Secret Intelligence; The Only Rule is Win; 101

<v Narrator 1>Secret Intelligence is made possible by public television stations and the Corporation <v Narrator 1>for Public Broadcasting. <v Narrator 1>Additional funding has been provided by United Airlines rededicated to giving <v Narrator 1>you the service you deserve. <v Man 1>Mr. Ghorbanifar was trying to encourage us to proceed with the <v Man 1>initiative. He said, you support the Nicaraguan resistance, don't you? <v Man 1>Among other things, he said, why don't you use some of this money <v Man 1>for that purpose? And as I described to you before we took recess, <v Man 1>I thought it was a right good idea. <v Man 1>And I came back and advocated it and we did it. <v Man 2>Even Ghorbanifar knew that you were supporting the Contras. <v Man 1>Yes, he did. Izvestiya knew it, the name had been in the papers in Moscow and all over <v Man 1>Danny Ortega's newscast radio ?Havana? <v Man 1>was broadcasting, it was in the every newspaper in the land. <v Man 2>All our enemies knew it. <v Man 2>And you wanted to conceal it from the United States Congress. <v Man 1>We wanted to be able to deny a covert operation.

<v Bill Kurtis>The Iran-Contra hearings of 1987 raised disturbing questions about the conflicts <v Bill Kurtis>between secrecy and democracy. <v Bill Kurtis>How can a society harbor in its midst secret arms of government? <v Bill Kurtis>Why did these agencies come to be? <v Bill Kurtis>What do we really know about what they do? <v Bill Kurtis>And how do they protect us? Fail us? <v Bill Kurtis>Sometimes threaten us. <v Bill Kurtis>These are not really new questions. <v Bill Kurtis>Similar ones have been raised throughout this century, a century in which the [music <v Bill Kurtis>plays] United States has created a vast intelligence empire, an <v Bill Kurtis>empire both foreign and domestic, supported by billions of dollars <v Bill Kurtis>and layer upon layer of government. <v Bill Kurtis>In the skies, dazzling spy machines have helped avert global war. <v Bill Kurtis>There have been secret agents and secret warriors who have changed the destinies of <v Bill Kurtis>nations. It is a secret empire that serves as America's <v Bill Kurtis>eyes and ears, its shield and sometimes its sword.

<v Bill Kurtis>But the U.S. intelligence community has evolved to a level where it has the potential <v Bill Kurtis>of threatening the very principles it was created to defend. <v Bill Kurtis>It is this constant tension between secrecy and democracy that we wish to explore, <v Bill Kurtis>seeking the answer to perhaps the most important question of all: who will watch <v Bill Kurtis>the watchers? A warning as we begin- the journey through the <v Bill Kurtis>world of secret intelligence is full of deception. <v Bill Kurtis>But it is possible to trace the important role of U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>intelligence in shaping the history of our country and the world in the 20th <v Bill Kurtis>century. That is what our series intends to do. <v Bill Kurtis>America at the turn of the century.

<v Bill Kurtis>Isolationist, prosperous and protected by two oceans. <v Bill Kurtis>It is a world with little need for espionage. <v Bill Kurtis>There is no mention of secret arms of government in its constitution, now over 100 <v Bill Kurtis>years old. <v Bill Kurtis>The United States will be the last of the great powers to create an intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>Such was the mindset of the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>towards espionage as late as 1916. <v Bill Kurtis>Even though war had been raging in Europe for two years. <v Bill Kurtis>America entered the war in 1917 wholly unprepared in intelligence <v Bill Kurtis>matters. When General Picken March became chief of staff, he found that <v Bill Kurtis>his entire intelligence department consisted of two officers and two clerks.

<v Bill Kurtis>[horses running] This was not the case in Russia, a nation torn apart by civil war. <v Bill Kurtis>Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin promised peace, land and bread to the Russian <v Bill Kurtis>masses. <v Bill Kurtis>He seized power in November of 1917. <v Bill Kurtis>The Bolsheviks made a separate peace with Germany to the dismay of the allies who <v Bill Kurtis>promptly invaded. The allies hoped to strangle the infant Soviet state in its <v Bill Kurtis>crib. <v Bill Kurtis>It was an invasion force made up of Czechoslovaks, <v Bill Kurtis>Poles, Japanese, The British, and <v Bill Kurtis>over 13000 American troops. <v Bill Kurtis>Bolshevik power was also challenged by supporters of the czar and by a disaffected

<v Bill Kurtis>populace that believed the revolution was being betrayed. <v Bill Kurtis>To wage war on the Soviet's military enemies, Lenin turned to his ablest associates, <v Bill Kurtis>Leon Trotsky, who created the Red Army. <v Bill Kurtis>To stamp out internal resistance, Lenin created what was called the extraordinary <v Bill Kurtis>commission to combat counter revolution and sabotage the Cheka, forerunner <v Bill Kurtis>to the KGB. <v Bill Kurtis>All opposition was to be crushed. <v Bill Kurtis>The Cheka's only rule was to win, it loosed mass unbridled <v Bill Kurtis>terror. Anyone could be branded an enemy of the people. <v Bill Kurtis>Thousands were arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed. <v Bill Kurtis>The reign of terror, like the fight against foreign invaders, succeeded. <v Bill Kurtis>Allied troops went home. <v Bill Kurtis>The Soviet people were subdued. <v Bill Kurtis>But protecting the revolution at home was only part of the Cheka's mission.

