War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Thomas Moorer, 1986

In 1969 well skim it was 70 years. Same time same question you were still a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1967. So in grand way what was your feeling. Well I felt that in the first place we should you know keep abreast of technology and in the second place I felt that we should increase our forces according to the rate at which they were increasing and then because of the perception factor. But it's not so much a perception on the part of the Soviets. But perception on the part of the Third World we cannot afford to permit the world at large to perceive the United States as being weaker than the Soviet Union. Now what did you think.

Well I think that that's a position that all politicians continuously take because the public our public in particular expects the politicians to strive for peace all the time. And we run into this today over and over again and I expect we will continue because that's the nature of our society. So I view that as a political objective and something like you know a motherhood and low taxes everyone would like to do that. But you have to live in a real world and that's you know depending of course on what steps will take on the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never

opposed arms reduction what we did oppose however was you know reductions that were not equal and not verifiable. So as a member you were correct. Beginning in 1970. What were your words. Well again our primary concerns. Yeah. Our primary concern related to the effort being made and the ABM field. We were concerned as to whether the two things first would the Soviets comply with the terms that were being proposed which it did not. And secondly would the United States

take action to build what we were permitted to build namely a defense of Washington D.C. the command controls and a site which could be used to continue research and development in this particular discipline. Well equality in other words is. What we wanted out of Salt was certainly the quantity I took the position at the outset that we should have equal aggregate with freedom to mix. In other words recognizing that we will never have a force that's a mirror image of the Soviet force because the Soviets

are a land power and we are a maritime power. Did you support. Which one. Well only if you must recognize that two things in the first place when you stand today to examine questions such as you are asking the technology at that time was a key factor. And one of the mistakes I made in reviewing the historical aspects of a problem like this is that people cannot resist putting themselves into the environment of the day as technology and wonder why things happened like they did many years ago. And

so at that time the ABM was just getting off the ground. It was I had some problems with it because if the other side served which they were determined to do then for every ICBM they built that meant we had to build six or 10 vessels to shoot them. Shoot shoot them down so you got into the arithmetic problem as to the size of the force and also what were you going to do with ABM What are you going to protect the United States at large. In other words have a total envelope over the United States through which this always can penetrate or you are going to attack the vital. Elements. And our retaliatory system namely command and control and some of the missile sites so that the Soviets would know that no matter what preemptive action they took against us they could not accept the results.

So we were. Well that was the second phase of this guidance the initial discussions focused almost entirely on ABM. And you may recall the ABM was approved by the Congress by a tie vote which was broken by the vice president. I believe that was what happened. And in any event there was one unanimous enthusiasm over the utility of the ABM and that time period which is 15 years ago. But at the same time the Soviets already had a system circling Moscow call a goldfish system. And so we had different problems to deal with namely that many in the colonies were opposed to

it and it was questionable whether they were going to fully support the permit us to build one in the first place. And so I think that bearing in mind the environment which we led at the time I supported the ABM Treaty but I would not have had I known that the Congress was going to take the position they did namely that they would not allow a system to be built in the vicinity of. Why is it then because what they told me how can I build a system in Washington and protect me and leave my constituents to make it. And so they wouldn't vote for it. They missed the whole point. The U.S. and so the thing degenerated to finally it was Teddy Kennedy that introduced revenue resolution to the Congress to abandon the experimental side. So we wound up not with anything nearly equal but with nothing in the ABM field until President Reagan you know

revive you might say the idea of having a defensive system. Well being a military man and having watched technical development I felt that we should never completely abandon a concept that would use technology which I was confident would change rapidly and permit you to build a better and better capabilities into the system. So it was my policy when I was chief of the Navy and even when I was fleet commander to support and to the best of my ability all new technical items were assets to the Marines have an aircraft as you know the area which is a vertical takeoff aircraft jet plane and there was a tremendous amount of opposition that I fully supported it. McGarvie I knew

that sooner or later we'll build a better one. And then it would give the Marines a superior capability. So I have never paused a technological development and a fighter. There's nothing as dangerous as a technological surprise. So far as the military people are concerned. So. Is this just for you say well I tried to explain to them what the facts are in the real world. They just make flat statements. You know this won't work. And you know I was like damn I did working out. And you always faced in the bureaucracy of our country with these types of confrontations. Frequently the congressmen who never make a statement like that because it's not being manufactured in their

district or because people prefers to spend the money on you know welfare for instance or social programs. And many and many of my take that position just for that reason alone. And so you have to very patiently try to explain the relationship of this particular question to the overall security of the country. Well I'd start by pointing out that the Soviets already have a system and b I thought that to be left with no alternative but mutual destruction retaliation was wrong.

