War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Scali, 1986

It was Friday and Friday of that week the first week of this missile crisis and it's what one what about 1:30 in the afternoon. I mean you can start where it was Friday at 1:30. But first of all I want to say that I'm an accident of history without seeking to I became directly involved in the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis. And as things turned out I was forced to keep the secret for two long years and was scooped on my own story. It was a Friday about 1:30 in the afternoon up when I received a telephone call and I recognized the voice immediately I was sitting in a State Department press no next to this chair this week. SCALLY take two. First of all I want to state that I'm an accident of history without seeking to. I

became directly involved in the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis a role that turned out to be historic but which at the time just added to the confusion because I was covering this crisis full time. My role began on the Friday afternoon the fourth day of the crisis when I received a telephone call about 1:30 t'ing afternoon I was munching on a bologna sandwich at that time which was to be my lunch for the day. I recognized the man on the phone immediately as the embassy counselor of the Soviet Embassy. He asked for us to have lunch immediately so we could discuss an important matter. I was about to tell him that I'd already had lunch. This namely the sandwich in my hand when he added that it was very important and that could I possibly find the time. I felt that perhaps he had something of an unusual

nature on his mind and so despite all of the work involved in covering every twist and turn of the crisis I agreed and we met about 20 minutes later at the Occidental restaurant which was one of Washington's old landmarks about two blocks from the White House. We sat at a table for two up against the wall and it was a rather icy kind of meeting with no black backs slapping and no frivolity involved us. We sometimes did when we met before but he then finally said the situation is very serious and something has to be done. I said Well your government should have thought of that before it triggered this crisis because what you have done is total insanity. He said nothing and we ordered and I noted that.

The gentleman involved Alexander phoned me and we can reveal his name now seemed indifferent to the food that he ordered which was a sharp contrast to the gourmet type attitude that he had when we had had lunch on maybe a dozen occasions. We said very little and picked our food and he said perhaps there's a way out of this. I said although he said that the Cuban delegate to the UN had mentioned something which should be pursued. I said well I had been following the United Nations debate very carefully and I don't remember that the Cuban delegate had said anything incidentally. Later a check showed that the Cuban delegate never said anything of the kind that he then put forward he said. What did you think of a solution to the crisis which would. Involve first are withdrawing these missiles from Cuba and doing

this under United Nations inspection. Do you think that your government would be interested I said. I was just a reporter and I didn't know but it sounded to me I said like it was something that could be discussed. He then went on to say that. Could I check urgently with my high friends in the administration and on this we didn't have to play any games because he knew that I was a personal friend of the president and that as diplomatic correspondent for ABC News I had virtually instant access to a Secretary of State Rusk if it was needed at that time I was the only reporter who had covered all of Secretary Rusk's overseas trips so that we were on a first name basis. I said well I didn't know whether I could get to the secretary of state immediately because he was very business very busy covering this same crisis. He said Please

do please try. It's very urgent and then he gave me two telephone numbers which I had not ever known about before one was his private number at the embassy after they switchboard closed down and number two his number at home. And he said I must understand that I am to phone him any time day or night because much depends on what is to happen next. As I went back to the State Department in the cab I got to wondering whether this meeting was this important as I thought it was at the time because why would the Russians turn to me to float even a trial balloon. And how did I not know that half a dozen other Soviets and half a dozen other places were talking to X number of additional people. By the time I arrived in the press room I had more or

less convinced myself that it wasn't as exciting as significant as I thought it was just as a precaution I called a friend of mine in the FBI and said to him is foaming important enough for the Soviets to float a trial balloon or a ledge. Intimate proposal for solving the Cuban Missile Crisis and he asked why I said I just had lunch with him. He said you did. He said the answer to your question is hell yes and we would sure like to know what it was he said I said I didn't. Well I'll pass it along to Roger helmsmen who was the then director of the State Department intelligence operation. So I sat down in my at my desk in the State Department press room and wrote a very brief memo about 100 words I said I'll Xander phone mean at a lunch in which he urgently

requested asked that I check with my high administration officials about what the U.S. attitude would be to the following proposition. Colon paragraph one. So the U.S. would remove all missiles from Cuba under United to that there would be a United Nations inspection. Three would U.S. government then be willing to pledge publicly there would be no invasion of Cuba. I said I did not know but that perhaps matter could be discussed period and I took the memo which I just finished typing up to the sixth floor where Roger Hill's women's office was and he was just coming out the door as I came up and I handed in the memo and we walked down the hall together as he was walking to his next meeting

