War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Paul Nitze, 1986 [3]

What did you argue about this verse. I first heard the news of the cute God the fact that we had photographs which confirm that the Soviets had were putting missiles into Cuba on a Sunday night and I was having dinner with Dean Rusk and a whole group of Germans and I just been talking to one of those Germans about my suspicion that the Russians were about to create a double crisis and response for their political defeat with respect to Berlin. That double crisis might include Cuba and at that moment there was a knock on the door and. Roger Hill's been nice to see Dean Rusk and took him outside and told him that there were photographs indicating that the Cuban missiles were there which McCall and John McCann of the CIA had thought was probably true and I also thought was probably true. We don't have confirmation of it. So then immediately thereafter Rusk took me out on the terrace of the State Department on the eighth floor and told me what heals but I told him and said What do you think we

ought to do next. And I said Well this seemed to me to be a very serious development and that clearly the president should be immediately had informed me that I from my myself didn't have an immediate answer as to what I thought should be done. And the next day I had to go out to make a speech out in Knoxville and then on the plane coming back I wrote out a memorandum as to what I thought with him. So we had maximum objectives and minimum objectives and what our objectives should be in connection with this crisis. And then after that the meetings went on day and night for several days before we really got the situation more or less thought through in an orderly fashion. What was your position where you were. But I think everybody change their positions at various times during the debate. But I thought I thought that we began to get some clarity as to the problem when Alexis

Johnson and I went off to his office and wrote and dictated a scenario as to how to handle this issue and which began with he did all the political parts of it. And I did all the military parts of it and what I was proposing in that scenario was that we start with a quarantine. Then if that worked well then the crisis would be over. If that if that did not work then we had to be prepared to take out the air defenses on the island and if we could get those air defenses out then we should destroy the missile sites. And if that worked why then we are through with the crisis if that did not work then we had to be prepared to engage in a way and a landing in an invasion of the island so that what it turned out my mind was that it was not a choice between one or another but one wanted to do was to use the minimum force necessary in order to achieve the result and the

result we wanted was the elimination to get those missiles out of there. And that's why I think everybody finally came to that conclusion. And the key date the key of this scenario that we developed was that the president at some time would have to make a speech to the American public and to the world. We need a draft of that speech in order to make us give our scenario some degree of concreteness. And we asked Ted Sorenson to dry to write that draft of the speech and he did a brilliant job. He did it overnight it was a first class job and he stood from the initial reaction with respect I think that was probably mine and I don't quite remember but I have favored one thing or another as we went through and trying to through Think through the logic of the case and as I say I think we finally did find the logic of the case when we worked out this scenario with the minimum use of force necessary to achieve the objective. But being prepared to you do whatever was necessary in order to achieve that

objective. I mean the initial reaction was people having issues or camps where did I think in the end most everyone was last. I stood as I remembered more with the harder line camp rather than the softer line camp during the initial phase. I sided with Dean Acheson with respect to the quarantine. There'd been some argument by the lawyers involved that a blockade was illegal under the circumstances because we hadn't declared war we were not at war with Cuba with Cuba and we didn't want to declare war. And Dean Acheson came up with the idea look you know you international law as a matter of precedent and will create a precedent. And if you object to the word blockade we'll call it a go a quarantine. And so I was behind that when he suggested that you go see and see if you can deal with that.

Seriously just give it a try not hammering up so they're going to anyways. I mean I think you can hear them. What was your reaction to that sector McNamara's assertion that the missiles didn't change history. I thought he was quite wrong. Totally irrelevant in the sense of women. When McNamara suggested that the presence of these medium range and intermediate range missiles in Cuba would not in any way change the strategic balance. I thought he was quite wrong about that. His view was on the one hand that we were quite vulnerable in any case to the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the heavy bombers that the Soviet Union had and that this would not appreciably increase the danger to the United States. And I think he also rather felt that there was a there's a better chance of getting along with the Soviets if there was a greater degree of equality between the nuclear capabilities of the

