War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Evgeny Velikhov, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 676000-678000 EVGENY VELIKHOV

[1]

SALT II Violations

Interviewer:

THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT JUST EXCEED THE LIMITS OF SALT II. WHAT DOES IT

MEAN TO YOU AS A PERSON CONCERNED WITH ARMS LIMITATION?

Velikhov:

Of course, the SALT II agreement was concluded pretty long ago and its

objective was not a drastic reduction but a limitation of the

development of nuclear weapons. However, until the new agreements are

signed, I think we should observe the framework of these terms. The

violation of these terms which has already happened with the

introduction of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, as well as the recent

open violation related to surpassing a limit on bombers, are, among

many other things, a demonstration of the intention to subvert all the

existing agreements. It's very hard to imagine how we could embark the

way to new agreements, more basic and deep, if we undermine principles

we've so far agreed on.

Interviewer:

THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID, TO MAINTAIN SUCH THING LIKE

KRASNOYARSK RADAR WAS THE EARLIER VIOLATION OF SALT II. HOW DO YOU

EXPLAIN THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR?

Velikhov:

The radar installation in Krasnoyarsk is designed for, as it was

officially stated by the Soviet government, it is designed for the

purposes of space objects observation and verification of the terms of

agreement. This use of the radar installation, the one with

phase-patterned array is permitted by the 1972 agreement on the

limitations of anti-ballistic systems. Naturally enough, this use of

the installation excludes any possibility of using it even as a means

of early warning, much less as a commanding system of anti-ballistic

defense of any kind. We... as for the SALT II agreement, this

installation has nothing to do with it at all. Therefore I think that

it would be quite possible to agree on all the necessary limitations

and requirements, concerning this installations' use if there were a

real intention to...as I said... to really maintain the existing terms

of agreement. However, today's administration demonstrates its

intention to undermine the agreement by any means, thus being

interested in the violations from their own side, as well as, I'd say,

in overemphasizing or picking out some... formally alleged violations

from the other side, instead of solving these problems. To solve this

issue would be very easy within the framework of the Consulting

Committee, I think.

Interviewer:

THERE WAS A STATEMENT BY... THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THAT USSR HAS

TESTED... SATELLITE KILLING CAPABILITIES WHICH ARE PROHIBITED BY THE

TREATY. WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THAT?

Velikhov:

First of all, unfortunately, there is no existing agreement that

prohibits tests of anti-satellite weapons. True, he use of

anti-satellite weapons against satellites designed to control the

upholding of existing agreements is prohibited, but regretfully, the

tests of the anti-satellite weapons are not. Nevertheless, starting in

1983, the Soviet Union, being aware that the creation of anti-satellite

weapons sets a dangerous precedent to the arms race, stopped

unilaterally all tests of anti-satellite weapons. Earlier, a system was

tested, which in general, was pretty well known to the Americans, and

once a variation of this weapon was even adopted by the United States

for the Armed Forces. As per today, it's almost three years since the

unilateral moratorium of the Soviet Union began, so the Soviet Union

does not test, use, or launch any systems of anti-satellite arms. We

hope, that in the interests of both countries and the world, we will

manage to reach an agreement prohibiting any kind of anti-satellite

weapons.

Nuclear Disarmament

Interviewer:

COMING BACK NOW TO REYKJAVIK. IS IT REALLY PRACTICAL TO PERCEIVE OF

TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? IS THAT A PROPOSITION THAT CAN BE

PERCEIVED AS A REAL ONE IN TODAY'S WORLD?

Velikhov:

In my understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons which we discussed

very deeply with many American colleagues and internationally, in

example, in Rome in 1983 we discussed with many members of a... What if

I switch to Russian?

Interviewer:

GO AHEAD, START IN RUSSIAN...

Velikhov:

In... From my discussions with American colleagues... as well as from

my own experience, in particular, from that modest experience which I

acquired while working on the mitigation of the consequences of

Chernobyl, from all that, I can come to only one conclusion: nuclear

weapons in any form or quantity, are definitely suicidal ones, indeed.

