was one of them and of course a number of military people were among them. And I would I don't want to take your time now to think back on

who they were they would have included. Well I shouldn't conjecture I shouldn't. I felt that it was. And I think Lewis straws and some others felt that it was of the utmost importance that if a super weapon called a hydrogen bomb could be developed and there was no knowledge of whether it could or could not. It was theorizing about if it could be developed he felt it was crucially important that the United States should have it before the Soviet Union had it and his reasons for that are I think should be self-evident that if the Soviet Union had a super weapon of a potency believed would be a thousand fold around number that they would use this to threaten the United States and the security of the Western and non-communist world. I think that was my own view is that was a very rational point of view that one would hope as

I think everyone maybe not everyone. I think he hoped that it could not be invented created. But if it could be we'd better have it first. I would expect that the Russians would EqualLogic an equal fervor felt exactly the same way on their side. And one would expect that and therefore we were in a race to see we didn't know that the other side was running but we felt they must be. And indeed history showed but the Atomic the the the fission weapon the thing were those straws felt it very important that we get there first. I made this clear. Can you remember me. Oh that's just. No. Let's stay close here. Who were the people who are most sympathetic to his fans. Dean Acheson was. The secretary of state. I mentioned Carl Compton as a very respected. Teller. While teller cost

teller. Teller was very actively and a favorite teller teller was attempting to invent the weapon and had been for some years. And of course Edward Teller was a Barry who is a very intense man. He's become more so in that since since this experience that Edward Teller wanted to invent create his weapon and he had ideas and his first ideas proved not to work out but then when Stanley Ulam came in with an additional idea the combined effect a year or so later was indeed effective and became evident on paper. And I'm getting off the subject although I'm on the general. Well Edward Teller was actively promoting. At a more intense effort to create the super and he was doing this even before the Soviet bomb went off. He he he. He believed that this could be created. He wanted to believe it.

He had advanced technical ideas on how and he wanted have greater support at Los Alamos rather than lessors support. By. The inventors and true believers. In many fields. He was dynamic. Yes. SULLIVAN Senator McMahon was strongly in favor of an active and intense development of the hydrogen bomb as it was called and he came out in this way with what's called a five thousand word paper that is probably largely written by a man named Bordon of the staff of the Joint Commission. Sometime during the period after the Russian bomb went off and always the 49. And sometime within

the next few months I wasn't there but I was in the paper later. So he came out quite early favoring it and sent this paper to President Truman as I recall. Between teller. And. I think they were in close communicate close and frequent and cordial communiqu easy communication. In spite of McMahon being a Democrat. And Louis was being very active Republican again. Yes well Edward Teller. Came to see Louis draws many times and found in Lewis was a member of the commission who was spiritually favorable to the idea of intensifying efforts to develop a super bomb if it could be developed over Edward Teller had. I. Had frequent contact. I shouldn't perhaps not frequent but

there was. There was a regular and continuing and easy contact whenever it seemed worthwhile between teller and straws. Straws and Brian McMahon were also on very good terms and Brian McMahon was also in easy communication with man's kind of communication with teller may have been I don't know I would guess that there was such because the Joint Commission on atomic energy was a very important part of you at that time and Teller with a political sensitivity would have made a contact but I don't know that on my own. Now. We're. Wrong here. What were your reactions when Chapman announced the decision to go ahead. I was so pleased and gratified. I expected it was going to happen. I just felt that the logic was so strong and I was so surprised at the opposition by the keenly intelligent highly virtuous equally patriotic

scientists for whom I have had and have great respect and you know at first I was incredulous. Then I realized in retrospect some of the elements in their mind at any rate. Your question was How do you. I shouldn't have said your question. At any rate I was. Gratified because I felt it was in the best interest of the United States as my long letter to which I referred from France indicated I thought it was crucially necessary that we proceed and we in the United States have that weapon first. If it could be made all the while hoping as one should that it somehow it was a physical impossibility. But it's hard to prove something impossible. And so one has to keep on trying. So when the Truman announcement was made I was gratified it was somewhat anticlimactic because by that time I knew that the report of this three man commission consisting I referred to it earlier