<v Bill Kurtis>Equally important was fomenting revolution abroad through military power, <v Bill Kurtis>subversion and espionage. <v Bill Kurtis>Lenin convened the third Congress of the Communist International in 1919. <v Bill Kurtis>There, he predicted a world Soviet states by the next year. <v Bill Kurtis>Lenin's bold predictions seemed possible. <v Bill Kurtis>The red revolution surged out of Russia. <v Bill Kurtis>Governments panicked everywhere. <v Bill Kurtis>In the once isolationist United States, complacency was shattered by a tide <v Bill Kurtis>of postwar labor unrest. Unrest attributed to red agitation. <v Bill Kurtis>Across the nation, some four million American workers went out on strike. <v Bill Kurtis>[people yelling] Blood flowed as police and private detectives battled workers. <v Bill Kurtis>The unrest grew worse in April 1919 when 34 bombs in several

<v Bill Kurtis>cities were intercepted before reaching their intended victims. <v Bill Kurtis>All public figures. <v Bill Kurtis>A month later, however, a 35th bomb did explode on the steps of this <v Bill Kurtis>Washington townhouse. <v Bill Kurtis>Its intended victim was then U.S. Attorney General A. <v Bill Kurtis>Mitchell Palmer. Palmer wasn't hurt. <v Bill Kurtis>The bomb thrower was not so fortunate. <v Bill Kurtis>He was killed. But in the debris, searchers found a leaflet signed by <v Bill Kurtis>a group called the Anarchist Fighters. <v Bill Kurtis>It threatened violence against the capitalist class. <v Bill Kurtis>Palmer labeled the bombing the work of emissaries, of the Bolshevik leader Lenin. <v Bill Kurtis>It was all part of a secret communist plot Palmer believed to bring Lenin's revolution <v Bill Kurtis>to America. The attorney general decided he would retaliate, then crush the <v Bill Kurtis>communist movement. All alien radicals were to be rounded up and deported. <v Bill Kurtis>The stage was now set for the emergence of an obscure 24 year old <v Bill Kurtis>lawyer in the Department of Justice, J.

<v Bill Kurtis>Edgar Hoover. <v Bill Kurtis>The young and energetic Hoover was placed in charge of the anti radical campaign. <v Bill Kurtis>He first surrounded himself with the writings of the Marxist pioneers. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] His strong convictions about communism were forged then, and would serve as <v Bill Kurtis>his model for the rest of his life. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover's first act was the deportation to Russia of 250 aliens <v Bill Kurtis>accused of attempting to overthrow the United States government. <v Bill Kurtis>To ensure no chance of a mutiny at sea, the ship also carried 200 soldiers. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover predicted that other Soviet ?arcs? <v Bill Kurtis>would soon set sail. <v Bill Kurtis>Meanwhile, thousands of other accused radicals were arrested at a national roundup <v Bill Kurtis>coordinated by Hoover. <v Bill Kurtis>Some were beaten. Many were imprisoned without benefit of due process. <v Bill Kurtis>One of those swept up in the raids was a young radical, Ella Wolfe. <v Ella Wolfe>They just put him in jail.

<v Ella Wolfe>And the hysteria was incredible. <v Ella Wolfe>Wherever you went, there was great hysteria. <v Ella Wolfe>And uh so um no matter where we uh organized, there <v Ella Wolfe>were the Palmer raids. And then two detectives came to take me the district <v Ella Wolfe>attorney's office. And when I walked in the first time, he said, <v Ella Wolfe>first tell me what, as an educated, lovely young girl do <v Ella Wolfe>with wasting so much time with these dirty, filthy foreigners? <v Ella Wolfe>That was his first question. <v Ella Wolfe>And I said, these are not dirty, filthy foreigners. <v Ella Wolfe>These are friends of mine. And they are comrades. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Although thousands were jailed, most went free. <v Bill Kurtis>The accused radicals had violated no laws. <v Bill Kurtis>The same could not be said for Hoover's raiders. <v Richard Gid Powers>Very soon, the public became more outraged at the injustices <v Richard Gid Powers>that these detainees were suffering more than the <v Richard Gid Powers>alleged danger that they posed to the United States.

<v Richard Gid Powers>When Attorney General Palmer went on to predict <v Richard Gid Powers>that there would be a revolution on May 1st, 1920 and nothing happened, the <v Richard Gid Powers>Palmer raids ended up looking ridiculous. <v Richard Gid Powers>Hoover nearly lost his job. <v Bill Kurtis>But Hoover survived the public backlash and in 1924 was named director <v Bill Kurtis>of the Bureau of Investigation, which later expanded and became the FBI. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover would hold this position for almost half a century, serving under six presidents. <v Bill Kurtis>In those years, the line between legitimate dissent and subversion would often blur. <v Bill Kurtis>The civil liberties of Americans would be breached time and again. <v Bill Kurtis>But for millions of Americans, Hoover was the defender of the American way of life. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] He protected the country against communists and gangsters, and he let the <v Bill Kurtis>public know it was a carefully orchestrated image.

<v J. Edgar Hoover>Well, Jack, what do you gotta say for yourself? <v Jack>I'm so short I ?would? have to get up on the box. <v J. Edgar Hoover>All right, Jack in the box. Let us know what you know about ?crime?, about the conditions <v J. Edgar Hoover>in New York. <v Jack>Gee Mr. Hoover. You're G-Men sure are good. <v Jack>I'd like to be one when I grow up. <v J. Edgar Hoover>Well if you work hard and play hard and live clean, you'll certainly be one. <v Jack>Thank you. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover's public relations savvy was surpassed only by his genius as a government <v Bill Kurtis>bureaucrat. <v Bill Kurtis>He established excellent relations with Congress, which approved his requests to <v Bill Kurtis>build a first rate crime laboratory. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover, who began his career as a Library of Congress messenger, now oversaw <v Bill Kurtis>the compilation of the most extensive collection of fingerprints in the world. <v Bill Kurtis>[machinery operating] Today's FBI is a monument to its first director. <v Bill Kurtis>As in the past, the FBI continues to pioneer in the use of science.

<v Bill Kurtis>State of the art technology like this laser beam examination of faint and very <v Bill Kurtis>old fingerprints is one of Hoover's legacies. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Today, the bureau's annual budget is more than a billion and a half <v Bill Kurtis>dollars. <v Bill Kurtis>It employs some 17,000 people who serve as the nation's protector <v Bill Kurtis>in uncovering spies, blocking terrorism and fighting crime. <v Bill Kurtis>Taking on the underworld brought Hoover much of his early national attention. <v Bill Kurtis>[gunshots] In the 20s and 30s, criminals were running wild in the nation, challenging <v Bill Kurtis>government authority. Hoover declared war on these public enemies who are taking <v Bill Kurtis>advantage of the lack of city, state and federal police cooperation. <v J. Edgar Hoover>We must not for a moment lose sight of our goal to teach the criminal <v J. Edgar Hoover>that regardless of his subterfuges, his squirming, his twisting and

<v J. Edgar Hoover>slimy wriggling, he cannot escape the one inexorable rule of law enforcement: <v J. Edgar Hoover>you can't get away with it. <v Bill Kurtis>Despite Hoover's eventual long reign at the FBI, he had no assurance that he would be <v Bill Kurtis>reappointed in 1932 when Franklin D. <v Bill Kurtis>Roosevelt was elected president. <v Elliot Roosevelt>My father distrusted Mr. Hoover very, very much. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Uh he felt that he was a great administrator and that he had <v Elliot Roosevelt>done a good job or he wouldn't have kept him on. <v Bill Kurtis>Besides the political uncertainty of a new administration, Hoover had an enemy. <v Bill Kurtis>Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor. <v Elliot Roosevelt>My mother disliked Mr. Hoover intensely and <v Elliot Roosevelt>uh disliked Mr. Hoover s- to the extent that uh <v Elliot Roosevelt>she would vocally express her displeasure with Mr. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Hoover and all of his works. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover kept an explosive dossier on Eleanor Roosevelt's private life.