They are extraordinarily dangerous. They are dangerous enough in a

crisis; more than that, there is a dilemma: in order to survive,

mankind has to get rid of nuclear weapons. Many countries support this.

Japan for example, I think, supports this in full, as well as many

other countries. Therefore, it seems to me that this view has gradually

begun to prevail in the world. The question is, how practical are the

proposals introduced on January 15, 1985 by Mikhail Sergeyevich

Gorbachev. In the beginning, many people considered this an ideal which

would be very difficult to achieve. However, in Reykjavik, practical

steps were offered. The first step: A fifty percent reduction and

elimination of medium-range missiles, which was quite a realistic step,

and speaking generally, a rather simple one in terms of control, let's

say. To decrease the quantities of weapons dozens of times, to get rid

of medium-range weapons, of tactical weapons, weapons of the

battlefield, that was also quite a clear step that could be verified by

existing methods. Of course, after a certain point, difficulties would

emerge when we cross the level of, say, one-tenth; the cooperation of

other nuclear powers would be required. New methods of verification

should be applied. However, I think that a beginning of this process

per se, a process that sets a goal of eliminating nuclear weapons,

would serve already as a great healing of the moral climate existing

today on our planet. Mankind... we... Our generation has to understand:

we will either be remembered (by future generations) as the generation

that prepared the biggest disaster in human history, or the generation

that in spite of everything, proved to be wise enough to solve this

problem. Therefore, the international atmosphere will gradually

improve. Apart from it, if we work as hard to realize this process, as

we do for the creation of new means of destruction of mankind, or even

harder, we undoubtedly will manage to find all the technical means

which will allow us to solve this problem.

Velikhov:

...and in the same way, the improvement in international relations...

will contribute to the possibility. But the goal to eliminate nuclear

weapons is the I think, ultimate goal. Of course, step by step, not

tomorrow.

Interviewer:

IN THE UNITED STATES BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDUSTRY RESIST, ANY

CONNECTION... RESIST MAKING ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN WEAPONS AND CIVILIAN

POWER PLANTS. WHY DID YOU CONNECT CHERNOBYL TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Velikhov:

I just mentioned my experience because that was an incident which

demonstrated the level of problems in fighting even the minimal

consequences of destruction and radioactive precipitation, and...

minor, really insignificant damages caused by this... break of reactor.

Once, for example, I happened to discuss the... with Edward Teller the

issue of consequences of a nuclear war. He was talking then, that

radioactive fall-out was nonsense, that it would be enough to take a

shower, to wash yourself a bit and no problems would remain. I should

say that in practical terms it is much more complicated, very

complicated, even when the number of victims is very small, even when

all the necessary wash-up installations are not destroyed and

functioning. Within all these peaceful conditions, it is still a very

difficult procedure. Therefore, I have to say that I connect here not

these two problems which have definitely a different nature, but the

consequences. I'm just telling you about consequences that can be some

sort of minimal lesson or reminder to us about the possible (effects)

of nuclear war.

Interviewer:

IN THE NOTION OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HOW... WHAT WAS THE

APPROACH TO SUCH NUCLEAR POWERS AS CHINA OR FRANCE OR ENGLAND?

Velikhov:

The governments of these countries have repeatedly stated that after

the Soviet Union and the United States significantly reduce their

nuclear arsenals, they would be prepared to undertake the same steps.

Therefore we, of course, presume that the moment will come when these

countries would also go for the significant reduction and elimination

of their nuclear arsenals.

Interviewer:

IN RETROSPECT, DO YOU THINK THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF NEGOTIATION

STRATEGIES WERE THE PROPOSALS IN REYKJAVIK FRUITFUL? OR WERE THEY GOING

TOO FAR TO ACHIEVE SOME PRACTICAL RESULTS?

