War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Ishrat Husain Usmani, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 009020-009023 ISHRAT USMANI

Early Work in Physics

Interviewer:

FIRST OF ALL, COULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME BRIEFLY YOUR OWN SCIENTIFIC

BACKGROUND AND HOW YOU CAME TO BE APPOINTED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE

PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION?

Usmani:

Well, my scientific background is that for everyone to see. I did my

graduation from the Aligarh Muslim University in India. Uh, having

graduated first from Bombay took my M.Sc. from Aligarh, Ph.D. from

London... all in physics. But in London at Imperial College I did my

Ph.D. in atomic physics, under the very famous Professor G. P. Thomson

who, as you know is the son of another Nobel prize winner, Sir J.J.

Thomson who discovered the electron at Cambridge. And then he came to

London and I was joined--I mean I joined him at London at Imperial

College and then did my Ph.D. under him. That was some time in 1939

when the war was... had already been declared actually. And I knew G.

P. Thomson, Professor G. P. Thomson, did lead a delegation of eminent

British atomic physicists who went to advise the Canadians and the

Americans about the possibility of good old Hitler getting hold of the

bomb. I mean, he was himself conducting certain experiments on fission

of uranium and did not know why a particular hut in which his equipment

was employed didn't blow up. But the Germans did it earlier then he

did, and he was very sorry about it. The, the reason why he could not

succeed and the Germans succeeded was because the neutrons with which

Thomson was playing were fast neutrons. The Germans played with slow

neutrons, and apparently slow neutrons caused the fission and not the

fast neutrons.

Interviewer:

I'D LIKE TO KNOW A LITTLE ABOUT YOUR BACKGROUND IN PHYSICS. IF YOU CAN

JUST MAKE THAT A LITTLE BRIEFER--IMPERIAL COLLEGE, PEOPLE WATCHING

WON'T KNOW WHO THOMSON IS. SO YOU DON'T NEED TO SAY... JUST EXPLAIN TO

US AGAIN.

Usmani:

Well, my thesis work was actually on the diffraction of electrons by

crystals and to watch the growth of crystals and see how the atomic

lattice which makes the crystal is actually developed. That was my

thesis. And I worked with electrons and electron diffraction, patterns

of chemical compounds and things like that under the guidance of G. P.

Thomson. But we had a number of seminars, colloquia, and day to day

discussions with Thomson on the prospects of finding out why nature was

so whimsical, or wise, as to end up the whole of the periodic table at

92 uranium. After uranium there was no other material. So we were

investigating under Thomson's leadership as to why not 93 and why not

94? There are only 92 elements then known up to 1938, and the

possibility was that the 93 did exist but probably existed for a very

short time and disappeared and so on. And everyone was trying to look

at the possibility of adding a little neutron into the body of the

nucleus of uranium. And what happened was not that 93 was born, but the

whole atom of uranium... the whole nucleus of uranium is split into two

halves. And the fission was for the first time discovered by the

Germans.

Interviewer:

NOW HOW DID YOU COME TO MOVE FROM THE IMPERIAL COLLEGE TO THE PAKISTAN

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND BECOME ITS CHAIRMAN?

Usmani:

Well, it's a long story, but to cut it short when I returned from

India, due to the war there was no possibility of conducting any

research, at least atomic research or electron diffraction research.

And I didn't like to take a job in the then India teaching physics and

deriving the same formula for the benefit of the B.Sc. or M.Sc.

students--the periodic time of the pendulum is this--unless there was

some opportunity to research. There was no opportunity to do research

and therefore, I took to the very prestigious examination of the

Indian, old Indian Civil Service of the British Raj. And by fluke or

otherwise, I got it. Then came partition and I came from Indian Civil

Service to the Pakistan Civil Service. And when Ayub Khan took over in

Pakistan the reins of power, he sent for me. He said, "I understand

that you are a Ph.D. in atomic physics". I said, "So I am". He said,

"Have you had any occasion to read that famous speech of President

Eisenhower, the president of the country where atomic energy was born?

Namely that technology is going to be developed as a result of this

spin off from the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki or whatever. Where

electricity in future will not be a problem. It will just be abundant

and cheap around the bend of the corner." In fact, if I remember right

he used the word that it would be cheaper to produce electricity from

the atom rather than metering it. So metering would be more costly than

generation of power. So my president Ayub Khan said, "Usmani, what the

hell are you doing here? Why don't you go to the United States and find

out what it is all about." And I did come, and find that in the same

very speech which the head of the United States government, President

Eisenhower, delivered in 1953 in the floor of the United Nations

General Assembly he announced that any friendly country which was to

take up nuclear research and was determined to find out the secrets of

the splitting up of the atoms for peaceful purposes, the United States

Government would give an outright grant of $300,000 for the acquisition

of the wherewithal of an atomic research reactor. So I came to the

United States and concluded an agreement, bilateral agreement, between

the government of Pakistan and the government of the United States

where, like any other, the government of Iran and the government or

Korea and all other friendly countries did get an atomic reactor,

toward the cost of the atomic reactor $300,000. So my submission is

that following that speech there were Atoms for Peace conference in

1955. Every five years there was an Atoms for Peace conference, and the

Atomic Energy Agency of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the

United Nations was born with a charter of its own. And the charter

prescribed how this international body could help the countries to

understand and take to nuclear to nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes.

Interviewer:

I WANT TO BREAK THIS DOWN A LITTLE BECAUSE YOU'VE COVERED A LOT OF

GROUND THERE. CAN I ASK YOU TO REPEAT, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE

ATOMS FOR PEACE SPEECH? YOUR PERSONAL REACTION AS A SCIENTIST.

