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Conditions in rural South Vietnam in 1966
VIETNAM
BUMGARDENER
SR #2710
Tape 1, Side 1
Americanization
TVP 007
August 24, 1982 (taped)
Washington, DC
Take One.
Clap Sticks.
Second Mark.
Second Sticks.
Clapsticks.
Interviewer:
Explain to me what the conditions were like in the countryside in '66-
what had happened, what were the realities in the areas of importance
were, Saigon or other important cities?
Bumgardner:
By late '65 you were in a situation where you had had a successive
turnover of governments. After the death of Diem, you had short lived
governments. The continuity of leadership in the Vietnamese countryside
was short lived. Policies were changed. One day, force was present, the
next day it was removed. Ah, little or no economic assistance for the
people, ah, whose normal resources had been curtailed, that is the
landlord, the money lenders, uh, due to insecurity no longer operated
in their area.
And they were left pretty much on their own, uh, from the government
point of view. However, among the fabric of the society in and out of
the hamlets and villages was the omnipresence of Viet Cong. They had
their cadre, they had their workers, uh, in among the people either
overtly or covertly, and both at times, and a force. You're aware that
in underdeveloped countries like Vietnam, for generations people had
been, uh, forbidden... you're aware...
Interviewer:
Give me a lens change.
Can I stop for a moment?
Interviewer:
Sure.
Sound. Marker. Take Two.
Clapsticks.
Bumgardner:
During this time, uh, due to tradition, the people had little, uh, in
the way of weapons to protect themselves it's forbidden for generations
that they should keep weapons. As a result, two or three guerrillas
coming into a village in the absence of government presence or
government forces can control hundreds and literally thousands of
people by the threat of force. Uh...
Interviewer:
Did they even have to use force?
Bumgardner:
Quite often they had to use force on the dedicated, uh, members or the
leadership element to either drive them out, to leave the people
further in the hands of Viet Cong, uh cadre or the threat of force, if
you do not cooperate with their, uhm, thought seminars and uh their
proselytizing endeavors. As a result, uh, in the absence of the
government due to the vast turnovers and the changing of the rules, uh,
minute by minute, day by day from Saigon, the enemy had a field day in
terms of exerting his influence and his control over many areas of
Vietnam. So that's uh...
Interviewer:
Is there anything else that uh, and you can change the lens, anything
else in terms of what had happened. Describe a little more what it
meant, the changes in the countryside, landlords had been forced to
leave areas. You mentioned briefly the money lenders. What were the
conditions in the countryside that the Viet Cong had come in and
responded to?
Bumgardner:
Uh, traditionally, landlords, uh, absentee landlords in the most part,
controlled vast areas of the rural, um, um, rice lands in the southern
part of the country. Uh, they had been driven out by the enemy, by the
Viet Cong, some of them assassinated, some of them were threatened out.
And the second echelon of control, called the "taka" or middle man who
actually lives in the village and does the work for the landlord, were,
uh, compromised.
They were either inactive, inert, or um, were in no way able to exert
any control over over the rural people. In this way, uh, the peasant,
which is the reservoir of manpower for an insurgency, was left to the
Viet Cong for guidance, was left to the Viet Cong for day-to-day advice
as to how to survive. Quite often this very presence of the enemy
exerted yet another uh debilitating influence upon the peasant. He got
poorer, and poorer, and poorer because they exacted taxes from him, ah,
in addition, ah, to his, ah, normal daily expenses.
Interviewer:
But were the were those taxes during '65 felt more severely then the
other kinds of taxes, the other kinds of economic problems that
peasants had? Was...
Bumgardner:
Well, all of these...
Interviewer:
Was there a sense, I'm trying to get at, in general of being less well
off in NLF areas that may have been with landlords and middlemen?
Bumgardner:
In answer to the question of the well being of the peasants during
these areas, I would have to say that his economic life uh deteriorated
considerably. But, in a perverse way this gave rise to opposition to
the government. Because, without anyone talking, uh, back to him,
without anyone holding an argument with the Viet Cong cadre, the Viet
Cong quite often can turn the peasant's mind into the idea that if you
revolt, if you join us, we can change this system.
Each year you are worse off- each year you are poorer. Next year your
children will be in a worse position for the future then you are now.