Velikhov:

I think, after Reykjavik the world, or, at least, the world of peace

talks has changed irreversibly... because there are proposals on the

table which the Soviet Union has no intention of withdrawing. There are

proposals that change the situation radically. They also outline

realistic steps. Today, these proposals are, first of all, addressed to

the United States' government, but they are also addressed to all the

people of the world who can now consider all the possibilities and

perspectives opened by real negotiations. Therefore, I think, these

proposals will always have a cardinal influence an all future talks.

Speaking of the level of their radical nature, many of them were

presented more than once as an ultimate goal of the present American

administration. President Reagan has stated his desire to eliminate

nuclear arms, strategic arms included. He also offered a zero option

for Europe. Many political leaders were also talking about it.

Therefore I consider the Reykjavik proposals, along with the offer to

observe the agreement on anti-ballistic defense for the next ten years

and to start immediately negotiations on a nuclear tests ban, as

forming quite a realistic basis for realistic deals, for the real

talks, not the pretense of talks....

Interpreter:

(TRANSLATES)

Velikhov:

He's ready to eliminate weapons; and he was for the zero option for

Europe, in such case... and many political leaders say same... and I

think the majority of governments are in favor of staying with the IBM

treaty, and majority of government today to the...CTB. In such case I

think it is very solid background for negotiations... for real

negotiation.

Interviewer:

I THINK... IT SOUNDS ALREADY LIKE A QUESTION, BUT I THINK THAT... THAT

REAGAN CAME TO REYKJAVIK TO NEGOTIATE EUROPE, AND THE RUSSIAN POSITION

THREW HIM OFF. IN SOME WAYS, PROPOSING THINGS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN

HIS MIND RATHER REMOTE AND IMPRACTICAL AT THAT TIME. IN RETROSPECT, DO

YOU HAVE A SYMPATHY TO THIS POINT OF VIEW?

Velikhov:

I am not understand exactly...

Interpreter:

(TRANSLATES)

Velikhov:

No, I don't have any sympathy to that, and I do not agree with it,

because one of the natural purposes which brought Reagan (to the

negotiations) was primarily to discuss problems of the so-called

Strategic Initiative. In his opinion, this idea was directed toward

making nuclear weapons impotent and outdated, i.e. useless. Therefore,

the proposal to fully liquidate (all nuclear arms was quite logical) if

you want to use this overcomplicated and unstable way, this uncertain

way to confront (a problem of) nuclear arms, wouldn't it be much

simpler just to eliminate these nuclear weapons? It would be quite a

logical idea. Therefore, it was clear to us that he should expect this

sort of discussion anyway. Perhaps, he was not quite prepared for such

a revolutionary approach, a... such a revolutionary option, but that

was... a demonstration of that very new political thought, which serves

today as the basis of the Soviet attitude in international relations.

SDI

Interviewer:

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS A SCIENTIST ABOUT SDI?

Velikhov:

The Strategic Defense Initiative is in my opinion, quite a complex, I'd

say, phenomenon. And a contradictory one. Speaking of it's... objective

as stated to the American people, that is, the creation of a shield

impenetrable to nuclear arms and the means of their delivery, this

objective is unachievable; this is proved by many years of discussions

and bolstered by the agreement on anti-ballistic defense limitation.

If... speaking of the administration's current interpretation, i.e.

limited defensive potential that makes the outcome of a nuclear attack

indeterminable, thus stabilizing the existing system of reciprocal

restraint, I think, these conclusions are wrong. A limited defense does

not stabilize this system, but quite the opposite, it destabilizes it.

At the same time, if approached from the opposite point of view, and as

far as any agreement is concerned, you always have to consider the

interests of the opposite side, the opposite side would always consider

such a limited defense as a system capable, above all, to exclude or

lessen the effect of retaliatory strike; hence, it is aggressive by

definition and undermines stability. Now, they are saying that this

system can serve as some sort of insurance policy, political insurance

in case of the total elimination of nuclear arms, against some third

power or against terrorists, etc. This doesn't seem to be a serious

argument, because the total elimination of nuclear weapons would be

possible only when accompanied by the most serious limitations of

anti-ballistic systems development, especially in space. Well, at last,

they are saying sometimes that this system could be ... er,... an

exchange... is needed for the purpose of negotiations, serving as a

bargaining chip during the negotiations. True, there are sometimes such

talks, though in fact, these things are certainly not serious

statements... and, therefore... as much as... The conclusion made after

the discussions of the 1972 agreement on the anti-ballistic defense

negotiations, the one which pointed to the necessity of real

limitations (of ABM) as the prerequisite for deep reductions in nuclear

arms this conclusion, I think, remains in force.

