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<v Narrator 1>Secret Intelligence is made possible by public television stations and the Corporation <v Narrator 1>for Public Broadcasting. <v Narrator 1>Additional funding has been provided by United Airlines rededicated to giving <v Narrator 1>you the service you deserve. <v Man 1>Mr. Ghorbanifar was trying to encourage us to proceed with the <v Man 1>initiative. He said, you support the Nicaraguan resistance, don't you? <v Man 1>Among other things, he said, why don't you use some of this money <v Man 1>for that purpose? And as I described to you before we took recess, <v Man 1>I thought it was a right good idea. <v Man 1>And I came back and advocated it and we did it. <v Man 2>Even Ghorbanifar knew that you were supporting the Contras. <v Man 1>Yes, he did. Izvestiya knew it, the name had been in the papers in Moscow and all over <v Man 1>Danny Ortega's newscast radio ?Havana? <v Man 1>was broadcasting, it was in the every newspaper in the land. <v Man 2>All our enemies knew it. <v Man 2>And you wanted to conceal it from the United States Congress.
<v Man 1>We wanted to be able to deny a covert operation. <v Bill Kurtis>The Iran-Contra hearings of 1987 raised disturbing questions about the conflicts <v Bill Kurtis>between secrecy and democracy. <v Bill Kurtis>How can a society harbor in its midst secret arms of government? <v Bill Kurtis>Why did these agencies come to be? <v Bill Kurtis>What do we really know about what they do? <v Bill Kurtis>And how do they protect us? Fail us? <v Bill Kurtis>Sometimes threaten us. <v Bill Kurtis>These are not really new questions. <v Bill Kurtis>Similar ones have been raised throughout this century, a century in which the [music <v Bill Kurtis>plays] United States has created a vast intelligence empire, an <v Bill Kurtis>empire both foreign and domestic, supported by billions of dollars <v Bill Kurtis>and layer upon layer of government. <v Bill Kurtis>In the skies, dazzling spy machines have helped avert global war. <v Bill Kurtis>There have been secret agents and secret warriors who have changed the destinies of <v Bill Kurtis>nations. It is a secret empire that serves as America's
<v Bill Kurtis>eyes and ears, its shield and sometimes its sword. <v Bill Kurtis>But the U.S. intelligence community has evolved to a level where it has the potential <v Bill Kurtis>of threatening the very principles it was created to defend. <v Bill Kurtis>It is this constant tension between secrecy and democracy that we wish to explore, <v Bill Kurtis>seeking the answer to perhaps the most important question of all: who will watch <v Bill Kurtis>the watchers? A warning as we begin- the journey through the <v Bill Kurtis>world of secret intelligence is full of deception. <v Bill Kurtis>But it is possible to trace the important role of U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>intelligence in shaping the history of our country and the world in the 20th <v Bill Kurtis>century. That is what our series intends to do.
<v Bill Kurtis>America at the turn of the century. <v Bill Kurtis>Isolationist, prosperous and protected by two oceans. <v Bill Kurtis>It is a world with little need for espionage. <v Bill Kurtis>There is no mention of secret arms of government in its constitution, now over 100 <v Bill Kurtis>years old. <v Bill Kurtis>The United States will be the last of the great powers to create an intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>Such was the mindset of the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>towards espionage as late as 1916. <v Bill Kurtis>Even though war had been raging in Europe for two years. <v Bill Kurtis>America entered the war in 1917 wholly unprepared in intelligence <v Bill Kurtis>matters. When General Picken March became chief of staff, he found that
<v Bill Kurtis>his entire intelligence department consisted of two officers and two clerks. <v Bill Kurtis>[horses running] This was not the case in Russia, a nation torn apart by civil war. <v Bill Kurtis>Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin promised peace, land and bread to the Russian <v Bill Kurtis>masses. <v Bill Kurtis>He seized power in November of 1917. <v Bill Kurtis>The Bolsheviks made a separate peace with Germany to the dismay of the allies who <v Bill Kurtis>promptly invaded. The allies hoped to strangle the infant Soviet state in its <v Bill Kurtis>crib. <v Bill Kurtis>It was an invasion force made up of Czechoslovaks, <v Bill Kurtis>Poles, Japanese, The British, and <v Bill Kurtis>over 13000 American troops.
<v Bill Kurtis>Bolshevik power was also challenged by supporters of the czar and by a disaffected <v Bill Kurtis>populace that believed the revolution was being betrayed. <v Bill Kurtis>To wage war on the Soviet's military enemies, Lenin turned to his ablest associates, <v Bill Kurtis>Leon Trotsky, who created the Red Army. <v Bill Kurtis>To stamp out internal resistance, Lenin created what was called the extraordinary <v Bill Kurtis>commission to combat counter revolution and sabotage the Cheka, forerunner <v Bill Kurtis>to the KGB. <v Bill Kurtis>All opposition was to be crushed. <v Bill Kurtis>The Cheka's only rule was to win, it loosed mass unbridled <v Bill Kurtis>terror. Anyone could be branded an enemy of the people. <v Bill Kurtis>Thousands were arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed. <v Bill Kurtis>The reign of terror, like the fight against foreign invaders, succeeded. <v Bill Kurtis>Allied troops went home. <v Bill Kurtis>The Soviet people were subdued.
<v Bill Kurtis>But protecting the revolution at home was only part of the Cheka's mission. <v Bill Kurtis>Equally important was fomenting revolution abroad through military power, <v Bill Kurtis>subversion and espionage. <v Bill Kurtis>Lenin convened the third Congress of the Communist International in 1919. <v Bill Kurtis>There, he predicted a world Soviet states by the next year. <v Bill Kurtis>Lenin's bold predictions seemed possible. <v Bill Kurtis>The red revolution surged out of Russia. <v Bill Kurtis>Governments panicked everywhere. <v Bill Kurtis>In the once isolationist United States, complacency was shattered by a tide <v Bill Kurtis>of postwar labor unrest. Unrest attributed to red agitation. <v Bill Kurtis>Across the nation, some four million American workers went out on strike. <v Bill Kurtis>[people yelling] Blood flowed as police and private detectives battled workers.
