War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Roger Sherfield, 1986 [3]

Know Sheffield What was your reaction to Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program at the UN in 1953. Well it was a favorable reaction. It was a it was a quite an important change of policy from the complete secrecy in which atomic energy matters had been held up till that time to up to a different policy of informing the world about the peaceful uses and the peaceful possibilities of the application of atomic energy. Was there a feeling that the British were suddenly being drawn in again. Having gone through this rather difficult period with the Americans. Well of course that the Atoms for Peace program was really had very little to do with the exchange of information which was basically military information between the two governments and not only military information but also technological information over the what was what was put out was fairly

elementary stuff. Well Bertrand Goldsmith called this a nuclear Renascence out of the nuclear Middle Ages. Would you agree with him on that and your Ketterer Nestles. Yes I do. I can see what he means I would agree with him I think that that it was a it was it was an attempt to educate inform the was a world population what the implications were for peaceful abuses of this new force did access the peace and seem to have any political goals at the time. No I don't think so. I suppose it was an attempt I suppose the United States government and the president felt that it would. Redound to the credit of the United States that. They had made this move to

inform the world and to. Us was obviously regarded as it wouldn't create a benefit. And look who has a good opinion of the other of what after all has been a rather frightening episode in the history of mankind. What was your reaction to the establishment of an eye say to promote nuclear development and also to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Did you have a positive reaction to it. Well I think there was a. The British government was one of the founding members and obviously I think was very much in favor of the of the of the of the foundation of the of the of the IAEA. We certainly played a very large part in its day in its deliberations in the early stages I used to go. At least

once a week or so and. Attend the discussions and meet all with all my colleagues from all over the world. We were very much in favor of it. Did you also attend the Geneva conferences. Did you also attend any of the. I did not. No I was I was doing other things at that time. Do you remember any other any stories you can remember from the from the actual i days that you when you visited. Can you remember any stories about Palestine if in fact the scientists from other countries are a diplomat. Well I am. I made a speech on one year which was rather critical of certain aspects of Russian policy Soviet policy and the Soviet delegate Emily ON-OFF got up and made a violent attack on me in day.

In day. In the in the open debate in wardship he accused me not directly of murdering his brother in Baku in 1990. Now there is apparently a very violent attack but I met him at lunch immediately afterwards and he couldnt have been more charming. I was just a little bit of little bit of propaganda be on the part of this whole period of atoms for peace. The I say the Geneva conference is nuclear cooperation I think we're in this period. Which countries did Britain this. Which countries did Britain give technical assistance to in these early days. Well we've we have of course had close links with France

and Belgium and Holland and Denmark Norway and of course for the Commonwealth countries. We were of course Canada was a was a was a partner and not a signature but still a partner in the in the Quebec agreement and in the combined policy committee which. Was set up during the war and we were of course. Quite close to. The. Two the Australians who were very anxious for information. And South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth at that time and India and Pakistan. We we had close relations in the atomic field with all of them but of course we could only. Pass to them the

information which had been declassified. And so there were a number of discussions with the with the United States at that time. Seeking to declassify. A whole lot of information which had been secret but which was really not secret and it was on the basis of that the classified information that we. We. We talked to and the negotiating with these and many countries we just over and the technical assistance to the Commonwealth. What kind of technical assistance did you give Did Britain gave to the Commonwealth countries if they can just get over that one point. Well I think we gave them the information which they asked for. And so far as we could and I don't know whether that was a formal agreement. I very much doubt that all those other nations were fairly

informal. The Australians were particularly anxious to get information about nuclear power and nuclear power reactors and we were eventually able to satisfy them I think but to this day they haven't yet built a nuclear power station. So it was it was. The curiosity. It was not followed up by action. Can you remember anything about the early Indian program and how it can help the the Indian program along. Well I was actually present at the opening of the Indian We're coming to the other side before the. Well. I don't I don't think we we were very interested in in collaboration with the Indians on account of thorium because they thought at that time that thorium might be a very important constituent

didn't or reactor fuel and other a great deal of Toryism comes from inside India. So we were anxious we were anxious to show that we could get supplies and sort of move from the from the Indians and that was a very close relationship between Holmey Bob Carr who was the very remarkable and brilliant head of the of the atomic energy. I was in India and he was a fellow of the Royal Society and had was it was a close friend and associate of Sejong Cockroft. James Chadwick and all our. Great Atomic Scientists. So that was a very close friendship and relationship between them. And I no doubt I'd read didn't have as far as I remember any formal arrangement but I've no doubt that they have been helped in many ways by giving him information and

advice again. Oh OK. OK. Let's just go over that because that was just in the middle there what happened the telephone just a little. And let me just go over the end of that. Yeah. How much scientific exchange of information was there between India and Africa. Well I don't think we had a formal agreement with the Indians but Bob Barr who was the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Project. And was a very remarkable and brilliant scientist was a fellow of the Royal Society in London. And so he was an intimate friend of our own physicists and I've no doubt that they gave him all the information he wanted which they could give. And we were also interested in in getting saurian from