Usmani:

My personal reaction was that having played with the atoms in the

laboratories at the Imperial College I was very excited to take part in

the utilization of that energy of the atom for peaceful purposes,

particularly for the generation of electricity.

Participation in International Nuclear Community

Interviewer:

AND HOW WOULD A COUNTRY LIKE PAKISTAN BE ABLE TO BENEFIT FROM IT?

AGAIN, I'M BREAKING IT DOWN A BIT.

Usmani:

Well Pakistan, like any other developing country would gain enormously

if the dream of those days came true. Namely, that cheap and abundant

power could be generated. As you know no socioeconomic development is

possible without energy, without electric power. Modern civilization

will come to a standstill without electric power. And Pakistan was

notoriously short of fossil fuels, particularly coal, and gas, and oil.

It had some very good potential for hydro-power. So as a supplementary

source of electric power for the socioeconomic development it excited

me enormously.

Interviewer:

AS PART OF ATOMS FOR PEACE AS I UNDERSTAND IT, SCIENTISTS CAME TO

AMERICA, AND THEN THERE WAS THE RESEARCH REACTOR YOU TALKED

ABOUT--AGAIN, IF YOU COULD JUST MAKE IT QUITE CONCISE, HOW DID PAKISTAN

BENEFIT FROM THE PROGRAM IN LOGISTICAL TERMS?

Usmani:

I think it's a good question. First we undertook to send a large number

of boys and girls to the United States--mostly to the English speaking

countries like Canada, United States, England, Australia--for getting

the necessary training in the fields of "nuclear disciplines," as I

call them. It included engineering, it included nuclear physics,

radiation chemistry, nuclear chemistry, nuclear medicine, agriculture

and so on. The idea was how to utilize the radiation from the atom

after it was split, and one way was... the liberation of the energy for

the generation of electric power. But the radiations that continued to

emit from the radio isotopes which were also a by-product of the

fission could be utilized for the treatment of cancer, for the

generation of new varieties of crops, and there were applications in

industry, and continue to be. Even today nuclear medicine is something

which... Pakistan has contributed, and gained in my opinion, a great

deal from our research reactor which we took from the United States and

produced our own isotopes for. Agriculture applications, industrial

applications, medical applications. Besides learning how to control the

fission of the atom at a level which could generate electric power.

Interviewer:

BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT DESCRIBES IT AS A "NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE AFTER THE

NUCLEAR MIDDLE AGES." DID YOU FEEL A SENSE OF THIS EUPHORIA? A NEW

INDUSTRY AND A NEW FUTURE?

Usmani:

The late '50s and the early '60s in my opinion can very easily be

termed as "the era of euphoria about nuclear power." And I must say

very frankly that Bertrand Goldschmidt, myself, and all of the

contemporaries went headlong to find ways and means and resources to

get this new source of energy--to actually show what could be done with

the liberation of energy, as well as the utilization of the radiation

from isotopes. Now in retrospect, I feel that the Three Mile Island

accident in the United States and the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet

Union showed that in those early years of euphoria about nuclear power

we rushed and planned to generate electricity, forgetting that there

are certain problems of radioactive waste disposal, problems of nuclear

remnants like plutonium which are also fissionable and could be

diverted for military purposes. But the radioactive waste disposal and

safety problems were ignored, and we all went headlong with the

technology of generating nuclear energy and nuclear power.

Interviewer:

COMING BACK TO THIS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, CAN YOU TELL ME

SOMETHING ABOUT THE MOOD AND ATMOSPHERE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCES? WHAT

DO YOU REMEMBER AS A PARTICIPANT?

Usmani:

I found that practically all the participants, including technologists,

and scientists, and Nobel Prize winners were outstanding men in their

own right, at that time. Physicists, chemists, mathematicians,

engineers and so on. They were all full of beans about nuclear power,

and I distinctly remember a session which I chaired at Geneva on the

desalination of sea water. Now you have unlimited quantities of energy

available from the fission of the atom, and unlimited quantities of

water, so you have water, water everywhere, and all the drops to drink,

if you could only match the energy of the atom and the enormous

quantities of sea water, so that problems of lack of water or aridity

and desertification and so on, could be also solved, and that attracted

me a great deal, because my country, as you know, has plenty of deserts

and arid areas.

Interviewer:

WHAT ELSE DO YOU REMEMBER?

Usmani:

Another thing that sticks to my memory of those conference days was the

trip of the civilian ship propelled by a nuclear reactor, like the

submarines, and that was on the Savannah, I believe. There was a United

States ship, which was propelled entirely by nuclear reactors, marine

reactors, so that they could not be required to fuel and change oil

from tankers or from supplies of diesel. They would be permanently

fueled by reactors. That demonstration was shown to us at, in Sweden,

actually.

Interviewer:

DID IT SEEM RATHER EXTRAORDINARY THAT THE AMERICANS, HAVING CLAMPED

DOWN SO TIGHTLY ON NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, SUDDENLY DID THIS?

Usmani:

No, I think the backing-down, if I may say, on nuclear power by the

United States... started some time, or coincided with the oil crisis in

the days of President Carter.

Interviewer:

I MEANT AFTER THE WAR, THE MCMAHON ACT, BUT THAT'S A LITTLE EARLIER...

AT THE SAME CONFERENCE, GOLDSCHMIDT MADE A SPEECH ON THE PLUTONIUM

SEPARATION PROCESS, AND CAME IN FOR A LOT OF CRITICISM SINCE. WERE YOU

THERE?