and he stopped and read it and looked at me and read it a second time. He said this is very interesting. He said Where are you going to be the rest of day. I said I think he'd back down in the pressure of continuing to cover this thing he said but don't go away. So I went back to work and after appearing on the ABC television network news that evening I suddenly got a telephone call Incidentally I did mention this during the six o'clock broadcast. It was hell's been on the phone saying without telling a soul. He says Get in the car that we have waiting for you directly outside the ABC studios in Compton the state department you may be on to something big. Well I've been around as a reporter many years and I know that I could leave in a crisis situation without at least telling my bureau chief where I was going in

approximately why. But I knew he could be trusted. And I asked him in turn to phone Jim Haggerty The former press secretary to President Eisenhower who was then the new president of ABC News and to give him a brief feeling. I was taken to the office of the secretary of state. He came out of his office initiate sleighs and said Johnny says you may be something you may be on to something which is very important. It fits with something which we think we are picking up at the U.N. he said I want you to go back to your friend and tell him the following and he reached into his pocket and put up. You pulled out a yellow legal size line piece of paper in which he had hand written the following. The USG sees the possibilities in this suggestion and imagines that

this matter could be worked out at the U.N. with the secretary general tyrant and the Soviet and US representatives. But. I must emphasize that time is very short. And he then said if they ask you yes you know where this comes from you can tell him that it comes from the highest officials in the United States government. But he said to try to say nothing else. And on this matter I found out later that the highest officials in the US government was just that he had called on President Kennedy as soon as my memo hit his desk it had also discussed it with Defense Secretary McNamara and after hours of discussion within the administration they had decided it was an opening that was well worth following up and thus they turned to me to go ahead and see Mr.

phony The second time I called him from the office of the State Department intelligence chief Mr. Hill xmen and suggested that we meet immediately in the coffee shop at the Statler Hotel. The reason I chose a Statter hotel was that it was only half a block from the embassy and at that time I figured that a coffee shop would be somewhat deserted and sure enough we met there in 10 minutes. And then I repeated the message word for word and he listened very carefully and then said that. He them for me and then I asked mate how does he know that this comes from important figures I said well it comes from the highest sources in the United States government the highest officials he said Mr Scally. If I were to report what you tell me and it did not come

from the highest officials in the United States government I could be made to look like a fool at a very crucial moment in history. I said Mr Phone mean if I were to lie about this very important point I would be the most irresponsible man in history. And I said and I am not irresponsible whereupon you seem to be satisfied that it was an authentic message and that he tried something that the Soviets do every now and then they raise the ante when they believe they had you hooked he said. Well he said you know he says this is a very interesting message but he says if there is to me. Inspection of the removal of the missiles from Cuba why shouldn't there be simultaneous inspection of the coast of Florida where you have this big mobilization of forces and of some of the other islands thereby where perhaps there could be the which could be the springboard

for an invasion of Cuba. Even after this I didn't have any clue as to what I should say then but I've covered foreign policy enough to take a chance and I said Mr foamy it seems to me that what you are raising is a terrible complication which might make it impossible for this agreement. I said the present United States could not in any way allow Soviet or United Nations inspectors to roam up and down the coast of Florida during this particular time because you want to remember the cause of this terrible crisis is not our mobilization in Florida and elsewhere but the fact that you the Soviet Union have illegally sneak missiles into Cuba. I said that is the source of the problem and what we are doing in Cuba. What we are doing in Florida is a counter mobilization which presumably would have no further purpose if and when you remove the missiles

he tried to argue a bit and then finally gave up and he said Miss Kelly I can assure you that this information will be relayed immediately to Moscow and to the highest officials in the Soviet government whereupon he got up. He said we should be back in touch together and he picked up the check from the table. We'd had each a cup of coffee at that time coffee at the Statler Hotel of these was only 15 cents a cup and the total check was 30 cents. And he took it to the cashier who at that time just talking to a lady friend. He waited impatiently for the conversation to end because he clearly didn't have any change you had only a five dollar bill and the two dear ladies continue their conversation and they continued their conversation so finally in exasperate he took the 30 cent check and the $5 bill and slapped it on the counter and took off

shot up the steps and went off to the Soviet Embassy I decided that perhaps he was a little excited. In any of that. I went back to the unit. Went back to the State Department and dictated to four different secretaries and relays a full report on this meeting and we took it to the secretary of state who came out and skim through it he said John he said you know he said this could be the first important sign that the Soviets want to back off because it fits with the secret message that we've just received from Khrushchev We've translated and are aware of the contents of the first two sections and have more or less of it I a general idea but the third section. Contains it comes from a man who is stupefied with anxiety.