<v Bill Kurtis>The unrest grew worse in April 1919 when 34 bombs in several <v Bill Kurtis>cities were intercepted before reaching their intended victims. <v Bill Kurtis>All public figures. <v Bill Kurtis>A month later, however, a 35th bomb did explode on the steps of this <v Bill Kurtis>Washington townhouse. <v Bill Kurtis>Its intended victim was then U.S. Attorney General A. <v Bill Kurtis>Mitchell Palmer. Palmer wasn't hurt. <v Bill Kurtis>The bomb thrower was not so fortunate. <v Bill Kurtis>He was killed. But in the debris, searchers found a leaflet signed by <v Bill Kurtis>a group called the Anarchist Fighters. <v Bill Kurtis>It threatened violence against the capitalist class. <v Bill Kurtis>Palmer labeled the bombing the work of emissaries, of the Bolshevik leader Lenin. <v Bill Kurtis>It was all part of a secret communist plot Palmer believed to bring Lenin's revolution <v Bill Kurtis>to America. The attorney general decided he would retaliate, then crush the <v Bill Kurtis>communist movement. All alien radicals were to be rounded up and deported. <v Bill Kurtis>The stage was now set for the emergence of an obscure 24 year old
<v Bill Kurtis>lawyer in the Department of Justice, J. <v Bill Kurtis>Edgar Hoover. <v Bill Kurtis>The young and energetic Hoover was placed in charge of the anti radical campaign. <v Bill Kurtis>He first surrounded himself with the writings of the Marxist pioneers. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] His strong convictions about communism were forged then, and would serve as <v Bill Kurtis>his model for the rest of his life. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover's first act was the deportation to Russia of 250 aliens <v Bill Kurtis>accused of attempting to overthrow the United States government. <v Bill Kurtis>To ensure no chance of a mutiny at sea, the ship also carried 200 soldiers. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover predicted that other Soviet ?arcs? <v Bill Kurtis>would soon set sail. <v Bill Kurtis>Meanwhile, thousands of other accused radicals were arrested at a national roundup <v Bill Kurtis>coordinated by Hoover. <v Bill Kurtis>Some were beaten. Many were imprisoned without benefit of due process. <v Bill Kurtis>One of those swept up in the raids was a young radical, Ella Wolfe.
<v Ella Wolfe>They just put him in jail. <v Ella Wolfe>And the hysteria was incredible. <v Ella Wolfe>Wherever you went, there was great hysteria. <v Ella Wolfe>And uh so um no matter where we uh organized, there <v Ella Wolfe>were the Palmer raids. And then two detectives came to take me the district <v Ella Wolfe>attorney's office. And when I walked in the first time, he said, <v Ella Wolfe>first tell me what, as an educated, lovely young girl do <v Ella Wolfe>with wasting so much time with these dirty, filthy foreigners? <v Ella Wolfe>That was his first question. <v Ella Wolfe>And I said, these are not dirty, filthy foreigners. <v Ella Wolfe>These are friends of mine. And they are comrades. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Although thousands were jailed, most went free. <v Bill Kurtis>The accused radicals had violated no laws. <v Bill Kurtis>The same could not be said for Hoover's raiders. <v Richard Gid Powers>Very soon, the public became more outraged at the injustices <v Richard Gid Powers>that these detainees were suffering more than the
<v Richard Gid Powers>alleged danger that they posed to the United States. <v Richard Gid Powers>When Attorney General Palmer went on to predict <v Richard Gid Powers>that there would be a revolution on May 1st, 1920 and nothing happened, the <v Richard Gid Powers>Palmer raids ended up looking ridiculous. <v Richard Gid Powers>Hoover nearly lost his job. <v Bill Kurtis>But Hoover survived the public backlash and in 1924 was named director <v Bill Kurtis>of the Bureau of Investigation, which later expanded and became the FBI. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover would hold this position for almost half a century, serving under six presidents. <v Bill Kurtis>In those years, the line between legitimate dissent and subversion would often blur. <v Bill Kurtis>The civil liberties of Americans would be breached time and again. <v Bill Kurtis>But for millions of Americans, Hoover was the defender of the American way of life. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] He protected the country against communists and gangsters, and he let the
<v Bill Kurtis>public know it was a carefully orchestrated image. <v J. Edgar Hoover>Well, Jack, what do you gotta say for yourself? <v Jack>I'm so short I ?would? have to get up on the box. <v J. Edgar Hoover>All right, Jack in the box. Let us know what you know about ?crime?, about the conditions <v J. Edgar Hoover>in New York. <v Jack>Gee Mr. Hoover. You're G-Men sure are good. <v Jack>I'd like to be one when I grow up. <v J. Edgar Hoover>Well if you work hard and play hard and live clean, you'll certainly be one. <v Jack>Thank you. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover's public relations savvy was surpassed only by his genius as a government <v Bill Kurtis>bureaucrat. <v Bill Kurtis>He established excellent relations with Congress, which approved his requests to <v Bill Kurtis>build a first rate crime laboratory. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover, who began his career as a Library of Congress messenger, now oversaw <v Bill Kurtis>the compilation of the most extensive collection of fingerprints in the world. <v Bill Kurtis>[machinery operating] Today's FBI is a monument to its first director.
<v Bill Kurtis>As in the past, the FBI continues to pioneer in the use of science. <v Bill Kurtis>State of the art technology like this laser beam examination of faint and very <v Bill Kurtis>old fingerprints is one of Hoover's legacies. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Today, the bureau's annual budget is more than a billion and a half <v Bill Kurtis>dollars. <v Bill Kurtis>It employs some 17,000 people who serve as the nation's protector <v Bill Kurtis>in uncovering spies, blocking terrorism and fighting crime. <v Bill Kurtis>Taking on the underworld brought Hoover much of his early national attention. <v Bill Kurtis>[gunshots] In the 20s and 30s, criminals were running wild in the nation, challenging <v Bill Kurtis>government authority. Hoover declared war on these public enemies who are taking <v Bill Kurtis>advantage of the lack of city, state and federal police cooperation. <v J. Edgar Hoover>We must not for a moment lose sight of our goal to teach the criminal
<v J. Edgar Hoover>that regardless of his subterfuges, his squirming, his twisting and <v J. Edgar Hoover>slimy wriggling, he cannot escape the one inexorable rule of law enforcement: <v J. Edgar Hoover>you can't get away with it. <v Bill Kurtis>Despite Hoover's eventual long reign at the FBI, he had no assurance that he would be <v Bill Kurtis>reappointed in 1932 when Franklin D. <v Bill Kurtis>Roosevelt was elected president. <v Elliot Roosevelt>My father distrusted Mr. Hoover very, very much. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Uh he felt that he was a great administrator and that he had <v Elliot Roosevelt>done a good job or he wouldn't have kept him on. <v Bill Kurtis>Besides the political uncertainty of a new administration, Hoover had an enemy. <v Bill Kurtis>Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor. <v Elliot Roosevelt>My mother disliked Mr. Hoover intensely and <v Elliot Roosevelt>uh disliked Mr. Hoover s- to the extent that uh <v Elliot Roosevelt>she would vocally express her displeasure with Mr. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Hoover and all of his works.
