War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with James Killian, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES CO3040-C03042 JAMES KILLIAN

Eisenhower's Science Advisers and the Threat of a Soviet Surprise Attack

Interviewer:

WHY DID PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SET UP THE SURPRISE ATTACK PANEL?

Killian:

In the early 1950s, and particularly in 1954, there had been much

discussion in part resulting from intelligence reports which were not

accurate about the great bomber fleet that the Russians were

developing. The intelligence about that bomber fleet resulted in a

number of actions taken by this country including the building of the

DEW Line which was developed at the Lincoln Laboratory here at MIT. A

line to report any plane crossing it, but placed in the Arctic. It was

quite a feat to do that. And it was at that time that Eisenhower was

worrying, based upon his military experience and based upon Pearl

Harbor, that a surprise attack was one of the major hazards that we had

to consider in our military planning. And in the protection of the

country. So when...Bobby Cutler, who at that time was a National

Security Advisor to the President went to him. Told him he thought he

ought to have a thorough study of the scientific measures to prevent

surprise attack in this country. Eisenhower picked that up immediately

and asked the Science Advisory Committee, the old Truman committee then

still in existence as Truman had appointed it to undertake a study of

surprise attack. At that time Lee DuBridge was chairman of that

committee, although Rabi of Columbia was very active too. Rabi had been

a friend of Eisenhower's when Eisenhower was President of the Columbia.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE A PARTICULAR TYPE OF ATTACK THAT EISENHOWER WAS CONCERNED

WITH?

Killian:

Well, I suppose at that time, mainly a... a bomber attack on the part

of the Russians. Because there had been so much discussion and so much

allegation particularly by the Air Force that the Russians have a

massive strength in the bombers they were building and could attack us

from the North of from the sea and that we should have ways of

anticipating or countering such an attack.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE CONCERN ABOUT THE H-BOMB AT THAT POINT?

Killian:

No. Not particularly. Although the H-bomb, of course, was a factor, it

was under development, But I don't think that related to this

particular...this decision. What actually happened was that Cutler,

after talking with Eisenhower asked him formally to invite the Science

Advisory Committee to undertake this study. And Eisenhower wrote a

letter to a Dr. Lee DuBridge then president of Cal Tech and chairman of

the President's Science Advisory Committee, ...head of the radiation

laboratory at MIT that developed radar during the war, to undertake to

set up a special panel to undertake a study of ways to cope with

surprise attack.

Interviewer:

THIS WAS JUST AFTER THE RUSSIANS HAD EXPLODED THEIR FIRST H-BOMB.

Killian:

I believe that's right.

Interviewer:

SO WHY WASN'T THAT A PARTICULAR CONCERN?

Killian:

It doubtless was in the minds of Eisenhower...

Interviewer:

THAT'S WHAT I WAS WONDERING. WHETHER THE H-BOMB HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH

EISENHOWER REQUESTING THIS REPORT ON SURPRISE ATTACK.

Killian:

It certainly effected his thinking. But I suspect that the bomber

hazard was... played a larger role at that particular time. But he was

I'm sure, greatly concerned about the the H-bomb and its development in

this country. And the Soviets duplication. Because of in the White

House ...uh...which is really what happened.

Interviewer:

TELL ME AGAIN THE TWO REASONS THAT EISENHOWER DECIDED TO SET UP THE

SURPRISE ATTACK PANEL.

Killian:

He wanted to as a military man to do all that he could to protect this

country against surprise attack which he felt to be a...the major

hazard as we made our military plans. And the fact that there was so

much discussion, so much intelligence uh...so called uh...to indicate

that the Russians were preparing for...for a force that could make a

surprise attack on the US. That led him to want to do this. Plus the

impact of the work that was going on in both countries on the

development of H...of H-bombs.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID THE PANEL CONCLUDE?