<v Bill Kurtis>One of many such files the FBI director kept on key political figures <v Bill Kurtis>in Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>In 1943, the FBI submitted a report to the president suggesting <v Bill Kurtis>that Eleanor was having an affair. <v Bill Kurtis>FDR responded with anger. <v Bill Kurtis>He threatened to send the FBI agents who had filed the allegations to the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>There they would serve until killed by the Japanese. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] By the time Hoover sent these accusations to FDR, the FBI chief was <v Bill Kurtis>secure in his job [cheering]. Roosevelt may not have liked Hoover, but he needed him. <v Bill Kurtis>In the late 30s, the nation was still at peace. <v Bill Kurtis>Once again, isolationist and complacent, in mood. <v Bill Kurtis>[soldiers shouting Heil Hitler] But as war clouds gathered in Europe, there was only one <v Bill Kurtis>man Roosevelt could turn to to provide domestic security against foreign <v Bill Kurtis>espionage. As to an international intelligence service,

<v Bill Kurtis>none existed [marching]. <v Bill Kurtis>In 1934, Roosevelt gave Hoover the assignment of surveilling potentially <v Bill Kurtis>subversive groups in the United States, like these American Nazis in Madison <v Bill Kurtis>Square Garden. <v Bill Kurtis>The FBI's mission was expanded. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover was given responsibility for tracking down German agents throughout the Western <v Bill Kurtis>Hemisphere, both prior to and during World War Two. <v J. Edgar Hoover>It was a struggle against enemy agents who have been sent to this country <v J. Edgar Hoover>to disrupt our industries, destroy our morale and damage the impact <v J. Edgar Hoover>of our fighting armies. <v J. Edgar Hoover>On May 26th and 28th, 1942, two German <v J. Edgar Hoover>submarines, left the base at ?inaudible?. <v J. Edgar Hoover>One landing on Long Island, the second landed in Florida. <v J. Edgar Hoover>[music plays] Four saboteurs landed from each submarine.

<v J. Edgar Hoover>They were well equipped with high explosives to breed <v J. Edgar Hoover>panic and insecurity in this country. <v J. Edgar Hoover>The submarine saboteurs were in jail two weeks after they landed. <v J. Edgar Hoover>Six of the eight were executed after a military trial. <v Bill Kurtis>Again, Hoover played up the FBI successes, but the wartime authority <v Bill Kurtis>granted for the tracking down of German agents would be used by Hoover to conduct <v Bill Kurtis>domestic surveillance for the next 36 years. <v Richard Gid Powers>Since Hoover had been directed to find out <v Richard Gid Powers>what groups had been infiltrated or were controlled by communists or <v Richard Gid Powers>fascists, logically, he had to investigate any organization <v Richard Gid Powers>that had a potential for infiltration. <v Richard Gid Powers>In practice, this meant that there was nothing to stop Hoover from investigating <v Richard Gid Powers>any organization to see if it was dominated by communists. <v Richard Gid Powers>If he came up with a negative finding, there was nothing to stop him from <v Richard Gid Powers>investigating the next year or the year after to see if some infiltration and

<v Richard Gid Powers>subsequently taking place. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] But years before Hoover's G-Men were hunting down spies, an obscure <v Bill Kurtis>operative was giving the United States its most important intelligence victories. <v Bill Kurtis>He was Herbert Yardley, a brilliant pioneer in the secret craft of <v Bill Kurtis>code breaking. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley's hobby became a profession in 1912 when he joined the State Department <v Bill Kurtis>as a code clerk. He quickly showed his genius. <v Bill Kurtis>One night, bored and with nothing else to do, he broke President Woodrow Wilson's <v Bill Kurtis>own secret message code. Yardley knew that if he could break America's most important <v Bill Kurtis>government code, other nations could also. <v Bill Kurtis>After America's entry into World War One, he was put in charge of an Army <v Bill Kurtis>cryptology unit, M-I 8. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley demonstrated the military edge to be gained from breaking the enemy's electronic <v Bill Kurtis>transmissions [electronic sounds].

<v Bill Kurtis>M-I 8 was dissolved after the armistice. <v Bill Kurtis>But in the 1920s, Yardley received 100,000 dollars from the government <v Bill Kurtis>to form a clandestine decoding operation. <v Bill Kurtis>It operated in absolute secrecy from this townhouse on East 37th Street <v Bill Kurtis>in New York City. <v Bill Kurtis>It was called the Black Chamber, and it had one mission: to steal and decipher <v Bill Kurtis>as many foreign government communications as it possibly could get. <v David Kahn>One of the great problems that Yardley had was where he was going to get the material, <v David Kahn>the raw intercepts, the coded messages to solve because <v David Kahn>uh radio was not in great use in those days, and he made an arrangement with a number of <v David Kahn>the cable companies to surreptitiously feed him these <v David Kahn>coded messages, which were, as I say, the raw material that he could use to break the <v David Kahn>codes of uh Great Britain, France, possibly Germany, <v David Kahn>uh many Latin American countries and so forth.