Bearing in mind what was possible in the future because this was a type of confrontation unlike any other in the sense that it would be this being a nuclear confrontation. I didn't like the idea of being absolutely ZERO having zero defenses. And I feel the same way about an offense too and we don't have any offense over here in the United States even today to speak of the Russians had twenty five thousand fighters available and and thousands of missiles. There's not a single surface to air missile in the United States today. No. Why didn't you. Why yes. Well I I would point out to you that the military does not make us say that can't they. The decision to conduct

any kind of discussion with a foreign country is solely responsible all day with the authority of our civilian masters. And so the military never queried as to whether they should go talk to Russia or not. They would ask many many questions about the military impact and the you know proposition to be made in a proposal to be made. But I've never known any president to ask a military man whether you should go talk to some chief of state in a foreign country that's never going to happen in our system where we have total and complete civilian control. Yes I thought it was interesting. I wouldn't limit it to national security unless you intend on how you define national security. I feel that you cannot

have should not have a country of millions of people and never talked to them. But you don't have to agree to them when you talk to them. It's the same thing goes for Red China. You say well the Vietnam war seriously weakened the administration as well as the United States and therefore we were not. A strong a position as we would have been for negotiating purposes if the Viet Nam war would never come. The press corps put the blackest picture before the world at large and it. Made the United States appear to be involved in a

war or a confrontation that many people opposed and including our allies right across the board. And so it's obvious that if we hadn't have had a Vietnam War we would have been in a much stronger position to negotiate. Did you think. No. I never felt that the Soviets were going to help us in anything. And they never never have and I don't think they ever will. I didn't buy that idea at all. No we

haven't. We tried that of course with the Soviets and what. We tried to get themselves to agree not to. Because when these discussions were commenced they did not have them or any operational forces. But I think I was impressed by a statement Mr. Brezhnev made when he was over here for his visit. When the subject of Mervyn were brought up and he drew himself up and said you should realize that we are never going to be denied any technology of the United States has. So I always try to get the Soviet to agree not them while we Merv's while we at least have the capability.

It was a lost cause but we spent an awful lot of time on it. Yes. Exactly. Yes. Yes. Because again. I was opposed to any idea of agreeing to for both sides to refrain from serving missiles. Simply because the Soviets I was convinced were going to do it anyway and therefore we would be probably caught with a force without mercy when they were suddenly introduced to force with Murf savage one. One thing that concerned me and the second thing was that the Soviets were always going to outnumber us so far as rockets were concerned simply because they count of rockets as a launch forth on their SS

70s and 80s and 90s and 70s and 80s etc. and consequently I felt that any imposed limitation on us would be far more disadvantageous to the United States than it would be to solve it. Did you think it was possible that if there was a ban agreed to and so one before the United States forces then the situation was more Merv's missiles technology on both sides. You can never stop and look. OK. So far as feeling that it has been a good idea to nip murmuring in the bud. Well I said dreamers concept. You can never again stop technological development and I keep saying that about SDI. And

since the different and different societies is so marked whereas they were all around the United States with freedom and we can never verify on the spot. Yeah as in so far as comparing the forces of the United States and Soviet Russia and checking whether or not the limitations have been violated one must never overlook the major difference in our societies. Whereas one only has to buy a copy of Aviation Week and the Congressional Record and he can find out everything that's going on in the military activities in this context of which technology has been tried. But I defy you to get into the Soviet laboratories or even to visit any of their bases and so on. And and consequently in the United States we've gotten to the point that

no one can keep a secret. Whereas the Soviets do a very good job of that. So it's an unequal fight in terms of verification of agreements you know and Germany whether or not they've been violated. Instructions Well what happened there was that there were frequent visits over to Helsinki. Vienna was on with the whole group and then they would come back to the United States and we would have several meetings in order to determine what was the next step and for what happened so far as Alison was concerned he would brief me on very carefully on what had taken place preceding the time that they returned. And then he would get his instructions and so far as the Jaycees position was concerned for the new proposals that were going to be put