Killian:

The panel once set up it had its first meeting right here at MIT, a

meeting to plan the plans for the science advisory committee.. I had a

call from Sherman Adams at the White House after Sputnik. The President

had talked with, former president of the National Academy of Sciences

and talked with Rabi. And both had urged that the President arrange to

get more scientists involved in his decision making process with

respect to the defense of the country. I had a telephone call from

Sherman Adams asking if I would come down and meet with General

Goodpaster himself, Gordon Gray, and of course Cutler. I went down and

met with them. They looked me over and I guess that when Sherman Adams

excused himself from the meeting and for half an hour and came back and

indicated that they had...the President had reached...a decision to

appoint a science adviser. And I later had breakfast with on a later

date with Eisenhower. And he formally asked me to take the post. And

take leave full time in the White House style reporting directly to

him. And that we'd proceed to set up a...a committee of science

advisers reporting directly to the President. Those were significant

decisions.

Interviewer:

WHY WAS IT SO IMPORTANT FOR EISENHOWER TO HAVE SCIENTISTS ABOARD? WHY

DID HE FEEL LIKE HE NEEDED YOU?

Killian:

Oh, he felt that he had not had adequate science advice up until that

time. The only science advice he was really getting was coming through

the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss. And Louis

Strauss was very protective of of the atom bomb and the whole program

to have. He didn't want those scientists who might have questions about

the atomic energy program to reach Eisenhower. And the only scientist

that Eisenhower really had talked with up until that time of our, Le󀀑

SzilᲤ. He had talked with... brought to him by Strauss. He reported

this in one of his memoirs that he had failed to get balanced science

advice until he appointed his own science advisers.

Interviewer:

THERE WAS A LOT OF TALK ABOUT CIVIL DEFENSE AND I WAS WONDERING YOU

IMPRESSIONS ABOUT CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE AGE OF THE H-BOMB.

Killian:

Yes. There had been a proposal launch discussed intensively in Congress

and elsewhere that we should undertake a shelter program. And a figure

of $40 billion dollars had been used for the US to expend that amount

on building shelters in our cities so that people could escape the

effects of a bomb. We didn't of course know... no one knew about the

later strength of the bombs that we were going to develop. And shelters

didn't make much sense in the end. But anyway there was great support

for the shelter program. That had led to the appointment of the TCP to

make a study of ways that surprise attack might occur and ways of

coping with it... the dead.

Recommendations of the Killian Committee

Interviewer:

WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS IN THE REPORT, MEETING THE THREAT OF SURPRISE

ATTACK? IF YOU COULD JUST SUM UP THE TWO MAIN POINTS THAT WERE

SUGGESTED.

Killian:

Well we we developed narrow concept of what the strategy of the US

should be given the weapons developments that were taking place in

Russia and on our own bark. And drew a... plan which I think had an

impact on the Joint Chiefs and all those involved in military planning.

That was one important thing. The second one was that our report led to

the upgrading to the priority given to the missile program. We

recommended as I said earlier top priority. And Eisenhower did that. We

also recommended that he give top priority to the development of a...

the sea born missile. The Navy had uh.. all kinds of plans about how to

take to sea a missile. They had talked about putting it on the deck of

ships and had other devices. And of course they had talked about

submarines. But a decision had not been reached as to which direction

we should take and whether we should proceed with an underwater missile

delivery system. And we recommended that be given top priority. And

Eisenhower did that. And so the Polaris program was...took off at that

point under the development of a very able group of naval officers and

engineers.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT THE U-2?

Killian:

The U-2 was the next most important development that we ...recommended.

We know..knew about a plane that had been developed by Lockheed that

could fly at altitudes higher than any other existing plane at that

time. I think it was 70,000 feet. Maybe a little more. And the the

panel that I set up as the panel of... for the President Science

Advisory Committee to study intelligence opportunities that we had

concentrated on the development of a reconnaissance plane. I had the

good fortune to get Dr. Land of Polaroid to chair that committee. And

he had first become interested in reconnaissance; that is the obtaining

of intelligence from outside the country. And in a study at MIT called

the Beacon Hill Study, in which he took a very active part. Land did a

brilliant job with this intelligence committee of PSAC and he got

together with the Lockheed people which were very secretly developing

this plane. In a very inaccessible place, Salt Ridge, California. It

did...They didn't want anyone to know they were working on...on this.

But they let us in. And the Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee

became convinced that that was an instrument we could use And that

combined with the fact that developments in photography of a high

sensitivity plus certain other technical developments would make it

possible to build an airplane that could fly higher than the Russians

could shoot. And that it did at first. And that could fly far enough.

