Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Nguyen Cao Ky, 1981

That. Mr. Key, in 1964, you wanted to take the war north, but why did you do that? What did you hope to accomplish?

Well, because military speaking, I think that's the only way we could stop them. I mean, you could stop the invasion of the Communists. Can't just fight within South Vietnam. It's no way. I remember during the warm conference with President Johnson, I instruct Calvin Vien, the chief of General Staff at that time, to give to the American delegation a complete briefing about our plan. In that, I asked the agreement of American government to support the idea, having me as a volunteer to go north, with two or three Vietnamese division. All what we asked them is to provide us with air support or, you know, a naval supply.

But back in 1964, when this question first came up, what was the reaction of the American? I remember many convoxations I had with the Secretary of the Indra, for example. I had the feeling that American government always afraid that if we go north, then the Chinese Communists will, you know, come south to rescue the Vietnamese Communists. What did you think of that? Would they have come? Well, I remember that time I told Mr. Dean Russ that that thing will not happen. I don't think the Chinese will come south to rescue the Vietnamese Communists. Well, because I don't think the Vietnamese Communists will ask the Chinese to come south.

And second, I think, even at that time, we knew that the Vietnamese Communist leader are more or less sighted with the Russian. And that's something that the Chinese don't like. And you see, what happened today proves that I am right in my judgment. But our goal was always independence for South Vietnam. Was yours the same? I beg pardon? The goal of the United States was always independence for South Vietnam. Yes. It wasn't to conquer the North. Was your goal the same? Oh, yes. Yes. Did you want to reunify with all of Vietnam?

Yes. Sure. Every Vietnamese wanted to see Vietnam unify. But at that time, our first priority is to bring peace back to the whole of China. In the works to stop the Communist invasion first. And then let the people above South and North live in peace for a while. And then maybe later on, let the people decide by themselves. But the best way to stop it was by heading north. Yes. You know, to destroy the enemy capabilities to sustain invasion war. You finally had a chance to go north in February 65. You were in the lead plane of that reprisal attack in Chaplain. Can you tell us what happened and how you felt about it?

Yes, but again, it's a very limited mission, you know, using only air power. Even for a limited mission, incursion into the North, it provides us a big excitement at that time. I was commander of the Air Force at that time. And I remembered it for the first air mission when we crossed the border. I had more pilot volunteers than what we need for the mission. It was good for morale to finally be heading north. Yes. There was a lot of Buddhist unrest in 1964 from the August down. Was cons during this, what was his, what was he doing at that time?

Why all the unrest? Well, why the unrest? Because remember, the Buddhist raised to power not only in 1964, but back in 1963. After the coup, you know, against the President Jim. And the Buddhists become a political force, strong and well organized. But then, I think the Buddhist leaders, they thought that they are the true, the real power. But they began to ask, you know, too much, trying to play a smart politician. He tried to accommodate, you know, not only the Buddhist, but other groups, other factions also.

And that's the cause of the downfall of Hank. There are so much groups, so much factions, so much differences that you couldn't please everyone and get the support from everyone. Were you instrumental in trying to get him out? I arranged the departure of Hank, but I never really wanted his departure. I arranged his departure only after he shows that he could not govern any more. Remember that time, and coup, and anti-coup, happen every two, three weeks, every month.

He saw it now. So you gave him a medal and set him on the way? Yeah, I think that's the best arrangement I can get from him. I like him, but because he's instability, you know, political instability. So the feeling among the senior, you know, General Officer that time, was against him. Tell me about your relationship with Ambassador Taylor. The incident, I think, was December 1964 when he got you and some of the other generals and came to a tongue lash. Well, when Jen Taylor was Ambassador in Saigon, you know, I was the junior officer.

One start, general commanding of the Air Force. So actually, I didn't have too much, you know, relations or conversation with Taylor. But we had met once, and I had the impression that he looked down, you know, on us like a big brother, you know, looking down the young junior officer. Tell us what happened when you first went into the emergency office to see Taylor. Well, I think that day, the armed forces had decided to abolish the National High Council, you know, a civilian body.

