Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981
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- Transcript
An NT. Just about to be. In. In March of 1968 the president had asked you to draft a statement saying that he would not seek reelection because you would urge him not to various times for that. But why had you were urged or did you were just not to see it. Well I had I had urged the president beginning in December 19 67 not to run again because I felt that he had. Accomplished is the purposes of his program. The purpose is that he spent most of his life committed to civil rights education legislation and Medicare
for the elderly that had been the basis of my feeling that he had completed what he was put on earth to do and it was that he did not need to run for another term. At the time of the it at the end of March at the time of the actual speech my urgings then were based on something that happened at that time in that he had drafted the speaker made the Breaux proposal to a prepared proposal to say for the cease fire hoping to win the war. I was unaware that until the day before he was to speak. And when I read the speech which he sent to me that contained this bombing.
Pose a way that I've felt very strongly at that point that if he was to make that proposal and be credible to the world he had to take it entirely out of the political context of the primaries that were then occurring. There was a Wisconsin primary on Tuesday after the Sunday on which he delivered that was to deliver that message and there had been a New Hampshire primary before that. And I felt that the only way he could make his proposal to Vietnam to North Vietnam credible was do was at the price of his own political life. Did you have a feeling that he shared that. I think he I think he recognized that and and he was he was focused much more in that period on the effort to get peace in Vietnam than he was on anything political. He was not really giving attention to politics although he
was. The odds on favorite to be both the nominee and the president. Be re-elected president to a second term. What would have been the risk if he had made that speech and then continued with politics as usual. If he had made a speech and had not withdrawn and not announced his withdrawal the effects would almost surely have been that on Tuesday the the Wisconsin primary would have occurred. He was not campaigning I don't recall even though he was on the. Well he was on the ballot under was gone. Under Wisconsin law it had to be. But he making no it campaign effort at all. Senator Eugene McCarthy who was also on the ballot would have would have won. The Wisconsin Democratic primary. Well the appearance to the world what it would be an appearance in the country that he had made the offer to halt the bombing in Vietnam or effectively bring the war to an end. In an effort to
influence Wisconsin and by Tuesday the whole thing would have been washed out. And I felt that that would leave. Norma's credibility gap for anything else that he might try internationally. And I think it would have it would have appeared to be even though I might not would have known otherwise it would appear to be a very shoddy piece of politics to change our nation's course to be the first president to try to halt bombing to into war and presumptively it would have left the presumption that he did all of it simply for personal political reasons which were was not the case. But you've got here this is the cause of this. Really can you feel you've done all you could. Is that why you are not all he could he was a very effective president and passed more legislation I suppose and same period of time than
anyone because he had also been a very effective leader of Congress which is the only such leader of Congress to become ever to become president. But from the time I first knew him which was in the late 40s and even before that he had. He had proceeded on a pretty determined course wanting to bring an end to the civil to the racial dilemma of the legal segregation in the country wanting to. Get the federal government involved in support of education which was one of his favorite themes and providing for medical care for the aged in some of the conservation measures he had. He had accomplished the things that he had spent his whole life devoted to race all political life. And I felt that he simply did not. Need to be president again for any reason other than perhaps to keep somebody else
out of the job and that's not enough in my view of things that's not an adequate reason. Now that I believe was the day before the speech was the day of the speech he got you over there in the family quarters to review what you had written and so on. Did you have a feeling that that other people agreed with what you were saying or did you use sequestered away so that other people wouldn't be aware of what you're doing with everybody. This was a good thing. No there was virtually no agreement with the with the proposal by anyone else at the White House staff or family. I answered your question. That's OK. There was no agreement at the White House from anyone else that I know of that he should do this. He in turn and he was he was reporting that to me he was telling me he said no one and they're all against you or against me as though it were my decision.
And he told me once he said don't you shouldn't go over to the West Wing and walk downstairs in front of anyone. What he was doing I found out later was that he was going around talking to his assistants on the staff and other people and saying I always call me buzz he said Buzz is proposing that I give up that that I quit tonight I give up the job. And he wasn't saying what he was thinking and so then of course their response was directed at me. But that's what friends of presidents are for I suppose. Did you feel that he had made up his mind at some point. Earlier during the day or let's put it this way when he went on television did you know that he was going to use that final thing. I was not absolutely certain that he would use it. Toward the end of the day on Sunday he spoke at 9 o'clock
on Sunday night from 8:00 o'clock forward it appeared likely most likely that he would use it although there was a considerable effort being mounted in the family quarters of the White House led by his young daughter Lucy who did not want him to do it in her basis for not wanting him to withdraw it was that she this would be the first election in which she had been old enough to vote and she wanted to vote for her father. But there were others arguing against it and had it been broadcast around it he discussed it with political leaders Democratic Party leaders congressional leaders they would have all been opposed to him doing that. And after all in 1064 he had. Won the largest popular vote victory ever for president. Still record which record still stands and the political his political allies and political and members of the same political party
would certainly not want a man who'd done that to be off the ballot in 64. But those political considerations of that sort just couldn't enter into this decision now really are in there in January. Didn't he call you into the bedroom and ask you to grab something for this for the state of Utah. Tell us a brief story and why you urged him not to do it. In January of 1068 after a rather long stay over the holidays at his ranch in Texas during which day he is he had a visit from a levy escolar of Israel and subsequent perhaps some other foreign leaders. He returned to Washington on Sunday afternoon before he was to deliver leave on Tuesday night the State of the Union message and he called me at my residence and asked me to come to the White House to help him with the state ostensibly to help him with the state of the Union message when I got there.