Join us, you have only your shackles to lose, that's in the manifesto.
And they carry this out pretty much in their proselytizing. As a
result, as a result, many young men and women voluntarily, willingly
joined the Viet Cong in order to, to change the political, economic
cultural system, uh, in Vietnam.
It's pretty hard to understand how you can be under a, um, total
domination of a strict enemy who uses force when necessary and still
rally to his cause which he in part has imposed upon you as an idea of
breaking out of, of those conditions. But under constant, uh, uh,
propaganda, and I must say, uh, tremendously, uh, well motivated
leadership, uh, the key mark, the, the, the, most important thing, I
think, in any insurgent organization led by the Communists, is, is, is
ah, is qualified leadership, dedicated leadership.
The good will of these people and the extremely tough conditions under
which they live, their self-denial, their living among the people, at
the level of the people, uh, their uh, constant, uh, observation of
being willing to give their life and their future for their cause tends
to be catching among the young uh peasants, and uh, they joined this
organization that then becomes their father, their teacher, uh, becomes
everything all encompassing. And they, in turn, develop this esprit de
corps, which is very hard to develop, ah, at the national level in a,
any developing country where you have so many conflicting loyalties the
loyalty of the family in, in say, in Vietnam, where...
Interviewer:
Before we go on to that, if you don't have time before he starts to
make a lens change, just tell me. We'll continue rolling.
Bumgardner:
I was just in the process of starting that starting the lens change
when you told me.
Interviewer:
Okay. Good.
Were there any other reasons why they were able to get good people,
good leadership, why the NLF was able to get good leadership in the
countryside? They're the ones you've already mentioned this response to
previous conditions.
Bumgardner:
In Vietnam, for generations, the real power and the economy and the
education through which you get power, uh, was in the hands of a very
few people. Maybe three to five percent of the population controlled
the government, controlled the economic life of the country. If you
were a peasant, or a lowly born, it was almost impossible to break out
of, of this chain of your father and your grandfather. The Viet Cong
offered social mobility. In those days, '65 and '66, before the great
pacification experiments, the great pacification uh, programs came in
to try to change this.
A perceptive, intelligent rural boy with a little education could
understand from the propaganda of the enemy that there might be some
social mobility, that today he was a peasant boy riding a buffalo,
tomorrow he may be a corporal, a year later he may be a sergeant And
for him to reach some position like that, uh, in the uhm, uh regular
forces of Vietnam, would have almost been impossible.
He was cannon fodder. And because of his lack of education, in a modern
army you don't understand artillery, you don't understand tanks, you
don't have the calculus and the math to do some of the chores of
warfare, but in a guerrilla army where it is ah principally ah on ah on
the basic operation of ah of a platoon, or at, the most a company, ah
the farmer boy, the peasant boy can master these and due to high
attrition, here is ah here's the point of the knife being turned is
that probably one of the greatest reasons the communists can offer
social mobility is there is tremendous casualties against the
government forces in the early stages, that is to say there are many
deaths and and uh wounded spots to fill so there's a quick way to move
up in the Communist uh uh uh guerrilla force.
Interviewer:
What was the relationship of the of the people recruited uh to
families, how they would...
We're out of film here.
Okay.
Vulnerability of youth to influence by the Viet Cong
Marker. Camera roll seven eleven, take three. Clapsticks. Go ahead.
Interviewer:
So let's go back to uh the family question.
Bumgardner:
The significance of uh cadre of uh a young rural boy joining the uh
Viet Cong uh tremendous change to his status. It was a tremendous
change for his family because everyone in the hamlet knows that he went
off to join either the government side or to the Viet Cong side. There
are no secrets in the rural area, there are uh few secrets in the
countryside. As a result, the government then classes his family uh as
a possible security problem. And the police, constabulary forces,
military forces the administration, uh seeks them out at all times and
I guess you could say they're under some form of harassment then on.
Either outright harassment or from a point of view of the government
trying to talk the family into getting the boy uh to come in through
the Chieu Hoi Program, the surrender program, or something or simply
desert uh uh the forces he joined. For the boy, Vietnamese families are
extremely close. You can't in the American sense of the word,
understand what the big family means uh to Asian folks. Uh it is almost
uh uh impossible to describe how close the families are.