So I think Ambassador Taylor was very, you know, unhappy. That morning, we were all meet together at the headquarters, the General Chief Staff. And General Kang, after talking with Ambassador Taylor in the telephone, he said to us, he said that Taylor wants to meet with me. And I'm not going, so why don't you, he asked me, and General Till and Admiral Kang, I think, the commander of the Navy, maybe. And General Till, so four of us, we went down the American embassy to see Ambassador Taylor. So when we first came in, you know, in his office, he was, he looked very, very, you know, unhappy.

He didn't even check hand with us, just say, okay, sit down. So we sit down and listen to him. And he said, well, General Till and remember a few days ago, I gave a dinner. And I told you that we want stability, we don't have any trouble, any changes. And now, see what happened, you know, you abolished the National Council and so on and so on. So he said something like, it's a waste, you know, either waste of time or waste of food that he gave to us. But, well, I understood that it was a waste of food. So I said to him, I said, now listen, General, I don't think it's a waste.

Because I remember the piece of a steak that you gave to me, it's the best piece of a steak I never had in my, you know, whole life as a pool of Vietnamese. So I really appreciate the food. It's not a waste. He said, why you did that, why you did, I said, well, why you did, because we thought it's in our interest, the interest of a Vietnam. Well, that's a whole, you know, conversation, because he didn't convince us that we are doing wrong or either we're convincing that he's wrong when we are right. How did you feel in June of 1965 when you finally became the Prime Minister? How did you feel then? Were you optimistic, were you excited?

Frankly, remember is it that day because the fight between the civilian factors, you know, at the time we had a chief of state and the Prime Minister, more of a civilian. Maybe long to two different political parties, you know. So at the end, they couldn't govern because the chief of state is against the Prime Minister. So I remember that night about 11 o'clock, they called all of us, the armed forces council to the Prime Minister office, and they decided both, you know, resign and handed the power back to the military. And after that, we had a long meeting at the headquarters of the Marine Corps to decide who will be, you know, the next Prime Minister.

And I remember that we first proposed a gentleman till, because he was the senior officer at that time, but facing the difficult situation at that time, till refused. And after that, we proposed a few more. So when you were finally appointed to the Prime Minister, how did you feel when you decided you finally had a chance to run your government? Well, I'm not excited because first I didn't want that responsibility. I didn't want that job. But as I mentioned earlier, after, you know, almost two days meeting and after we proposed a few more, you know, senior army general,

like a corn, tea, and all they declined, you know, refused the responsibilities. So at the end, they all come to me and said, well, what about you, Ki? Because now that the civilian handed the power to us, you know, we must have someone, you know, responsible for the government. So when we come back to the meeting and I asked all of them 60 or 70 of them, you know, in the room, I said, okay, one more time. Anyone want to be Prime Minister? And I said no. So I proposed Ki and all of them just stood up and, you know, accept the offer. But then I didn't give them the answer. I said I have to go back and talk with my wife first.

And when I told her about that offer, you know, she was not excited. She said, oh no, not that job, not as a Prime Minister. I said, oh, what can I do now? So I accept the role and responsibilities with only one goal in my mind, which is to bring back stability to Soviet now, to write a new constitution, and to establish a new regime, a democratic regime in Soviet know. I was not excited. You know, I accept the role, responsibilities as any other responsibility to one of my country. How did you feel when the American troops were building up in 65? Did you, was this necessary or were you worried that they would take over the war?

Did they ever make aid? No, I didn't think that they would take over the war, you know, over the responsibilities of the Vietnamese. But then, 68, 69, they really took over, you know, the responsibilities. But at the beginning, they were necessary. No. They were not necessary? Well, at the beginning, when I was a Prime Minister, I think we need additional troops right at a time. So the arriving of American troops was welcome. But instead of strengthening, you know, the Vietnamese forces to replace, you know, the American unit, you see, in the next years, more American troops coming. They really built up a big, massive armed forces, air, sea, and ground forces.

So after that, they are so, you know, involving in the war that they took over everything. And that's bad, because at the end, we lost our own identity. The Communists become the true nationalists, and we become American puppet. And that's American press help a lot too, to make it appear that we are, you know, puppet of American. Well, we'll get to that later. But let me ask you about the telefinism.