[END OF TAPE 676000]

Interviewer:

DOES IT REFLECT THE DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE... POSSIBILITY

OF THE SDI BEING EFFECTIVE? FOR MOST PEOPLE WHO FEEL THAT THE SOVIET

UNION MUST HAVE... MIGHT HAVE EXAGGERATED ITS POSITION ON IT: IT COMES

OUT OF THE FEELING THAT IT'S... THAT'S NOT A VERY PROMISING WEAPON

SYSTEM...

Velikhov:

As I already mentioned the strategic initiative is not based on any

integrated military concept. I Therefore, as a full-protecting system

of anti-nuclear defense it is certainly ineffective; but as a concept

that creates all sorts of new space armaments, that opens the door to

space, providing a new substance to the arms race, which subjugates the

scientific efforts of a whole group of modern countries with the burden

of creating weapons of (mass) destruction, this conception is

definitely very dangerous and harmful.

Interviewer:

IS IT YOUR FEELING THAT THE SAME TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE NOW SUGGESTED AS

POTENTIALLY, DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES CAN BECOME, OFFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES?

Velikhov:

There are certainly no reasons, either scientific or technological, to

separate the defensive technology from offensive. First, what is

defensive technology? It is an attempt to attack the launching

missiles. With attacking missiles you may attack any object, having in

possession the required information, means of guidance and means of

destruction. Therefore, it would be naive, both in terms of science and

technology, to divide offense and defense. In reality, these means are

definitely mixed.

Soviet vs. American Negotiating Positions

Interviewer:

THAT'S ABOUT MY LINE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT REYKJAVIK. CAN YOU TELL ME SOME

OF PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF WORKING WITH YOUR AMERICAN COUNTERPART, NOT

SO MUCH ABOUT THE NEGOTIATION ITSELF, BUT WHAT KIND OF SPIRIT, WHAT

KIND OF ATTITUDE ON THE PROFESSIONAL LEVEL, THE NON-POLITICAL LEVEL WAS

IN REYKJAVIK?

Velikhov:

Well, first of all, I worked not on the high level. I was an expert.

Therefore I worked only with the night team that acted for ten hours

every night in order to fulfill the tasks set by the leaders... the

national leaders... It seemed to me... well, my opinion... my personal

opinion about Reykjavik... the impression which remained with me also

in the future... is that... the President as well as his staff were

definitely not prepared for serious negotiations, even to some extent,

in technical terms. At the same time, on the lower level there was a

will to exclude a possibility of any progress in any negotiations and

that was, I think, a prevailing if not a unanimous attitude. Therefore

this division of the higher and lower levels caused the essence of

difficulties in Reykjavik... These difficulties seem to me to reflect

the general situation of today's administration. On one side there is a

certain intention to reach some agreements, but on the other hand there

is a... a whole... there is a group of individuals who are convinced

that any agreement with the Soviet Union is harmful.

Interviewer:

OBVIOUSLY THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL. BUT ON THE

MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC LEVEL, IS THERE A SORT OF, IS OF EXCHANGE....

ARE THOSE THE SAME, ARE PEOPLE UNDERSTANDING BOTH THE TECHNOLOGY AND

THE CONSEQUENCES IN THE SAME WAY, OR ARE THERE DIFFERENCES... BETWEEN

THE SORT OF THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES...OF THE

TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES AND THE RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING?