Usmani:

No, I was there, but I didn't attend the chemical sessions. Bertrand,

of course, was a magician chemist. But I didn't care, I was more

interested in what happened to plutonium, I couldn't care less. But

what happened to the fission of the atom and the energy that it

liberated, so that we can catch all of that energy and generate

electricity, that was my fascination.

Interviewer:

HOW ABOUT THE... HOW MUCH TAPE DO WE HAVE...

Usmani:

Incidentally, those conferences I miss very much now, because, as you

know apart from anything else, whether you attended a particular

session on chemical separation of plutonium, or desalination of sea

water, or generation of electricity from the atom, apart from anything

else, the contact it produced worldwide between east and west, between

north and south have been absolutely inestimable. And I don't think

under any single subject today which can attract the peers of science

as the Atoms for Peace conferences did in Geneva.

Interviewer:

DO YOU HAVE ANY STORIES ABOUT THE SOVIET SCIENTISTS THERE?

[END OF TAPE 009020]

Interviewer:

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU CAN ADD ABOUT PAKISTAN'S ROLE AT THOSE

CONFERENCES?

Usmani:

The role of Pakistan's delegation to the conferences, other than the

very first one in 1955, when the Atomic Energy Commission in Pakistan

was not even born, was to get as much information from the

international community as possible, to... the famous speech of

President Eisenhower, namely that electric, cheap electric power would

be around the corner. That was the main focus of our program... what we

could get hold of, was the opinion, enlightened opinion on that

subject, from our technical colleagues in different countries.

Interviewer:

IN THE COURSE OF TALKING TO PEOPLE ON THIS PROGRAM, THE SOVIETS SAY IT

WAS GOOD BECAUSE THEY WERE ABLE TO SHARE INFORMATION. THIS WAS RATHER

UNUSUAL, THE AMERICANS AND SOVIETS WORKING TOGETHER. CAN I ASK YOU

ABOUT THE INDIAN SCIENTISTS AT THIS PARTICULAR CONFERENCE?

Usmani:

Well, Homi Bhabha, I must say, emerged from the Geneva Conferences;

Homi Bhabha, you mean the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy

Commission, who was my contemporary, did emerge from these

conferences--

Interviewer:

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO SAY AGAIN, HOMI BHABHA AT THE BEGINNING?

Usmani:

Homi Bhabha was a very brilliant physicist who got his initial degree

from Cambridge in England, and was then appointed by Jawaharlal Nehru,

the Prime Minister of India, to be the chairman of the Indian Atomic

Energy Commission.

Interviewer:

LET ME INTERRUPT YOU THERE. WHAT DO REMEMBER ABOUT WHAT HE SAID AT THE

CONFERENCES?

Usmani:

At the conferences he emerged as the champion for nuclear electric

power for the developing countries. And had at that time the most

advanced program planned for the nuclear technology in India.

Interviewer:

MOVING ON NOW TO PROJECT PLOWSHARES. PAKISTAN'S VIEW OF PEACEFUL

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, IF THEY HAD A ROLE IN THESE EARLY DAYS.

Usmani:

None at all. Actually when we got the invitation to the Plowshares

experiments in the United States, where the underground explosions

were--

Interviewer:

LET ME REPHRASE IT THEN. WHY DID PAKISTAN NOT FEEL THAT PEACEFUL

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS HAD A ROLE? IF YOU COULD REMEMBER FROM JUST THAT

TIME.

Usmani:

What little we did read about the efficacy and the economics of using

nuclear explosions for digging canals, and deepening the harbors and so

on, didn't appeal to us to be a very worthwhile attempt to divert our

resources for that purpose. For one very simple reason: and I don't

know whether I was right or wrong at that time, for one very sample

reason that there must be some radioactive fallout to these explosions.

Interviewer:

VERY BRIEFLY... DID YOU THINK PAKISTAN COULD BENEFIT AT ALL FROM

PROJECT PLOWSHARES?

Usmani:

No. I didn't think at that time that Pakistan would benefit from the

Plowshares project at all. Partly because we were not familiar with the

technology involved; somebody brought a black box, magic box, and it

exploded, and that's it. So we were not participant in that design or

in the makeup or, of that explosion.

Interviewer:

HOW DID YOU VIEW THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE IAEA?

Usmani:

At the time I thought that IAEA... the charter of the IAEA at that

time, and I have speeches made before the board of governors as well as

the general conference of the IAEA, that the charter of the IAEA did

combine the functions of a witness and judge at the same time. It was a

beautiful idea to establish a UN organ for the promotion of nuclear

power, but in promoting the nuclear power it created lot of other

problems. And the same organization to look after those problems as

well as promotion appeared to me to be a little contradictory. I mean,

you have the safety problem, the safeguards problem, the diversion of

military... and they still say, "Go, go and use more and more nuclear

power." The two organizations should be totally independent in my

opinion. I felt it at that time and I still say that the charter of the

IAEA needs to be revised. It should be either an organization for the

promotion of nuclear power--and somebody should overlook the shoulders

of the IAEA as to what the promotion would lead to environmental

degradation or whatever other peaceful fallouts.

Interviewer:

HOW WAS THE IAEA SYSTEM APPLIED IN THE PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM?

Usmani:

Well, I think it is on record that we from Pakistan were the first

country ever to subject a nuclear power reactor to the IAEA safeguard

system. We believed in the international inspections, we believed in

the non-diversion of fissionable materials for military purposes was

wrong, and at that time IAEA was the only body for such safeguards. And

the only thing is that the, what I did not like was, and I must be very

frank here, was that the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy

Agency were not attracted at all to any nuclear facility unless the

member state concerned had approached the IAEA for assistance. In other

words, if you were to stand on your own, IAEA safeguards would not be

attracted at all. So all the advanced countries of Europe, for example,

Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden, if they had their reactors and they

had their reprocessing plant and if they had their fuel cycled... you

know, fuel fabrication plant and so on, they would not, and if they did

not choose to go to the IAEA for assistance, the IAEA safeguard would

not apply, which was very ridiculous, in my opinion.