For him to cut this umbilical cord and to go off into the jungle to
where he cannot get back to see his family too often he is jeopardizing
his safety and his unit if he comes back. Uh he has to form new
liaisons with people that he may not know. He needs a new father and
mother, uh he needs a new counselor, he needs a new teacher, he needs a
protector. He finds all of this in generally the political cadre of the
unit he joins. They replace all of this for him. So what he has to do,
is really find all of the um things that he previously got from his own
family and from his community he has get that from the unit.
This in turn works for the Viet Cong, it builds the kind of elite units
that they are well known for, because having cut, cut the bridges,
having burned the bridges in back of him he has to depend upon his unit
for everything. And as a result they can mold him, and develop him, and
train him, and bring him up through the ranks in the form that they
want. They control his behavior, his thoughts, his actions. Uh it's a
complete metamorphosis. If you look back when he was riding that
buffalo in uh the patty field from the time he that he joined the unit
and became uh uh a fighting uh soldier against the government.
Interviewer:
Was there a uh an effort um at that level to to make Communists of
these young men, or what ah what was the the new view of the world, so
to speak.
Bumgardner:
At this uh at this point...
Interviewer:
Start again.
Bumgardner:
At this uh at this point of his education, at this point of his
education, there's very little attempt, or very little mention of uh
what we would classify as Communist doctrine. He's developed into a
super nationalist, an anti-government fighter. Uh a savior of his
village and his family eventually, and for uh and for uh and very great
emphasis on his children and grandchildren the future, sacrifice
yourself for uh what's going to happen in the future. If he survives,
and he shows a great deal of intelligence and dedication, a superior
quality which the Vietnamese call [incomprehensible] or zealousness,
which is more than just ordinary drive.
Uh then he is brought up through promotions and importance uh in the
cadre organization, in the guerrilla organization to where people do
begin to talk to him about his economic and political thoughts, and
it's that point later, or when he has proven himself uh that he is
introduced to to uh what we in the West would recognize as as uh
Communist indoctrination, and eventually he, is sold on this uh
political uh economic system and becomes himself a teacher of that to
others.
Interviewer:
What did being a uh super-nationalist for that young man or woman mean
in detail?
Bumgardner:
I can, I can tell you what this means uh to the individual in terms of
how it limits his behavior. Uh, it gives him a philosophy uh an esprit
de corps, which is pretty hard to duplicate uh in uh in Western society
and uh in Western armies because of the freedom which is prohibited,
which is uh permitted.
Interviewer:
Start again.
Bumgardner:
Ah, let me give you an example of um... how the super-nationalism uh
impacts upon um a a boy who is joining the Viet Cong. It limits his
acitivities, it limits his behavior and it controls his behavior. He
has to uh at many times during the course of his uh his day, break the
old habit of uh thinking first of his family, and lastly about his
country or his mission. And make decisions which uh uh effect uh uh
what he is doing. That may harm his family, it may ac--actually
jeopardize his family. He has to put mission and cause before family ah
considerations, for the immediate.
This is extremely hard uh for rural people to do. It also uh puts him
in a position of where, well he might be an extremely passive person uh
an extremely sensitive young man uh who uh may be Buddhist may regard
human life very highly, and uh actually uh uh lose merit for his
passage to the life beyond by taking uh human life, he has to steel
himself and he has to be able to be a pretty savage fighter.
Ambushes, quick hit and run uh, uh, operations, participate in the
terrorism and the um beheading or assassinations of village chiefs or
effective government officials who are opposed to him. So he undergoes
quite a uh psyche change, uh, in uh, going, uh, towards, uh, this um,
uh political goal. Uh, uh he can accept this and they generally do very
well because uh the cause justifies the act. They are so imbued with
their cause, that it follows on that anything they do to attain their
ends and uh it justifies the means by which he gets there.
Interviewer:
Would you define uhm what the cause is.
Bumgardner:
The cause is... the cause for all of them is revolution to change the
economic uh, the political and the social systems of uh, of uh, their
country. It is uh, a an attempt as one very uh, uh well known
Vietnamese told me at one time, it really comes down to an attempt to
destroy the ethics and the philosophy of uh, Confucianism. That this is
really what they're uh, doing to to break the chains of Confucianism,
as the Communists might uh, uh might, uh, tell their cadre...