<v Bill Kurtis>Hoover kept an explosive dossier on Eleanor Roosevelt's private life. <v Bill Kurtis>One of many such files the FBI director kept on key political figures <v Bill Kurtis>in Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>In 1943, the FBI submitted a report to the president suggesting <v Bill Kurtis>that Eleanor was having an affair. <v Bill Kurtis>FDR responded with anger. <v Bill Kurtis>He threatened to send the FBI agents who had filed the allegations to the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>There they would serve until killed by the Japanese. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] By the time Hoover sent these accusations to FDR, the FBI chief was <v Bill Kurtis>secure in his job [cheering]. Roosevelt may not have liked Hoover, but he needed him. <v Bill Kurtis>In the late 30s, the nation was still at peace. <v Bill Kurtis>Once again, isolationist and complacent, in mood. <v Bill Kurtis>[soldiers shouting Heil Hitler] But as war clouds gathered in Europe, there was only one <v Bill Kurtis>man Roosevelt could turn to to provide domestic security against foreign
<v Bill Kurtis>espionage. As to an international intelligence service, <v Bill Kurtis>none existed [marching]. <v Bill Kurtis>In 1934, Roosevelt gave Hoover the assignment of surveilling potentially <v Bill Kurtis>subversive groups in the United States, like these American Nazis in Madison <v Bill Kurtis>Square Garden. <v Bill Kurtis>The FBI's mission was expanded. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover was given responsibility for tracking down German agents throughout the Western <v Bill Kurtis>Hemisphere, both prior to and during World War Two. <v J. Edgar Hoover>It was a struggle against enemy agents who have been sent to this country <v J. Edgar Hoover>to disrupt our industries, destroy our morale and damage the impact <v J. Edgar Hoover>of our fighting armies. <v J. Edgar Hoover>On May 26th and 28th, 1942, two German <v J. Edgar Hoover>submarines, left the base at ?inaudible?. <v J. Edgar Hoover>One landing on Long Island, the second landed in Florida.
<v J. Edgar Hoover>[music plays] Four saboteurs landed from each submarine. <v J. Edgar Hoover>They were well equipped with high explosives to breed <v J. Edgar Hoover>panic and insecurity in this country. <v J. Edgar Hoover>The submarine saboteurs were in jail two weeks after they landed. <v J. Edgar Hoover>Six of the eight were executed after a military trial. <v Bill Kurtis>Again, Hoover played up the FBI successes, but the wartime authority <v Bill Kurtis>granted for the tracking down of German agents would be used by Hoover to conduct <v Bill Kurtis>domestic surveillance for the next 36 years. <v Richard Gid Powers>Since Hoover had been directed to find out <v Richard Gid Powers>what groups had been infiltrated or were controlled by communists or <v Richard Gid Powers>fascists, logically, he had to investigate any organization <v Richard Gid Powers>that had a potential for infiltration. <v Richard Gid Powers>In practice, this meant that there was nothing to stop Hoover from investigating <v Richard Gid Powers>any organization to see if it was dominated by communists. <v Richard Gid Powers>If he came up with a negative finding, there was nothing to stop him from
<v Richard Gid Powers>investigating the next year or the year after to see if some infiltration and <v Richard Gid Powers>subsequently taking place. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] But years before Hoover's G-Men were hunting down spies, an obscure <v Bill Kurtis>operative was giving the United States its most important intelligence victories. <v Bill Kurtis>He was Herbert Yardley, a brilliant pioneer in the secret craft of <v Bill Kurtis>code breaking. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley's hobby became a profession in 1912 when he joined the State Department <v Bill Kurtis>as a code clerk. He quickly showed his genius. <v Bill Kurtis>One night, bored and with nothing else to do, he broke President Woodrow Wilson's <v Bill Kurtis>own secret message code. Yardley knew that if he could break America's most important <v Bill Kurtis>government code, other nations could also. <v Bill Kurtis>After America's entry into World War One, he was put in charge of an Army <v Bill Kurtis>cryptology unit, M-I 8. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley demonstrated the military edge to be gained from breaking the enemy's electronic
<v Bill Kurtis>transmissions [electronic sounds]. <v Bill Kurtis>M-I 8 was dissolved after the armistice. <v Bill Kurtis>But in the 1920s, Yardley received 100,000 dollars from the government <v Bill Kurtis>to form a clandestine decoding operation. <v Bill Kurtis>It operated in absolute secrecy from this townhouse on East 37th Street <v Bill Kurtis>in New York City. <v Bill Kurtis>It was called the Black Chamber, and it had one mission: to steal and decipher <v Bill Kurtis>as many foreign government communications as it possibly could get. <v David Kahn>One of the great problems that Yardley had was where he was going to get the material, <v David Kahn>the raw intercepts, the coded messages to solve because <v David Kahn>uh radio was not in great use in those days, and he made an arrangement with a number of <v David Kahn>the cable companies to surreptitiously feed him these <v David Kahn>coded messages, which were, as I say, the raw material that he could use to break the <v David Kahn>codes of uh Great Britain, France, possibly Germany,
<v David Kahn>uh many Latin American countries and so forth. <v Bill Kurtis>As an emerging global power, the United States now recognized the need <v Bill Kurtis>for foreign intelligence, and the Black Chamber could provide it quickly, efficiently <v Bill Kurtis>and illegally. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Yardley broke Japan's diplomatic codes in time for the intelligence to be <v Bill Kurtis>used at an international naval disarmament conference in 1921. <v Bill Kurtis>By reading Japan's cables, U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>negotiators knew Japan's secret bargaining position. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese diplomats found the Americans unusually stubborn at the conference table <v Bill Kurtis>and quickly agreed to a ratio of battleships more favorable to the U.S.. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley's Black Chamber would go on to break the codes of many other nations. <v Bill Kurtis>But in 1929, the entire operation was shut down by Secretary of <v Bill Kurtis>State Henry L. Stinson, who is said to have uttered, gentlemen <v Bill Kurtis>do not read each other's mail.