He said there is no mention of the proposal that they're suggesting through you in this message. But he said if you put them side by side they fit like a glove. He says there are two things I want to tell you. He says Remember when you report this that eyeball to eyeball and they blinked first. And secondly he said if this works out he said I'm going to give you the biggest dinner any correspondent it's ever been given in the city of Washington. I nodded appreciatively. Incidentally as much as I love Dean Rusk and I think he is a great man. That was the last time I heard about it or so. He then turned around to help his men who is with us and said I want your people to look through this. Word for word upside down and inside

out to determine whether there are any hookers in this. But he says off hand he says I don't see any. So we parted and I went to bed feeling that perhaps that and that at a minimum that was the end of that. But the next morning. It was a new and more urgent crisis. The Soviets had broadcast from Moscow. Another message from Nikita Khrushchev which bore no resemblance to to the first one and which said nothing whatever about pulling out the missiles. Instead it repeated in some places almost word for word a column that Walter Lippmann had written for the morning papers which proposed a swap of missiles that this Soviets would hold this new

Soviet note made it look as if what they had said threw me and indeed what had been said in the secret message which the White House never did disclose was unimportant and there had been a sharp and almost shocking change of attitude on the part of the Soviets. Even as I heard about this secretary Rusk's office called me and asked for me to come by urgently. I went by the see the secretary he came out of his office looking very cold. And asked me says Well John what happened. I said I don't know Mr. Secretary I'm but I've been thinking about this as I came to see you and I can come to no other conclusion than that the whole exercise has been a trap an effort to force us to concentrate on the possibility of a

peaceful settlement and to prevent us from doing anything while they rushed the missiles to completion in Cuba and confronted us with the new proposition. He didn't say you think this is where you go to see your friend and see what you can find out. So I called and asked to see him. And this time I thought that it would be a good idea not to meet in a fully public place instead I chose the six mezzanine floor deserted main ballroom at the Statler Hotel. I knew how upset I was and I thought perhaps I would raise my voice. So we met. Almost immediately and I jumped at him immediately with the same question that the secretary of state had asked me I said what happened. And he threw up his hands and said

he didn't know what had happened. He said there was such a delay in exchanging messages even the most urgent with Moscow now that perhaps Mr. Cruise ship had not received the Embassy report on what had been relayed of my message. I said I found this exceedingly difficult to believe. I said I would have to be a fool to believe that in a moment of big crisis such as this you can't move a message to Moscow in 12 to 18 hours as you claim I said. I can only come to one conclusion and that is that this is part of a stinking double cross and I virtually shouted this at him but I must say that I at that time felt that perhaps I had been used by the Soviets to betray or at least to confuse my own government so to say that I was.

Upset was an understatement and he threw up his hands again and said no no no he says don't get excited this is not so he said. Both the ambassador Dobrynin and I are urgently waiting for a reply you must not believe that we are trying to deceive you. I said Well anybody who would come up with any other conclusion I said would be a fool I said of this one thing that you must understand. Above all else and that is that if you believe that you can bluff or that you can somehow trick the United States at a crucial moment. I said you're part of of one of the most serious misjudgments of American intentions in history I said. This president is determined to get those missiles out of Cuba and he will and for Yuna believer to misunderstand the depth of that determination. I say it is a disaster. One of the things that is so disturbing about what you're telling us is that

an American U-2 plane that was photographing these missiles has just been shot down and we know that it wasn't the Cubans who pulled the trigger on that SAM missile that knocked down the plane and had to be the Soviets. So how can you say that the offer is still valid. He said well he said I don't I didn't know what had happened he had a face turned almost ashen at that development he said no he said. All I can tell you is believe me he said and I promise you I'll be in touch with you there at the earliest moment. I said well I didn't know but I felt that there was something very very strange. So I went back to. The State Department and dictated another message another summary of what was said. By that time Roger Hill's been a State Department intelligence chief. It collapsed because he had been away for