Mr. Gui, let's jump ahead to the telefinism. Why wasn't there a general uprising as the Communists to help for? Because the majority of the Vietnamese are against Communism. That's what I'm trying to tell everyone, you know, for many years. Basically, we are against Communism, not only the southerners, but even the people, many people in the north, are against Communists. So, their goal of trying to inspire a general uprising, do you think this was a realistic goal? That's what they thought. But the state offensive shows to them and to the whole world that the Vietnamese armed forces are capable to stop their offensive. And also to show that the majority of the Vietnamese people are supporting a non-Communist regime in South Vietnam.

You won the battle, didn't you? I won the battle. I can say, I won the battle because I was by myself that night till I was out of town and I was by myself. Two o'clock in the morning, the base commander, he called me, he said, well, better you took a helicopter with your family and go somewhere. Because he's no longer safe the base, they are inside the base. And he said to me that he had many casualties, he had no reinforcements and he didn't think he could hold them longer. Well, I said that if you stay, then I will stay. And then we stay and fight them and we stop them.

This is a Tanzanu. So the next morning I took over the command, direct the troops, security forces, the police forces. And I dispatched Jinnan Tang down to the forecourt, the Delta. And we actually cleaned them out all the city within two months. And they suffer a lot of big, heavy casualties. It was widely reported in the American press as a victory for the continent. I don't know, during the war time, you know, everything they did, the American press make it a big nose and big victory for them. I had the impression that all along the war, the Western press signing with them.

But it wasn't big. No, you can see by yourself that the people stay with us and the soldiers stay and fight. And it was a victory for the non-communist. What was the... The press also gave us a picture of vast social changes in the 1960s, after 1968. You know, prostitution and overcrowding because of the refugees and so on. Did this terra part of the fabric of South Korea and South Vietnamese like you coming on that? Prostitution.

Tell me, is somewhere in this work that there is no prostitution? Tell me some city, some country where there is no prostitution. So there is prostitution in Vietnam, in Saigon, of course. There is corruption, of course. There is black market, yes. But because we are living in war for a long time, 30 years. And with the vast, the big presence of our foreign troops in Vietnam, it created a lot of social problems. But we recognize the problem and we face them and try to solve it. But we lost the war not because prostitution, not because corruption, but because from the beginning we had adopt a strong, a wrong strategy.

That's all. But when you came to the United States in 1970, I would hear your reaction to the demonstrations and the media comments. Did you think that the U.S. support for South Vietnam was running out? You did the end of the American involvement, was it all the American people and the American wealth and money? And didn't this have a real effect on South Vietnamese customs? Oh, yeah. Tell us about it. What did you feel personally that it was doing to your society? The American President. Well, like a black market.

The press at the time tried to blame it on Vietnamese official or Vietnamese people. You know that most of the goods that are selling at the black market come from the various PX. So it's wartime. A lot of people, both sides, American as well as Vietnamese, are involved in the black market. So it created a big upside-down of the society. But did you feel your society was losing its identity and how? Well, losing identity first because at the time, all you heard about war is from American side.

So people are paying more attention about what Mr. Johnson said, what General Roy Smullen said, what McNamara said. But concerning what we said, what do you think? The people just ignore it. That's the biggest loss that we suffer. Even among the military, the Vietnamese unit who fought alongside American unit had received more commodities, or more facilities, ice cream, food, cigarette. So at the end, they are so American as that I remember one day I told Thiel and Vien

that if we continue like this, someday when Americans withdraw, go home. The Vietnamese armed forces will no longer have all the facilities and commodities that we have today. And the fighting capacities that soldiers will diminish. No, no, vice versa. I think it's really changed the face of the society. In the works, no, not better. The communists could then say, we're the ones that are going to preserve the society.

Exactly. Well, that's the reason they use it for their propaganda. They said that we are puppet of American. We are working for American, precinct money from American, die for American. Why they are the true liberator, you know. They fought for a national, nationalist goals and for the Vietnamese people. So when you look just at the surface, when you look at what happened, you know, to the society. A lot of people listen to their propaganda and believe them. That's why I remember one day I told Mr. Johnson and I said, why don't you just stay, you know, behind the scene,

like a Russian, like a Chinese, and let us make the show. Do the show. Well, he's just smart and we never get, you know, a good respond from American government. They want to do, most of the time, they want to do it by themselves. Well, like a big executive officer of a big, you know, money factors. While I invest money, soldiers, equipment, I want to control, I want to direct. I want to take this decision. Tell me, when you came to the United States in 1970, I saw this coming.