Velikhov:

First of all, I don't think that the existing contradictions could be

called contradictions between the Soviet or, as you call it, the

Russian understanding and the American one. The fact is that the

majority of American experts and scientists have today the same notion

of the problem as we do. We both understand the necessity of

disarmament, we both understand dangers of an arms race in space, and

in general, many particularities are equally comprehensible to both of

us...Please note, I mention people who certainly do not share our

political concept. Although, there is a group of people who are simply

against all the agreements. As for these people, it is also quite clear

to us that if they are against any agreements, it would be useless to

work with them at all. Well, I just divided it somehow into black and

white. Though, what I'm really trying to show, is that the problem is,

as it seems to me, that today the United States must work out its own

definite policy, which would serve the United States interests. As for

the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that "...not for a

jot are we interested in having the United States security less than

the security of Soviet Union." We are aware that achievement of any

agreement is only possible when it serves the interests of both sides

as well as all the others'...sides.

Interviewer:

ARE YOU TIRED?

Velikhov:

No, no...

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

Interviewer:

WHO... WHO ARE IN HIS JUDGEMENT THE GROUPS IN... OR, WHAT GROUP

PRINCIPALLY, OR WHAT SUB-GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE THE PRINCIPLE

OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT?

Velikhov:

Well, now I can talk only on some speculative level, but I imagine,

there is a unity of some professionals, such as Richard Perle, such as

Weinberger who think for any number of reasons that any agreement with

the Soviet Union is negative; and this group is naturally joined by

right-wing circles on the basis of their ideologic considerations. At

the same time, the same direction conforms the interests of certain

circles in industry... in the military-industrial complex, of certain

circles in Congress, of certain members of Congress representing

interests of the military-industrial complex in a number of committees

as well as, to my regret, of some scientific circles who also represent

interests of researchers whose career is related to the service in

military area.

Interviewer:

HOW COME ONE DOESN'T SEE THE SAME KIND OF GROUPINGS IN THE SOVIET

UNION?

Velikhov:

The group interests in the Soviet Union are in general less represented

than in the United States, because the very process of policymaking is

here significantly more homogeneous. After all, it considers the basic

interests of the Soviet Union before any others. On the other hand,

er... the economy...inasmuch as we do not have private industry which

would be interested in making profits from developing new military

technologies, in terms of economy we are interested conversely, in

minimizing our expenditures for defense. So, the economic... all the

economic factors work against big military spending. Of course the

careers of particular individuals may depend in different ways upon

their success in this area, but these are just careers of some

particular people. As for group interests, the interests of some mighty

financial groups supported by private capital, we don't have this in

the Soviet Union. Therefore, in principle, the forces working in the

direction of militarization, in the direction of enforcement of...

these forces are far weaker here.

Interviewer:

BUT IN THE INTERNAL CONSULTATION DO SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY

INDUSTRIALISTS IN THIS AREA, DON'T THEY EXPRESS THEIR OPINION SIMILAR

TO AMERICAN SCIENTISTS INDUSTRIALISTS AND MILITARY?

Velikhov:

As I mentioned before, the question is not just of expressing opinions.

The question is one of basic interests. This basic interest... Inasmuch

as we don't have a private sector producing weapons, we don't have a

basic interest of supporting arms race. The rest is the interests of

particular individuals, but as for the interests of individuals... it

is much simpler to convince a separate individual; he is much better

fit to comprehend the role of national interests, party interests...

so, our opinion... you can see, how clearly (our) opinions are

expressed, how great is the general support of today's course that is

followed... and of the new attitude reflected by this course. These

are, mind you, concrete examples: A unilateral moratorium on space

weapons testing, a unilateral moratorium on the nuclear weapons testing

-- all these are concrete...these are examples of concrete steps, which

would be enormously hard to undertake in the American conditions, as it

also would be hard in our conditions, had we a real ground for inner

opposition.

Interviewer:

LET ME ASK YOU MORE ABOUT THE TESTING MORATORIUM. FROM A SCIENTIFIC

POINT OF VIEW, WHAT DO YOU THINK, WHY ARE THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN VIEWS

SO DIFFERENT ON TESTING?