Interviewer:

IN 1965, WHEN PAKISTAN CONTRACTED WITH CANADA FOR THE KANNUP REACTOR,

WERE YOU PART OF THAT NEGOTIATION?

Usmani:

I negotiated myself personally.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT?

Usmani:

Well, as I said from the word go, we were anxious to utilize nuclear

energy for production of electricity. Now nuclear energy comes from

either natural uranium, or artificially enriched uranium. Natural

uranium, as you know, has got only .7 percent of fissionable material,

and this can be enriched to 3.7 or 2.7 in reactors of the American

design. But the Canadian reactors use natural uranium, of which we had

the reserves.

Interviewer:

I'M MORE INTERESTED IN THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATION, THE HUMAN, THE

PERSONALITY SIDE OF IT.

Usmani:

Oh. Mr. Lorne Gray was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Limited of

Canada, and he and I had met several times in Vienna, which was the

Mecca of international atomic energy, if you will. We talked about the

possibility of Canada assisting us, and he encouraged me to come over

to Canada to see the systems and meet the scientists and so on. And

there I decided it would be in the interest of Pakistan, if it is going

to have a nuclear power program, to follow the Canadian example right

through. Canada, I think, is the only country in the world which can

make an atom bomb if they like, but they have not.

India's Nuclear Program

Interviewer:

AT THIS TIME, HOW DID YOU PERCEIVE THE INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, IN

THE EARLY '60S, WHEN YOU WERE CHAIRMAN?

Usmani:

Well, the atomic energy program of India also was... linked to the same

philosophy as that of Pakistan, namely to utilize the Canadian

experience of natural uranium, heavy-water types, rather than

light-water and enriched uranium, of the American type. And... I at one

time did mention even to my colleague from India, Dr. Homi Bhabha, that

we may have a get-together on the concepts of reactors and designs and

safety features which are peculiar to the environment of the

Subcontinent, and not to the environment of a cold country like Canada.

Unfortunately, it didn't turn out to be what I thought it could and

should have. And the design therefore of KANNUP is not a carbon copy of

the CANDU reactors in Canada, which was adopted by my colleagues in

India.

Interviewer:

AFTER THE CHINESE EXPLOSION IN '64, HOMI BHABHA ANNOUNCED THAT INDIA

COULD ALSO PRODUCE A NUCLEAR BOMB WITHIN 18 MONTHS. HOW SERIOUSLY DID

PAKISTAN ASSESS THIS POSSIBILITY?

Usmani:

Well we knew that the Indians had set up a plutonium plant, but I

didn't give any credibility to that statement of Homi Bhabha at all,

because India did not have a reactor of her own from where it could get

the plutonium to do the explosion. I did not doubt the capacity of the

Indians to make the bomb, provided they had the material. Now it is

very sad that the so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion which India did

stage, in 1974 I believe--wasn't it?

Interviewer:

YES, I WAS COMING TO THAT A LITTLE LATER. LET'S JUST GO HISTORICALLY

THROUGH. THIS MAY BE MORE OF A POLITICAL QUESTION, BUT HOW DID THE

INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF '65 INFLUENCE THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM? DO YOU HAVE ANY

IDEA AT ALL?

Usmani:

No.

Interviewer:

BEFORE WE GET TO THE INDIAN EXPLOSION THERE'S THE NON-PROLIFERATION

TREATY, AND I WONDER IF YOU FELT THAT YOU COULD COMMENT OF PAKISTAN'S

DECISION NOT TO SIGN?

Usmani:

I think Pakistan effectively signed the treaty in the sense that it

subjected it's only power reactor to IAEA safeguards, which were a part

of the treaty, as you know. The IAEA was asked to monitor the nuclear

facilities in the developing and other countries, but the thing that

particularly worried me at that time was the inability of the two other

nuclear powers, namely France and China, not having signed the treaty

so far. Why is the world so anxious that the developing countries sign,

and not these two giants like China and France? Why? It's a truncated

treaty.

Interviewer:

AFTER THE SIGNING AND BEFORE THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, YOU WERE CONCERNED

ABOUT INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND I BELIEVE YOU TALKED TO PRIME

MINISTER TRUDEAU ON A VISIT. I WONDER WHAT YOUR RECOLLECTIONS WERE OF

THAT VISIT?

Usmani:

My recollections are very clear in my mind. I said in my welcoming

speech--to lunch, which was very informal--to Prime Minister Trudeau

that nuclear energy has been invented, we can not dis-invent it. We

have to learn to live with it. There are two doors to the same room;

one door has a very clear sign, "Death and Destruction," the other is,

"Unlimited Prosperity." The key to the door is in the hands not of the

scientist, but the statesman, like Trudeau. That's all. You can open

any door you like.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION WHEN THE INDIANS DID HAVE THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR

TEST?

Usmani:

Sheer disgust. Because if that explosion was supposed to demonstrate

that 10-12 kilos of plutonium will explode, that was unnecessary. It

will explode, everyone knew it. You can read it in the textbooks, even

a high school student at Princeton could write the equations which

would be responsible for an explosion. And what did India achieve by

it? I should have thought that the country which owes its independence

to the philosophy of non-violence would come forward as a leader of the

developing countries and show that nuclear power for peaceful purposes

was more important than a tiny explosion of 10-12 kilos of plutonium. I

think it caused a great setback to the peaceful use of nuclear energy

in the Third World, I really do.