And it did. It flew across Russia gathering intelligence. And the most

exciting times that I had was when George Kistiakowsky who had

specialized on missiles and I would take the pictures that our U-2 was

getting in flying over Russia that showed Eisenhower definitely that

the Russians were behind us in their building of missiles. ...was

campaigning about the missile gap and Eisenhower knew it because he had

positive evidence from these photographs that we were showing him that

the Russians were primitive at that stage in their development. They

speeded up a great deal later on. And that led him...led Eisenhower to

go all out in supporting our own work in the development particularly

of solid fuel missiles which we had recommended rather than liquid

fuel. Liquid fuel is hard to handle and particularly even

in...in...with uh...solid fuels and liquid fuels, those we saw in the

disaster we recently had in the shuttle.

[END OF TAPE C03040]

Killian:

...uh...I might also add that it was well received in government

particularly by the military which we might have gotten cross wired

with, but we didn't. We supported, it turned out, things that they had

dreamed about, but hadn't been able to move ahead on. And we had

Interviewer:

IF. . .

Killian:

...military representatives sitting in on that committee when we were

meeting if they choose to do so. Well, there was good communication

between the Department of Defense and these group of civilian

scientists.

Interviewer:

IF YOU REALIZED THAT CIVIL DEFENSE WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT A LOT OF

MONEY SHOULD BE SPENT ON...

Killian:

We didn't. Unquestionably,

Interviewer:

WHAT FACTOR DID SETTING UP A DETERRENT IN ORDER THAT SAC WAS NO LONGER

VULNERABLE PLAY IN YOUR REPORT?

Killian:

We particularly supported the plan to have SAC planes flying in the air

all the time. Uh., that was one way to protect them. And actually,

never proceeded with any underground hangars. ...think I'm right in

saying that for Sac plane. So the shelter concept didn't appeal to the

air officers, General LeMay who headed SAC. But there was much

discussion and much debate about the...putting SAC planes in the air

all the time. They would have to land to refuel and so on, but there

was a period when we had planes loaded with deadly bombs and missiles

flying over all the time. And they were safe in the air.

Lack of Confidence in American Scientific Community after Sputnik

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO SPUTNIK?

Killian:

The reaction to Sputnik was panic on the part of American people. And I

think much too much fear and concern. Because the American people were

sensitive to all they were hearing about bomb developments and so on.

And the American people had inadequate science education. Incidentally,

one of the things that came out of that study and of PSAC ...was the

great stress on the improvement of our science education in our high

schools. Uh.. and there was a famous study that took place under PSAC

headed by Dr. Zacharias here at MIT called the PSSC, Physics...

Physical Sciences Study Committee that had designed a new program for

teaching physics, in high schools. And the laboratory

equipment...equipment made out of ordinary things like bottle stoppers

and...it didn't cost much. And a PSSC book and that course of study in

the high schools really came out of this group of physicists some of

which had been inspired by their participation in PSAC. Zacharias was

one of them.

Interviewer:

YOU TOLD ME ABOUT LETTERS YOU RECEIVED AFTER SPUTNIK?

Killian:

Talking about?

Interviewer:

YOU HAD TOLD ME ABOUT LETTERS YOU RECEIVED FROM PARENTS...

Killian:

Yes.

Interviewer:

TELL ME ABOUT THAT.

Killian:

Well, the people were obviously frightened about Sputnik and my office

received something like 4,000 letters. Most of them from parents

concerned about the teaching in the schools and high schools and making

suggestions as to how that should be improved. And it was later on that

Zacharias and Rabi and that group took up this program. And we

organized a a little company...a non profit company to handle the

building of laboratory equipment and the publication of the book. The

book is still being published by uh... Raytheon. Their subsidiary that

publishes books. And it sold over a million copies around the world its

the best physics book probably in existence.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY OTHER...

Killian:

But the fact that there was so much evidence of concern by the American

people took place back in 1955, '56, '57 anticipating the results of

the report that came out, when was it just a few years back. The famous

report...

Interviewer:

IS IT THE GAITHER REPORT YOU'RE REFERRING TO?

Killian:

Yes. The report that got such wide publicity about the failure of our

schools...