<v Bill Kurtis>Yardley, who had suffered the loss of a finger on his right hand due to experiments with <v Bill Kurtis>secret inks, was now bitter, out of work, and with a family to feed during the <v Bill Kurtis>Depression. He wrote a book in 1931 revealing the secrets <v Bill Kurtis>of the Black Chamber. The Japanese, upon reading the book, discovered their codes <v Bill Kurtis>had been broken and promptly changed them. <v Bill Kurtis>The U.S. government never forgave Yardley. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley died in 1958 and was buried here in Arlington National Cemetery. <v Bill Kurtis>His true monument is not this stone, but the largest and most secret agency <v Bill Kurtis>in the entire U.S. intelligence empire. <v Bill Kurtis>That is the NSA headquarters located at a 1000 acre complex in Fort <v Bill Kurtis>Meade, Maryland. About 25 miles from downtown Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>It is highly secure. This is as close as we could get. <v Bill Kurtis>But in those buildings, is America's modern code breaking effort and other eavesdropping
<v Bill Kurtis>systems as well. <v James Bamford>Today, the National Security Agency's probably five times the size of the Central <v James Bamford>Intelligence Agency and probably has about five times the size of the budget. <v James Bamford>It's an enormously large agency. <v James Bamford>Uh ?times? it's been upwards of 100,000 people when you count the civilians and the <v James Bamford>military uh devoted to signals intelligence and code <v James Bamford>breaking. Today, NSA eavesdrops on entire streams of communications <v James Bamford>and those streams of communications, which may contain thousands of telephone calls, <v James Bamford>uh are simply filtered through a computer that can be programed with individual telephone <v James Bamford>numbers to target those numbers and listen to those phone calls. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] One of the NSA's earliest advisors was William Freedman, a man who took <v Bill Kurtis>cryptology to new frontiers. <v Bill Kurtis>Friedman was a genius at code breaking. <v Bill Kurtis>When the Japanese altered their codes after Yardley's book, it was Friedman who, despite <v Bill Kurtis>the enormous complexity of Japan's new codes, broke them once again.
<v James Bamford>The highest uh diplomatic cipher at the time um <v James Bamford>was one known as Purple. The Purple Code. <v James Bamford>And when uh Friedman and his uh small team uh was known as <v James Bamford>the SIS, the Signals Intelligence Service, were successful in <v James Bamford>uh manufacturing or basically putting together almost an identical machine. <v David Kahn>The Japanese purple machine was a machine that put ordinary <v David Kahn>messages, sometimes in Japanese, sometimes in English. <v David Kahn>They sent messages English into secret form so that a message you <v David Kahn>shall report might come out to be ZQVBLD and so <v David Kahn>forth. And at the other end, you would have to have a similar machine to take out the <v David Kahn>ZQVB and so forth and turn it into a report. <v David Kahn>It did this in part by using telephone <v David Kahn>selector switches such as this. <v David Kahn>If you see as this is [clicks] pressed, a switch goes around.
<v David Kahn>The way this would work in the machine was that if you were constantly <v David Kahn>pressing the letter A for example, each time you press it, it would be <v David Kahn>inciphered into a different letter. <v David Kahn>At this position A might be Q. <v David Kahn>At this position A might be R. At this position A might be L. <v David Kahn>And this constant changing was the principle of <v David Kahn>the purple machine. And you had to reconstruct something like this if you were trying <v David Kahn>to decipher it and solve it. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] The purple machine is still considered secret by the NSA, and the agency <v Bill Kurtis>refused our request to film one. <v Bill Kurtis>Only these rare photographs exist to suggest the immense difficulties faced <v Bill Kurtis>in recreating a machine Friedman's team had never seen. <v Bill Kurtis>It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of all time, but its product, <v Bill Kurtis>which could have prevented a profound U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>military defeat, was squandered.
<v Bill Kurtis>[marching] 1940 marked the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire. <v Bill Kurtis>Emperor Hirohito had chosen the word ?Shoah?, enlightened peace, <v Bill Kurtis>to characterize his reign. <v Bill Kurtis>But in greeting the New Year, [cheering] Japanese military leaders declared that the time <v Bill Kurtis>had come for Japan to reject any who stood in the way of the nation. <v Bill Kurtis>[cheering] They meant primarily the other major Pacific power. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese had a term for the U.S. presence: ?inaudible?. <v Bill Kurtis>Cancer of the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Admiral Isa Roko Yamamoto, commander of Japan's combined fleet, began <v Bill Kurtis>planning a surprise attack on U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>naval forces at Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>It would be a daring, knockdown punch from which the United States would not recover. <v Bill Kurtis>But the attack had to take place soon. <v Bill Kurtis>Japan's stockpile of oil would only last about 18 months. <v Bill Kurtis>While Yamamoto's navy prepared for the attack, one
<v Bill Kurtis>of Japan's top spies under diplomatic cover in Hawaii began openly <v Bill Kurtis>gathering intelligence critical to the success of the mission. <v Bill Kurtis>[car running] Takeo Yoshikawa was a Japanese diplomat and a trained spy, and all he had <v Bill Kurtis>to do was hire a cab and take a sightseeing trip. <v Bill Kurtis>Yoshikawa took no photographs, he used no binoculars, and he broke no laws. <v Bill Kurtis>The FBI and military intelligence were helpless to stop him. <v Bill Kurtis>The hills surrounding Pearl Harbor gave Yoshikawa an excellent view of the disposition <v Bill Kurtis>and movement of the U.S. fleet. <v Bill Kurtis>What he freely observed and reported to Tokyo were two significant discoveries concerning <v Bill Kurtis>schedules. First, the fleet was usually harbor side on Sundays. <v Bill Kurtis>Second, early warning U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>patrol planes sent to patrol the waters around the islands never <v Bill Kurtis>left before sunrise.
<v Bill Kurtis>Despite worsening U.S. Japan tensions, complacency reigned in Honolulu. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] The U.S. military was all but asleep, lulled by pronouncements like this, <v Bill Kurtis>a Japanese attack on Hawaii is the most unlikely thing in the world, with one <v Bill Kurtis>chance in a million of being successful. <v Bill Kurtis>That was how the Honolulu Star Bulletin assessed the situation on September 6th, <v Bill Kurtis>1941. <v Bill Kurtis>Two months later, the Japanese navy was at sea observing strict radio <v Bill Kurtis>silence. Meanwhile, Tokyo transmitted false signals to <v Bill Kurtis>further hide Yamamoto's true position. <v Bill Kurtis>Captain Allyn Cole, a U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>codebreaker, was stationed at Pearl Harbor.