He said rather characteristic ways and you don't think I got you down here to work on the STATE OF THE UNION did you. He said I've made up my mind. He said I can't be president. I can't have peace and be president too. And so then he set off on a lengthy session in. We got. OK. Mr. BUFFETT in January of 68 president called you into it. You got to tell us what he what he did what was I was not.
He was Sunday afternoon and he was supposed to be working on his State of the Union message and it was very much on his mind but he was not working on that he was the bedroom of the presidential bed in the presidential bedroom is a canopy bed and the room was dark and it was a dark day already and he had only one light on he had a memorandum opinion polls many things spread around about him and he was on the bed in his pajamas. And when I started shortly after I had entered he said I've made up my mind I can't be president and have peace too. And. His intent and what he called me there to do was to write a as he kept describing it a one page statement which he would read before the joint session of Congress on Tuesday night after he had delivered the State of the Union message in which he wanted to say he was not going to seek reelection.
Over the course of the evening courses with there was a very short time for less than 48 hours before he was to speak to Congress. I kept trying to write what he had asked me to write but I had questions about the decision about the action. And I finally wrote something which of course was never used but I wrote something for him but I attached to it a memorandum of my own saying that this was very very early in the year and he was speaking on approximately January the 20th and it meant that the country would go 12 months without a with a lame duck president. And. I was not sure that this was was wise. And I told him in the memorandum that I had. Questions about the questions about that. The wisdom of withdrawing so early.
And for whatever reason he did not use the statement that that he had what what risks did you see in him withdrawing your it that it would be it left too much exposure internationally. Could you begin that with without a problem of interest. I saw I saw the risks. Perhaps imaginary but I think it was a practical judgment that if he if the president were. To announce his withdrawal 12 full months before he the end of his term that it was an invitation for mischief. Quite serious Mr. perhaps. Internationally it would. It gave up a certain amount of control. Authority rather for the office domestically. In a period that was unstable already. It effectively
removed him from as a as a strong influence on Congress. Or on the whole governing system of the country. And now it's just my perception. Having learned what I knew about the presidency through long association with him that you should not have someone in the White House. For 12 months who has already said that he's effectively out of office a lame duck and then. Yes within just a few days after he passed the state of the Union. Mark. After President Johnson had the Koreans the North Koreans seized on the high seas. Our intelligence shipped the Pueblo and took the ship and the crew hostage. And this had a very. Strong effect upon the country and on the Congress. Now President Johnson's
reaction to the hostage taking was to work very hard here to keep keep down any demands for retaliation or any any other attacks upon on North Korea. His reasoning being that if you that through your rhetoric here. You could kill the hostages. And so he did not talk about that himself very much and Congress did not. And the hostages were released in 11 months. But he meets again within a matter of two or three weeks after the Pueblo was taken. The beginning of the Tet offensive in South Vietnam resulted the first day in the siege taking of our embassy in Saigon So those two events really did unsettle the country and I was grateful myself that he had not made that statement.