Velikhov:

Again, this is not a matter of differences between the Soviet and

American points of view. Just look at the history of the struggle for

the ending of nuclear testing, and you will see that full agreement

on... that the achievement of an agreement on total cessation of

nuclear testing was always a goal of all presidents, including the

present administration. Recently, though, the point of view of the

American administration has changed. It has changed for the same basic

reasons: today the economic and ideological factors which... and groups

supporting this administration are working against stoppage of the arms

race. Therefore, the struggle for the third generation, for the new

round of the arms race is actually a struggle for new budgeting, a

struggle for... Well, for some, it as an illusion of the creation of

superiority, the ideological reason. For others, it is a possibility

for new profits the economic reason. Integrating these factors, a new

reality of the United States emerges. The Soviet Union adheres to the

position that was worked out and agreed upon with the American side

many years ago. (It was agreed), that it was necessary to conclude as

soon as possible an agreement on total stoppage of nuclear testing,

providing that adequate control, quite realistic a condition in terms

of today's technology, would be established.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT... THAT CURRENT MORATORIUM ON TESTING AND THE REFUSAL

OF THE AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CURRENT MORATORIOUM HAS ANYTHING

TO DO WITH SDI?

Velikhov:

Of course to some extent, one of the arguments of the administration,

as well as of scientists of the Livermore Laboratory among others, is

that the tests are necessary for the purpose of the creation of weapons

of third generation, the x-ray lasers, in particular. Therefor, despite

the administration's statements that the anti-ballistic defense should

be non-nuclear, we know that the nuclear component of this system is

being developed; this fact serves as a bold argument against stoppage

of nuclear tests. Though, there are some other arguments within the

government of the United States. I think that all these arguments are,

in general, not serious, from the technological point of view, and that

cessation of testing is immediately possible, considering the

maintenance of a stable balance (of powers) and a gradual transition to

stable non-nuclear peace. However, the argument of the necessity of

developing the space nuclear component is the important argument in

today's policy of the United States.

Interviewer:

BACK TO EUROPE. WHY THE ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS PROMOTED IN

REYKJAVIK, WAS NOT ACCEPTED WHEN REAGAN OFFERED IT IN THE FIRST PLACE

TO EUROPE?

Velikhov:

Well, this is a purely academic question. However, one should admit

that the Soviet Union has gone a long way ever since toward a new

attitude in international issues; on the other hand, that was also a

considerable concession toward the interests of European countries, (I

mean) West European countries and the United States. As you understand,

we do not now consider the arsenals of France. We also agree to

disregard those of England; we agree, as of yet, to not consider the

means of forward basing and this big compromise was possible

exclusively within the context of all other agreements, i.e. drastic

reduction of the strategic armaments, faith to the ABM treaty and

cessation of nuclear tests.

[END OF TAPE 677000]

Weapons Development vs. Arms Control

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE PROPOSAL THAT USSR HAD NORMAL DEALING WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL

CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE OF (THE SOVIET FORCES?

Velikhov:

Well, first, it's quite an arguable question, who has superiority in

conventional forces, er, because, in general, uh-m... it is also

possible to figure differently the potential of these forces. At the

same time, I should say that the Soviet Union is interested, and very

much so, in not getting the conventional arms race as a substitute of

the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, we are interested in the most

substantial reduction of conventional arms too, inasmuch as it is one

of the most expensive components of today's military expenditures.

Therefore the Soviet Union, as well as countries of the Warsaw Pact

have offered repeatedly a number of appeals to the West, to NATO to

start immediately... to establish a working committee and to start

immediately to work out realistic conditions for drastic reductions of

conventional armaments and, above all, their offensive components,

their components of dual purpose, etc. Therefore, I think that this is

also to some extent, one of the existing myths about the alleged

intention of the Soviet Union to maintain its alleged superiority in

conventional armaments. No, we are prepared for the most substantial

reduction of conventional armaments, we consider it a very important

element along with the elimination of chemical warfare, the

strengthening of the ban on biological weapons, and all other means of

mass destruction.