<v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>Two or three weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, uh there <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>was a game of hide and seek going on between our electronic surveillance <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>and their ele- electronic transmissions. <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>They trying to convince us that nothing was going on and we trying <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>to find out what actually was going on. <v Captain Roger Pineau>When Admiral Kimmel, who was the commander of the Navy at Pearl <v Captain Roger Pineau>Harbor asked his intelligence officer, uh Commander Edwin <v Captain Roger Pineau>T. Layton, where the Japanese fleet was located, Leighton says, I <v Captain Roger Pineau>do not know, sir. And Kimmel said, you mean they could be rounding Diamond <v Captain Roger Pineau>Head at this moment? And Leighton had to say to him, for all we know, they <v Captain Roger Pineau>may. They might because we do not know where they're located. <v Bill Kurtis>U.S. naval codebreakers were confused by the false messages being transmitted <v Bill Kurtis>by the Japanese navy. <v Bill Kurtis>They had lost track of the Japanese fleet and they never received a message that said
<v Bill Kurtis>specifically, we will attack Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>Even so, three purple intercepts warned of an imminent hostile <v Bill Kurtis>Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>And any one of them should have galvanized the commanders here. <v Bill Kurtis>Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter ?Teeshort? <v Bill Kurtis>into action. They did not. <v Bill Kurtis>[typewriters clicking] They didn't because the commanders never received the intercepts. <v Bill Kurtis>The codes were diplomatic, not military, and went instead to Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>Government authorities there failed to transmit this intelligence back to Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>The first intercept asked the Japanese consulate to provide information based on an <v Bill Kurtis>imaginary grid over Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] This would allow the Japanese Navy pilots to plot the exact position of <v Bill Kurtis>each individual ship and its specific anchorage. <v Bill Kurtis>Such intelligence would be of incalculable value in a bombing and torpedo attack. <v Bill Kurtis>On December 2nd, a second message was intercepted. <v Bill Kurtis>It ordered Japanese diplomats to burn their codes and destroy their code machines
<v Bill Kurtis>as well. This was a certain sign that the Japanese were planning to launch a major <v Bill Kurtis>attack. <v Bill Kurtis>On December 7th, yet another intelligence opportunity was squandered. <v Bill Kurtis>A final Japanese dispatch decoded in the early hours of December 7th <v Bill Kurtis>revealed that Japan had ordered its diplomats to break off negotiations with the United <v Bill Kurtis>States at 1:00 P.M.. <v Bill Kurtis>Such an order for a precise time in the midst of a weekend was a sure sign <v Bill Kurtis>of imminent attack. There were four hours left to act on the information. <v Bill Kurtis>But by the time Washington did act, it was too late. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese signal for attack. Tora, tora, tora had been given. <v Bill Kurtis>[planes flying]Washington's <v Bill Kurtis>warning, the most important intelligence in U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>history, was delivered hours too late by an RCA telegram
<v Bill Kurtis>messenger, Tadao Fuchikami. <v Tadao Fuchikami>?inaudible? And the funny thing is that nobody e- ever questioned me about my SS <v Tadao Fuchikami>?do? anything. No problem. <v Tadao Fuchikami>I kind of felt guilty that uh maybe was my fault uh not delivering <v Tadao Fuchikami>it quicker. <v Tadao Fuchikami>But wasn't anything I could do because the message came uh <v Tadao Fuchikami>late. [explosions] <v Bill Kurtis>Most of the Pacific fleet and Air Force was destroyed.
<v Bill Kurtis>Amidst the destruction and confusion, over 1,000 men were wounded, <v Bill Kurtis>2,400 more were dead. <v Bill Kurtis>Some 1,100 of those men, sailors and Marines, are <v Bill Kurtis>entombed under the shrine where the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>battleship Arizona rests. <v Bill Kurtis>It was a terrible price to pay. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays]
<v Bill Kurtis>Although the Japanese had destroyed most of the Pacific fleet, they had overlooked a <v Bill Kurtis>critical target that had been ripe for the taking. <v Bill Kurtis>It proved to be Japan's most serious intelligence blunder of the war, a fact <v Bill Kurtis>not known until the intelligence debriefing of the Japanese military leaders <v Bill Kurtis>at the end of the war. <v Captain Roger Pineau>I showed them a picture of the of one of those great still shots taken <v Captain Roger Pineau>from an attacking Japanese plane of Battleship Row. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And I said, do you gentlemen all know this picture? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Oh, yes, yes, yes. I said I said, do you know what those white circles are up <v Captain Roger Pineau>in the top? And they said, sure. Fuel tank farm on O'ahu. <v Captain Roger Pineau>I said, how many bombs did you drop there? <v Captain Roger Pineau>They said, no bombs. Not a target of attack. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And I said, do you realize that all of the fuel oil the United States possessed <v Captain Roger Pineau>west of the California coast was located above ground in those tanks? <v Captain Roger Pineau>It did not occur to them that oil could be a critical factor to the United States, <v Captain Roger Pineau>despite the fact that oil was the critical factor in their own timing
<v Captain Roger Pineau>of going to war. They had a one year supply of fuel oil <v Captain Roger Pineau>and uh of oil in general, petroleum products. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And it was that that caused <v Captain Roger Pineau>the timing of the outbreak of the war. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And yet, thinking of the United States as ?inaudible? <v Captain Roger Pineau>the wealthy country, it never occurred to them that we could be short of oil. <v Bill Kurtis>The fact that America still had its oil would have been little consolation for the <v Bill Kurtis>stunned and silent crowd that gathered in Times Square, New York, on <v Bill Kurtis>the night of December 7th, 1941. <v Bill Kurtis>They wanted to know, as did the entire nation, how such a surprise attack <v Bill Kurtis>had happened, what had gone wrong in the Pacific and who was to blame. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] General Short was harshly censured and relieved of his command. <v Bill Kurtis>So was Admiral Kimmel, who had later congressional hearings attempted to defend his
<v Bill Kurtis>actions. [music plays] <v Admiral Kimmel>We needed one thing which our own resources could not make <v Admiral Kimmel>available to us. <v Admiral Kimmel>That night ?inaudible? was the information available in Washington, <v Admiral Kimmel>from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where <v Admiral Kimmel>Japan would probably strike. <v Admiral Kimmel>I did not get this information. <v Bill Kurtis>But another commander in the Pacific, Douglas MacArthur, despite derelictions <v Bill Kurtis>before and after the attack, escaped criticism. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosion] <v Captain Roger Pineau>MacArthur, who knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor and <v Captain Roger Pineau>was informed of it as soon as it happened, made no <v Captain Roger Pineau>movements and there were a number that he could have made in <v Captain Roger Pineau>order to ameliorate the Japanese attack 8 hours later in the Philippines. <v Captain Roger Pineau>There were those who think he should have attacked Japanese <v Captain Roger Pineau>air bases in Formosa. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Uh the very least he could have done was to disperse his planes.