Similarities in Creating Nuclear Energy and Weapons

Interviewer:

THAT BRINGS ME TO THE POINT THAT THE TECHNOLOGY IS THE SAME RIGHT? CAN

YOU JUST DESCRIBE THAT FOR SOMEBODY WHO HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF SCIENCE?

Usmani:

Well, there are two very positive routes to the fission phenomenon. One

is the fission of uranium-235, it's an isotope of uranium which is

split under the bombardment of slow neutrons. Now it so happens that

all materials, or all elements, after uranium like plutonium for

example, is not 93, but 94, and it's a very stable element in the sense

that its half-life is 24,000 years. So you can play about with

plutonium; it won't disappear, sort of thing. So from 92 uranium, you

go to 93 for a very short time, and then get down to 94, solid, stable.

And the beauty about the 239, the discovery of my friend Dr. Seaborg,

of the United States, is that when it absorbs a neutron, like 235 and

fissions, it also gives rise and birth to two or three other neutrons,

which can trigger the same fission reaction in other atoms and so on,

and you get what you call a chain reaction. In other words, uranium-235

and plutonium-239 are the only two elements known to man so far which

not only split in fission, but are in a position to sustain a chain

reaction. Which made the reactors possible, which made the atom bomb

possible, and so on. Now you can, you can fission any atom, the nucleus

of any atom will fission, but it will not be sustained chain reaction.

And for the chain reaction, you need a critical minimum mass. The first

atomic bomb, that was dropped on first at Hiroshima and then at

Nagasaki during the war, by the Americans, incidentally the Americans

had only four bombs at that time, one they tested in New Mexico, two

they dropped on Japan, and they had a fourth one. Which caused all

the...

Interviewer:

THE TECHNOLOGY IS THE SAME...JUST A LITTLE SIMPLER, A LITTLE MORE

CONCISELY.

Usmani:

I'm not going into the details, but let me tell you that there is a

minimum mass which is required for explosion. Less than that it won't

explode, and above that, it, it will not go, it will automatically

explode. So, 10-12 kilograms is normally assumed to be the minimum

weight of plutonium, if you can get hold of 239-plutonium, or pure 235,

about 10-12 kilos. So what they do in a bomb is, that they... put six

kilograms on one side, and six kilograms on the other. Now, these are

sub-critical masses; they won't explode by themselves. There is a lead

window in the bomb, there is a lead window--which I'm describing it

very very, uh, outlines of a bomb. The bomb has the same casing, the

same mechanism, as you have in a conventional bomb, which is dropped

from the air, except that it has a lead window; we have two halves of

the so-called atom bomb... on either side of the window, and as soon as

the window is, as soon as the... the plane that is due to drop that

bomb, is on the target, the window is lifted, and the first half, of

six kilograms, rolls over into the compartment of the second half, and

the two together become 12. And the 12 is critical and they go. Why?

Because there is... a neutron source placed under them, which is

emitting neutrons, so you have a neutron source, two parts of the 239,

or 235, whichever it is. And they roll over, they come to a critical

mass and explode over the target. Now, in a reactor, this is not the

case. The two halves have to be 98 to 99 percent pure uranium or pure

plutonium; the reactor can live, and reactor is not a bomb. It's a

controlled fission reaction; 10 kilowatts, 50 kilowatts, 100 megawatts,

200 megawatts, 1,000 megawatts, we control the genie that is liberated

at any level by poisoning the fission, not encouraging the fission, but

poisoning the fission. So you add a certain poison in the reactor,

which inhibits the fission reaction, to a point which we would like to

have, namely, 10 megawatts, 100 megawatts, 1,000 megawatts; as the case

may be, the size of the reactor. So it is called a reactor, because

there is a reaction, which is controlled. In the case of the bomb,

which is a simpler mechanism, there is no control; the more energy

liberated, the better it is. So that is the difference.

[END OF TAPE 009021]

Interviewer:

COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME THE DIFFERENCE IN TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN THE

WEAPONS PROGRAM AND THE CIVILIAN PROGRAM?

Usmani:

Well, once it was established that a fissionable material, whether it

be plutonium, which is the by-product of the fission of 235, of

uranium, or pure uranium-235 by itself, once it was proven that 10-12

kilograms of either material can, is the critical mass, which you must

have if you wish to have a bomb, the, the question which scientists

like myself, who were more keen to find the peaceful uses of this

enormous liberation of energy, applied their minds to controlling the

liberation of energy, so the bomb was born under the stress and duress

of the war, and nobody wanted to control the liberation of energy; in

fact, the more the explosion, the better it was. But there were certain

conscientious objectors, like myself, if I may say so, who began to

wonder whether this enormous source of energy could be harnessed by

controlling the liberation of that energy at any level that we like. So

came the concept of the reactor, and the difference in the reactor and

the bomb is that although bomb is an uninhibited and uncontrolled

liberation of energy, the liberation of fission energy in the reactor

is very much controlled. Now there are two mechanisms, and two, um, uh,

disciplines involved in controlling that energy, which are not involved

in the bomb, and that is the difference between the two. One is that

you don't have to start with 100 percent-pure 235, or 100 percent-pure

239 plutonium. You can live with a lesser percentage, because it was

found that man does not have any access to materials which would be

able to withstand the tremendous heat that is generated from the

liberation of this energy. So the first thing they did was, and even

now--

Interviewer:

WE'RE GETTING A BIT LONG AGAIN. THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE MATERIALS ARE

THE SAME...