Acheson. Johnson. And Lilienthal had come out unanimously recommending it. Now this was a very odd matter and hard to explain. Lilienthal first had opposed and then joined a unanimous recommendation to the president to go ahead and I curiosity. Perhaps in part because he was very tired. No one has to think of the human element in all of these. They were I think very important I alluded to them without extending their remarks about the human element in the scientists opposing the development of the weapon which I think in part relates to the general virtuous hope that couldn't be developed that is the reason not to try. And the feeling of guilt and I think this is something that must be looked into. These people who are in a way saved the world they might have if the if the if if the Germans had. In fact. Developed an atomic bomb which they hadn't later been to prove they weren't very far advanced.

We had no way of knowing that. And the real intensity of drive on the part of the scientists at Los Alamos and elsewhere to create the bomb was impelled by Hitler as visualized as the anti-Christ. And this was the real driving force so there's an emotional element in all of this. Many of these scientists are certainly. Far from all that many of them were refugees from Hitler's Germany. Including Einstein who is way way back in this so emotional elements were strong I think that these men and a few women who had developed the weapon which had killed so many people almost all of them innocent and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in doing so had saved many many more lives. I think it can readily be demonstrated by. Terminating the war rather than having it play out a scenario of island the island and not something that I was in the very midst of in the navy time. I think. That. Though. The wrong people

were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki it saved many more lives. Both Japanese and American than if the weapon had not been used. I want to digress a little bit because it relates to the use of the weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as against the demonstration of that weapon which maybe are going to go into elsewhere in a relatively unpopulated area which straws had favorite and a number of others had favored but were overruled. They were out to save the world from what I call the anti-Christ and Hitler even after that and when that war ended before we had the bomb the Japanese war was killing thousands of people and the war planes were clear that thousands and thousands of them are going to be killed on both sides. And so in the development of this instrument was the cause of patriotism. And.

Yet. It was a terrible thing. And it directly killed a lot of people who would not have been the ones who would have been killed otherwise and the ones who had been killed otherwise in a conventional war would have been killed without any. And the implication of the scientists who are working on the nuclear bomb I believe I've been one of them I would have a mixture of a sense of achievement and a sense of guilt. Why was I the instrument of fate or one of them now. And I would have thought of Ecclesiastes these are what you remember and which maybe some of them have. And it goes something like. Four in. Four and wins for in wisdom is much grief and who increases knowledge increases sorrow. And this is kind of what happened. How much better it would have been if a nuclear bomb couldn't have been created.

Now. I think this kind of feeling goes through something and I as I say I thought they came out with an unsound recommendation but the president and oddly enough if you will actually end up. David let me in Thall all these recommendations came out to go ahead. And. Send a strong reaction to the recommendations. To the recommendation of the GSA. Well it was strongly to oppose it and to vote out by saying guess what Lewis Lewis drives was greatly disappointed in the in the in the findings the opinions of the general advisory committee which recommended against development of the efforts to develop the hydrogen bomb. And he therefore felt that. It was his duty. To try to oppose this up to the decision making level which would ultimately be the president. Now his view I think it's worth stating and it's also is my view with the time

expressed in my letter and remains that the United States should have proceeded with trying to develop the weapon but not to test it and that simultaneously and concurrently immediately we should try to negotiate with the Soviets for a a a a. A a pact an agreement under which neither side would either develop or. Test the weapon. His strongest feeling which you're more concerned about with than mine but mine was the same was that we should do both. We should immediately negotiate with the Soviets but we shouldn't wait for that. And this harks back to the negotiations with them under the axis and Lilienthal and the baroque program while they were developing their bomb. And the feeling was and I think it's absolutely right that therefore we should develop but not test. And we should concurrently go ahead with

discussions now as it happens. This didn't come about and the development did go ahead and ultimately we tested and it turned out that they must have been developing at the same time because they tested less than a year later I think our test was 15 1952 in any meaningful test and their test was less than a year later in 1953. So that was very unfortunate. But some of the scientists felt that we should not develop but should negotiate. And the strongest feeling and mine was that while we were the Nosheen the Russians would be we had no assurance that they wouldn't be developing on their own. And he believed them. And I think the reasonable position is one must believe that they would have been trying to develop on Iran covertly and they would have felt that was in their best interests and that they should have done that. So. An opportunity was lost.