<v Bill Kurtis>As an emerging global power, the United States now recognized the need <v Bill Kurtis>for foreign intelligence, and the Black Chamber could provide it quickly, efficiently <v Bill Kurtis>and illegally. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Yardley broke Japan's diplomatic codes in time for the intelligence to be <v Bill Kurtis>used at an international naval disarmament conference in 1921. <v Bill Kurtis>By reading Japan's cables, U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>negotiators knew Japan's secret bargaining position. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese diplomats found the Americans unusually stubborn at the conference table <v Bill Kurtis>and quickly agreed to a ratio of battleships more favorable to the U.S.. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley's Black Chamber would go on to break the codes of many other nations. <v Bill Kurtis>But in 1929, the entire operation was shut down by Secretary of <v Bill Kurtis>State Henry L. Stinson, who is said to have uttered, gentlemen <v Bill Kurtis>do not read each other's mail. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley, who had suffered the loss of a finger on his right hand due to experiments with

<v Bill Kurtis>secret inks, was now bitter, out of work, and with a family to feed during the <v Bill Kurtis>Depression. He wrote a book in 1931 revealing the secrets <v Bill Kurtis>of the Black Chamber. The Japanese, upon reading the book, discovered their codes <v Bill Kurtis>had been broken and promptly changed them. <v Bill Kurtis>The U.S. government never forgave Yardley. <v Bill Kurtis>Yardley died in 1958 and was buried here in Arlington National Cemetery. <v Bill Kurtis>His true monument is not this stone, but the largest and most secret agency <v Bill Kurtis>in the entire U.S. intelligence empire. <v Bill Kurtis>That is the NSA headquarters located at a 1000 acre complex in Fort <v Bill Kurtis>Meade, Maryland. About 25 miles from downtown Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>It is highly secure. This is as close as we could get. <v Bill Kurtis>But in those buildings, is America's modern code breaking effort and other eavesdropping <v Bill Kurtis>systems as well.

<v James Bamford>Today, the National Security Agency's probably five times the size of the Central <v James Bamford>Intelligence Agency and probably has about five times the size of the budget. <v James Bamford>It's an enormously large agency. <v James Bamford>Uh ?times? it's been upwards of 100,000 people when you count the civilians and the <v James Bamford>military uh devoted to signals intelligence and code <v James Bamford>breaking. Today, NSA eavesdrops on entire streams of communications <v James Bamford>and those streams of communications, which may contain thousands of telephone calls, <v James Bamford>uh are simply filtered through a computer that can be programed with individual telephone <v James Bamford>numbers to target those numbers and listen to those phone calls. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] One of the NSA's earliest advisors was William Freedman, a man who took <v Bill Kurtis>cryptology to new frontiers. <v Bill Kurtis>Friedman was a genius at code breaking. <v Bill Kurtis>When the Japanese altered their codes after Yardley's book, it was Friedman who, despite <v Bill Kurtis>the enormous complexity of Japan's new codes, broke them once again. <v James Bamford>The highest uh diplomatic cipher at the time um

<v James Bamford>was one known as Purple. The Purple Code. <v James Bamford>And when uh Friedman and his uh small team uh was known as <v James Bamford>the SIS, the Signals Intelligence Service, were successful in <v James Bamford>uh manufacturing or basically putting together almost an identical machine. <v David Kahn>The Japanese purple machine was a machine that put ordinary <v David Kahn>messages, sometimes in Japanese, sometimes in English. <v David Kahn>They sent messages English into secret form so that a message you <v David Kahn>shall report might come out to be ZQVBLD and so <v David Kahn>forth. And at the other end, you would have to have a similar machine to take out the <v David Kahn>ZQVB and so forth and turn it into a report. <v David Kahn>It did this in part by using telephone <v David Kahn>selector switches such as this. <v David Kahn>If you see as this is [clicks] pressed, a switch goes around. <v David Kahn>The way this would work in the machine was that if you were constantly

<v David Kahn>pressing the letter A for example, each time you press it, it would be <v David Kahn>inciphered into a different letter. <v David Kahn>At this position A might be Q. <v David Kahn>At this position A might be R. At this position A might be L. <v David Kahn>And this constant changing was the principle of <v David Kahn>the purple machine. And you had to reconstruct something like this if you were trying <v David Kahn>to decipher it and solve it. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] The purple machine is still considered secret by the NSA, and the agency <v Bill Kurtis>refused our request to film one. <v Bill Kurtis>Only these rare photographs exist to suggest the immense difficulties faced <v Bill Kurtis>in recreating a machine Friedman's team had never seen. <v Bill Kurtis>It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of all time, but its product, <v Bill Kurtis>which could have prevented a profound U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>military defeat, was squandered. <v Bill Kurtis>[marching] 1940 marked the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire.

<v Bill Kurtis>Emperor Hirohito had chosen the word ?Shoah?, enlightened peace, <v Bill Kurtis>to characterize his reign. <v Bill Kurtis>But in greeting the New Year, [cheering] Japanese military leaders declared that the time <v Bill Kurtis>had come for Japan to reject any who stood in the way of the nation. <v Bill Kurtis>[cheering] They meant primarily the other major Pacific power. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese had a term for the U.S. presence: ?inaudible?. <v Bill Kurtis>Cancer of the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Admiral Isa Roko Yamamoto, commander of Japan's combined fleet, began <v Bill Kurtis>planning a surprise attack on U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>naval forces at Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>It would be a daring, knockdown punch from which the United States would not recover. <v Bill Kurtis>But the attack had to take place soon. <v Bill Kurtis>Japan's stockpile of oil would only last about 18 months. <v Bill Kurtis>While Yamamoto's navy prepared for the attack, one <v Bill Kurtis>of Japan's top spies under diplomatic cover in Hawaii began openly

<v Bill Kurtis>gathering intelligence critical to the success of the mission. <v Bill Kurtis>[car running] Takeo Yoshikawa was a Japanese diplomat and a trained spy, and all he had <v Bill Kurtis>to do was hire a cab and take a sightseeing trip. <v Bill Kurtis>Yoshikawa took no photographs, he used no binoculars, and he broke no laws. <v Bill Kurtis>The FBI and military intelligence were helpless to stop him. <v Bill Kurtis>The hills surrounding Pearl Harbor gave Yoshikawa an excellent view of the disposition <v Bill Kurtis>and movement of the U.S. fleet. <v Bill Kurtis>What he freely observed and reported to Tokyo were two significant discoveries concerning <v Bill Kurtis>schedules. First, the fleet was usually harbor side on Sundays. <v Bill Kurtis>Second, early warning U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>patrol planes sent to patrol the waters around the islands never <v Bill Kurtis>left before sunrise. <v Bill Kurtis>Despite worsening U.S. Japan tensions, complacency reigned in Honolulu.