Usmani:

The technology and the materials are the same, one is uninhibited,

uncontrolled, in the case of the bomb. In the case of the reactor, it

has to be controlled, so two things have been done: one is to control

that reaction, in the reactor, you start with three percent purity, and

not 98 to 99 percent purity, number one. And number two, the liberation

of energy is poisoned by mechanisms which can control the level of

liberation. We would like only so much of energy to be liberated, so

what you do is to kill that reaction, partially, by injecting some

material into the body of uranium, rods or whatever you like to call it

in the reactor, the boron and other material, that inhibit the reaction

itself. They don't smother the reaction completely, but they inhibit to

the point that man can say, "Oh, now I know how much poison is to be

given to this three percent uranium, in order to get 10 megawatt or a

100 megawatt, a 1,000 megawatt, as the case may be."

Interviewer:

SO JUST BRIEFLY NOW, HOW DO YOU BUILD A BOMB, AS OPPOSED TO THE

REACTOR. WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

Usmani:

This is a very... difficult question to answer, but the bomb is built

entirely by the chemists, who are called upon to separate a chemical

called uranium from its other impurities, et cetera, number one. Now,

uranium, in nature, exists in a mixed form, which has got a "fat

brother," as if it were, weighing 238 units of weight in an atom in

protons, neutrons, or whatever... Well, briefly, I can't... see how.

But, the point I'm making is that it is impossible to separate 235 from

238 by pure chemical means. It's impossible. Therefore, physical means

have to be done, have to be adopted, and the physical means are that we

convert this...uranium-238 and 235 mixture, into a gas. And pump this

gas through very fine membranes so that the "fat" 238 remains on this

side, and the on other side 235 comes out. And like that we go on

pumping this gas... a million times, perhaps, in order to get no 238

going through those holes. I mean, the technology of the membrane is

the technology of the secrets of the atom bomb. Which is called the

diffusion process. So today the diffusion process is the only process

which gets the main, pure 235 at the end of the tunnel, which is about

two miles long, and requires as much electricity to pump it... as the

total generating capacity of the whole of Pakistan. So only a big

country like the Soviet Union, the United States, and very advanced

countries like United Kingdom or France could do it.

Nuclear Proliferation

Interviewer:

GOLDSCHMIDT SAID, "IF YOU WANT TO BE SOMEBODY IN THIS WORLD, YOU HAD TO

HAVE A BOMB." WOULD YOU AGREE WITH IT?

Usmani:

I totally disagree with Bertrand, and we had many discussions on the

subject. I totally disagree that the only way to get your goal is... of

prestige or whatever it is, I'm, and your... is to get the bomb. I

think Canada, is as advanced as, as France; France has the bomb, Canada

does not have. Japan today is the richest nation in the world, next to

the United States, in terms of GNP. She has all the nuclear power, but

no nuclear bomb. China, on the other hand, is one of the poorest

countries, as far as per capita GNP. She has the bomb, but no nuclear

power. So all sorts of combinations are possible; I don't think

Goldschmidt can say that unless you have bomb you will not be regarded

as something; in my opinion it is absurd. Germany has no bomb, but she

is one of the most economically... most prosperous; they have won the,

both Japan and Germany have won the peace and lost the war.

Interviewer:

AT THE PRESENT TIME, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS SOMETHING OF A

BACK-BURNER ISSUE, AND I WONDER HOW YOU SEE THE FUTURE.

Usmani:

Well, the non-proliferation is, started with politics, with questions

of sovereignty, with questions of discrimination, with questions of

technology, with questions of espionage, and all sorts of things. And I

don't know which aspect you are talking about, but the fact of the

matter remains, that if five nuclear weapon states of today cannot

agree among themselves to sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, just

as France and China have not signed out of five, two have not signed.

Imagine fifty countries having nuclear weapons: would they sign? So...

proliferation of weapons is something to be condemned all around, no

question about it. Whichever treaty you consider in future must provide

for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. There's no question about

it in my mind. And all the technology that goes, and all the funding

that goes, should be diverted to peaceful uses of doing research, and

the waste-disposal research on safety, because as I said, we have to

live with nuclear power, just as we live with electricity, if you put

your finger in the plug you will die instantly! Immediately

electrocuted! So, it is a very unforgiving technology. If you make a

mistake you get Chernobyl or Three Mile Island. And many people think

that aircraft and... for example, or... flying in the air, is also a

very unforgiving technology, it is. If you make a mistake, well, the

plane comes down, that's it. And the whole jumble, 300 people die. But

in the case of a nuclear reactor, like Chernobyl or Three Mile Island,

it is often a case of an unforgiving technology, as I call it, in the

sense that by mistake, or sabotage, or war, or whatever, the reactor

goes wild. Due to human error or whatever it may be. The aftereffects

of going wild are not confined to the occupants of the plane and the

operatives of the reactor; it just goes wild in a big way. The entire

populations are affected, and slow radiation can cause a lot of cancer

deaths and so on.

Later Career

Interviewer:

ANOTHER QUESTION I WANT TO REPEAT...HOW YOU CAME TO BE APPOINTED

CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION?

Usmani:

I was in the civil service of India... I was identified by President

Ayub Khan who took over in 1958, and he said, "If you are a Ph.D. in

physics and a civil servant, why don't you take over the nuclear

power--I mean Atomic Energy Commission--chairmanship?" So I first was

appointed as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, and then 1959 I

was appointed--1960 I was appointed the chairman. I was a civil

servant, knew the rules and regulations and procedures, but what I did

was, and I told president Ayub Khan that an atomic energy program is

not a biblical or koranic injunction for Pakistan to follow, unless it

had a focus, and that focus was nuclear electric power. And he agreed.