And I don't know but but there's one of the lessons maybe that can come out of some negotiations. That might be more fruitful in the future and we continue to be confronted with this kind of issue in which one can one take any risk if one is let's say the president of the United States or down the chain of command as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission can take any risk that the Russians are developing a weapon while we are not developing one. That was the issue and there were those who felt they were involved with one. Well we can take a chance. It isn't much of a chance and we could catch up and so forth and we just felt that we could only take zero risk. And there were others who felt we could only afford to take zero risk. And if you are responsible for the country. You might think that way too. Think about it when you're not sleeping. He described the Soviets around this time as godless atheist. Why not let's

say Godless. Oh I see. Yeah. Well let's close with that sound of the recording saying I don't recall him saying that but it's entirely plausible. He was a deeply religious man. Lewis rose was he had. He had that real kind of faith which can't be put into words by me. He believed that he believed in God. And the way that. I can't define or describe what I felt was there. And so many people do. You recall his concern with atomic espionage in particular and all he was deeply concerned. He was and it follows it's consistent. He was distrustful of the Russians. He was generally skeptical about motivations of other people.

I should say that Louis Ross had a remarkable combination of intellectual capability. And capability to. Understand the motivations of other people. And much of his effectiveness in what might be called a political broadly speaking political way was having and utilizing this sense of what would motivate other people. And combining the intellectual with. This. Intuitive appraisal of people made him a very effective person. You might not always agree with whether he was effective at it if it. Increased his influential. And effectiveness. Now his reaction to the arrest classroom because his reaction was somewhat Well I told you so. Not necessarily about Fewkes himself but hey louis Ross

felt that that was a great deal of spying going on and he had had some awareness of this in the Navy of course and he was distrustful of the British not because he was anti-British but because he felt the British were careless in their security. And indeed history has proven that they were not that we were perfect in ours and he was an intense. Constructionist when it came to security classifications and for granting of security clearances to individuals in the atomic energy program. He had this he was certainly the strongest person he had the strongest feelings about not taking chances on matters of loyalty and that not only matters of loyalty but matters of security risk a person to be loyal and a blabber mouth and and could be just as dangerous maybe more so in a way that he was very

candid and intense almost a fixation on this matter of spying and leakage. And he was at odds with David Lilienthal the Carol Wilson who he felt were lax and somewhat especially with Carol Wilson who had certain British ties and he had no doubt about it I'm sure. But I certainly have none whatsoever about the loyalty and patriotism of Lilienthal. Carol Wilson the lie. But he felt they were lax and subsequent events proved that they were because people had access to the Atomic Energy Commission who later defected to the to the Soviet. Time and that's a question about Strawson and take you back to a couple of your own personal experiences but how did those stories assess

the particular military significance of atomic weapons. You can comment on that as a general point. Well as a general point he felt the atomic weapons work were of the highest importance both militarily and politically because they were saying Look most. Yes. All right. Lewis Rose regarded atomic weapons as the highest significance in military and international political. Forces and influences and for the reason that they were the most potent weapon and. Therefore were self-evidently the weapons of greatest concern. What is his attitude about the wisdom of an increasing reliance by the US. On atomic weapons as an instrument of foreign policy.