When you came here in 1970, I saw the demonstrations and the media comments. How did you feel about that, those? Well, I had a demonstration in New Zealand, in Philippine, and of course during my visit to the United States back in 1970. Can I tell you an example, when I stayed Williamsburg before I went to the White House, we stayed one night at Williamsburg with my wife, and it was very cold. And the next morning, when I woke up, there was a group of 30 of them, a young, so-called hippie, you know, long hair and dirty.

They stood outside, shouting. So we were escorted by 21, a secret agent at that time. So I asked the chief secret agent to invite them to come inside the hotel, and I would come down and talk with them. So first he said, oh no, I can't let them come closer to you because they are dangerous people, taking drugs and so on. I said, no, just let them, because it's cold outside. I invite them to come inside, warm, and I want to meet and talk with them. So finally, they arranged for not all of them, but about 15 of them to come inside the lobby. So I come down and I stood there, you know, they all surrounded me.

So I asked them, what are you against? They said, I'm against the war. We are against the war. Well, I said, me too, I'm against the war. The reason I'm against the war, because in war I risk my life every minute. And you can see that I have a beautiful wife and a beautiful family. And I want to live, not to die in wartime. So I asked you, as any other people in the world, I'm against the war. But when the war is imposed on you and when you have to defend your own country and then you have to accept war, as I said, we are against corruption. I said, me too, I'm against corruption.

Do you think I, as a chief of government, I am corrupt? I said, not you, but, you know, you are a government. I said, yeah, that is true, there is corruption in Vietnam, as there is corruption in anywhere. Can you tell me that in your own society, there is no, the most advanced society in the world, that can you tell me today that there is no corruption? And they thought about it, they said, oh, you are right. So, you know, I talk with them and I explain to them everything, you know, with honesty, with my heart. And then when I left for the White House, they all stood there and, you know, clapped. And the guy from the State Department, you know, who escort us, you know, he said to me, well, I think President Nixon needs you stay here as he is advised, you know, for PR, public relations.

So, you know, that's that kind of a meeting. I had many in my life. But in general, were you discouraged by the way you were received from other demonstration? That must have hurt your feelings? No, not at all, because I know that whether they are against me because they are ignorance or because they are, they belong to the other side, the Communist. And I know that I cannot change the Communist, I cannot change their mind, as I know that they cannot change my mind. Now, for the people who... I want to go on to the election in Saigon in 1971. But why do you withdraw from the race?

Well, because we knew, for sure, that we will not have a clean election. The tear will rig the election. That's all. Oh, yes. But why? Well, the reason he won the election with 104 percent of the vote. So, why? Why? Because the power corrupts. Once you stay there for four years, you won four years miles, and after that you won eight years more. So, you didn't want to be part of this? No, not at all. But the American ambassador, Bunker, won very much at the people like me, or Big Ming, you know, participate in the election.

But we refuse to play the game. And even Bunker comes to my house and offers financial aid if I accept to run against Mr. Teo. But I didn't accept it. Why? Because I'm honest. During 72 and 73, when the peace negotiations were going on, did you think that the South could survive the terms of the proposed agreement, the ceasefire and place itself? Well, the South could survive with only one condition. In that condition, I mentioned it to Mr. Nixon and led on to handy Kissinger. And that only condition that we asked was the Communist North Vietnam will accept to withdraw all the North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.

But at the end, I don't think we got this agreement from the Communist North Vietnam. No, the ceasefire and place, and they stayed there. Did you feel that Nixon and Kissinger were abandoning you? Well, I feel that particularly for Henry Kissinger, I had the feeling that he made more concession to the other side to the Communist than he was really trying to defend us as a friend. You sort of felt that he was abandoning you?

Yeah. Yeah, I think he made too much concession to the Communist. Well, the fact that, you know, his irony was that after the treaty was signed, and both Kissinger and the Communist led it all. Both got the Nobel Prize for peace. So, you know, you can see that we, you know, the non-Communist Vietnamese are the victims. These are some questions for Elizabeth Dean. After the agreements, there were immediate violations, I guess, on both sides. How did the two government view the violations on both sides? Well, you know that in any military, military truth, you know,

unless you have international forces, you know, for the control. Otherwise, if you just live it to the, you know, the soul, to the two parties involved it. Of course, they will violate it, and the war, the fight will continue. That's what I suggest to them before, you know, the treaty. I said we should have once the treaty was signed in international forces, you know, for the control and the implementation of the agreement. But Washington could have been more helpful at that time if there hadn't been Watergate and Nixon's resignation and so on. Were you keeping a close eye on Washington, what was the American politics? Do you think they affected the... I didn't realize that factors, you know, before my visit in 1970 to Washington.