from India that time Toryism was thought to be. Might be an important material for nuclear fuel and there are large deposits of sodium in size in the community about the Apsara research reactor. I think that can help build the AppStore. Yes when I saw it. Oh ok. Like that. But I can't remember that I can't remember the details of it. Brazil was a small research reactor. I think of water a small water reactor. You remember British technicians going to convey that was from India. Well I don't know. I don't remember the details of it. In 1964 the Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb. What was the reaction in the reaction in the in Britain to the Chinese expansion. I don't remember any particular reaction. We got

scientists advisors from the very beginning. That. That countries with who has a technological experience and knowledge of what it would certainly be able to do is to make an atomic bomb. They knew. That they were not at all surprised when the Russians exploded the bomb. They thought that it would take them a little bit longer than it did to achieve success. But at that time scale was only I'd fired two or three. And of course. And and so the same would apply to to the Chinese who. Before the war the resolution had some very eminent blunders around the same time President Kennedy talked about our points of

30 25 30 nation acquiring nuclear weapons programs. Did you share his concern about perforation at that point. I think we were always concerned about proliferation but. It seemed very unlikely that. Any except to very few countries would would want to devote the resources necessary. To produce an atomic weapon while you were chairman of the UK. AC A is highly praised here. You've visited India on a number of occasions. What's your recollections of the inauguration of the Cyrus Riak set from day in 1961. Well I went as a representative of the person I was John Cockroft the great physicist who was then the head of Harvill and it was a very interesting.

Visit. The the Indians were put on a good show and they had narrow the prime minister was there. And of course Holmey Baba was his principal advisor. I had a Canadian minister called Cordone Churchill the Canadians having given the lives of the locals a rather large research reactor which was big inaugurated. There was a version of. Two very distinguished French physicists of power and Goldsmid. There was a Chinaman. Who. A Chinese physicist of an oldish man who had studied in the United States and spoke perfect English and was very charming and courteous but not very free with his information. We tried to extract some.

Information about the Chinese program from him but he'd managed to evade all our questions and then oh well there was a group of representatives from the Scandinavian countries from South America from Yugoslavia. That was a Russian physicist that I called kutcha Robiskie who was a. I think a very generally known or good scientist. And we was a big opening ceremony which is narrow for he made a speech of course as a Canadian It has to start again. OK. That was you just saying there was a big I was a big opening ceremony day I said via Spence's my daughter in law talking on the telephone. But I better go and ask her not to then would you. All right. Now I mean how can you tell me something about the atmosphere the mood of the whole ceremony.

Oh it was a it was a it was a it was a very. Upbeat. Occasion. Everybody was in good form and they were very hospitable and very pleased with the achievement which was rather remarkable. They had and they had the they had two or three small research reactors. They had the Canadian reactor which and which was the occasion for the ceremony. They had to I believe but if I remember right they had about 2500 people employed there plus a thousand people working on electronics because the Indians had really started off their electronic electronics industry at Trumbo. They'd say they had a Dodge group of people. And of course that was and they were training them in electronics. So then of course they ended scientists very good

many of them and they had some very good people. So it was a it was a celebration and breezed right away. You had this opening ceremony then we had conferences and. We all made speeches and said what we were doing. The Russians made a speech and the Canadians made a speech. And John Cockroft and I made a speech and everybody spoke and it rode on of a sudden the mind of in 10 mins. And narrow was down for about three or four days. And took a large part. In the proceedings. And then when it was all over we were sent on tour of India. John it was a it was a it was an IT WAS A. It was a very good occasion. Remember any conversations that the Chinese scientists. Yes well birds. So John Kafka often I decided

that we would try and find out something about that program. And so we cornered him at the tee one day and told to him for about half an hour I suppose and I asked him all sorts of questions. Was that the Chinese sound was very courteous very charming fellow but he told us exactly nothing. Did it occur to you at the time of the inauguration that the Indians enthusiasm for nuclear energy was partially due to their long term interest in acquiring a military option. I don't think that was in my mind at the time. That was a long way off. I think things began to turn around about 60 about four years later four years later. Well Bob you actually made an announcement after the Chinese bomb in 64 that that that India would acquire nuclear weapons within 18

months. Oh well I don't know whether did you get any sense. I. I didn't get any sense of that because I didn't I didn't think that they had the the the material of that time they didn't have an operational plan. They didn't have any. I suppose they did have a metal plan so they could make uranium oxide but it would have been fairly primitive. First rising in 90. They certainly didn't have any plutonium in 1968 Bob barber had actually told little black it that he hoped to develop nuclear weapons. You recall that. Well I mean I I don't remember being particularly concerned about that at the time but it was perfectly clear that if the Indians had the scientific information they had the materials and they had. The resources to work to develop a

full atomic energy program if they wished to do so. Can you describe your reaction to the explosion of the Indian nuclear device in 1974. I don't think I had much of a reaction to it. It was just something that I've felt show would happen some time and it happened in 1974. I don't think much it will make much impression on the French Atomic Energy official birching girls Nicole Smith has said if you wanted to be somebody in this world you had to have a bomb. Would you agree with them. No I would say that if we wanted to be something in this world you had to have a nuclear reactor. But it doesn't follow that you had to have a bomb. I think I would not agree with that. You can send that more countries will test nuclear weapons and underachieve nuclear weapons capability in the future.