almost 72 hours and his deputy Thomas Hughes then took me to the White House because the secretary of state had been called there just a half hour earlier for an extraordinary meeting which was as it turned out a crisis conference of the entire establishment to determine whether there should be a bombing attack at a minimum on that Samak missile site which would shut down the U-2. I was taken into the White House via a side entrance and to the president's office secretly and I sat just a few yards away from where the meeting was going on talking with Evelyn Lincoln who is the President Kennedy secretary and I was. Sipping on a cup of coffee when Pierre Salinger the White House press secretary walked in and he looked he said John Scally

he said what are you doing in here. And I was about to reply Well I've been invited. And he turned and talked to two of the security people who were standing nearby and was told that yes he is here for a reason he has been invited. Now you have to remember there were about 200 or maybe 300 reporters all standing eagerly in the White House lobby waiting for even the single drop of news and there was John Sculley sitting serenely inside the innermost chambers there SEPIC a cup of coffee and acting as if he belonged to Pierre. He had raised his hand and was about to tell me out when Hillsman when Thomas Hughes walked in the room he said Oh no no Pierre he's all right. And Pierre Pierre turned around and saw Hughes whom he had never met

before after all he was just a deputy chief of The Hills and he said on who the hell are you to. And he explained who he was in his The conversation was going on. In walked Rusk and rescued Pierre. It's all right we'll tell you about it later. So and So Pierre muttering about something like nobody ever tells me do you think that he more or less. It was I mention this because it was one of the footnotes of history that Pierre and I remain iste about every noun in any of that. Russ gass asked me Johnny said you have the feeling that this man is telling you the truth. I said well my secretary I didn't know. If he's lying. I said he's an awfully good actor but he gives

me a very strong impression that he is deeply worried maybe almost panicky and he looks like he's passing on a genuine message of deep concern and confusion and wonderment about what the hell is happening. So he said Well all right. Then he went back into the meeting. My message had been read at that meeting and there had been a discussion about how it fit into the overall mix. And I have been told that it was a factor in the decision not to bomb but to delay any important action for at least another 24 hours until there was more information about two important points. Number one of which was was the new message that had been

broadcast in genuine Khrushchev message from Khrushchev. Or was it a signal that perhaps Khrushchev had been overthrown or put aside and a new group was in power and there was also another feeling that perhaps it was too early to move. So it was after that meeting that Bobby Kennedy came up with the. It was at that meeting that Bobby Kennedy who was attorney general was a member of the inner council came up with an incredible solution and it was that the president should ignore both the broadcast

message and the message that had been sent secretly and concentrated on the offer that had been relayed through me accepting it is genuine even though the offer had not been repeated either in the secret message or in the broadcast. And to ignore the others. And. If it was a fake with what they had said to me was not meant to be regarded as serious then we would know soon soon enough. But in any event to try it and this is why the president's message which was made public about an hour after that meeting ended said your message to Mr. Khrushchev your message Mr. Khrushchev as we understand it is that you will remove the missiles from Cuba under United

Nations inspection at the United States. In turn will promise publicly not to invade Cuba he says which we are quite prepared to do. And so your proposal is a satisfactory way to end this. That's approximately what message said. Afterwards he called me in and said. I want to thank you. But he said there's something that both of us have to worry about and that we have to pray about and that is that we have correctly understood what the Soviets are trying to say should you go to church John. I said yes I do was present he said Bill Saturno are deceiving. He says both of us should go to church and pray

that we have not misunderstood and that we have correctly read what the Soviets had to do because there could be a very long tomorrow. President did go to church that evening and I went separately to church and I think we both prayed for that message that was broadcast about 9 o'clock the next morning which was in the name of Nikita Khrushchev and acceptance of the idea that the Soviets would withdraw their missiles under United Nations inspection in return for the president's pledge to invade Cuba. Now that withdrawal did happen but it was not one that was observed of by the United Nations because Fidel Castro who had been kept in the dark throughout all of this

maneuvering rebelled and he declined to permit any international observers on his territory the Soviet solved it as you remember by withdrawing all 48 of the missiles and allowing an American observer planes to fly low over them while the Soviet sailors and pulled the turbulence back in so that we could count them and we counted every one of them as having left and so that's all. Once the crisis ended I went to the president and said Well I want to tell the story and I recalled to him that the secretary of state had said to me John when you report this so he fully knew that at one point I should be allowed to tell a story. He then appealed to me not to write it yet not to report it because it was imperative.