forward. So I don't think I can tell you in three or four days that all instruction I gave him because this thing went on for years and years. But that was the system. He was a joint chiefs of staff represented lenity. And we therefore he was given instructions as to what position we wanted him to put forward as the JCL position on these various proposals that were wiped out and the verification panel actually was named at the outset verification panel. And it was invasion I think it only deal with the subject of verification. How are you going to verify compliance it rapidly expanded into play. A planning group for you know discussion across the board with the Soviets on nuclear matters. The Soviets had larger rockets that we had and consequently they

had a heavy throw away capability. And if this trend was allowed to continue without any compensating action on our part of course I was concerned about that. No I don't think it would be wonderful if we could remove all nuclear weapons in the face of the earth. Oh that would be a great one. But you know the facts are that this is not going to happen. I mean I think the military people are more prone to live in a real world. Than the politicians the politicians want to accomplish something great that makes everybody. Take a sigh of relief and sit back and say how wonderful. You know they generally have the

hearings on these. I thought one saw two right before the election. You know Carter I had sold before the election and President Nixon had sought one for the election. And so that's why I think U.S. military people are not as hopeful as the politicians like to raise expectations far beyond anything they can reach. Yeah. And finally was said at

62 that was you know in a Soviet submarine program was limited to 62 and. So far as SLBM program is concerned. A final agreement not limited to the Soviet to 1:54 and we had accords about two thirds of that. But the whole approach to this. National agreement so far is the offensive system concern I was an executive agreement not a treaty. It was to be re-examined in five years. And end the discussions with the president you know the first thing that they see us put forward was certain conditions under which we could support the

salt 1 treaty for a limited period of time assuming it would be re examined and about to 5 years later. Mr. Nixon agreed that all these conditions were in France and were building a pre-signed of submarines and improving our verification capabilities. Going forward was several special R&D programs and things like that and building the B-1 bomber of course this that's one of the problems with our military people get into a mess next. Yes we have built a B-1 bomber and and which we thought was necessary in order to keep us in some kind of balance with this over as soon as Mr. Carter come to any council to be one Bob. So when you have presidents serving four and eight years of people in uniform rather than a Navy 45 years you never know how stable you are agreeing with you get with the politics of this because

you know you can't depend on and I'm sticking with it. That's one of the problems we have to try and program yes. Yes. When the negotiations had reached a final point and President Nixon was actually in Moscow and about to sign the treaty by telephone I was asked whether the Jaycees would support. The treaty. And my answer was under certain conditions which included the building of the B-1 bomber and they tried in submarine and improving our verification capabilities to the extent we

could. And certain other research and develop programs should be pursued and he agreed to all always and in all fairness the secretary of defense if you read the Congressional Record supported this fully. However it's in the sense that we felt very strong about to be one Bamma as soon as Mr. Carter came in he cast lead. We're here for. You. I think so far as Datsuns amendment was concerned it was. A good idea. But there's no way you can make a case for it for the simple reason that they said already run off and ahead of us we had a thousand and fifty six missiles. As I recall the number and then all the production lines

were stopped. And so we had no means of rapidly equaling them and secondly at the rate they were going they could have had far more that then. Fifteen hundred or so that no treaty permitted. And the same thing goes for the submarines. Had they continued their rate of production. Were you sitting here with no production. We didn't have a single keel laid for a submarine. We didn't have a single production line for a missile. You can see that they would run in five years they would be far more. You know ahead of us in terms of numbers at least than we could possibly reach. We could not do anything during that interim period to increase our forces. So you are dealing with a situation as to whether you know you want to permit or prevent.