But then after that visit, I came back to Saigon and I told Thiel that we should do something, you know, concerning a public opinion in America. But Thiel didn't listen to me. What were the thoughts in Saigon at that time about Nixon's resignation and Watergate and all that? Well, first we thought that Watergate, you know, the whole of things was a ridiculous. You know, it came as a big surprise for all of us that because Watergate, so an American president had to be signed because we don't think Nixon did something different than all the, you know, American president, than all the American politicians.

The only thing wrong with him was, you know, he's not coming out the very first minute and I'd meet that, yes, I did it, like other did it before me, but now if you people don't like it, okay, I apologize, I will not do it again. And that's it, finished. How did you feel all this with effect? But then after he's resigned, you know, and then we... We saw the trouble coming because... And now the Congress and the press, you know, had the control of everything. The executive branch with the resignation of the press, and it was so weak, weak at that time, you know, couldn't do anything to help us. Because something depressed and the Congress, we knew before the resignation they're feeling, you know, they're reaction about the problem of Vietnam.

So we were, you know, we know that we are in trouble because no longer after Mr. Nixon's resignation, we had to support all of the Congress or the public opinion, no more. On the 1st of January 1975, when the Communist attack fucked in, did you think you were troubled then, did you think this was the beginning of a big final offensive or was this just one important battle? Personally, I knew that it was the beginning. But as you know, in the past, we had such kind of offensive, you know, every three months, every four months, every five months. So I believe that we could, you know, resist the offensive and stop them. But then, when it happened with Ban Mi Tuat,

and seeing the two core commanders and his staff, you know, retreat to the South, an abundant play cool, I went to see a Jinan Kao Van Vien and asked him to give me a troops, a tanks, and then I will let that column to reoccupy Ban Mi Tuat. And Vien said it was, you can do it, but he had to ask the two formation. And that formation never, you know, reached us. So we lost the whole two core area. The Highlands were always very, traditionally, have been very important.

And they were very important to French strategic thinking. Why is that? Well, because when you see on the map, you know, the figure of Vietnam, you know, the one who can occupy the Highland can cut Vietnam in two easily. Second, because they have the Ho Chi Minh Trail and their troops, their centers in Cambodia, you know. If they can occupy permanently the Highland, and then it's a link between, you know, the Highland and the North and the Cambodia and Laos, or in their long runs, you know, we'll lost anyway. They will cut Vietnam in two. In April, later on, when the army was, North Vietnamese army was sweeping down the country, you were trying to work out a coup against Jew or to force him to resign. Yeah.

If you had gained some political power there, how would you cope with this message? I think the whole problem is still a military leadership. When you look back in every battle from the beginning, one made to a placo, the second core, and then Nhat Trang, and then the I core, you can see that what happened was the core commander, you know, choose to run first. So I thought that if the, you know, the commanding, you know, choose to stay and fight, the soldiers will stay and fight with them. And the whole problem for us at that time was the troops stay and fight. That's what I told Martin, when he came to my home, American ambassador,

and he discussed with me about, you know, having me taking over the government, what will be our military, you know, position, strategy, and political and so on. So I told him that the first thing we have to do is stop the enemy happens, you know, by having our troops stay and fight. And I could do it. If I stood there and fight, they would, you know, stay and fight with me. Did he encourage you to take over? Yeah, that's what he discussed with me when he came to my home. Why didn't you? Well, because, and then we went, you know, he said something like, well, give him some day. You know, he will make a arrangement for Mr. Tio to go on something like that. But then what happened was, well, the French ambassador, you know, went to them

and offered a solution acceptable to the commoners, which is Mr. Tio Gold and Big Ning replaced him as, you know, the head of the government. So they, they accept the solution and what happened, you can see. Now, when you actually left the country, when did you think it was all over? When did you have to leave and how did you do it? Well, you know, I'm a soldier. Even in the last second, I still had some hopes that I could do something. So that morning of the 29, you know, I stayed up on the air the whole night,