He said that we seize the moment as a government to improve our relations with the Soviets. And if I in turn disclosed the story of how at a critical moment they backed down and all of the maneuvering that went on behind the scenes the Soviets would believe that I was speaking with the full authorization of the administration and would regard it as an American effort to humiliate them publicly. The president said any move to humiliate them may ruin this magnificent opportunity to move toward peace. Well as a student of foreign policy I had to accept that because I believe that would have been the result of my disclosing it even as a reporter. I wanted very much to tell. The exclusive In addition the president said we want you to continue to

maintain your contact with foamy because the next step should be to get the Soviets to remove the jet bombers which they have moved into Cuba as a delivery vehicle for these for these of missiles. So I consented and I continued to meet with full mean for a period of about two or three more months until the full meaning disclosed to me some 48 hours before an official message arrived that they indeed would remove the planes too. Once that happened and now with maybe for five months having gone by I thought that there would be no danger of a misunderstanding or not even any Russian suspicion that it was a belated effort to humiliate them. And I gan went to the president and the president said Well not now but later but not now. I had.

Second meeting with him at which point he said I still uneasy about disclosing this right now he said but here's what I will do. I will write you a letter in my own personal hand in which and I will quote this because I remember the words so vividly I will extol your contribution to the nation at this time of crisis. I will sign it of course. But he said you cannot disclose this letter until I have left the White House. Well at that time if you recall the president was being hailed as one of the Great Peace statesmen of all kind and his popularity was at all time high and his asking me to accept this letter which I could not disclose for another

four years because his reelections. It was a certainty. It was pretty tough for me to take. And I said Mr. President if you are very very good if you work very hard you go to church every Sunday helpful ladies and children across the street and then on top of that if as a reporter you are lucky. I said you will have a story like this only once in a lifetime. This is you're asking me to accept a letter from you which I cannot disclose for another five years is much like my asking you to accept to be satisfied with the nomination by the Democratic convention in secret. And he wired them to back a said. He said I see what you mean. He said Well let's talk about this later. By then it was October of

1962. One month before he was killed and start that. The president threw back his head a nice laugh and said well I see what you mean he said. Maybe we should talk about this later. Once I come back from some trips I have schedule that was in October 1963 only about a month before he was assassinated after the assassination. I was just devastated by what had happened that I didn't pursue this for a period of time because I wasn't sure that the President Lyndon Johnson knew the full background of this and so I began to try to figure out how best I could to renew the whole project.

Finally the Secretary of State Rusk agreed that I could write it but he said you have to get White House confirmation. Well that confirmation never came because. What happened instead was that Roger Hillsman decided to write a book called to move the nation. It was basically a treatise and a study of how government how the United States government moves at a time of crisis. And he told me before writing that he intended to tell my story about the Cuban Missile Crisis because he thought that the United States government would never give me permission to tell a story. And he said I know the president wanted to give you recognition so he said I will be your biographer. I told Roger that I took a pretty dim view of this because it was my story I felt and that while it was kind of him to offer to be my

biographer I thought I could find another way to meet that problem. But as we all know Roger did write it and in August of nineteen sixty four Look magazine disclose it in a cover story. And my secret role became part of history and the fact that John Scally was scooped on his own story and his own secret also became a part of journalistic history. What more do you know about phone mean. I don't know I think more about me. All I know is that he left about me left in the spring of 1963 and we talked and

chatted for X period of time and he disappeared just like he had dropped into a big hole. When I went to the Soviet Union. In. April as a member of President Nixon's foreign policy advisers staff I asked about him and this was 73 and I was told by one of their key people that he is out of the city. I expressed a desire to see him or talk with him. And they said well we will know that. Do you know anything more about his relationship with Khrushchev or his. You see in me you know he was saying you know he was very close to Russia with