<v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] The U.S. military was all but asleep, lulled by pronouncements like this, <v Bill Kurtis>a Japanese attack on Hawaii is the most unlikely thing in the world, with one <v Bill Kurtis>chance in a million of being successful. <v Bill Kurtis>That was how the Honolulu Star Bulletin assessed the situation on September 6th, <v Bill Kurtis>1941. <v Bill Kurtis>Two months later, the Japanese navy was at sea observing strict radio <v Bill Kurtis>silence. Meanwhile, Tokyo transmitted false signals to <v Bill Kurtis>further hide Yamamoto's true position. <v Bill Kurtis>Captain Allyn Cole, a U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>codebreaker, was stationed at Pearl Harbor. <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>Two or three weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, uh there

<v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>was a game of hide and seek going on between our electronic surveillance <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>and their ele- electronic transmissions. <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>They trying to convince us that nothing was going on and we trying <v Captain Allyn Cole Jr.>to find out what actually was going on. <v Captain Roger Pineau>When Admiral Kimmel, who was the commander of the Navy at Pearl <v Captain Roger Pineau>Harbor asked his intelligence officer, uh Commander Edwin <v Captain Roger Pineau>T. Layton, where the Japanese fleet was located, Leighton says, I <v Captain Roger Pineau>do not know, sir. And Kimmel said, you mean they could be rounding Diamond <v Captain Roger Pineau>Head at this moment? And Leighton had to say to him, for all we know, they <v Captain Roger Pineau>may. They might because we do not know where they're located. <v Bill Kurtis>U.S. naval codebreakers were confused by the false messages being transmitted <v Bill Kurtis>by the Japanese navy. <v Bill Kurtis>They had lost track of the Japanese fleet and they never received a message that said <v Bill Kurtis>specifically, we will attack Pearl Harbor.

<v Bill Kurtis>Even so, three purple intercepts warned of an imminent hostile <v Bill Kurtis>Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific. <v Bill Kurtis>And any one of them should have galvanized the commanders here. <v Bill Kurtis>Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter ?Teeshort? <v Bill Kurtis>into action. They did not. <v Bill Kurtis>[typewriters clicking] They didn't because the commanders never received the intercepts. <v Bill Kurtis>The codes were diplomatic, not military, and went instead to Washington. <v Bill Kurtis>Government authorities there failed to transmit this intelligence back to Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>The first intercept asked the Japanese consulate to provide information based on an <v Bill Kurtis>imaginary grid over Pearl Harbor. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] This would allow the Japanese Navy pilots to plot the exact position of <v Bill Kurtis>each individual ship and its specific anchorage. <v Bill Kurtis>Such intelligence would be of incalculable value in a bombing and torpedo attack. <v Bill Kurtis>On December 2nd, a second message was intercepted. <v Bill Kurtis>It ordered Japanese diplomats to burn their codes and destroy their code machines <v Bill Kurtis>as well. This was a certain sign that the Japanese were planning to launch a major

<v Bill Kurtis>attack. <v Bill Kurtis>On December 7th, yet another intelligence opportunity was squandered. <v Bill Kurtis>A final Japanese dispatch decoded in the early hours of December 7th <v Bill Kurtis>revealed that Japan had ordered its diplomats to break off negotiations with the United <v Bill Kurtis>States at 1:00 P.M.. <v Bill Kurtis>Such an order for a precise time in the midst of a weekend was a sure sign <v Bill Kurtis>of imminent attack. There were four hours left to act on the information. <v Bill Kurtis>But by the time Washington did act, it was too late. <v Bill Kurtis>The Japanese signal for attack. Tora, tora, tora had been given. <v Bill Kurtis>[planes flying]Washington's <v Bill Kurtis>warning, the most important intelligence in U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>history, was delivered hours too late by an RCA telegram <v Bill Kurtis>messenger, Tadao Fuchikami.

<v Tadao Fuchikami>?inaudible? And the funny thing is that nobody e- ever questioned me about my SS <v Tadao Fuchikami>?do? anything. No problem. <v Tadao Fuchikami>I kind of felt guilty that uh maybe was my fault uh not delivering <v Tadao Fuchikami>it quicker. <v Tadao Fuchikami>But wasn't anything I could do because the message came uh <v Tadao Fuchikami>late. [explosions] <v Bill Kurtis>Most of the Pacific fleet and Air Force was destroyed. <v Bill Kurtis>Amidst the destruction and confusion, over 1,000 men were wounded,

<v Bill Kurtis>2,400 more were dead. <v Bill Kurtis>Some 1,100 of those men, sailors and Marines, are <v Bill Kurtis>entombed under the shrine where the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>battleship Arizona rests. <v Bill Kurtis>It was a terrible price to pay. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] <v Bill Kurtis>Although the Japanese had destroyed most of the Pacific fleet, they had overlooked a

<v Bill Kurtis>critical target that had been ripe for the taking. <v Bill Kurtis>It proved to be Japan's most serious intelligence blunder of the war, a fact <v Bill Kurtis>not known until the intelligence debriefing of the Japanese military leaders <v Bill Kurtis>at the end of the war. <v Captain Roger Pineau>I showed them a picture of the of one of those great still shots taken <v Captain Roger Pineau>from an attacking Japanese plane of Battleship Row. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And I said, do you gentlemen all know this picture? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Oh, yes, yes, yes. I said I said, do you know what those white circles are up <v Captain Roger Pineau>in the top? And they said, sure. Fuel tank farm on O'ahu. <v Captain Roger Pineau>I said, how many bombs did you drop there? <v Captain Roger Pineau>They said, no bombs. Not a target of attack. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And I said, do you realize that all of the fuel oil the United States possessed <v Captain Roger Pineau>west of the California coast was located above ground in those tanks? <v Captain Roger Pineau>It did not occur to them that oil could be a critical factor to the United States, <v Captain Roger Pineau>despite the fact that oil was the critical factor in their own timing <v Captain Roger Pineau>of going to war. They had a one year supply of fuel oil