I said we must train our people. How to train? Well we get the

reactor...and forward. But the focus was nuclear power, electric power.

Interviewer:

WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO LEAVE PAKISTAN?

Interviewer:

I decided to leave--without saying too much about a dead man--because

late prime minister Bhutto and I developed some serious differences of

opinion on the direction the nuclear power program should take in

Pakistan. I thought that Pakistan was too poor a country, in fact it

still is the poorest of the 34 countries of the world, including India,

Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Bhutan, you know, the World Bank has got

some criteria of judging the poverty or prosperity of a country. So we

belonged to the league of the 34 poorest countries of the world, and I

genuinely was, and genuinely now, feel that the poverty can only be

resolved by having abundant and cheap electricity. If nuclear power can

do it, fine. If hydrogen power can give it, excellent. If solar energy

can give it, all the better. But we must have energy to accelerate the

process of socioeconomic development. Now, this was my idea as to why

we started a research reactor, followed by a power reactor, and more

and bigger power reactors, and so on. The late prime minister probably

had some other ideas. That's all. And because we didn't tally, and

didn't consider this to be a worldwide effort, I thought I had done my

job, and 11 years was quite a long time as the chairman of the Atomic

Energy Commission of Pakistan, I developed some very wonderful contacts

with friendly scientists in the Soviet Union as well as in, in the West

and so on, and I thought it was time to go, and quit. Fortunately for

me, the oil crisis came, and I got a job in the United Nations.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE ANY PARTICULAR EVENT, ANY TURNING POINT? PEOPLE ALWAYS TALK

ABOUT THIS FAMOUS MULTAN MEETING.

Usmani:

The Multan Meeting has been made a big...step in that direction. I

don't think the Multan Meeting has any significance at all, except that

it gives an inkling of the working of the mind of the late prime

minister, who had already decided to replace me. For reasons I don't

want to disclose, nor do I wish to discuss. But the fact of the matter

is, that he had made up his mind, the Multan Conference was just a

carnival show in which he was doling out jobs to this man, that man. I

was not interested, I had made up my mind to quit in any case.

Difficulty in Creating Nuclear Bomb

Interviewer:

I HAVE ANOTHER GENERAL, POLITICAL-TYPE QUESTION. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU

AGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT IF A COUNTRY IS GOING TO DEVELOP A BOMB, IT

WILL DO SO ANYWAY?

Usmani:

It's not so easy. I would like to give my very candid opinion that

there seems to be a lobby somewhere which goes on whipping up this

euphoria about the bomb--Israel getting the bomb! Pakistan getting the

bomb! India getting the bomb! All of the developing countries not

signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty! I think at the back of their mind

is that they want to make the bomb!--and so on. But I as a technologist

tell you, madam, that all this is an illusion of knowledge, rather than

knowledge itself. It is not easy to make the bomb! You have to have a

very sophisticated chemical and metallurgical infrastructure first in

the country before you begin to think of being a nuclear power. Now to

smuggle a bomb, or to make do and make a jigsaw puzzle and say, "here

is the bomb," et cetera, would court in my opinion--would invite

disaster. Because you cannot sustain the make up. You don't have the

hydrofluoric acid, you don't have certain metallurgical components, you

don't have certain electrical gadgetry and oscilloscopes and so

on--denied to you. You can be made to come to an absolute horror; and

it will be disastrous.

Interviewer:

STOP THERE...OKAY.

Usmani:

In support of my thesis, it is not easy to make the bomb... It is not

easy to make the bomb. In the true sense of self-reliance, I mean, if

you make one bomb, you should be able to make two or three, et cetera,

as the case may be. But if you wish to smuggle the bomb, supposing I

give you the drawings of a Boeing aircraft. Now does it mean that you

can make a Boeing aircraft, without the metallurgical parts of the

aircraft and the jet-engine theory of propulsion, et cetera? I mean,

you can assemble an aircraft just as a little child does assemble

something, but it would be very risky to assemble and not be able to

sustain it.

Interviewer:

BUT SO MANY COUNTRIES HAVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE NOW.

Usmani:

No, none. If that was so, it would not take 40 years -- when did the

war end? 1945? Well, now we are 40, 40, 41 years.

Interviewer:

LET'S JUST REPEAT THAT. SO MANY COUNTRIES HAVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE, EVEN

A COUNTRY LIKE BRAZIL HAS THE WEST GERMAN...

Usmani:

You see, no, no, this is what I am trying to say. To have a nuclear

power reactor, or a nuclear electric power program, does not mean that

that country which has a nuclear power reactor automatically becomes a

candidate for a nuclear bomb. I oppose this concept, right on the basis

of technology, on the basis of actual conditions prevailing and so on,

for the simple reason I give you, one simple reason. And that is, that

if you have a reactor, the power reactor, it doesn't mean that you

automatically become a nuclear power. Now Brazil has a power reactor,

Pakistan has a power reactor, India has a power reactor, and so on...