We permitted and the treaty for them to have the fifteen hundred missiles and 62 submarines. But the argument was made and we prevented them from having far more. We were just sitting on top there that we didn't do anything. And so that what you were dealing entirely with the Soviet forces and they had production lines all over the place going for speed. And so the objective in that executive agreement to slow that down and then see if we can get the Congress to break away from the McNamara concept of a mutually assured destruction to the extent of building new equipment. Well I would point out so far is a

proposal that you made that there were many many proposals made in these discussion with respect to every little point. And I. Was. Firmly in support of the Trident because it gives us an advantage of having a sufficient range to be able to come have to operate in a far greater area. MCCAUL you're talking about pi. You say if you increase our name. That's one point. And even in port and Zella I thought it would be a serious mistake to trade that organization and volunteer in a to voluntarily say when we're all going to be on on it Poseidon is

here. John around me he wanted to put non-general around he who who verified ASA and he was had just been assigned NATO and NATO organization. And so Jackson of course was getting ready to run for president at that time in fact he was on the front cover of Time magazine and I didn't like it at all. Not that I objected in any way to get around me but that was a first and only time in my neighbor Korea and I've had many commands where someone was detailing people to my staff. I mean I didn't one those do around in any way but I was

opposed to the idea of each and every congressman come in and say I want you to take Bill Jones and Jack Johnson's on on your staff. It's really none of his business. And I went over to see him and at the end of the argument with him about that. Because he and Senator Jackson had the power to detail officers Jay-Z as Herb because President Nixon permitted him to do it. And in exchange for his support in this connection one thing he did was very much in favor. One is to. Town at outset to ensure that the scientists who had been working on ABM small were not dissipated. And that was the purpose of that second installation and not cost but that quickly where the non-divine and the United States Congress will never support a program like that. You

know in case program. And so the site is quickly dissipated throughout the country and started working on the other side is not going to work on something that he didn't think was going to be built. Senator Jackson accused your general health know security and so. On. And so far is Jackson's accusation that Allison and support the interest of the United States I don't agree with that. I did what I told him to do. As you know as the kind of person that sometimes is hard to follow. But nevertheless he didn't manage to take positions position that they posed by the Jaycees Yes I think he said that because he. Was you know. Very

determined to put Brownie in that position. And so that's a tactic you use when you start to to you know take some kind of action you use you weaken the opposition and and strengthen you man. And that's what he was doing with Ronnie and Allison. Allison had men long enough and I was in talking to the chief of staff afterwards about his relief. I thought he'd been at too long in a particular role but now they said it had nothing to do with what Senator Jackson stepped in and did I thought it was a first step. Yeah my Veres envoy's ABM treaty

was concern was that it was it had flaws. It was divided into a treaty and executive agreement. But from the discussions I felt it was more or less temporary in a sense that it would be you know fine tuned later as the weapon systems changed and so on and I didn't object to the fact that it was really constituted a first step and arms discussions and I said a short time ago I never again oppose talking to the Russians at all and trying to make some kind of. Take some kind of effort to reduce the burden of arms of this type. And so long again as they were always equal in terms of the restraints were imposed.

I think it's possible that at the Treaty dead there really. Or restrain if not prevent technological progress would have occurred during the 1970s I think you will have to say that. I would ask you if you thought the events recent someone's suffered because of political considerations. So give us some examples. I think that the trade is made by the

United States regardless of whether the salt or whatever always suffer. By the because of the nature of American American negotiate as American people we are a very impatient people and we only we have a problem. We want to solve and get over and get it over with. And so no negotiator wants to spend a couple of years in Geneva and come back and tell the president well we didn't accomplish anything. And no president wants to listen to the pounding against contagiously from certain members of the Congress as well as these individual groups in a society that you know why don't we have a treaty. Why don't we. I've heard Senator that the senator is saying that you know that the first thing I do of our president I would go all the Soviets and sign a treaty. And so I think that the United States always has a disadvantage with trying to make any kind of agreement with the Soviets because of the nature of the American people

for. Going back to around here in this state. Nuclear weapons strategic bounds. What did you see as the rule here. We were engaged or were useless. Well for deterrence if you start over and say OK again. And the main purpose of having a nuclear weapon. And as I told you before. Don't break the glass I say hey. HANNITY OK. We're just starting. I want to just start. Go ahead.

So what did you see as the role of the role of nuclear weapons has always been the same in my view namely to provide deterrence Mkhize if we would permit ourselves to be without weapons entirely whereas the other side in this case the Soviets were building up Elize numbers. I think they would dictate to us without any difficulty exactly what we were supposed to be and what it was supposed to be and what we're supposed to do under any situation. I don't believe that there's going ever going to be a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia. As long as we maintain a survivable command and control system and a a modern force. But on the other hand I think it would be ridiculous for us to make a unilateral reduction. You feel that as long as are saying that we need to keep building we need to keep.