Interviewer:
And so it's, it's uh, an attempt to leap frog the the city Vietnamese
and become a modern state or, or what?
Bumgardner:
Social--it's an attempt to bring social justice and and uh, upward
mobility to the uh, to the peasantry or the lowly uh, born Vietnamese,
to break this endless cycle, of son, grandson, and grandfather, uh,
knowing that they're always going to be, uh, at a certain station of
life, they are not going to be able to break out of this endless chain
of poverty.
And through the proselytizing propaganda of the insurgent force, and in
the case of Vietnam, the Viet Cong, they could convince a considerable
number of people who had been mistreated by the government for
generations, who had been mistreated by the Diem police, uh, who had
been, uh, held back from, from, uh, from progress, and they recognized
it, and as a result this became a big gamble for them to break this
cycle, to break out of this cycle. Perhaps not they personally, in the
in the short run, but certainly the class of people they represented. A
class struggle.
Interviewer:
Would you describe the the uh, the view of of countryside people for
city Vietnamese.
Bumgardner:
The urban-rural conflict exists in any society. We have it in the
United States, you have it in Europe, but I don't think it's, uh, uh,
as prevalent as it is in in underdeveloped societies, because there the
haves almost always reside in great numbers in the cities at the seat
of power, the seat of control; where the armies operate from, where the
police operate from, the economic systems. In rural countryside places,
such as Vietnam, you have a small frog in a small pond who carries out
the uh, edicts of the central government.
A high, that's a also another indication of a, of a society uh, that
has no social mobility. A very rigid, centrally directed system. Oh,
other than these few people who enjoy privileges and power, uh, for
whom the laws seem to be uh made to help, and to hinder everybody else,
uh, the rest of the people, uh, of rural Vietnam uh, simply have to uh,
endure these uh, these uh, restrictions upon their mobility and their
uh, desires, uh, uh, for the last hundreds of years.
Interviewer:
We're out of film...
Challenges for the Pacification Program in the South
VIETNAM
BUMGARDNER
SR #2711
Tape 1, Side 2
Americanization
TVP 007
August 24, 1982 (taped)
Starting. Marker. Go ahead.
712. Take four.
Clapsticks.
Interviewer:
Let's uh, let's go on to your experience, as, as I think the
city-countryside thing for discussion.
Bumgardner:
When the Americans arrived in Vietnam, in force with the advent of the
advisory effort, and the uh, larger, uh, economic mission, uh, group of
civilians, there wasn't really very much expertise among uh, this group
of people. There wasn't very much to read about. You could read of the
French experiences and of, Malaysia who had a similar problem that was
somewhat successful in fact um in terms uh, of the military effort was
quite successful. Ah, the Americans were left to try to figure out what
it was they were going to advise the Vietnamese to do.
The Vietnamese have had some experiments, they have had uh, some
attempts to separate the Viet Cong or the Viet Cong families, uh, from
the uh, rest of the population who had no family or other ties,
political ties, uh, to the enemy. And this proved to be a failure
because the man assigned to do it would have had to gone into the Viet
Cong uh, part of, uh, the population division.
And this kind of an insurgence in this situation almost every family
and I'm speaking of the large family, the mothers, the grandfathers,
and the uncles and cousins, has uh, some of the people, some of their
family members, uh, in the enemy opposition. The next experiment was
almost directly taken from Malaya, and that was uh, removing people
from extremely remote uh, areas, that were under constant, uh
insurgent, harassment, or control, and bringing them to larger, new
villages, and they called this a agroville project.
Some twenty two or twenty three of these larger relocation uh,
projects, were instituted and while it accomplished uh, some of they
uh, aims, uh, it really made uh, the economic and the um, social life
of the villager, uh, quite painful , and quite often it simply
collected him into one spot where the enemy could uh, shot at him,
harass him, mortar him, uh, to to throw fear into him for joining
their, or at least being allowed uh, allowing himself to come to the
government side. So this failed. Uh, by the time the Americans
resources were available and the and the um, and the civilians who were
there to advise upon this pacification idea, pacification meaning the
the taking back of geographical and and um, and groups uh of population
from enemy control, and then eventually converting them to resources
for the government side or to their own side.
Interviewer:
Put it another way for me.
Bumgardner:
All right.
Interviewer:
Just say pas, just define pacification for me here so that we can...