the KGB was he he was a full colonel in the KGB. And my briefing from the people who knew about his background was that he was a personal friend. The key to Khrushchev and it was known that as the KGB chief for the United States he had his own independent communications to Moscow. So he didn't have to rely on the embassy cable apparatus. Last thing on your Rusk meeting what was your sense of rusks state. How was he like was he throughout the entire Cuban missile crisis. Russ good behaved and acted with remarkable called Mus.. I think he had to be a very important balancing figure in deciding what sort of

military action to take if and when. And I cannot believe but that he was a very important influence for the soberer that were carefully studied in advance. I didn't find him to be among the Hawks who wanted it. She would then ask questions later. And your meeting with Kennedy where they were suggesting you go to church is that you know he's been quoted by Sorenson I think is saying that he thought the chance of a nuclear war was between one three and even. What was your sense of it. Well when the president talked to me. Having just made public his reply to Khrushchev and not knowing whether there would be a tomorrow. He was very very subdued Grey the demeanor and when he suggested that we go to church

to pray. This was not just a throw away. This is something that cave from deep within it. Can frighten you I mean did it for the for me. I guess you're writing it today partly because the White House just about an hour earlier had made public the names of the 12 reporters who were to be evacuated with President Kennedy in the event of war and they were to be flown up into the Catoctin Mountains where we have this secret command headquarters. And my name wasn't on that. I thought that was a pretty eloquent commentary of the importance of whatever it was that was doing. But was that the first time in a sense that although you were covering this thing daily and reporting on it

was I mean the first time you felt perhaps how urgent I mean how serious the whole thing was. Well I yes at that moment I don't know what the president's odds were for war or peace but I thought that we had maybe a 20 percent chance of avoiding war because I wasn't sure that the message they were relaying to me was that significant. Everything was happening so fast. And I declined to believe that I was playing a central or even a significant role. I was just doing what I could to avert a nuclear war. I think it's something. That X number of other reporters would have been willing to do. I just happened to be there and I took the necessary responsibility I think it's strange that they would use that approach of you.

You must have thought about well actually it's not that strange if you go back in history. Soviet experts tell me it is not unusual for the Soviets to use some third party on the fringes of a crisis to pass on secret messages and or to use it to test the claimant to determine what kind of. Deal make it make it so that they can get the maximum situation they can always disavow whatever it was they were say to people like me. In this case by the way everything happened so fast that even if they wanted to disavow me it represented the only avenue of averting a nuclear war that even though it wound up in an

ignominious retreat for that they at least lived to fight another day. Here we are feeling on Sunday morning when you heard the news. Oh yes. Hell I felt as if a massive weight had been lifted from my shoulders. I was happier not so much because it seemed worked out with whatever assistance I could provide but because we had stepped back from what appeared to be an almost certain hour I met the phone mean on that Sunday night about six hours after it was clear that the crisis had been settled that he said we should go to have a celebration. In 1962 there were very few restaurants

open on a Sunday night in Washington D.C. but there was a Chinese restaurant which I remembered and. So we went to a Chinese restaurant where we had one or two or three or four of five. Toasts to peace and friendship. I will remember how remarkable that evening was for several reasons but the most important one was that he said you know our two countries should never again come this close to war. I said well I can drink to that as a but you have to remember that the reason we came close to war this type was not because of what the United States is because of some very rash and impulsive actions on your government part. He said you know in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Secretary Rusk should meet with investor Don't be deliberated three times a day to make sure that everything is clear. I said well I said that would leave Mr. Rusk with much time to do anything else. He said Well that is not what is important or what is more important is that there should not be this kind of misunderstanding again because nothing is more important than peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. I said I would be inclined to bring drink a toast and asking everyone I talk to about this. Been involved in all facets of it what they feel are the most essential lessons that we can learn from the Cuban missile crisis in our operating today in our relationship. Oh I think that the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated very clearly

that no matter how grave the provocation and no matter how evil the motive that we attributed to the Soviets it is imperative that there be a period of very solemn reflection before we decide that the alternative is for the United States to use its full military force in response. Because during the Cuban missile crisis there were two or three points when a military advice was to act quickly. I think the president demonstrated that remarkable wisdom in a forbearance and a maturity which I think is something that we should reflect on that lesson has been learned. So maybe they can close the door the cutting room door that.

This is the right thing as well. You think these lessons have been learned today. Has that lesson been learned I hope so but each crisis is not the same and the lessons that we learn from one crisis is not necessarily point the way to solving the next because there's always something different.