<v Captain Roger Pineau>And uh he he did neither of these. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And what happened to MacArthur? Nothing. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Uh nothing derogatory. He became a hero. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Why wasn't he vilified? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Why wasn't he accused as Kimmel was? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Because the United States, in addition to needing a scapegoat, also needed <v Captain Roger Pineau>a hero. And MacArthur was handy to serve that role. <v Captain Roger Pineau>[radio transmissions] <v Bill Kurtis>But more than U.S. commanders were at fault. <v Bill Kurtis>The worst intelligence failure in U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>history was rooted in the lack of a centralized system to collect and <v Bill Kurtis>disperse information. <v Bill Kurtis>The United States government resolved it would never again be subject to surprise <v Bill Kurtis>attack. [music plays] By then, Roosevelt had taken formal steps <v Bill Kurtis>to change the business of intelligence gathering and spying.
<v Bill Kurtis>This man would play a key role in the shaping of America's foreign intelligence service. <v Bill Kurtis>William Donovan was the most highly decorated U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>officer of World War One, where he earned the nickname Wild Bill. <v Ray Cline>He was a very charismatic figure. <v Ray Cline>He wore a uniform and I knew him and he had a lot of <v Ray Cline>merit badges [laughs]. He was, of course, a World War One uh <v Ray Cline>Congressional Medal of Honor holder. He had piercing bright <v Ray Cline>eyes, uh he looked at you intensely when he talked to you. <v Ray Cline>He seemed to be interested in all of his junior staff. <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan is considered the father of American intelligence. <v Bill Kurtis>A man is still revered by those who once served under him. <v Bill Kurtis>In a hastily invented World War Two intelligence group called the Office of <v Bill Kurtis>Strategic Services, veterans of the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>still convene for annual meetings. <v Bill Kurtis>At this [applause] Washington gathering in 1986, the late CIA director, William <v Bill Kurtis>Casey, made one of his last public appearances and paid tribute to William
<v Bill Kurtis>Donovan. <v William Casey>Fellow survivors always ?had? <v William Casey>started with a vision of Bill Donovan's. <v William Casey>A vision that intelligence, subversion, and psychological <v William Casey>warfare could be our spearhead, a critical spearhead <v William Casey>in the invasion of Europe. <v Bill Kurtis>Prior to World War Two, there was no foreign intelligence agency for young Americans like <v Bill Kurtis>Casey to join. Its creation in 1942, however, was not a popular <v Bill Kurtis>decision. <v William Casey>Everything in governments gets decided by a committee, <v William Casey>and for two years, Donovan was struggling to get an authorization, <v William Casey>get a charter to get uh a lot ?inaudible? <v William Casey>of people uh through committees. <v William Casey>There was always somebody there to block them. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Uh J. Edgar Hoover objected to anybody uh being in intelligence uh <v Elliot Roosevelt>other than himself because he felt that he was much better qualified
<v Elliot Roosevelt>to conduct a world wide organization because he already had the <v Elliot Roosevelt>FBI in place here in this country. <v William Colby>The military, of course, were very resentful of the arrival of this independent <v William Colby>organization uh and various situations the military intelligence <v William Colby>people particularly resisted it. <v William Donovan>It was born in upon me by this experience that today in this country <v William Donovan>we are facing one of the most crucial tests of our history. <v Bill Kurtis>[Donovan inaudibly speaking] Donovan survived the interservice rivalry and quickly began <v Bill Kurtis>building his espionage agency. <v Bill Kurtis>One of the first places Donovan turned to was here, the Library of Congress. <v Bill Kurtis>Not exactly a haven of spies, but for Donovan's brain trust of scholars, this <v Bill Kurtis>was a goldmine of critical information about the world now engulfed in <v Bill Kurtis>war. <v Ray Cline>I think the reason we all admire Donovan was that he was such a <v Ray Cline>dedicated uh driving man and
<v Ray Cline>that he saw the in- brainy side <v Ray Cline>of intelligence. He was not just a spook or a cowboy, though <v Ray Cline>he was fascinated with behind the lines operations and he strongly <v Ray Cline>believed in espionage. <v Ray Cline>But he also believed that the product of intelligence could come <v Ray Cline>from anywhere, open sources, library research, whatever. <v Ray Cline>And that what you wanted was a broad, contextual <v Ray Cline>understanding of the uh international conflicts that were confronting <v Ray Cline>the United States so they could be explained in depth to the man like <v Ray Cline>the president, who had to make concrete decisions affecting what the United States would <v Ray Cline>do. <v Bill Kurtis>Before the O.S.S., American intelligence, what little there was, had been insular. <v Bill Kurtis>Now, for the first time, America was taking a critical look at the entire <v Bill Kurtis>world. <v Bill Kurtis>But such intelligence gathering was only part of the job of the O.S.S..
<v Bill Kurtis>The other part was much more exciting. <v Bill Kurtis>Like the British service it was modeled after, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>also conducted espionage and low level military operations [planes flying] as seen <v Bill Kurtis>in these O.S.S. films. <v Bill Kurtis>Like many others, Richard Helms was trained in the arts [explosion] of espionage by a <v Bill Kurtis>British agent. <v Richard Helms>The man who taught close combat was um Colonel Fairbairn. <v Richard Helms>And I must say that he had a lot of exotic and very effective means of <v Richard Helms>uh disposing of people. <v Richard Helms>His uh thesis was that in wartime, <v Richard Helms>there are no good enem- good guys among the enemy. <v Richard Helms>They're just dead guys. <v Richard Helms>And I must say that it was a most startling experience to learn how many ways <v Richard Helms>that you could find to dispose of your fellow man. <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan's initial plan was for a group of less than one hundred agents
<v Bill Kurtis>[music plays]. Before the war was over, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>grew to over 12000 as agents trained for missions behind enemy lines. <v Bill Kurtis>One of its first operations took place in the jungles of Burma, a nation overrun <v Bill Kurtis>by the Japanese in 1942. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] In command of allied forces was General Joseph Stilwell. <v General Joseph Stilwell>We got run out of Burma, and it's humiliating as hell. <v General Joseph Stilwell>I think we oughtta find out what caused it, go back and retake the place. <v Bill Kurtis>The retaking of Burma began with a small O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>unit detachment 101.