In January when you when you first give on March 30th not to pass the resignation if you will part to the to the bombing halt speak it was because about me I didn't have to do it. No it hadn't. There was no connection between his March 30 first withdrawal and the events in Southeast Asia that were the war events. The connection as I saw it was entirely between the effort he was making which was without precedent in American presidential history to end a war by in fact ending the attack upon the enemy's territory. And that was an unprecedented step and it required. I felt a high order of. Accompanying action to make it credible. Now in 1961 U.S. went to Southeast Asia with the president the vice president. What message did he bring back I'm interested in that
people didn't want American boys over there enough that nobody could replace him nine hundred sixty one in the US in May of that year after the Bay of Pigs episode in Cuba. President Kennedy asked Vice President Johnson to go to South Vietnam because there were reports there that the South Vietnamese were greatly upset by the conduct of the United States in regard to the Bay of Pigs in the fact that we did not follow through the landing and things of that sort. The trip. Was broadened subsequently on the basis of other reports from other of our embassy outpost to include the Philippines. Taiwan Thailand Pakistan. And India. All these points not just began in Saigon with his When and where he met with president GM but in all those countries the leaders
who are friendly to us were very unsettled about the conduct of the United States at the Bay of Pigs. The new administration and they did not feel that their feeling was that a great power such as the United States does not is not tentative toward somebody who's established a. Hostile stronghold 90 miles off shore. And the purpose of this trip was to to be reassuring to them. What what message did you bring the message that he brought back from his message that Vice President Johnson brought back from his trip to Southeast Asian 961 was unanimous among the leaders of the country he visited that they did not want a presence of foreign military troops of any sort in their countries. They were. Already or in on the continent
they were fresh out from under colonial military rule. And. At each stop including Saigon this was the message and it was in the report that Vice President Johnson presented to President Kennedy. It was there also my feelings that it was a good leader and there was anybody to replace him. On his three days in three or four days in South Vietnam in one thousand sixty one president Vice President Johnson talked several times in the palace there with the president of South Vietnam. There was a great deal of criticism of being among. American State Department people and others but also a great deal of support for him among American military. President Johnson's assessment
of the situation just from his what he saw was that GM had done a good job against strong odds great odds odds of culture and history and all else at organizing a government and a country. And making things run. But what he saw behind that from talks with other people was that there was not a there was not a chain of command there was not anybody behind DMN in this was Vice President Johnson knew who could do the same sort of job in organizing and conducting the affairs of South Vietnam. So when Johnson became president yeah I was gone you know heard that. Yes only about 20 days before. Lyndon Johnson became president in November of 1963 DMN was killed in Saigon. And so he began Lyndon Johnson began his
presidency with what he was a situation there that he most feared. How did he feel. We don't love it as well. Did you ever say Mike this 613 pixel. Like this. Just above it was the scene on that final day there when you walked into the president's bedroom and there were TVs and valets and doctors. The scenes at the White House close in around a president are not all that often times are not the way the public would perceive it I think. When I arrived at the White House on the morning of March 30 first I entered the presidential bedroom which expecting to find only him there. And it's not a large room but instead I found a real gathering.
All of which was related to the presidential debate one way or another. He was on the phone standing. And he always had long long cords on his telephone so he could wherever he was and always live so he could walk all over the room. So with this long corridor he was walking to the center of the room and using his free hand to dive in his grandson who was squeal and fall over and his mother Lucy would pick him up and set him up for the next. Approach of his grandfather in the far corner of the room the presidential valets who are servicemen were opening in boxes and laying out three new suits that had just arrived from the tailor and matching them up with the shirt appropriate shirts and ties for him to select one to use on his broadcast that night. There were some friends of the president private friends who'd spent the night while they were scattered about the room and to my right and I entered were two military
officers one of them being a naval physician who was stationed at the White House and the other one I assumed was a physician. And so when the president got off the phone he first went over and picked up the suit he wanted to wear. Then he came over to the Navy doctors and he was on the phone again by then and President Johnson had on his hands what we were called in rural Texas skin cancers which he was always putting something on or having them cut off and so he while he was talking he held out his hand to the visiting doctor who immediately adjusted an eyepiece on the glass and bent over examined it took a sip again taking small tools out of his kit and he was scraping this one of these skin cancers. The president was talking to someone I think a Cabinet officer and he didn't explain what was going on but about every
15 seconds he would be let go with some loud response to the to the doctor scraping on his hand oh you got it then I do not know what the other party of the letter into the phone might have been thinking was wrong with the president. But he was doing all these things simultaneously. He continued to play with the grandson too along with all those. But that's that was the scene at the start of this. This day immediately after this he had attended all these things. You're going to go broke. Well I think if he was concerned about protecting you from why you were grafting in those final moments what did he tell you. I want to get that don't go down the stairs with somebody behind you know who that will go. Yeah really get out.
The president had me in the White House on the second floor in what's known as the Treaty Room actually in ancient times or most of the presidencies. That's where the president received people who just walked in off the street. But I was in the Treaty Room said look guys it was the only room on the floor that had a desk on which one could write. He had not hidden me away by any means but the discovery that I was there a great deal of credibility to the fact that he might be serious about what he was doing. Since over a period of about 20 years I had written many of his most important speeches. But what if the way in which he used it he would go to the West Wing where the executive offices are and began talking among his assistants saying that I was over there pushing him which was preposterous advocating that he withdraw from the
presidency and so this caused them to respond to meet me against me and rather heatedly I understand a number of instances you know what. Why does he think that and the president didn't disclose his own feelings because he wanted to hear the argument. And he came back several times and told me that they're all against you and once he came back and said don't go over the West Wing Walk down the stairs in front of anybody. But that was the I have no idea who was saying what he was just coming back over saying that one White House staff person a woman wrote a book and said that if she could have gotten to me that night she would have choked me to death. Not suppose that was the level of incipient violence that he was reporting. What kind of a guy was what made him tick. Give us an adjective. Was he in secure hospital.