<v Captain Roger Pineau>and uh of oil in general, petroleum products. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And it was that that caused <v Captain Roger Pineau>the timing of the outbreak of the war. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And yet, thinking of the United States as ?inaudible? <v Captain Roger Pineau>the wealthy country, it never occurred to them that we could be short of oil. <v Bill Kurtis>The fact that America still had its oil would have been little consolation for the <v Bill Kurtis>stunned and silent crowd that gathered in Times Square, New York, on <v Bill Kurtis>the night of December 7th, 1941. <v Bill Kurtis>They wanted to know, as did the entire nation, how such a surprise attack <v Bill Kurtis>had happened, what had gone wrong in the Pacific and who was to blame. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] General Short was harshly censured and relieved of his command. <v Bill Kurtis>So was Admiral Kimmel, who had later congressional hearings attempted to defend his <v Bill Kurtis>actions. [music plays]

<v Admiral Kimmel>We needed one thing which our own resources could not make <v Admiral Kimmel>available to us. <v Admiral Kimmel>That night ?inaudible? was the information available in Washington, <v Admiral Kimmel>from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where <v Admiral Kimmel>Japan would probably strike. <v Admiral Kimmel>I did not get this information. <v Bill Kurtis>But another commander in the Pacific, Douglas MacArthur, despite derelictions <v Bill Kurtis>before and after the attack, escaped criticism. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosion] <v Captain Roger Pineau>MacArthur, who knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor and <v Captain Roger Pineau>was informed of it as soon as it happened, made no <v Captain Roger Pineau>movements and there were a number that he could have made in <v Captain Roger Pineau>order to ameliorate the Japanese attack 8 hours later in the Philippines. <v Captain Roger Pineau>There were those who think he should have attacked Japanese <v Captain Roger Pineau>air bases in Formosa. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Uh the very least he could have done was to disperse his planes. <v Captain Roger Pineau>And uh he he did neither of these.

<v Captain Roger Pineau>And what happened to MacArthur? Nothing. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Uh nothing derogatory. He became a hero. <v Captain Roger Pineau>Why wasn't he vilified? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Why wasn't he accused as Kimmel was? <v Captain Roger Pineau>Because the United States, in addition to needing a scapegoat, also needed <v Captain Roger Pineau>a hero. And MacArthur was handy to serve that role. <v Captain Roger Pineau>[radio transmissions] <v Bill Kurtis>But more than U.S. commanders were at fault. <v Bill Kurtis>The worst intelligence failure in U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>history was rooted in the lack of a centralized system to collect and <v Bill Kurtis>disperse information. <v Bill Kurtis>The United States government resolved it would never again be subject to surprise <v Bill Kurtis>attack. [music plays] By then, Roosevelt had taken formal steps <v Bill Kurtis>to change the business of intelligence gathering and spying. <v Bill Kurtis>This man would play a key role in the shaping of America's foreign intelligence service.

<v Bill Kurtis>William Donovan was the most highly decorated U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>officer of World War One, where he earned the nickname Wild Bill. <v Ray Cline>He was a very charismatic figure. <v Ray Cline>He wore a uniform and I knew him and he had a lot of <v Ray Cline>merit badges [laughs]. He was, of course, a World War One uh <v Ray Cline>Congressional Medal of Honor holder. He had piercing bright <v Ray Cline>eyes, uh he looked at you intensely when he talked to you. <v Ray Cline>He seemed to be interested in all of his junior staff. <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan is considered the father of American intelligence. <v Bill Kurtis>A man is still revered by those who once served under him. <v Bill Kurtis>In a hastily invented World War Two intelligence group called the Office of <v Bill Kurtis>Strategic Services, veterans of the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>still convene for annual meetings. <v Bill Kurtis>At this [applause] Washington gathering in 1986, the late CIA director, William <v Bill Kurtis>Casey, made one of his last public appearances and paid tribute to William <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan.

<v William Casey>Fellow survivors always ?had? <v William Casey>started with a vision of Bill Donovan's. <v William Casey>A vision that intelligence, subversion, and psychological <v William Casey>warfare could be our spearhead, a critical spearhead <v William Casey>in the invasion of Europe. <v Bill Kurtis>Prior to World War Two, there was no foreign intelligence agency for young Americans like <v Bill Kurtis>Casey to join. Its creation in 1942, however, was not a popular <v Bill Kurtis>decision. <v William Casey>Everything in governments gets decided by a committee, <v William Casey>and for two years, Donovan was struggling to get an authorization, <v William Casey>get a charter to get uh a lot ?inaudible? <v William Casey>of people uh through committees. <v William Casey>There was always somebody there to block them. <v Elliot Roosevelt>Uh J. Edgar Hoover objected to anybody uh being in intelligence uh <v Elliot Roosevelt>other than himself because he felt that he was much better qualified <v Elliot Roosevelt>to conduct a world wide organization because he already had the

<v Elliot Roosevelt>FBI in place here in this country. <v William Colby>The military, of course, were very resentful of the arrival of this independent <v William Colby>organization uh and various situations the military intelligence <v William Colby>people particularly resisted it. <v William Donovan>It was born in upon me by this experience that today in this country <v William Donovan>we are facing one of the most crucial tests of our history. <v Bill Kurtis>[Donovan inaudibly speaking] Donovan survived the interservice rivalry and quickly began <v Bill Kurtis>building his espionage agency. <v Bill Kurtis>One of the first places Donovan turned to was here, the Library of Congress. <v Bill Kurtis>Not exactly a haven of spies, but for Donovan's brain trust of scholars, this <v Bill Kurtis>was a goldmine of critical information about the world now engulfed in <v Bill Kurtis>war. <v Ray Cline>I think the reason we all admire Donovan was that he was such a <v Ray Cline>dedicated uh driving man and <v Ray Cline>that he saw the in- brainy side

<v Ray Cline>of intelligence. He was not just a spook or a cowboy, though <v Ray Cline>he was fascinated with behind the lines operations and he strongly <v Ray Cline>believed in espionage. <v Ray Cline>But he also believed that the product of intelligence could come <v Ray Cline>from anywhere, open sources, library research, whatever. <v Ray Cline>And that what you wanted was a broad, contextual <v Ray Cline>understanding of the uh international conflicts that were confronting <v Ray Cline>the United States so they could be explained in depth to the man like <v Ray Cline>the president, who had to make concrete decisions affecting what the United States would <v Ray Cline>do. <v Bill Kurtis>Before the O.S.S., American intelligence, what little there was, had been insular. <v Bill Kurtis>Now, for the first time, America was taking a critical look at the entire <v Bill Kurtis>world. <v Bill Kurtis>But such intelligence gathering was only part of the job of the O.S.S.. <v Bill Kurtis>The other part was much more exciting.