<v Bill Kurtis>Its members parachuted behind enemy lines to undertake a new form of warfare <v Bill Kurtis>never before fought by Americans. <v Bill Kurtis>Their mission was to organize and train native tribesmen in guerrilla <v Bill Kurtis>warfare against the Japanese. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>O.S.S. headquarters in this area is located [Bill Kurtis: Colonel Carl Eifler, an <v Colonel Carl Eifler>early O.S.S. recruit was in charge of the mission]. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>General Stilwell gave us a mission to get into Burma behind the Japanese <v Colonel Carl Eifler>lines and disrupt communications. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Another phase of our mission is to gather intelligence on Japanese <v Colonel Carl Eifler>movements, equipment, supply and plans. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>I uh took the first unit out of the United States in the <v Colonel Carl Eifler>history of American warfare to hide behind enemy lines. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>There was a great deal of uh of training went into training the natives
<v Colonel Carl Eifler>themselves. We were looking for individuals that we could train when we <v Colonel Carl Eifler>found them. We put them through a school, trained them physically, develop their <v Colonel Carl Eifler>bodies to where they could take the hardships of of guerrilla warfare. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Without the goodwill of the natives that you are <v Colonel Carl Eifler>living with and fighting for, guerilla warfare's useless. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>We formed a new kind of war that had never been part <v Colonel Carl Eifler>before. We always fought attack. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>[fire burning] We struck and we ran. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>And the result of our activities was that we drove them back and took from <v Colonel Carl Eifler>them some 15,000 square miles of territory. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>I just figured that in my day I broke every law of God to man. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>And someday I'd pay an answer to it. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Not to man, to God.
<v Colonel Carl Eifler>When I was fighting it, no rules. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>The only rule was win. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] These scenes shot by the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>speak of the brutality of a guerrilla war. <v Bill Kurtis>The war where often the only rule was to win. <v Bill Kurtis>This left a legacy, one which would come to haunt the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>covert actions in later years. <v Richard Helms>I know that uh people take sides and they're rather vociferous on the subject. <v Richard Helms>But the fact remained that in World War Two, the O.S.S. <v Richard Helms>was dedicated to the thing that everybody else was, and that was to win the war. <v Richard Helms>And how you won it was irrelevant. Nobody cared. <v Richard Helms>And I served side by side in the O.S.S. <v Richard Helms>with priests and ministers and lawyers and teachers and professors and so forth. <v Richard Helms>All of them dedicated to the same principles. <v Richard Helms>There was no division about uh how it was desirable to win or how fast you oughtta
<v Richard Helms>do it. Fast as possible. <v Richard Helms>It was only later that these divisions came up and these issues of whether you should <v Richard Helms>have covert action or not have covert action it was moral or immoral, all of those things <v Richard Helms>are long after the war was over. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] By D-Day on June 6th, 1944, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>had carved out its turf in allied military operations. <v Bill Kurtis>Many O.S.S. officers and agents were already in place far beyond the beach head. <v Bill Kurtis>There was a can do attitude of William Donovan that nourished inside the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>a belief that anything that could be thought of might be done. <v Bill Kurtis>The assassination of Adolf Hitler was one. <v Bill Kurtis>The kidnapping of Germany's atomic scientists was another. <v Bill Kurtis>But on this day, as troops fought for a beach head at Normandy, O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>paramilitary units working with the French Resistance operated behind enemy
<v Bill Kurtis>lines. <v Bill Kurtis>Blowing up bridges. <v Bill Kurtis>Disrupting communications. <v Bill Kurtis>And tying up troops away from the battlefield. <v Bill Kurtis>But here, as in Burma, were omens of trouble for the United States. <v Bill Kurtis>The secret arts of commando warfare were learned well. <v Bill Kurtis>In years to come, they would be used without accountability throughout <v Bill Kurtis>the world. <v Ray Cline>Those were good O.S.S. operations and they were the the cowboy type. <v Ray Cline>And uh Donovan let it all be known that we had done these things. <v Ray Cline>Uh II think that our successes were real but <v Ray Cline>limited. I do not believe that they succeeded <v Ray Cline>in the uh clandestine penetration of Germany nearly early enough. <v Ray Cline>I think they did succeed in making contact
<v Ray Cline>with behind the lines fighters in France and Italy uh, but <v Ray Cline>they were marginal, if you like, in in organizing that effort. <v Ray Cline>Uh I give them high marks for starting from scratch and achieving <v Ray Cline>uh uh limited goals. But if you ask, would we have won the war without <v Ray Cline>them? I'd say yes, we would've over a longer period of time. <v Ray Cline>[gun shots and explosions] <v Bill Kurtis>After the Normandy invasion, almost a year of fighting remained in Europe. <v Bill Kurtis>A time in which the allies would discover the true horror of Hitler's Third Reich. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Many veterans of the O.S.S. would witness such scenes. <v Bill Kurtis>Here was real evil, evil worth defeating, it seemed, at any cost.
<v Bill Kurtis>By 1945, Germany was conquered and Hitler dead. <v Bill Kurtis>Russian and American soldiers celebrated. <v Bill Kurtis>But even then, U.S. leaders, including the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>Commander Donovan, had already begun to regard the Soviet Union with deep suspicion. <v Bill Kurtis>One totalitarian power was conquered, but another seemed to be taking its place. <v Bill Kurtis>Quietly, O.S.S. and military intelligence officers began preparing <v Bill Kurtis>for a new struggle. Surrendering Germans were recruited. <v Bill Kurtis>Some were scientists and engineers who had created Germany's terror weapon, the V2. <v Bill Kurtis>This was the world's first ballistic missile. <v Bill Kurtis>And Hitler had hurled it against allied cities with devastating effect. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosion] The V2 appeared too late to change the outcome of the war, but in future <v Bill Kurtis>conflicts, intelligence officers reasoned, the balance might rest with
<v Bill Kurtis>such a weapon. <v Bill Kurtis>All of the allies scrambled at war's end to capture Germany's rocket engineers. <v Bill Kurtis>America got most of them. They were secretly transported to the United States <v Bill Kurtis>where they built America's first missiles. <v Bill Kurtis>In their ranks were Nazis who had helped run the V2 missile factory and prison <v Bill Kurtis>where thousands of slave laborers perished. <v Bill Kurtis>Others had even more grisly pasts like General Reinhard Gehlen, responsible <v Bill Kurtis>for the torture and murder of countless allied prisoners of war. <v Bill Kurtis>And Klaus Barbie, who personally tortured Jews and French resistance fighters <v Bill Kurtis>and sent thousands to their deaths. <v Bill Kurtis>Why were the past deeds of these and others ignored? <v Bill Kurtis>We asked that question of John Weitz, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany who also <v Bill Kurtis>served in the O.S.S.. <v John Weitz>And somebody would say, this man knows exactly what's what and who's who.