Bumgardner:
Pacification essentially means the uh, deprivation of population and
areas to enemy control and enemy uses for resources, and converting the
people into a viable force to protect themselves and uh, of course
protecting the uh, the uh, ideals of uh, the host government, uh,
prefers, of adopting the democratic system as opposed to the Communist
one. Uh, this has uh, a mixture of military force and military ideas,
along with, uh, creating a uh, political system that is more amenable
to the wishes of the peasants, uh, some democracy involved, an economic
system that replaces the landlord and the money lenders, uh, with uh,
uh, a more Westernized or, uh, freer type of uh, uh, source of funds,
to for the villager to develop his own independent economic life.
Interviewer:
Let's um let's talk about the main elements of pacification, the ones
that you think are most important was land of the tiller the central
element or obviously there were dozens, but let's go one by one through
the ones that you think were most important in terms of being
successful.
Bumgardner:
To take back an enemy area or to pacify it, involves many many delicate
steps. It is a it involves a great deal of timing, and it uh, involves
a great deal of depth of knowledge of that particular village and their
history and what has happened to it. Regardless of what the mix are,
regardless of how you divide up what it is you do, it has to be done in
the correct phase. In the first phase, and I don't know what percentage
this is, but the first phase, and the first percentage your resources
you put in are military. You must exclude major enemy forces from the
area, and you must build a cofferdam around that area so that they do
not reintroduce themselves midway through your, your process.
And after you've brought security to the people, to where they can
depend upon, uh, their tomorrows, depend upon the government's word,
uh, then you begin a process of economic and political building so that
they can become self sufficient and do their own protection. There is
not enough soldiers in any army of the world to protect everyone, and
you can see the logic of this just in plain mathematics. You would need
one soldier to protect one individual, uh, you would have half the
people in the army, and you don't have that kind of resources.
So the people must protect themselves. Eventually, you can provide a
main force, you can provide a constabulary force over a period of time,
but the end purpose of this pacification is to prove to the uh, rural
people that their interest in their future lies with the government and
not with the Viet Cong.
Interviewer:
The way giving people security, the way the word is is used, ah,
implies that it would be popular for them to be secure from the NLF
when in fact a lot of areas, it might be unpopular. Um, isn't security,
isn't the definition of security in those terms of, in in government
terms, security for a new set of people with power and a new set of
ideas?
Bumgardner:
Ah, security is a tricky word in a rural, insurgent area. Ah, it means
twenty-four hour security. When you initially move in and displace the
insurgent force, the Viet Cong, you must do it on a seven day a week,
twenty-four hour basis, because if you lapse for just one hour, the
enemy guerrilla force, political forces, can move back in to that
hamlet and punish anyone who cooperates with the government. So it has
to be per, pervasive, and it has to be constant. And you have to give
to the peasant uh, his uh, a feeling that this is permanent and it it
will be there as long as required.
In the mean time, uh, you educate him to the fact that uh, if he wants
the economic, political, social benefits of the program that you are
about to start after security is established, then he must be willing
to defend it and take some chances to defend a better way of life. And
you, so therefore you must give him a better way of life. If you simply
move in with military forces and uh, say OK we've done our job, now
here are weapons, you must protect yourself, it's a failure from the
very beginning because you haven't convinced him of the necessity of
giving up his life or fighting an enemy force uh, uh, because you
haven't put anything different into the pot, into the equation.
Therefore, you must go through stages of developing a better life for
him, educating his children, bringing the health of the village up to
par, providing money that he can borrow, uh, in order to buy his to buy
his seed grain and fertilizer, and increase his harvest so that the end
of the year he has a little extra money so he can use this extra money
to educate his children, so the children once educated can break out of
the of the the rural poor status and perhaps go one to be something
much greater than than would uh, normally be possible without the
education.
Health conditions in the villages
Interviewer:
Would you describe briefly, uhm, what the the uhm health conditions,
educational conditions, ah, just a thumbnail sketch of what uh, what it
is like...
Bumgardner:
Okay. In 19...
Interviewer:
A remote place with [inaudible] communications...
