Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Henry Cabot Lodge, 1979 [Part 4 of 5]

Cigarettes all the time. Could you imagine oh yeah he was a chain smoker. Yeah but he didn't call them down he just liked to put them out and ready. I just want to go back Mr. Ambassador and ask you about these meetings that you had with the president. What was it like sitting there with him. He had this office where he received foreign visitors. He had a big table with a TV set on it and you had a big chair and a table difference between the two tables was rather important because the TV in front of me contained a diuretic which created that thing which nobody else can do for you. I gather his tea was not the same kind of that I had.

So he sat there chain smoking cigarettes one right after I sat with a growing on me. Finally I had to leave. I never took another cup of tea in his palace again. And what about his smoking I wish you could describe that well he'd light a cigarette and take one of them and put it down he kept doing that all the time so he must of he MUST way he must. I want to raise the name of another Vietnamese that that you met during this period. You remember when the Buddhist leader took tree Quand took asylum in the American embassy and you get to know him during that period. Oh yes and became friends. That you brought up

with Ana and an English translation. I should like to present you with a small Buddhist statue which according to traditional symbolism represents the spirit of self. Tell them that comes from doing good deeds in light of your deeds here in Vietnam. You are most content on behalf not only of myself but also some 10 million countryman who have benefited from your actions during your stay here. I thank you and wish you and your wife happiness. What kind of a person with what kind of impression did he make. He was a very clever determined energetic man. He detested what GM was doing.

He was very suspicious by nature. And he wrote me a letter and then he turned on me later when I came back from my second tour because according to the Chinese they believe that if you have been associated together difficult enterprise the way one of them will get it. He wanted me to get one I said well I can't possibly overthrow and I haven't got

that far and I haven't got the instruction. And he took a great dislike to me when I left. I never saw him. You didn't get another Buddha the second time. I didn't get another time. I see that I'm honest. Here I really disagree because the cost to me is an American. A government official. The idea that I can go around throwing people over people was absolutely preposterous. Let me ask you one thing about it. You could take him and you talk to him at some length. And this was during a period when the Buddhists were very much in agitation and ferment against this young government. Did he strike you as more of a religious man or more

of a poor politician. How would you describe him. Oh he was both. We've seen that. Could you elaborate a little on that. He he he was very much interested in politics and very much interested in the Buddhist religion. They're all together as far as it was going to go. But did you consider that he had a good deal of political savvy that he was smart politically. But the Buddhist organization was not very moderate. And he couldn't he couldn't do all the things he wanted to do. Let me touch on another point about about this period. You remember the the Polish representative of the International Control Commission is a man by the name

of Minelli this time. Oh yes. Yeah that's right. I hardly knew him. But we know now that he was talking to the French ambassador Roger about the possibility of a deal between Saigon and Hanoi and they got new interested in this. Manelli said that the Communists were interested in making a deal and you seem to express an interest. Did you know about this at the time. Because a lot of what left three or four days after a rug but Nellie has said and he has written I think I may have just met a very casually and informally somewhere but I never knew him I got to know a successful 11. school that's later yes. Later I got a marigold I know him very well. But let me just go back on this point. Did you have any hints at the time that the brother knew and maybe even

being under pressure from the United States might event obtain the idea of some kind of a deal with the North. Thought about it. And it might have something might have been worked out I suppose. All things are worth remembering and following up on. Well let's. But I never knew. To me it was just a room without without any basis. I never saw a piece of paper that I never saw never heard of anything. But let me just put it to you that Nellie has said and has described in some detail these contacts although they didn't go very far. But let's go back and speculate in retrospect do you think we would have been much better better off in the end if some deal had been a between South and North. It could have been made well through.

Through most of Vietnamese history the north and the South have not been united in eighteen hundred two was the first time that North and South Vietnam were put together and that was with the help with the help of the French under the Emperor drawn most of the time. As far as I can read history there was the North which was ton tonking Tonkin was the north and was the middle of Cochin-China was the bottom. That's the way it was. Most of the time. Let me raise another incident that happened about this time. You know early September. You remember President Kennedy sent General cruel act and Joseph Mendenhall to Vietnam and they returned with contradictory opinions.