Well my my recollection is that he believed in being strong militarily both with nuclear weapons. And with combat what he called conventional weapons. And that was his basic feeling was that we should be strong or we would be in one way or other attacked or undermined. As to. The amount of emphasis to be placed on the nuclear weapons I would just say that he felt the great emphasis should be placed on that we have to be superior to any other country not to use them but that if we were inferior he felt the other country might use them if we were superior. His feeling was we would not use them. But the other country would not either. That's self-evident. Simplistic but that was his view. And furthermore he had the feeling that if we were stronger and we had a monopoly for a while

in nuclear weapons that if we just at least displayed a possible willingness to use them then that would act as a deterrent to conventional warfare because these nuclear weapons are so much more powerful than the conventional weapons that if for example the Soviets felt that we would use them if the Soviets invaded Western Europe then the Soviets would not invade. As long as we have the war. So he felt there would be a very strong deterrent and that we had to stay ahead. And you know if you this side but if you think about it we've had no major war in what is it is 40 years and you can't prove that this post hoc ergo propter hoc. But there certainly is a strong relationship between the the horrible nature of nuclear weapons even before the superweapon and an unwillingness to use them. And that of course reaches a point at which if the unwillingness to use them becomes strong

enough then the ability of a foreign power namely the Soviets to use conventional weapons against let's say Western Europe becomes greater. So this is a very complex issue for some training. I don't know. I would think he favored it but I really don't recall the issue. I mean I just want to ask a couple of questions taking you a little early again just as with tensions between the two but again about the Atomic Energy Commission the tensions between the Atomic Energy Commission and Mann's Joint Committee on Intelligence. Well there were there was indeed tension between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Commission on atomic energy at various levels and at various times. And I remind you that in the. Summer of 19 early summer of 1949 Senator

Hickenlooper a member of the joint committee. I don't recall whether he was. No he wouldn't have been the chairman at the time but he was a Republican member I brought charges against David Lilienthal as chairman of the AEC charging him with as I recall gross incompetence was so strong a word that I had the good fortune to be on the ocean going to Europe at the time that I would have been very distressed by that and I thought the charges were quite unwarranted and were essentially political in nature of the Republicans who were attacking Lilienthal. As a Democrat and I had no for an hour this was coming where the Luistro has had any I'd have don't know although he and I were very close in many matters. He never said anything about that but he was very he was very close to Senator Hickenlooper he was a very intense loyal Republican. At any rate these charges. Were brought and that

kind of hearings were held. And this proved to be very very divisive within the Atomic Energy Commission. All of the time the same time when I was in Europe and fortunately not torn between. People that I liked and trusted on the commission including David let me throw who I thought had real shortcomings but not what he was charged with. So there was that big tension other time. That was the start. That was a crucial point in American and American History of American science in my opinion and deserves some attention. In your series because it split the scientific world and began the split which became Let's say it began that it split the commission the staff of the commission and it began a split which led to the dreadful Robert Oppenheimer trials which were such an evil influence

on. Not just the lives of those involved but on American science by being so divisive. Now all of that one could say grew out of a tension between some parts of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Commission time energy where political influences of wanting to have an opposition of one party to another and add strongly into the conduct of human beings I should say what must be evident that I've always been non-partisan. Neither party has been good enough to turn to for me to feel that I be part of it. It's the stuff. I went to the sandstone tested 1948 in the Marshall Islands for a number of reasons primarily to be truthful because I was very eager to see a bomb test. It was the first that I would have been the first was the first that I had ever seen. And it was indeed very exciting. Lewis

straws to whom I was assistant he being a member of the commission was very glad to have me go because he felt that my observational powers were such that I might see things that people dedicated to direct and immediate responsibilities might not see the members of the commission. We're glad to have me go. For similar reasons and I want to report back to Louis straws and to the commission. Any observations that I thought were worthy of attention that might be useful for the future. The commissioners themselves did not go to the test. Let's try one more time. Sure. I went to the sandstones test to observe the Atomic Energy Commission in a general way and my capacity as assistant to Luistro is which is a staff position. I of course was very eager to go on my own because I wanted to see an atomic bomb test. I went to the sandstone test in the Marshall Islands in 1948 as a

representative of the Atomic Energy Commission where I was on the member of the staff. I was there to observe any things that I thought would be of interest to bring back by someone who is as I was was a general staff person and assistant to Louis straws and in addition I would say I was very eager to see a bomb test. This was the this was the first time. Indeed it was the first test after the bikini test and after the military uses. That Japan uses against Japan