Yes I think you cannot permit the force to become obsolescent obsolete. And secondly I think that if we do not have a force comparable to the Soviets then we will be perceived by the rest of the world as weaker and that in turn will have major impact in the political and economic areas. Well let me ask you this if we do you favor as always pursue new technology. How can we ever stop the upward spiral arms. Well I don't think it can be stopped the that. I'm sorry. And they will continue as well as the Soviets. Also to keep a modern force that is to introduce new technology

becomes available. The race may not spiral upward but it would increase in capability in terms of accuracy and speed of launch and things of that kind. So that's what I mean by modern force. I think in terms of just pure kilotons or megatons if you will that you get to a point where that is not significant as one might think as long again as we have a force that has a survivable command control system and modern weapons. You know I don't think it will be that they increase in speed and accuracy will create a more dangerous situation. And I

I believe that once again that is not going to be a major nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia because in both cases the result is unacceptable. That is that's not to say that nuclear weapons may not be used by some of the smaller countries who do not have the place in the world and their responsibilities in the world that the United States does. But at the same time I believe very strongly that they would be the height of folly and extremely dangerous. For us to do any kind of unilateral disarming. One of the big. Tree is actually pushes the arms race the backswing from an arms race. It wants to modernize. No I don't think so. I think that essentially the same force

levels would exist whether we you know discuss treaties or not. And so to say that discussions and negotiations push the leveled hard is in my view not a sound statement. Are you saying that it really doesn't matter. I would say that treaties do matter because they indicate a willingness on the part of the Soviets to talk about the problem. At the same time I think that the two matter is you as you and I use the word the Soviets have got to agree to some kind of verification as long as the Soviets do not agree to site verification. In my view they don't matter. But look what's happened to ABM treaty already in terms of massive violations.

And that's what's going to always take place as long as we are dealing with a society such as they have in the Soviet Union. The point is that you have to start a point of engaging an arms negotiation is that hopefully they society and Soviet regime will change. And little by little we can get down to meaningful discussions. And so if we we have to start on time we must start now and see if we can little by little make some kind of progress in this area. I'm in favor of attempting to make a treaty. I am was more violently opposed to unilateral

disarmament which many of our citizens want the president to accept. You find out. Why. You want this. Well I want them I want the soldiers to change their. Outlook their way they operate. They are intent to violate the treaty in such a way that we can in fact. Have a sound verification on the sign. Which they certainly have in the United States. And until they get an open society far different from the one they have now I think that you can almost take it for granted that it will violate any treaty you make with them.

Until the Soviets change their current way of thinking that type of government and so on and permit some kind of free access that will result in onsite inspection. I think it's reasonable to say that they will violate any treaty they make. To Nixon and Kissinger at time. Well. I am always concerned that American politicians will give way too

much because in our society one has difficulty accepting failure. And unfortunately our negotiations are more or less tied to the timing of administrations. Whereas the Soviets on the other hand have essentially a permanent government a central authority and they do not alter their policy or their objectives. And so we are dealing with a on again off again and again the situation in the United States depending on the position in in administration where they are always consistent in what they do. I accepted them. I won you know.

Well last minute negotiations were made by the president next and not my kids and your kids. He was president. And so I think people are inclined to think that Nixon was not involved that Kissinger was putting forth all the ideas and all the proposals. That's not the case. So I like to think that Mr. Nixon that made their proposals. And consequently I thought that you know he had about as far as he could go to influence or got the impression he had to sign. But I think one step further would have been too much. So when came here

where you know I was not worried that President Nixon was going to be too lenient with the Soviets. Regardless of the circumstances of the moment when you wake up I don't think I said they thought that the talks were the only thing that saved them politically. I don't believe that's the fact. I think it certainly they thought there would be a political plus. No I don't use this system which what you are

against that each side. I thought it was very important and presenting proposals to the Soviets to include in the total package a. System which could be used to as a development base as new technology became available while at the same time building the best you could with today's technology to protect the command and control system namely the command authority who's president and all the people that work with him in the event of a mistake. I think one of the reasons we encourage the Soviets to move more of their forces out to sea