Interviewer:

OH. OH. RIGHT. THE EDU... RIGHT. DO YOU REMEMBER

Killian:

But this had been accomplished for a period of time and then faded back

in 1950... the early 1950s.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER OTHER STORIES ABOUT REACTIONS TO SPUTNIK, ABOUT THE

PANIC? WHAT WAS TELLER SAYING AFTER SPUTNIK? DO YOU KNOW?

Killian:

I remember that Eisenhower announced the appointment of a science

adviser and of a PSAC on a national tel...televised speech. And

announced my appointment in that speech. Uh....that really put me on

the spot. And I wouldn't recommend anyone taking an appointment when

announced by the President in a nationwide broadcast. It doesn't give

you any time to get ready and puts you in...a...a position of being

spectacular more than you would be able to achieve probably. But that's

the way it happened. And there was wide spread reactions to this speech

and to the appointment that I was to be czar of the... all defense

programs. That wasn't the idea at all. But there were many newspaper

headline, Killian Made Czar of US Defense Research and other reactions

of that kind. Because the intent was not sharp enough or clear enough

to indicate that my role would be that of an adviser. My associates

reporting directly to the President for the first time in the history

of this country we had that arrangement. And we had meetings with the

President repeatedly which were memorable occasions for us, because

Eisenhower not only was interested, but informed. And we would go in to

meet with him to discuss some particular problem on his agenda or on

ours and usually wind up spending an hour, an hour and a half with him.

He liked to talk about uh.. scientific and technological models. And

those were really delightful sessions with a very humane man. And

incidentally, one of the things that was accomplished in this whole

effort was that the reaction to the Oppenheimer case where the general

reaction of the scientific community was, of course, one of being upset

by the way Eisenhower made the final decision to uh... take severance

away from Oppenheimer That was a most unfortunate decision. But the

impact of PSAC and...Ike having... right at his side a group of

scientists to...who had no trouble seeing him at any time helped to I

think rebuild the confidence of the science community in Eisenhower.

And that was an important accomplishment.

Test Ban Efforts under Eisenhower Administration

Interviewer:

HOW SINCERE WAS EISENHOWER IN HIS QUEST FOR A TEST BAN WITH THE

RUSSIANS?

Killian:

Have a test bomb...

Interviewer:

A TEST BAN...DID EISENHOWER REALLY WANT...

Killian:

There...there was a lot of public discussion about test ban and one of

the principle interests of the President's Science Advisory Committee

and mine was to support Eisenhower's intense efforts to move ahead on a

test baa. We at first were reluctant to get into that debate or

argument, but decided we couldn't avoid it. And we...the whole

committee went down to Puerto Rico to an Air Force base and spent a

week debating whether we felt we could support Eisenhower's plans to

proceed with discussions with the Soviets for a test ban program. We

had, the only time we took a vote in that committee was at that

meeting. And the one person who voted no was Herbert York who later on

became the most ardent advocate of uh.. disarmament and efforts

to...achieve test ban. But anyway a dramatic incident occurred. The

President had invited me to sit with the National Security Council at

its meetings. And at one of these meetings Dulles was talking about

the...increasing attacks on the United States in the United Nations and

in other foreign groups about fallout. The dangerous radiation that

came from tests in the atmosphere. And he felt that the US had to do

something about it. I not being a member of the council, but being

there pulled myself together and got up and made a statement to the

council and to Eisenhower that we had had this meeting in Puerto Rico

and concluded that there were possibly ways of detecting nuclear tests

by the Soviets. And that we felt strongly that we...he should proceed

with his efforts to get the Russians to talk about it. Eisenhower moved

very promptly after that meeting and got in touch with Khrushchev and

proposed uh.. a session of technical experts to examine the test ban

question. And that led to the appointment of the Geneva Conference of

technical experts headed by Dr. Fisk who later became president of the

Bell Labs. And...made an all out study of this matter and suggested a

system of detecting nuclear test underground because underground

testing had come up as one of the examples of how you couldn't have any

system that would work adequately in detecting nuclear tests. And

actually that committee, with DuBridge participating, knew that there

were difficulties, but went ahead and made their report recommending

that we undertake building a world wide system of seismic detecting

systems to spot nuclear tests made underground.

Interviewer:

WHY WEREN'T. . .