directing air power to destroy the last missile position of the enemy. So the next morning, I went to the headquarters of the Jinnon staff. From where I tried to call the Marines, the power troopers, the Air Force, you know, tried to call all the units and maybe have the last meeting trying to do Sunday. But then all they left, the morning of the 29. So I was by myself, you know, in a big compound of the headquarters. So I've known time when American helicopter, you know, stuck their evacuation flight. My aunt, the com, he said to me, well, Jinnon, I think, is too late now.

And of course, the communists are, you know, coming all over. So he said to me, you couldn't do nothing, it's too late now. It's better you fly out. So I decided to fly out with my own helicopter to the midway aircraft carrier. What was it like when you landed on the midway? Well, with the helicopter, you know, it's easy landing. You threw it yourself? Tell us a thing that you actually threw it. Well, people don't wouldn't make it you threw it that you have a pilot. And I think all I know, all, like, the only thing I can do well is, you know, flying the airplane. I'm not the good politicians. I'm not a good diplomat because I'm too honest.

Did you feel that the Americans would, somehow, hope that the Americans would come in during this April period, that the BVP Jews would come back and that we were waiting for us to do something? A lot of people, a lot of Vietnamese people are, you know, hoping, expecting that the American government will, you know. But personally, now, because three days before the end, I had a meeting with that guy named Abortesundi. His assistant secretary of defense of material. He came, so we had time to oversee, you know, the evacuation of the material, or the destruction of the material. So I met with him at headquarters of Vietnamese Air Force.

So I asked him, if I decide to go south, you know, and regroup the troops down the Meekam River, the Delta, and continue the fight. You think American government will support the idea? And he looked at me and he said, no. And he said, when I go, you better go with me. If you look back at the whole history of the war, when did you feel it was lost? As I said, you know, until the last second, I'm still hoping that, you know, I personally can do something. But as I said earlier, that, you know, sinks right after the Paris Treaty was signed. I felt firmly that with ill-empower and nothing changed, we're going to lose the war to the communist.

I said it before it happened, and it happened, as I said it. Was the problem too, or was the problem that the Vietnamese were left in place? Well, I think mainly the problem was too. The problem of military leadership was the South Vietnamese government. Because if we are strong enough, you know, we can deal with the 300 to 400,000 North Vietnamese troops. Did you feel betrayed by the Americans in Paris? No, because in the whole affair, I still think that we, you know, have to build responsibilities because it's our country. Because it's our government, our people, our armed forces. And because we are not capable to build a strong army, a strong regime, that's why we lost the war.

You want to go back? We go back sometimes? I'm going back. It's no doubt. Oh yeah, yeah, I'm going back, no doubt. Because, you know, when you look at the situation a bit now, today, you know, millions of people are suffering, whether in the so-called education camp, are living in misery. There's not only no freedom, but no food, no medicine, nothing. When you look at thousands of so-called bot people who are trying to risking their lives, risking everything, trying to escape South Vietnam every day now, who they are? They are not imperialists, they are not the enemy of the regime. They are just a poor, you know, innocent person.

Why those people, you know, still today have to risk everything to escape the communist regime. And even today, they still use my name and look upon me as someone who can save them, liberate from that. So it's my duty and my responsibility is I have to go back. It's no doubt. 28 minutes. Why do you want to go more than 60 hours? Well, I want to go now because that's the only way to stop them, you know. And also, there are centuries in the South for them. So there is no way, no reason why we don't have our own centuries of North Vietnam. And not only we can use those centuries as a rally point for the anti-communist people in North Vietnam,

but also tying down their troops so that they will not have, you know, too much to send down South. It's very clear and simple. That's the reason. Did you want to establish outposts? Yeah. Well, big centuries, a big, you know, set zone for our military camp. And particularly at that time, the support we can have from the air and sea, American sea and air forces, you know. It's easy. And that continued to be your feeling all the way long. Oh, yeah, all that time. And also, I advocate the blockade of a high fund mining a high fund.

And that's what Nixon did, you know. But they went, how many years to do it? You should, you know, do it right at the beginning. Well, I think this is just right.