Interviewer:

ARE THERE GOOD WAYS THAT YOU ENVISION AS A SCIENTIST OF VERIFICATION OF

THE CURRENT SMALLER WEAPONS--TACTICAL WEAPONS, CRUISE MISSILES AND

SUCH, THAT MIGHT CREATE A BIGGER AND BIGGER PROBLEM IN TERMS OF ANY

KIND OF FUTURE AGREEMENT?

Velikhov:

Of course one should say, that the development of technology turned to

the direction that creates more and more problems of... er... control.

Therefore, we have to stop immediately and limit the development of

military technology. That is what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is

repeatedly talking about: about the very immediacy, that the time is

running out, that we may reach the point when it will be very difficult

to control. On the other hand, I should say that if we muster all those

efforts which we are spending today for the creation of means of

destruction and information systems that guide and assist these means

(to reach the targets), if we muster all of these efforts for the

purpose of arms control, I am sure we would be able to achieve it. Just

look, it took us one month to establish seismographs near

Semipalatinsk, we are ready now to to deploy a whole network (of them),

a worldwide network... We are fully aware that today it is possible to

is, seismology contributes a lot to the area of verification of nuclear

tests. We can use existing spacecraft as a means to verify the whole

number of agreements. Of course, the matter of cruise missiles is more

complicated, but inasmuch as both sides...the Soviet Union has

expressed repeatedly its preparedness to accept on-site verification, I

think all these means... all these procedures can be worked out and

enforced by technical means. We just have to hurry. I agree that it is

a very urgent problem.

Specifics of Reykjavik Summit

Interviewer:

I WANT TO GO BACK A LITTLE BIT TO THE ...NEGOTIATIONS IN REYKJAVIK

PRESIDENT... IS NOT TECHNICALLY CONFIDENT... EVERYBODY WAS EXTREMELY

TIRED, EVERYBODY WAS EXHAUSTED...AND IT GOES FOREVER. AND IT'S A BAD

MODE OF TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL. DO YOU... WHAT WAS YOUR SENSE ABOUT THIS

RELENTLESS...OR, ESSENTIALLY, HARD WORK OF NEGOTIATIONS?

Velikhov:

No, I think it is... I think that is the destiny of political leaders

and all of... It is hard to expect that a politician can be well versed

in every detail... It is important that he could rely on advisers who

share his main political attitude, and are thus able to assist him. At

the same time, the difficult work of negotiations is truly difficult.

But what is most important is a political will. If there is a political

drive to really achieve drastic reductions, to get rid of this

Damocles' Sword of nuclear arms, this is the main thing. The rest of

the work should be carried. Oh, for me? Well... I actually had two

jobs. One was a night job at which time we had to discuss all of the

details. At that time I was mainly participating as a member of the

group which nightly discussed the military problems. But at the same

time I also participated in another group that discussed all other

problems, including technical... scientific/technological cooperation

which I considered very important, as well as being interested in, and

general human problems. On the other hand, during the daytime we

had...all the time...we had constant contacts with the press trying to

explain in detail our position. Therefore the work consumed my days and

nights. Though I should say that when one participates in such an

historical event, which had an influence on... -- I think, Reykjavik

will go down in (history)... It already out by experts who would follow

given instructions. That's what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was

talking about in Reykjavik. He said that it was time to stop the

rubbish of enormous numbers of particularities that disturb...er...that

creates only an illusion of negotiations in Geneva. It was time to

agree in principle. And in principle, the President should have surely

reached an agreement with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. And he was...

and what prevented him from doing so is a different question.

Therefore, I see the problem is in the internal contradictions within

the American system. And these are the contradictions which need to be

resolved. They should be resolved by the current of the political

process in America.

Interviewer:

PERSONALLY FOR YOU, HOW WAS IT? IN TERMS OF HARD WORK OR IN TERMS OF

WORK?

Velikhov:

has gone down in history, there is nothing to argue about it... so, I

didn't feel especially tired.

Interviewer:

...WITH FOR EXAMPLE, RICHARD PERLE, AND HE HAD AN OPINION ABOUT WHAT

MAKES HIM TICK, AS THEY SAY...