Well I'm not sure about that. I mean is it worth it you see. There are a few countries who've got the capability all Lily got the capability now. But. What is really the point of having three or four nuclear bombs. What about other countries. Kiver I'm I'm a little skeptical about that. I But say what's your reaction to the newspaper the newspaper reports when you read about Israel and. The Iraq pre-accident all these events are lies half the history that you've gone through what how do you feel. Well Ahmed frankly I do not have and at this stage the information about about it I read it can make a sensible answer to that. I would but I would be very skeptical about Iraq. I would be quite skeptical for what I remember about

Pakistan. I wouldn't be skeptical about Israel at all because of course. They. Suddenly have. The. The the. They've been working on it for a long time and of course they have the intelligence and the scientific knowledge of the energy to do something of that sort. Whether what they're doing I have no idea. I just want to go back over one question here and then. And it's because of the telephone because it just fell into the wrong time again. Can you just answer the question last time. What was the extent of Bush's Indian nuclear cooperation in the late 50s. Well I do not remember that we had any formal agreement. We were suddenly interested in the supply of sorties from and from the outside sounds in southern India. Trouble troubling.

Because at that time it was thought that thorium might be a material for a. Nuclear fuel. The. Homie Bob Carr the head of the Indian project was a fellow of the Royal Society of London and a very brilliant and distinguished physicist of a great friend of our physicists. They came to London often attended meetings of the Royal Society. I would meet Cockroft of the Chadwick and Penny and Blackett and so they were great friends. And I don't know but I'm quite sure that they talked with him freely and so far as they were able to and that they gave him all the information and advice which he needed. Otherwise yes that's fine when it just hit me as you said when you attended that you know vibrationally nation

again. Did you share some of the pride of the Indians when when they when they got have any success that they don't can react to do you feel some sense of pride too. Well I thought they done very well. I don't know that I felt pride in it. God I've always been very. Very. Interested in India and very sympathetic with the Indians and I've. Felt very sympathetic with that time. I stayed with the governor of of Bombay of the province in the palace. Narrow was staying and I really enjoyed talking to them both very much indeed. Now I'm just going to ask you one question about that in the Truman press conference. Was that a concern in Britain about the possible use of of U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea.

That was a great concern about it partly because of the way in which the question came up. What happened was as I remember that the President Truman gave a press conference in which he made a number of remarks which were not particularly well phrased and which were open to misconstruction. And to the thought that he might be contemplating the use of the atomic weapon in. Korea against the Chinese Well it so happened. That there was a debate on foreign policy going on in the House of Commons when this information arrived and the result was that there was a great commotion in the House of Commons and. Could go a great deal of excitement about it. And and so the prime minister actually. Had some hard to deal with this. Commotion. And so he quickly arranged that he would go over to

Washington to talk to the president Truman about it. And so we all set off to go to Washington where we spent three days discussing. Not particularly this subject but a whole range of other subjects of interest as the two governments and in the course of that discussion the president and the prime minister went sort of took a went of went away and talked together for a bit and came back and said that they had fixed it. And so the president. Was rather difficult to get a form of words because the president had to reassure the Senate. That he hadn't given away anything to the British and the prime minister had to assure the House of Commons that he got the assurances that he needed. And the communique was so word that. The president was able to do what he wanted.

And Attlee came back and told the House of Commons that he had had personal discussions with the president he was perfectly satisfied with the result and that he had all the assurances that he needed and that was the end of the affair from the moment he went off on the plane. Can he somehow get it just a bit shorter perhaps if you cut out the line about you know that you discussed other things if you could just make it a little briefer by saying the president and prime minister went off in a corner straight away. So if we start it so early so we got straight on the plane to Washington if not at that point. Well we had we had a three day meeting in Washington and discussed a number of matters but the actual question which we've come to discuss was not dealt with until the very end of the conference when the president the prime minister went all together and had a 20 minute conversation and came back saying that they were

satisfied with the discussions that they had had and that this was duly recorded in the communique. Of the arc of the conference. And the president was able to reassure the Senate that he hadn't given away way of saying to the British and the prime minister was able to reassure the House of Commons that he talked to the president and got all the assurances he needed and that was the end of the affair. But much better. Thank you very much. That's a thought that just went on in his name I could give. Hey Ciao. Paying one child something that got it here. We've asked for an interview with him but we asked for an interview with him. Do you know if he's still alive. Oh yeah. Interesting. And Emiliano. We fast forward now. Is he still alive.

It's happening. Oh he was. You really are not just us. You can. And do you recall any conversation that you had with the Chinese. I did indeed I do. Because on one occasions John Cockroft and I. Took him aside. That's where we we have a problem. If you say the Cockroft Crafton I talk with Chinese scientists they go part they don't study under any conversations with the Chinese participants. Yes I do. So John Cockroft and I took the Chinese delegate at the conference aside and. Talked to him and hope to get some information out of him. And we asked him a number of questions and he answered them very courteous. They're. In excellent English but he didn't really give us any information of any

importance