You remember what the president said that have you over the same code. I wonder if you could repeat that. I wasn't anyway. I was well I was in Saigon when Mendenhall cruel garage. But this story about President Kennedy saying if you remember live the same country that was something I heard later and I was in Washington right now I hardly ever was in one. But in retrospect looking back the debt the idea that the president sent these two men to to to assess the situation as later he would send Maxwell Taylor and McNamara did this give you the impression that the president was still undecided about what to do about Vietnam. Did you get the impression he was looking for some kind of a policy. Yes I think he was I think of I think it's very normal for a president when he's got a very very tough complicated problem.

Always to look keep on looking into sci fi get some kind of a solution. It's better than the one trying to get in. Yes I think if he was looking at I think it is understandable that he should constantly have an open mind and listen to any new ideas that might come to him. Well what was the purpose in your recollection. The purpose of the mission of McNamara and Taylor later in September what. Why did they come out to get your number to go to him. He had a secretary of defense. He was interested in things particular perfectly willing to be very active in Vietnam. I think here now you remember

that. I mean was there do you think that sending McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam had anything to do with differences on policy between state and defense or between you and Harkins. I don't think so I think. I think all of that. We did. There was that unfortunate misunderstanding with General Harkins which really was with my flow. Because of that I was instructed not to tell him these secrets. Well when McNamara and Taylor when their mission ended they wrote a report in which they said that the military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. Do you agree with that conclusion.

In September of 1963. Well no it was the Vietnamese military. They said they wrote it. They wrote a report in which they said the American military at that time were involved. Yeah ok the Vietnamese military they wrote the report and said the military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. Now would you agree that that was a fair assessment that we were making that the Vietnamese were making progress militarily from what I would be inclined to do because you later wrote in a message to McGeorge Bundy that no successor government could bungle the war as badly as Yemen that I think you thought the GM was doing a bad job. You my but they also after their mission announced the decision to withdraw a thousand American advisors before the end of the year. What was the point of that.

But I never heard of a thousand American advisors were withdrawn. No they announced the plan to withdraw a thousand American advisors who did not the McNamara Taylor or the president did after they returned. You know none of them forgot about that. Let me go back into the point that you raised earlier about the economic sanctions against this young government. You recommended that the commercial that 18 million dollars of the commercial import program be deferred and it was in fact deferred. Could you explain how this aid program worked. What was the commercial import program we program. Web. Wide variety agricultural implements a

wide variety of useful thing from a popular program country where I was when I started thinking about it. I shiver at the thought of what it would mean. If this program ended when I had in mind did not involve ending the program with a few items just enough to worry them. And what was the purpose of suspending the purpose of spending. It was to get away. The first time I started cutting down on the export of

the import. I got a call from the Department of Agriculture. I refused to receive him. So he went to my sister and my assistant to something like this. Why prime minister Mr. Yam talked to me like that and finally the last light of his life when we were sitting in front of an open fire incidentally. That's what he said. Oh by the way he said I've changed my mind about commercial programs and we'll talk about it and I have written. I have

it here today. I had written a letter. Published in the preface to why I was resuming commercial imports. We were like two boys on bicycles playing chicken and he gave way. But you say that the purpose of suspending the program was to put pressure on GM. Yeah but it also was interpreted at the time as a green light to the general. Well I don't I don't go with what I said that may not been your purpose but would you acknowledge that they interpret it that way. No they didn't and I don't think they did interpret it that way because of a general trend in general. I used to see them all the time. They couldn't possibly have been under any kind of a doubt as to what I was doing when I told them what to do.

Now on October 5th President Kennedy sent you a message saying that no initiative no initiative should now be taken to give any covert encouragement to a coup but efforts should be made to would benefit by possible alternative leadership. What did that mean. What was your understand where we are to make a survey of a country and see if some prospects of ability. So you weren't in there was general. Q who later became for many years. He was the one who organized the coup against General General live. There was a little there was a list of rules that were

generally considered to be above average ability. Now you also asked following that message you told Kony CIA man to tell the generals the United States will not forward a coup according to the records and Washington also told you according to the records that the United States should not thwart a coup if it offers a prospect of a more effective fight against the Congress. So in a sense do you think the president the stage was beginning to come around to the idea that maybe a coup might be necessary if it improve the chances of fighting against the common. That's all I know was long before I did. You know I I couldn't know all of the presidents in a most blogs.