two sides. I thought that to the presence of these missiles and and Cuba with a much shorter time of flight than ICBMs would in fact give the Soviet Union not just equality but would help them along the road what having superiority. And I thought this that whoever had creative superiority would thereby gain political advantages which we could ill afford to give to the Soviet Union. So I disagreed with McNamara on that right from the beginning of the arguments. EX Can you feel it you won the day in terms of that argument. DG I think I did. Was it was it the argument was that if you don't you're both strong you're both strong articulate individuals that we think that. Just think Oh now there were lots of tough arguments between lots of different people in the X come during those days. The view

of one or another person is very passionate. At any given time and then they will change their viewpoints. We were seeking to argue these things out and Zaki argue them out. This was a serious matter and therefore you don't do that. Timidly do that by honestly putting forward what your views are are you going out and saying well you can't come to a consensus we eventually did come to a consensus on the what you call the hard liners were upset by the blood bath. I don't believe that I just was upset. No I don't remember that he was upset because after all here if you could get the job done through a quarantine Why not. There was some additional risk that the Soviets might have missiles the warheads there and that they might use those before the quarantine really could take effect. And there were some that argued that this was more

rapid and certain. But on the other hand some of the military agreed that you couldn't be certain you're going to get them all out in a national strike and therefore it was a set. Another way of looking at it so the rest perhaps was greater if you carried out and air strike first in a strike against the missile installation. So it was it was a you had to have a balanced judgment after you knew all the facts and the facts kept coming in. So we knew more and more about it day after day. Did you feel the Soviets moving here were related to other situations. I think it did relate to Berlin and I think that it was when women start to get here. I did this as I did believe that the Mr. Khrushchev's decision to try this rather hazardous experiment in Cuba was related to the fact that he had had to back away from his

ultimatum that he had given the preceding year with respect to Berlin. We won that one on Berlin and he felt this was an opportunity to reverse the aid to reverse the correlation of strategic nuclear forces which had caused him to back down in Berlin by putting these missiles in Cuba it would change the strategic relationship. And B could then exploit that politically in order to gain a political victory which would compensate for having outfaced him in the Berlin situation. Subsequently you know when they fired cross just that they called this a hair brained scheme the idea of deploying this is the Soviets that fired him calling it a harebrained scheme to deploy these missiles in Cuba. How do you know those things. I thought during the time that we were not coming very close to it. We

had clear cut conventional superiority around Cuba. We found the four of five submarines that they had and made them surface so they were not a threat. We could have carried out whatever we wanted to with respect to Cuba that we could invade we could to capture the island we could have done all those things but we also had really effective strategic superiority at that time. At that time the effect of Mr. Ives now is very great emphasis in the latter years of his presidency on the nuclear part of our defense had paid off and so we were beginning to get into the see the Polaris submarines and the and the intercontinental missiles etc. etc. and the heavy bombers. So we were in better shape than they were with respect to the nuclear situation at that time the strategic nuclear and the combination of being in a pursuit Perrier position both locally in the conventional and in the strategic seem to me to reduce

the risks not to zero. You never could tell what somebody might do out of anger. Irrationally but it was my feeling that the Russians are very careful conservative and very irrational people who believe in having the greater firepower per mile of front and that's what they have. That's the basis of their military thinking. You didn't feel I mean this was kind of an irrational miscalculation by the way. Kennedy was saying well the chances were that one or some other people is going to wake up and see their eyes peeled. This was an irrational act to change the ballgame so logically I thought it was. The probability was very high that they would not wish to get themselves involved in a war with us at that time about Cuba where they were No. And

poor check that they viewed was not in. Not impossible that they might react. I thought that if they did react they might very well react against missiles in Turkey and Italy or perhaps by reinstituting the Berlin blockade. I thought it would be unlikely that they would even do that. Think of the essential lessons we should learn from the humanness today help us today and say that if you have a clear cut conventional superiority backed by nuclear superiority you're in very good shape. If you don't have it you're not in as good shape. You think Islam you state that again as a lesson you know you feel less than human right. My feeling that the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated that when you have conventional superiority on the point that the point of conflict confrontation plus superiority