Well he was. Awfully close to him you say and he was sort of a one of a kind person. Some books some authors who've written about him and used phrases like that that we never saw his kind before and likely will never see it again. And the legislature in the in the realm of the national government not state governors that a government run in the national government he was as near to a genius as the system has produced at making it work at that. I'm talking about the political the political process. He was not a he was imbued with the. The philosophies of the 30s are the objectives of the 30s in fact much of it he did say will get into policy just as a man well kept he was he was a tumultuous person.
He had he had many wars going on within himself. He did he knew he was good yet he never thought he was good enough. He had insecurity that often accompanies these men who rise to the top of our system. He was a he could he had a great comic sense a great satirical sense even of himself which he didn't disclose to very many people would he make money. He was very. Funny story which would be funny. He was very funny man in private. He could not tell I could not speak easily before a big crowd with one liners. That was not his style but. When he would sit down to recall an event a meeting between two men or between himself and someone he would it we would be rolling around the floor almost for 30 minutes he
drew the story out quite at length but he making little satirical comments on the human condition as he went. And he was stormy. He he. He would scream at people and yell at people and try to make everybody function for he often with snap his fingers and say less function less function less function. He never had done enough. And no one around him it done enough and he he he worked. Long he worked too much in some respects he was too obsessed with it. How did he personalize the world when pilots would go down during the take I was president. I felt that at the beginning of 965 when there were some raids being made off of our carriers on the North Vietnam that of watching him. Every night.
He knew what right he was going to be made. He would awaken in his bedroom about two or three o'clock in the morning at four o'clock and call the Pentagon a room that he was supposed to call and ask if the boys had gotten back. Maybe they were two planes or four planes are not big not big operations and. By the time staff got around him at 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning if he knew one of the planes was not back it cast a pall on his mood. Yeah good. Yes at one level it was. Commendable I think that he had that personal concern for the man at another level. I often pondered whether a commander in chief can be that close to can personalize a battle that that is intensely and closely and still seek still keep his perspective because it doesn't reduce stand of those individuals. How do you feel in 65 when the troops are committed.
But we were the men. Oh yes he went when the commitment began and it never was of the commitment of troops to. Vietnam which eventually grew to around 500000 I believe came slowly it was not just a one day announcement that we're going to do what we eventually did there was hope on his part always and he was often told as by advisers and the use and another thousand men or 2000 men and that may be enough and it will all stop. His advisers were. In 65 were very optimistic about a small commitment of strength resulting in a big dividend in terms of shortening the war. I don't think he was optimistic. He saw the war. He saw the what ultimately came. In public reaction here he saw earlier than his advisers and feared. Wanted to avoid. And I think he was skeptical
about the courses of action that he took or that we were taking collectively as a government. I think we got we had a young vote.
- Raw Footage
- Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981
- Contributing Organization
- WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip/15-cf9j38kn17
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-cf9j38kn17).
- Description
- Episode Description
- Horace Busby, Special Assistant to President Johnson, discusses Johnson's presidency and his decision not to run for re-election in 1968. He describes Johnson's 1961 trip to Vietnam as Vice President, and recounts his reactions as President to the Pueblo Incident and the Tet Offensive. In addition, Busby reflects on Johnson's character and his style as a leader.
- Date
- 1981-04-24
- Date
- 1981-04-24
- Asset type
- Raw Footage
- Topics
- Global Affairs
- War and Conflict
- Subjects
- Presidents--United States--Messages; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam--Politics and government; Vietnam--History--1945-1975; Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam (Republic); Escalation (Military science); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American; United States--Politics and government; Tet Offensive, 1968; Pueblo (Ship); Presidents--United States--Election; United States--History--1945-; Political consultants; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Presidents--Staff
- Rights
- Rights Note:1) No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the liability of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project.,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
- Media type
- Moving Image
- Duration
- 00:34:26
- Credits
-
-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Busby, Horace W.
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
-
WGBH
Identifier: 80f972a56059ac11104ce1a006e5256ccbfa3035 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:34:24:14
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- Citations
- Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981,” 1981-04-24, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 8, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-cf9j38kn17.
- MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981.” 1981-04-24. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 8, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-cf9j38kn17>.
- APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Horace W. Busby, 1981. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-cf9j38kn17