<v Bill Kurtis>Like the British service it was modeled after, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>also conducted espionage and low level military operations [planes flying] as seen <v Bill Kurtis>in these O.S.S. films. <v Bill Kurtis>Like many others, Richard Helms was trained in the arts [explosion] of espionage by a <v Bill Kurtis>British agent. <v Richard Helms>The man who taught close combat was um Colonel Fairbairn. <v Richard Helms>And I must say that he had a lot of exotic and very effective means of <v Richard Helms>uh disposing of people. <v Richard Helms>His uh thesis was that in wartime, <v Richard Helms>there are no good enem- good guys among the enemy. <v Richard Helms>They're just dead guys. <v Richard Helms>And I must say that it was a most startling experience to learn how many ways <v Richard Helms>that you could find to dispose of your fellow man. <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan's initial plan was for a group of less than one hundred agents <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays]. Before the war was over, the O.S.S.

<v Bill Kurtis>grew to over 12000 as agents trained for missions behind enemy lines. <v Bill Kurtis>One of its first operations took place in the jungles of Burma, a nation overrun <v Bill Kurtis>by the Japanese in 1942. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] In command of allied forces was General Joseph Stilwell. <v General Joseph Stilwell>We got run out of Burma, and it's humiliating as hell. <v General Joseph Stilwell>I think we oughtta find out what caused it, go back and retake the place. <v Bill Kurtis>The retaking of Burma began with a small O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>unit detachment 101. <v Bill Kurtis>Its members parachuted behind enemy lines to undertake a new form of warfare

<v Bill Kurtis>never before fought by Americans. <v Bill Kurtis>Their mission was to organize and train native tribesmen in guerrilla <v Bill Kurtis>warfare against the Japanese. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>O.S.S. headquarters in this area is located [Bill Kurtis: Colonel Carl Eifler, an <v Colonel Carl Eifler>early O.S.S. recruit was in charge of the mission]. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>General Stilwell gave us a mission to get into Burma behind the Japanese <v Colonel Carl Eifler>lines and disrupt communications. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Another phase of our mission is to gather intelligence on Japanese <v Colonel Carl Eifler>movements, equipment, supply and plans. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>I uh took the first unit out of the United States in the <v Colonel Carl Eifler>history of American warfare to hide behind enemy lines. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>There was a great deal of uh of training went into training the natives <v Colonel Carl Eifler>themselves. We were looking for individuals that we could train when we

<v Colonel Carl Eifler>found them. We put them through a school, trained them physically, develop their <v Colonel Carl Eifler>bodies to where they could take the hardships of of guerrilla warfare. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Without the goodwill of the natives that you are <v Colonel Carl Eifler>living with and fighting for, guerilla warfare's useless. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>We formed a new kind of war that had never been part <v Colonel Carl Eifler>before. We always fought attack. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>[fire burning] We struck and we ran. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>And the result of our activities was that we drove them back and took from <v Colonel Carl Eifler>them some 15,000 square miles of territory. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>I just figured that in my day I broke every law of God to man. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>And someday I'd pay an answer to it. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>Not to man, to God. <v Colonel Carl Eifler>When I was fighting it, no rules.

<v Colonel Carl Eifler>The only rule was win. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] These scenes shot by the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>speak of the brutality of a guerrilla war. <v Bill Kurtis>The war where often the only rule was to win. <v Bill Kurtis>This left a legacy, one which would come to haunt the U.S. <v Bill Kurtis>covert actions in later years. <v Richard Helms>I know that uh people take sides and they're rather vociferous on the subject. <v Richard Helms>But the fact remained that in World War Two, the O.S.S. <v Richard Helms>was dedicated to the thing that everybody else was, and that was to win the war. <v Richard Helms>And how you won it was irrelevant. Nobody cared. <v Richard Helms>And I served side by side in the O.S.S. <v Richard Helms>with priests and ministers and lawyers and teachers and professors and so forth. <v Richard Helms>All of them dedicated to the same principles. <v Richard Helms>There was no division about uh how it was desirable to win or how fast you oughtta <v Richard Helms>do it. Fast as possible.

<v Richard Helms>It was only later that these divisions came up and these issues of whether you should <v Richard Helms>have covert action or not have covert action it was moral or immoral, all of those things <v Richard Helms>are long after the war was over. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosions] By D-Day on June 6th, 1944, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>had carved out its turf in allied military operations. <v Bill Kurtis>Many O.S.S. officers and agents were already in place far beyond the beach head. <v Bill Kurtis>There was a can do attitude of William Donovan that nourished inside the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>a belief that anything that could be thought of might be done. <v Bill Kurtis>The assassination of Adolf Hitler was one. <v Bill Kurtis>The kidnapping of Germany's atomic scientists was another. <v Bill Kurtis>But on this day, as troops fought for a beach head at Normandy, O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>paramilitary units working with the French Resistance operated behind enemy <v Bill Kurtis>lines.

<v Bill Kurtis>Blowing up bridges. <v Bill Kurtis>Disrupting communications. <v Bill Kurtis>And tying up troops away from the battlefield. <v Bill Kurtis>But here, as in Burma, were omens of trouble for the United States. <v Bill Kurtis>The secret arts of commando warfare were learned well. <v Bill Kurtis>In years to come, they would be used without accountability throughout <v Bill Kurtis>the world. <v Ray Cline>Those were good O.S.S. operations and they were the the cowboy type. <v Ray Cline>And uh Donovan let it all be known that we had done these things. <v Ray Cline>Uh II think that our successes were real but <v Ray Cline>limited. I do not believe that they succeeded <v Ray Cline>in the uh clandestine penetration of Germany nearly early enough. <v Ray Cline>I think they did succeed in making contact <v Ray Cline>with behind the lines fighters in France and Italy uh, but

<v Ray Cline>they were marginal, if you like, in in organizing that effort. <v Ray Cline>Uh I give them high marks for starting from scratch and achieving <v Ray Cline>uh uh limited goals. But if you ask, would we have won the war without <v Ray Cline>them? I'd say yes, we would've over a longer period of time. <v Ray Cline>[gun shots and explosions] <v Bill Kurtis>After the Normandy invasion, almost a year of fighting remained in Europe. <v Bill Kurtis>A time in which the allies would discover the true horror of Hitler's Third Reich. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] Many veterans of the O.S.S. would witness such scenes. <v Bill Kurtis>Here was real evil, evil worth defeating, it seemed, at any cost. <v Bill Kurtis>By 1945, Germany was conquered and Hitler dead.