<v John Weitz>And then somebody else came to them and said, this man is a swine. <v John Weitz>He's a Nazi. You can't use him. <v John Weitz>The American officer, 9 out of 10 times was a perfectly nice, somewhat middle aged <v John Weitz>lieutenant colonel, a reserve officer who wanted to get the heck the heck back <v John Weitz>to Oklahoma, to Wisconsin, to to Illinois, <v John Weitz>to his job, to his family. <v John Weitz>And he was not anxious to hang around and find somebody else because this was <v John Weitz>not a peccable man, because this was a <v John Weitz>swine. So he said, okay, I'll use him. Look, you worry about what he's about <v John Weitz>later. In the meantime, I I I'll I'll get what I want out of him. <v John Weitz>Then I'm sure we can get rid of him. That's how Klaus Barbie, I'm I'm sure, <v John Weitz>got recruited. <v Bill Kurtis>While his officers in the field prepared for a new conflict, Donovan lobbied for a <v Bill Kurtis>permanent intelligence organization, it would confront the Soviets throughout the <v Bill Kurtis>world. <v Bill Kurtis>It was a job J. Edgar Hoover sought as well.
<v Bill Kurtis>Donovan promoted his O.S.S. with an old Hoover trick, using the media <v Bill Kurtis>to build up public support. <v Bill Kurtis>Quickly, a spate of books, magazine articles and even comic books appeared <v Bill Kurtis>all glorifying the espionage and behind the lines missions of Donovan <v Bill Kurtis>and the O.S.S.. But the media proved part of Donovan's undoing. <v Bill Kurtis>Someone, many believed it was Hoover, leaked Donovan's confidential proposal <v Bill Kurtis>to the press. <v J. Edgar Hoover>[music plays] There is the flag draped coffin- <v Bill Kurtis>[inaudible speaking continues] Whatever chances Donovan had to run America's postwar <v Bill Kurtis>intelligence agency died with the death of Franklin Roosevelt. <v Bill Kurtis>Within a month of the war's end, Donovan's O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>was disbanded. The O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>commander was given a handshake instead of a permanent intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover and his FBI survived, of course, but the director, too, was denied
<v Bill Kurtis>his dream of heading up an expanded intelligence agency. <v Richard Gid Powers>Truman hated Hoover. <v Richard Gid Powers>Truman distrusted Hoover. <v Richard Gid Powers>Therefore, when it came time to set up postwar worldwide intelligence, <v Richard Gid Powers>Truman rejected Hoover's wishes for the FBI <v Richard Gid Powers>to manage both domestic and foreign intelligence. <v Richard Gid Powers>In fact, Truman used the word Gestapo in describing <v Richard Gid Powers>what the FBI would become if it held responsibilities for both domestic <v Richard Gid Powers>and foreign. Therefore, Hoover harbored a grudge <v Richard Gid Powers>against the CIA and this lasted for the rest of his career. <v Bill Kurtis>Harry Truman tried to manage a nation that was now the world's greatest economic and <v Bill Kurtis>military power without an international intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] He quickly changed his mind. <v Bill Kurtis>In the uneasy peace that followed World War Two, Truman decided there was a need for <v Bill Kurtis>secret agents and warriors, the O.S.S.
<v Bill Kurtis>would rise again under the name of the Central Intelligence Agency. <v Bill Kurtis>Many of those who would join the CIA came from the ranks of the O.S.S.. <v Bill Kurtis>Men who witnessed the intelligence disaster of Pearl Harbor and the utter evil <v Bill Kurtis>of Hitler's Third Reich. <v Bill Kurtis>But many of these men had learned another lesson as well. <v Bill Kurtis>One that would leave a disturbing legacy in years to come. <v Bill Kurtis>The only rule was to win.
Secret Intelligence
Episode Number
No. 101
The only rule is win
Producing Organization
KCET (Television station : Los Angeles, Calif.)
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
The Walter J. Brown Media Archives & Peabody Awards Collection at the University of Georgia (Athens, Georgia)
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Episode Description
This episode of Secret Intelligence discusses the shortfallings of the US handling Pearl Harbor. J. Edgar Hoover's life is discussed and the O.S.S.'s involvement in World War II is as well. Additionally, the rise of guerilla warfare is addressed.
Series Description
"When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the U.S. Chief of Staff, General Peyton March, discovered that his entire intelligence department consisted of two officers and two clerks. "Seventy years later, the United States has created a vast intelligence empire, both foreign and domestic, supported by billions of dollars and layer upon layer of government. It is a secret empire that serves as America's eyes and ears, its shield, and sometimes its sword. But in its evolution, the U.S. intelligence community now has the potential of threatening the very principles it was created to defend. "SECRET INTELLIGENCE, a four part documentary series, explores the constant tension between secrecy and democracy for the United States. This series, for the first time, provides American television viewers with a detailed and in-depth understanding of the reasons why the United States established the FBI, CIA, and National Security Agency. In doing so, viewers chart these agencies' successes as well as their failures, from Pearl Harbor through the Iran-Contra affair. It attempts to tell these stories in a fair and balanced way, as recognized by Newsday: 'The series makes clear the dangers of inadequate as well as overzealous use of intelligence tools.' "This is an epic and global story told in large by actual participants: a woman arrested in the infamous Palmer Raids directed by a young J. Edgar Hoover; an intelligence officer trying desperately to gather electronic signals from the Japanese fleet at Pearl Harbor; a former CIA officer explaining how he orchestrated a coup that brought the Shah of Iran back to power; a Senate investigator providing insight about the Iran-Contra hearings. "SECRET INTELLIGENCE, the Los Angeles Times wrote, 'undoubtedly will shock and perhaps anger lay viewers unaccustomed to encountering such a broad, blunt and expertly presented survey on the uneasy coexistence of secrecy and openness in America.'"--1989 Peabody Awards entry form.
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Chicago: “Secret Intelligence; No. 101; The only rule is win,” 1989, WGBH, The Walter J. Brown Media Archives & Peabody Awards Collection at the University of Georgia, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed June 28, 2022,
MLA: “Secret Intelligence; No. 101; The only rule is win.” 1989. WGBH, The Walter J. Brown Media Archives & Peabody Awards Collection at the University of Georgia, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. June 28, 2022. <>.
APA: Secret Intelligence; No. 101; The only rule is win. Boston, MA: WGBH, The Walter J. Brown Media Archives & Peabody Awards Collection at the University of Georgia, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from