Killian:

...And using the big hole technique

Interviewer:

WHY WERE TELLER AND STRAUSS SO OPPOSED TO TEST BANS

Killian:

They were... always opposed to anything that uh... seemed to limit the

development of more and better H big bombs. And there was little

agreement between the group in the President's Science Advisory

Committee and the group out at Livermore headed by Teller And there was

a great deal of, I would say, disagreement to put it mildly with the

Teller point of view. Uh.., Teller had as I say, come to have an impact

on Eisenhower through Louis Strauss. He's had an impact on Reagan that

many of us worry about very much at the present time. He is a

brilliant, gifted man. He played a major role in the development of the

first atomic weapons and there's no question about his gen... his being

a genius. But he's a curious sort of genius. And he has supported the

present program for shooting down incoming missiles uh...the Star Wars.

Interviewer:

I'M ONLY GOING TO BE IN THE '50S IN THIS PROGRAM..

Killian:

...And some of us don't support that program and the way it's the end

of at the present time.

Interviewer:

IT SEEMS TO ME A REAL CONTRADICTION THAT ON THE ONE HAND IKE APPOINTED

YOU AND KISTIAKOWSKY AND ON THE OTHER HAND ALSO APPOINTED STRAUSS AND

SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH STRAUSS AND TELLER. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

Killian:

Strauss was a good friend of Eisenhower's and personally, Eisenhower

liked him. And Strauss could be very companionable. Very much of a...an

outgoing person. Knowing that I opposed his most of his ideas in regard

to in regard to the bombs, he used to invite my wife and I out to his

farm. We went to dinner at his home in Washington. We saw him socially

and always was a...very agreeable relationship. But one thing I will

always remember. As soon as I got to Washington, he called up and asked

me to go to lunch with him. Well I took Dr. Fisk with him...with me. I

thought that 2 of us would do better than one. Well we got to his

office and he had a bible on his desk, which he always did exhibited

and the reason for his inviting us to lunch was to say that he hoped

that we would do nothing to reopen the Oppenheimer case. And start that

debate over again. And we didn't appreciate that.

[END OF TAPE C03041]

Interviewer:

I'LL ASK YOU A COUPLE MORE QUESTION ABOUT UH... THE TEST BAN. DID

PEOPLE REALLY THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD CHEAT?

Killian:

People were afraid that they... they would I think Americans generally

have no trust in...in the Soviet. But that doesn't mean that we aren't

working hard to find ways of a meeting of minds with them. ... would

want to emphasize that Eisenhower in many ways held as his primary

objective the achievement of some agreement with the Soviets that would

uh.. stop nuclear testing. And much of the background of what happened

in the Kennedy administration in the atmospheric test ban really was

built up during the Eisenhower administration. It was one of

Eisenhower's primary objectives to be friendly with the Soviets. To be

strong with them. And much of the...work for Eisenhower was in the

field of test detection and related related matters. I have in one of

my books a letter that Macmillan, then Prime Minister of England wrote

to Eisenhower praising Jim Fisk as one of the most skillful negotiators

of the Soviets that he had encountered. And of the British admiration

for the whole operation. That when Jim Fisk several years back was ill

and died he had just written me a letter saying that his great sorrow

was that we had not continued to support a detection...development of a

detection system that way we would have confidence in. And that we felt

that we had dropped the ball. He felt that we had dropped the ball on

that. We had dropped it because after the Geneva conference of experts

the Teller group...launched an all out attack on the proposals that

came out of that study and did everything they could to thwart any

further development or efforts to achieve a test ban. And they

succeeded for a while. It was too bad. And when we came to meet the

Soviets in the next, what was called the diplomatic follow up on the

conference of experts George Kistiakowsky was involved, Jim Fisk was

again chairman of our American group. They found that the Russians felt

that we had second guessed them. That we had broken our promises to

them and they wouldn't negotiate anymore on test ban. They were

obviously upset at the Americans and their unreliability as a result of

the destruction of the report of the conference of experts. And that

meeting again in Geneva on the diplomatic arrangements that would be

made to put into effect the complicated detection system that they

proposed. The Russians would have none of although they had accepted it

in the first round. And it was a mean, nasty meeting. And the Americans

were taken aback, but realized that we had lost the... any

possible...confidence that might have been developed with the Soviets

in proceeding with a nuclear test ban.