Velikhov:

I didn't have any informal encounters with Richard Perle, but I have to

admit that after several meetings with different representatives of the

Administration, be it his deputies or some other representatives of the

Administration, say, those in charge of Strategic Defense Initiative,

I've got generally a pessimistic impression as a result of these

encounters. Inasmuch as they usually tried during these meetings to

avoid the principle discussions, trying instead to deal mainly with

issues of secondary importance... such as all sorts of accusations...

in a word, all those talks were unconstructive in general. Therefore,

regretfully, I had very few constructive conversations with

representatives of this particular Administration.

American-Japanese Cooperation on SDI

Interviewer:

I'M PRETTY MUCH DONE. LET ME ASK YOU ONE QUESTION FOR KOBAYASHI. HOW

DID YOU RESPOND TO THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO WORK TOGETHER ON SDI. WHAT IS DOES IT

TELL YOU ABOUT JAPANESE THINKING ON THE SUBJECT?

Velikhov:

Well, I would not try to intervene between the United States and Japan:

they are allies; though I would like to say in general, the attempt to

involve other countries in developing anti-ballistic defense is also a

very controversial one. Because from one side it clearly contradicts

the 1972 agreement if they really speak of co-production or

technological data exchange. On the other side, it is purely a

political process... On the other side... it is, so to say... it is

like... a recognition of loyalty... the oath loyalty...as I see this

recognition of cooperation, because many governments understand that

they would not gain anything positive in technical terms from this

deal. Yet on the other hand, again, it is a type of process of

involving the resources...the scientific resources, technological

resources... in (military matters). This is carried out in a manner

which I consider dangerous to the world community; because it brings to

the existing systems of relations... to the science which was

traditionally... traditionally, the European science was an open one --

it imposes additional limitations on it. It imposes additional

requirements of secrecy, of concealment, thus ruining science in

general. And not only (the exchange of) science between the socialist

countries and the capitalist world, but also, in terms of the internal

structure of science in the West.

Position During Reykjavik Summit

Interviewer:

I'M PRETTY MUCH DONE. IF THERE IS ANY SORT OF OBSERVATION THAT COMES TO

YOUR MIND ABOUT REYKJAVIK PROCESS AND YOUR PART IN IT THAT WE DIDN'T

DEAL WITH? IS THERE SOMETHING THAT YOU THINK IS IMPORTANT AND WE

IGNORED ABOUT THE PROCESS IN REYKJAVIK?

Velikhov:

No.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU JUST TELL ME IN A SORT OF FORMAL WAY WHAT WAS YOUR OFFICIAL

CAPACITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT OFFICIAL CAPACITY DO YOU HAVE

IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS OF THE ?

Velikhov:

In the negotiations I was expert of...

Interviewer:

IN RUSSIAN...

Velikhov:

In Reykjavik I was the expert of the Soviet delegation. My official

position in the Soviet Union regarding the process of nuclear

disarmament... well, sometimes they appoint me as an expert, but in

general I am a Chairman of the Committee...of the Public Committee,

elected by the scientists... of the Committee of Soviet Scientists

Against Nuclear Threat for Peace. This Committee works not only as the

(body of) experts, advisers...we also work out different kinds of

scientific problems, and we're trying to increase the contributions of

scientists in the field of real issues leading to nuclear detente. In

particular, we make appropriate scientific research, writing

appropriate books... we also deal with concrete issues for example,

this cooperative work with the American seismologists in Semipalatinsk.

[END OF TAPE 678000 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Evgeny Velikhov, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-9c6rx93d64

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-9c6rx93d64).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Velikhov, E. P.
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 46e11e16c98fb341d8f966b5f90c80e02eba44a9 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Evgeny Velikhov, 1986,” 1986-12-15, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 30, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-9c6rx93d64.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Evgeny Velikhov, 1986.” 1986-12-15. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 30, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-9c6rx93d64>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Evgeny Velikhov, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-9c6rx93d64