Korea, or Taiwan, or... you know, there are so many countries and there

will be more and more proliferation, if you like to call it, of nuclear

power facilities. But that doesn't mean that these countries will

become automatically a nuclear power, and I think that lobby must be

defused. And I know there is a very strong lobby in Washington that

thinks on those lines. I think it would be a great harm to the Third

World, which is starved for electric power, and if it can get nuclear

power, cheap, of course, and economical enough, only on the grounds

that if you give the reactor, my God, doesn't become another...

additional candidate for a nuclear bomb, not at all. And the reason I

say so is that a power reactor boils like the milk on a fire. If I tell

you I want the cream in the morning for my breakfast, you have to put

this milk on very slow fire. If you make that milk boil on very hot

fire, you will not get cream but you'll get some sort of a mud of milk,

which we call rubbery. Now there's a difference between rubbery and

that mud of milk and pure cream. So that, in case you wish to go the

nuclear bomb route, you have to penalize your reactor and not produce

electric power. And work it very slowly. It will burn. You can regulate

a 1,000 megawatt reactor to operate on 10 megawatts, and slow burning

is possible, but it is slow burning that generates plutonium-239. If

you boil it too much, it will turn into 240, 241, 242,--

[END OF TAPE 009022]

Usmani:

...that a country doesn't automatically become a potential candidate

for a nuclear bomb for the simple reason that nuclear power, in the

form of electricity, is generated by burning the fuel inside the

reactor at a very high rate.

Interviewer:

GIVE ME THE EXAMPLE OF INDIA. WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED WITH INDIA?

Usmani:

With India... what happened was, they did not utilize the plutonium

from their power reactor, but from the research reactor, which they

could burn at any level that they want, and that research reactor was

supplied by Canada. It's an ideal tool for the production of that cream

of milk at slow fire which I was talking to you about.

Interviewer:

COULD YOU JUST SAY THAT IT WAS A RESULT OF A VIOLATION?

Usmani:

Oh, yes, absolutely, and that is why all the supplies from Canada were

cut off. In fact, Lorne, Mr. Lorne Gray, the chairman of the Canadian

Atomic Energy Authority, of... Atomic Energy Company of Canada, I

said... "You have given--

Interviewer:

IF YOU CAN EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED IN THE INDIAN CASE.

Usmani:

The Indian explosion was due to the utilization of plutonium from a

Canadian safeguarded reactor, which was given to India by Canada under

the Columbo Plan for all Asian countries, in that I could send my boys

for training to India, on the Canadian-Indian, uh, uh, the

Canadian-India reactor. It was a research reactor, and because it was a

research reactor, it could operate on a very slow fire. Not a power

reactor. And slow fire means cream, and the cream means 239, and 239

means... the bomb...

Interviewer:

IT SOUNDS TO ME LIKE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS IT'S A POLITICAL DECISION IN

THE END. WOULD YOU AGREE?

Usmani:

Absolutely, absolutely.

Interviewer:

WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON THAT.

Usmani:

It is a political decision; it is something like holding a cut-throat

razor in your hand. If you have vertical strokes, you shave the beard.

If you have horizontal strokes, you know what happens.

Nuclear Cooperation of Asian Countries

Interviewer:

THE FUTURE OF SOUTH ASIA, HOW DO YOU SEE IT AT THIS TIME, IN TERMS OF

NUCLEAR...?

Usmani:

I have very strong views of that subject, personal views, and I think

the leadership should come from India being a bigger country, for the

formation and constitution and establishment of what I call Asiatom. On

the model of Euratom. The European countries have together combined

their research, as well as their utilization of atomic energy, through

the medium of Euratom...

Interviewer:

(QUESTION REPEATED)

Usmani:

The future of India, Pakistan, or for that matter China, Japan, Korea,

Taiwan, Philippines, all those developing countries of Asia, the huge

continent, in my opinion is inextricably bound in the future to the

development of an organizational international or multinational

organizational effort to the... establishment of what I called Asiatom.

The purpose of this would be: (a), to have common reprocessing

facilities; (b), to act as a nuclear-fuel bank. Do you want nuclear

power? Well, here is the fuel, at a certain market price, or whatever

it is and once the fuel is burned in the reactor, containing plutonium,

it comes back. And we may have a common reprocessing facility on an

island in the Pacific or somewhere uninhabited, many of these atolls

were used by America and other countries for bomb explosions and

testing of bombs, et cetera. We from the Asiatom could use a Pacific

island to bury all the radioactive waste to reprocess the plant for the

benefit of all the countries of Asia.

Interviewer:

SO YOU DON'T SEE IT AS A CHAIN REACTION -- INDIA, PAKISTAN, PAKISTAN,

INDIA?

Usmani:

No, Not at all. I think... I would like to quote to you from a Chinese

proverb, which is that "the taller the bamboo is, the lower it can

bend." And I think India and China are two very big countries of Asia;

one is a nuclear power, the other is a PNE power, peaceful nuclear

explosion power, and these two countries must take the initiative, of

establishing an international regime which would include

nuclear-weapon-free zones, which would include common reprocessing

facilities, in other words, something which I can have the satisfaction

that I'm not being cheated and my security is not being jeopardized by

some clandestine action taking place across the border, et cetera: it

breeds suspicion for nothing. So if I can oversee the shoulders of

India, the Indians can oversee the shoulders of Pakistan, Pakistan over

Japan, Japan over Korea, Korea over China, et cetera, I think it would

lead, in my humble opinion, to the establishment of something which is

required in Asia, namely nuclear electric power, without unnecessarily

giving room to this national slogan-mongering or prestigious statements

about bomb-making and so on so forth, in my opinion. This is what I

feel. Thank you.

[END OF TAPE 009023 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Ishrat Husain Usmani, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-g15t727k20

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-g15t727k20).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Usmani, Ishrat Husain, 1917-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 1fd5cce818733196794396b2b6e017b9dfd4db82 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Ishrat Husain Usmani, 1986,” 1986-12-15, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed October 2, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-g15t727k20.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Ishrat Husain Usmani, 1986.” 1986-12-15. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. October 2, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-g15t727k20>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Ishrat Husain Usmani, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-g15t727k20