was that there's a unique characteristic about seagoing forces namely you can hide a Muhanna man in Russia in order to train or to function in any way. They have to come out in the ocean where we can take a look at it. And that's why we were more concerned about what the Soviets were doing. Ashore than we were afloat. We have several advantages over them and see how the Soviets at sea. One is geography which is a vital factor in this whole contest. They today have four fleets are all separated. They cannot join without passing through what would be hostile areas in the event of war. And second I don't think that they are though they are moving ahead. I don't think that

they can compare with our people in terms of the quality of the equipment or the skill which is operated. And so we are a maritime nation. They land nation and I think we have a major advantage at sea. It was properly explored it. Made it a threat to us that that time was I think. Expressed by the tremendous buildup they had not just nuclear forces but of conventional forces all military forces across the board. And if fact they were of course gradually increasing their presence in the Pacific Ocean and spreading out over the world. And so overall I was clear on that. So it's as I said many times one

embark on a grand design of world. Conquest or at least establishing a world presence like they did in Angola in Mozambique in Cuba and Nicaragua and Cameron Bay etc.. Now this is where. That's right. And not during a Vietnam action. As a matter of fact during the time of the signing I saw one we mind. Aha. So that was concerned

by what I call a hand. My position was that we were spending maybe twenty six billion dollars a year and the Soviets were spending 1 billion. And so they didn't want the Vietnam War to ever end. But nevertheless there was always an administration that thought the Soviets would rush down and sweep the mines. And of course was ridiculous. They weren't going to go down and sweep up old mines and in a matter of fact when we laid the mines they Soviets had it right before Mr. Nixon went over there. The Soviets put out a press release which said some to the fact that those not all Americans are at it again but they never did name president next and then their press releases and they were particularly anxious for him to come. And so unlike all as you know the doomsdayers that we have always in the government the Soviets weren't engaged at all in US

mining Haiphong Harbor because they didn't have really a national interest down there. So could just. Exactly. They solve it. I'd tried to state many times during meetings where I'm not interested in Vietnam as compared to salt one. And consequently when we mine Haiphong Harbor in May of 1972 they made no move whatever or even expressed any dissatisfaction relating to relating the mining we have on to this one negotiation. As a matter of fact the advance party was in Moscow when the mining took place and then I was were escorting our people around for lights etc. they never made sense.

Well I think the Soviets are. One in sort one wanting some kind of negotiation because they felt that that time that force level wise they were above us considerably. And second the Soviets have a ingrained fear of our technology. And they never know what Manock we go come up with something that they can come up with. And so they they wanted to have a treaty to try to stop the expansion of the IBM system. And for that matter hopefully do what they could with the offensive system. But it is interesting to note that practically during entire negotiations they didn't want to talk about offensive systems. They kept coming back into the defensive systems which was their real concern. I think the main concern

of the Soviets none in negotiation was to at least in my view put a halt to the development of ABM because they felt they had an advantage in the offensive systems and they didn't want to talk about the advent of settlement as a matter of fact. Finally President Nixon time instructed a negotiating group to tell them that they either talk about the negotiating I mean the offensive sets them down on negotiation. All. I mean he in fact gave them ultimatum that they had to shift from the defensive to the offensive systems where this guy didn't know he wasn't going to negotiate anymore which is the proper thing to do. And that's where we got into this executive agreement. OK. I'm not aware of a deal but I think that the way things go in the Congress there was probably a commitment to

build a base on the West Coast. More likely in the Puget Sound area. But I didn't get involved in that because I was at that time not chief of naval operations and the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff does not get into a discussion of that. I think it's fair to say that Senator Jackson was most interested in having a submarine base a large base in Puget Sound area from the very outset although I would say that's not in a any different from the position taken by most of the congressmen and senators. I think when the cruise missile question

came up it really a technology become became available and we began to talk about it right towards the end of the major part of this all one discussions. But I believe it's fair to say that the deputy Sackler defense Mr. Clements is now governor. Taxes was probably the most enthusiastic supporter in high levels on the cruise missile and it was not just by his name but by others pointed out that that would be one more alternative in the delivery systems which would strengthen our position. Stress free

in general. Yes. Well I had the concern about Santu that I have about most all the treaty negotiations. But I sense that there was a having taken the first step was solve one. Now there was a move in the country in particular in certain interest in the Congress to call for another treaty. And so I. Felt that. We had to be very careful about that as a matter of fact my concerns were certainly borne out one song to took its final form and of course it was quite advantageous to the Soviets so much so that the Senate refused to