in nuclear weapons you're in very good shape. There is very little that the other side can rationally do about it. Now they might do something irrational but if they do something irrational they'll get it much worse than we would get it so they're not apt to do that. Now it isn't that easy to have the combination of conventional superiority plus being backed up with nucleus of Perry's superiority. We don't have it today and there are many parts of the world where we don't have what we have where we're faced with gross conventional inferiority because the geographic position favors the Soviet Union. But we don't have nuclear superiority either and nor do I think we have even nuclear equality so we're in a much more dangerous position today than we were but we still I think have a sufficient nuclear capability that we don't have to panic until because I don't believe as I said earlier I think the Soviets are conservative therefore I don't think that they will do push

that hard when there is a real danger of war you can't be certain of it. We certainly should certainly shouldn't let our guard down. But we've got if we do the intelligence things will be alright. You know the Cuban missile crisis changed the world in any way you can thinking about nuclear weapons. For example utility. I think not because there are many in the United States many who are who worked with us in the during the X-Com like Mike Bundy who evaluate the situation quite differently than I do. He thinks the nuclear weapons are nothing to do with it and he so says he thinks all you need is a minimum to nuclear deterrent I think he's quite wrong. Totally wrong but that's all I'm saying is it didn't settle these arguments. You put the red cameras away and said in our interview that you know they want the role of nuclear weapons in the humanness seem to me that the role of nuclear weapons was crucial not the only

thing that was crucial. Our conventional superiority at the point of confrontation was equally as crucial. Both were crucial. I think the lesson is that if you have both conventional superiority and that is backed up by nucleus superiority then you're in very good shape you're not physically riskless. But the risks are clearly risks that you can take with confidence. If you're in the reverse of that situation where you have both conventional inferiority and you it is not backed up by nucleus superiority but you have nuclear inferiority. Still the power to retaliate. You've got a much more dangerous situation. It was the greatest moment of danger. Us what is what was the greatest moment of danger. My feeling was that the I was most concerned during the period when we couldn't

make up my mind what to do. But once we made up our minds what to do and we had adopted this policy really of using the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve the objective but still stage by stage being prepared to use whatever force was necessary in order to achieve the objective of getting those missiles out of there. I felt confident after we arrived at that decision. You'll recall that moment that day on I see the ship was approaching the last live and I remember it very well indeed. What you're McNamara and Ross Kilpatrick and I went down to flag plot which was in the in the Navy part of the Pentagon and with the. General I mean I had all of them but sustained outlanders. Yes at the time when the Soviet ships were

approaching our quarantine line. McNamara and Ross Kilpatrick who was deputy secretary of defense and I went down to flag plot to go over with Admiral Anderson the exact location of all the ships and to discuss what was going to be done next. And during that conversation McNamara insisted that he be kept informed minute by minute as to what was going on and how the situation was evolving on the spot so that he could inform the president and he and the president could be sure that all the political consequences of whatever was done had been thoroughly taken into account. Not at all Anderson was of the view that this was quite an improper procedure. The history of naval doctrine had always been based upon the fact that the person on the spot was the only person who could take into account all the factors which bore upon hub what was happening on the

spot that he should be given correct general instructions but he should be given a great deal of leeway as to how to carry out those general instructions. You want to be his instructions not to be specific as to what the purpose was. But not in detail as to what he was to do and that this this procedure that McNamara was suggesting of masterminding you know McNamara and the president masterminding what was said and done minute by minute all seem to be him to be a total violation of that doctrine and quite improper. What was your what was your feeling about that relationship. Do you feel that this was it. I thought on this that McNamara was right. I thoroughly sympathized with with the Admiral's viewpoint as to what the history had been. But under these circumstances it's seem to me that the political considerations weighed the immediate military considerations on the spot. This was partially due to the fact that I was sure that

we had naval superiority at that spot and no great disaster could come from some improper action on our part. You gave me a clear understanding where you can go the lessons of the missile crisis where you think these lessons are understood today by the ministration and by God I think they're understood by the administration I do not believe that they're understood by the populace but instead of saying Oh. I think the lessons of the Cuban crisis are understood today by the administration. I doubt that they're understood by a large segment of the populace.