<v Bill Kurtis>Russian and American soldiers celebrated. <v Bill Kurtis>But even then, U.S. leaders, including the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>Commander Donovan, had already begun to regard the Soviet Union with deep suspicion. <v Bill Kurtis>One totalitarian power was conquered, but another seemed to be taking its place. <v Bill Kurtis>Quietly, O.S.S. and military intelligence officers began preparing <v Bill Kurtis>for a new struggle. Surrendering Germans were recruited. <v Bill Kurtis>Some were scientists and engineers who had created Germany's terror weapon, the V2. <v Bill Kurtis>This was the world's first ballistic missile. <v Bill Kurtis>And Hitler had hurled it against allied cities with devastating effect. <v Bill Kurtis>[explosion] The V2 appeared too late to change the outcome of the war, but in future <v Bill Kurtis>conflicts, intelligence officers reasoned, the balance might rest with <v Bill Kurtis>such a weapon.

<v Bill Kurtis>All of the allies scrambled at war's end to capture Germany's rocket engineers. <v Bill Kurtis>America got most of them. They were secretly transported to the United States <v Bill Kurtis>where they built America's first missiles. <v Bill Kurtis>In their ranks were Nazis who had helped run the V2 missile factory and prison <v Bill Kurtis>where thousands of slave laborers perished. <v Bill Kurtis>Others had even more grisly pasts like General Reinhard Gehlen, responsible <v Bill Kurtis>for the torture and murder of countless allied prisoners of war. <v Bill Kurtis>And Klaus Barbie, who personally tortured Jews and French resistance fighters <v Bill Kurtis>and sent thousands to their deaths. <v Bill Kurtis>Why were the past deeds of these and others ignored? <v Bill Kurtis>We asked that question of John Weitz, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany who also <v Bill Kurtis>served in the O.S.S.. <v John Weitz>And somebody would say, this man knows exactly what's what and who's who. <v John Weitz>And then somebody else came to them and said, this man is a swine.

<v John Weitz>He's a Nazi. You can't use him. <v John Weitz>The American officer, 9 out of 10 times was a perfectly nice, somewhat middle aged <v John Weitz>lieutenant colonel, a reserve officer who wanted to get the heck the heck back <v John Weitz>to Oklahoma, to Wisconsin, to to Illinois, <v John Weitz>to his job, to his family. <v John Weitz>And he was not anxious to hang around and find somebody else because this was <v John Weitz>not a peccable man, because this was a <v John Weitz>swine. So he said, okay, I'll use him. Look, you worry about what he's about <v John Weitz>later. In the meantime, I I I'll I'll get what I want out of him. <v John Weitz>Then I'm sure we can get rid of him. That's how Klaus Barbie, I'm I'm sure, <v John Weitz>got recruited. <v Bill Kurtis>While his officers in the field prepared for a new conflict, Donovan lobbied for a <v Bill Kurtis>permanent intelligence organization, it would confront the Soviets throughout the <v Bill Kurtis>world. <v Bill Kurtis>It was a job J. Edgar Hoover sought as well. <v Bill Kurtis>Donovan promoted his O.S.S. with an old Hoover trick, using the media

<v Bill Kurtis>to build up public support. <v Bill Kurtis>Quickly, a spate of books, magazine articles and even comic books appeared <v Bill Kurtis>all glorifying the espionage and behind the lines missions of Donovan <v Bill Kurtis>and the O.S.S.. But the media proved part of Donovan's undoing. <v Bill Kurtis>Someone, many believed it was Hoover, leaked Donovan's confidential proposal <v Bill Kurtis>to the press. <v J. Edgar Hoover>[music plays] There is the flag draped coffin- <v Bill Kurtis>[inaudible speaking continues] Whatever chances Donovan had to run America's postwar <v Bill Kurtis>intelligence agency died with the death of Franklin Roosevelt. <v Bill Kurtis>Within a month of the war's end, Donovan's O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>was disbanded. The O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>commander was given a handshake instead of a permanent intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>Hoover and his FBI survived, of course, but the director, too, was denied <v Bill Kurtis>his dream of heading up an expanded intelligence agency.

<v Richard Gid Powers>Truman hated Hoover. <v Richard Gid Powers>Truman distrusted Hoover. <v Richard Gid Powers>Therefore, when it came time to set up postwar worldwide intelligence, <v Richard Gid Powers>Truman rejected Hoover's wishes for the FBI <v Richard Gid Powers>to manage both domestic and foreign intelligence. <v Richard Gid Powers>In fact, Truman used the word Gestapo in describing <v Richard Gid Powers>what the FBI would become if it held responsibilities for both domestic <v Richard Gid Powers>and foreign. Therefore, Hoover harbored a grudge <v Richard Gid Powers>against the CIA and this lasted for the rest of his career. <v Bill Kurtis>Harry Truman tried to manage a nation that was now the world's greatest economic and <v Bill Kurtis>military power without an international intelligence agency. <v Bill Kurtis>[music plays] He quickly changed his mind. <v Bill Kurtis>In the uneasy peace that followed World War Two, Truman decided there was a need for <v Bill Kurtis>secret agents and warriors, the O.S.S. <v Bill Kurtis>would rise again under the name of the Central Intelligence Agency.

<v Bill Kurtis>Many of those who would join the CIA came from the ranks of the O.S.S.. <v Bill Kurtis>Men who witnessed the intelligence disaster of Pearl Harbor and the utter evil <v Bill Kurtis>of Hitler's Third Reich. <v Bill Kurtis>But many of these men had learned another lesson as well. <v Bill Kurtis>One that would leave a disturbing legacy in years to come. <v Bill Kurtis>The only rule was to win. <v Narrator 1>Secret Intelligence was made possible by public television stations and

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