Change in Scientific Community after Gaither Report

Interviewer:

I WANTED TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT THE TIME OF THE GATHER REPORT THAT

ROBERT SPRAGUE WAS INVOLVED IN AND WIESNER THAT CAME OUT SHORTLY AFTER

THE TIME OF SPUTNIK THAT WAS SET UP INITIALLY TO STUDY CIVIL DEFENSE,

BUT INSTEAD WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SAC VULNERABILITY. I WAS WONDERING IF

YOU THOUGHT THERE WAS A REAL CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDES OF SCIENTISTS

AFTER THAT REPORT CAME OUT?

Killian:

There was another committee devoted to missiles that Wiesner was on.

Kistiakowsky was a member. And that Von Neumann was chairman of that

were doing everything they could to promote missile development. They

worked closely with PSAC. It was of great help to have that background

study for PSAC in making his recommendations to the President. I am not

aware that they devoted much attention to the shelter problem.

Interviewer:

I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THE VON NEUMANN COMMITTEE. LATER ON AROUND THE

TIME OF SPUTNIK THERE WAS ANOTHER REPORT THAT CAME OUT, THE GAITHER

REPORT. ROBERT SPRAGUE WAS THE CHAIRMAN OF THAT AND THEY WERE

COMMISSIONED TO STUDY...THE NEED FOR CIVIL DEFENSE.

Killian:

Yes. This is a second a round of a...TCP type of study for the

President which was advocated by Robert. He came to the science

advisory committee and asked him to form a group. ... was given the job

of finding a chairman and I went to...Gather who had been in the radar

laboratory here at MIT during the war. A very brilliant lawyer, later

head of the Ford Foundation. He agreed to take it on. But he had Robert

Sprague as a co-chairman and there was a second man involved there in

the running of that program. And they were devoting an earnest effort

to work out a system of shelters, of passive defense. Became and I just

meant in that a lot of other people, too involved in rethinking the

whole strategy for the country and made a report that went wide afield

over the shelter problem. The people who were not scientists that were

on the Gather Panel were...frightened by what seemed to them to be the

inadequate measures taken by the Eisenhower administration, taken by

the country to protect itself. And to some of them, not having been

through the kind of...closed mouth studies that the scientists had

become accustomed to and knew how to handle it, they began to talk too

freely about some of the findings of the Gather report. And somebody

talked with Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post and he

published...he got the report as a matter of fact and published the

entire report in the Washington Post before the report was presented to

the President. This made Eisenhower very angry and said he would never

use a group of this sort again to bring it into the... there's been

much discussion as to how that report leaked. Some of us have some

ideas-

Interviewer:

SUCH AS?

Killian:

...uh...about how it happened...

Interviewer:

HOW WAS THE REPORT LEAKED? WHO LEAKED IT?

Killian:

Because we don't know. For sure. But the fact that Nixon was invited to

one of their last meetings has raised questions. This is unfair to

Nixon, because there's no positive evidence, that some of Nixon's staff

might possibly have been involved with this. But I don't site this as

real evidence ...But I think some of the people, some of the civilians

even a Nelson Rockefeller or someone like him were so moved by the

dangers to the country that they saw as a result of this study that

they felt freely about how we must move and move aggressively not only

to do some building of shelter, but also to increase our military

strength. So that....

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THERE WAS A SHIFT IN THE THINKING OF THE SCIENTISTS AT

THAT TIME?

Killian:

I have a feeling that that was a continental divide, you know, among

the thinking of scientists. Up until that report was prepared the

Wiesners and a lot of people engaged in it began to reflect upon the

importance of test bans and of dealing with the hazards of both

countries having bombs. And began to be more concerned with things

other than shelters. Other than the uh...frightening conclusions of the

Gather panel. And Wiesner himself will say that that was the time when

many of us took a new view of the whole defense situation and began to

work aggressively and hard of finding other ways to deal with the

Russians. So I do think that the...there was a difference.

Incidentally, Eisenhower followed the policy of never giving any of

these reports to Congress. This got Congress disturbed as

understandably and they took the report and published it in the

Congressional Record, in full. And that didn't wasn't appreciated in

the White House and made Eisenhower mad. But Chairman Adams came to me

at the height of that debate and said won't you talk with uh., Mr.