you know confirm the treaty. And it's amusing to me that they are seven. It was a Democrat a Democratic Senate. And now the Democrats standing up there right now criticizing the president for violating the law to say that hey they wouldn't vote for. OK. Kissinger. Why I didn't think that was. A feasible approach simply because when one trades off Merv's adv.. And you know you're talking about a quantum versus quantity in the sense it's the kind of thing you can verify. You cannot verify what the Soviets have learned because

you can't look inside the warhead. You can photograph a rocket from a satellite but you don't know what's inside and they want it to sometimes come in. The secretary fans had his own Allison and or dance around it. And we we had some back and forth. So. I think that someone probably. Had a very positive political effect because the public took a deep breath and leaned back in their chair and that's what I think it had a negative effect on

the development of a workable ABM because the Congress stopped all support that they had we had a treaty now we don't need to do anything else. You know they could have at least maintained a research and development program of high order and containment which was allowed by the treaty. To develop the best system possible in the development so indicated that of course we had the option which is in a treaty then abrogated treaty and going ahead with our program. I was satisfied. Well I was satisfied with equal numbers. I was

satisfied with accepting that for temporarily until we could get our production lines going for ICBMs and submarines and then talk some more. The general understanding was that we would take a new look in five years. And that was really done as a matter of fact. We are still arguing about ABM. And when people discuss the ABM Treaty they don't mention the executive agreement which was related to our financial system still talking about you know relating it related to SDI we're you. Know

this is. My feeling about detente was that it was perhaps. A reasonable proposal so long as the Soviets carried out their a bargain. What I didn't expect them to do I wasn't surprised at all when they went out the window. For one thing very few people no one knew what the word meant. It's a French word France didn't know what it meant and so it didn't really amount to much. So I didn't really spend much time concerning myself about Dayton because subsequent negotiations French and Carter's

negotiations at Camp David had Sadat you know up hands on and begun and Sadat and Cartwell hugging and kissing one another in the White House. But nothing ever came of that. So when the politicians get together and come up with these grand ideas I always am very skeptical and went oh that was. Action taken in response to a very strong letter we receive from Brezhnev and the United States was obliged to take some kind of action because the Russians were going to threatening to go into Egypt. We just the events. The situations were developing in

the middle. Nixon's second tour. Really signal the end of this. You said I don't think that there were any events that were you know our warships that indicated day end of detente. And the last part of Nixon's term I think what really threw it down to one was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when President Carter said that he for the first time line what the Soviets would actually like. Well you know it was an amazing statement for president the United States to make. He said talk to me. I think that.

The situation which exist between the Soviets and their satellites and the Western world is science. Anyone in a position at a prayer in the United States has and I think you'll see that argument made about this current incident. I know you want to take that on. But anyway I think that. All presidents are groping. For some solution to this seemingly unsolvable problem. And so in this case they came out with a well let's try this let's see if they we're trying to be a little more cooperative and and provide them more the economic and cultural political feel if they want than slack off from others. Pellmell development of weapons and so they tried and it didn't work. But I don't fault of trying it because

nobody can anticipate what the outcome of these efforts might be. And so I don't get very enthusiastic about him. But I don't mind him trying. And you don't hear the same thing that I just said when the administration explains the Iranian thing. He has Iran sitting in a most prestigious position in the Middle East. Has his stride it runs up and down the Persian Gulf and you've got all the moderate Arab nations right across the water from the Emirates and Saudi Arabia and so on and then on the other side is Afghanistan where there's thousands of Soviet troops and to the north of Iran twenty six divisions just waiting to come down the man there are 600 Soviet agents in Iran. And when

they Iran gives the Soviets something that they will long for I have the greater access to the Indian Ocean. And so if the United States permitted the Soviets to dominate Iran we'd be in hell fix. And so it's the same kind of thing that happens in every administration. Kennedy had his Bay of Pigs and his Cuban crisis and Ford had is a Cambodian thing and then after that Nixon had Viet Nam and Watergate and now for. Well Ford then followed him and then Carter was dead one. And Reagan's got the war on. I mean they one of go we have a problem with that.