Weizel who was legal counsel for the congressional committee, the Joint

Committee of Atomic Energy. And really told him what the Gather Panel

was all about. In an off the record discussion. And I did, to indicate

to Congress that that the President wanted them to know the facts and

it was a very uh., amicable...amiable conversation. And much of the

congressional debate stopped at that point.

Relationship between Eisenhower and Scientists

Interviewer:

DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION THERE WAS A HUGE RISE IN OUR

NUCLEAR ARSENAL. HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THAT? WHY DID PRESIDENT

EISENHOWER LET THAT HAPPEN?

Killian:

A huge...

Interviewer:

...RISE IN OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HUGE INCREASES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Killian:

I think that's the way the Atomic Energy Commission directed the

program and they supported this multiplication of weapons. ... think

that Eisenhower perhaps should have held the reins more tightly

Throughout his administration he was objecting to the build up in

publicity. The attitude of the military industrial complex about our

increasing expenditures on weapons and he was deeply troubled about his

inability adequately to control the development of a more and more

weapons, more and more expenditures for weapons. I saw Eisenhower once

I had gone to his office for a meeting and after talking about the

business of a...I went to see him about, he put his head down on his

desk and said, I don't no whether my brain is going to be able to take

it or not. It is at that time that the aviation weekly and all the

press were attacking Eisenhower because he wasn't doing enough in the

way of providing...approving expenditures for defense. Building more

weapons. And he went through a period of being under attack that was

intensive and to him demeaning. And he was a very disturbed and unhappy

man as I indicated. Happily after that he went down to do some shooting

at the George Humpher's plantation in Georgia. Spent two weeks down

there. It rained all the time. And he didn't have any activity, but to

sit around and play cards. And he came back refreshed and had gathered

his spirits together again. He he was a very human sort of person.

Incidentally, the scientists loved him. He responded to them and they

to him in extraordinary ways. The Atoms for Peace program decided to

give the prize, a $75,000 prize, to Eisenhower as his last prize. The

Ford family had set up a fund for prizes of $75,000 to people who had

made major contributions to the peaceable uses of the...of the atom.

And selected Eisenhower to receive the last one. I called up Milton,

his brother, and asked if he thought that it was appropriate for me to

go to see Ike in the hospital. Where he had been for some time, at

Walter Reed. And he said, by all means. He needs to talk to people. And

so I went to see Ike, and we spent an hour gossiping and reminiscing

and he said, "Tell me about my scientists." And named several of them

that had worked with him. He recalled their names and he spoke and made

the statement that they were the only group in my Presidency that

seemed to me to have come to Washington to help the country and not

help themselves. There wasn't any politics in PSAC. Although on one

occasion the President told us that he had been criticized by the

national Republican committee because he wasn't putting his scientists

to work on the next election in supporting the Republicans. And I told

him that he hadn't appointed these people to do that kind of thing. He

appointed them for their scientific competence. And he would not expect

them to become involved in politics. And I know, on another occasion he

was telling a story to Herbert, and Herbert said, "Don't you know Mr.

President that all scientists are Democrats." And Ike laughed, "I don't

believe it, but it doesn't make a damn bit of difference to me whether

they are or not. That's not what I...not what I appointed them for."

That's the kind of man that he was. And as I say, there was a

compatibility and a intense loyalty on the part of the scientists who

had been so upset by the Oppenheimer case and all that had go be

before. And you will find, I think to a man, that the people who had

the great opportunity to work for Eisenhower of feeling that he was a

great man. And I'm glad to see the biographies that are now appearing

about Eisenhower. I have the latest one, up there.

Interviewer:

YES, I'VE BEEN REFERRING TO THAT ONE A LOT IN MY WORK.

Killian:

And he concludes that Eisenhower was among our great presidents. When

Eisenhower went through a post-retirement when he was rated very low by

Arthur Schlesinger and others.

[END OF TAPE C03042 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with James Killian, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-b27pn8xj9m

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Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Killian, James Rhyne, 1904-1988
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 19a6b401eb6753ddff2b4f805ca67f7ffc61f8ef (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with James Killian, 1986,” 1986-04-18, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed December 21, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-b27pn8xj9m.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with James Killian, 1986.” 1986-04-18. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. December 21, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-b27pn8xj9m>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with James Killian, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-b27pn8xj9m