Bumgardner:
In ah, remote rural portions of, in remote rural portions of Vietnam in
the '65, '66 era, you found inadequate schooling from the point of view
that perhaps the teacher, uh, who taught the children were barely uh,
more literate, uh, than the children that she was teaching. Uh, you
found that the schoolhouse was simply a bamboo thatched roof, or a uh,
a poorly, uh, constructed, uh, uh, local edifice. Uh, you also found
that perhaps they were so limited, so many children and so few school,
uh, uh, chairs, that only some of the selected boys could ever go to
school.
Girls had little or no possibility of receiving any education. And that
education for a rural uh, child generally stops after the third grade,
and absolutely by the end of the fifth grade. So without this um
further education uh, he had literally no chance to break out of the,
uh, of social pattern that he and his grandfather were locked into. The
health of the uh, of the hamlets were pretty much the same. Twenty to
thirty miles...
Interviewer:
Let's start over...
Bumgardner:
The health of the um...
Interviewer:
Excuse me a second, is this noise outside coming over . .
Camera roll 713, take five. Clapsticks.
Bumgardner:
In terms of uh, what the rural health was like in those days, I've been
to village and hamlets in the Delta, remote areas where there were no
health rooms, and no one who was well versed in any kind of you might
even call first aid, so anyone who had dysentery which can be fatal,
uh, anyone who had high fever simply had to uh, wait it out, and they
were lucky if it turned out to be a minor uh, bacteria or a minor
virus, and it turned out to be something more serious meningitis or one
of the more serious disease they simply uh, had waited too long before
they could be transported some fifty or sixty kilometers ah, into a ah,
government facility.
Quite often when they got to the government facility, it was so crowded
they still had hours to wait or uhm, unfeeling medical personnel,
overworked who simply didn't pay too much attention to them. It was the
very basic medical facilities that uh, that anyone could imagine. The
problems of uh, mobile medical teams were also magnified by the
culture, that you might have a doctor to come around to a village once
a month, or once every three months, and treat everyone ah, from as an
outpatient. He would find someone who ah, needed medication for a
chronic condition and he would leave the medicine, and tell them and
instruct them how this was suppose to be taken.
Invariably because of the naﶥt頯f the people, by the end of the
third day they'd taken all of the medicine because if one teaspoon is
good uh, five teaspoons must be better and as a result, quite often
they had side effects from the medicine. So what was needed, of course,
was um, uh, medicine that was uh, closer to the people ah, and was more
sophisticated in in terms of uh, of uh, of of public health uh,
considerations, which up through '65 existed only in the cities and the
major towns and the major villages.
The Pacification Program's problems of leading and accessing the villagers
Interviewer:
Let's go on to uh, the other pillars of the pacification program that
were uhm, that we felt were important.
Bumgardner:
Traditionally, uh, the village was organized ah, ah, in sort of a
paternal uh, way. Uh, the richest or most important man, uh, was
generally uh, designated as the village chief or the village leader, or
he was appointed by the government, or if the government did not trust
that village for some previous reason, some past reason, they would
send in an outsider, a person not even from the village in order to be
their village chief, and you can't imagine the immense power this gave
this person.
Uh, generally, under a non-democratic system, everything that came into
the village came through his hands, so quite obviously his friends and
his family in most cases, benefited first, uh, from any of the
resources the government uh, was able to uh, to uh, share with the
people. Uh, service, public service, was an unknown word. It's simply a
public servant, simply didn't see himself in Vietnam as a person who
served ah, a constituency. He was there to dominate them, to carry out
central orders, to direct the peoples' daily lives and as a result, a
conflict developed between the population and ah, the government
officials.
The Viet Cong, understanding this because they were from the people,
would not use the word, the same word in Vietnamese to to designate
their leadership or their ah, people ah, who served in the hamlets,
they called their people "cadre" or "canbol", to differentiate between
the Vietnamese word which meant government official, because the people
felt so badly and so estranged from normal civil servants, the Viet
Cong didn't want to be mistaken or identified that they were simply
another government, so they changed the very word which they called ah,
ah their administrators.
Later on, after the Americans and the host government, uh, learned a
little bit more about how one uh, changes the minds of people, how one
pacifies them, uh, they developed a very large cadre of nationalist uh,
civilians who they called cadre also. Oh, they lived and administered
among the uh, uh people of the hamlets and villages much in the way
that the Viet Cong had been doing for the past fifty years.
Interviewer:
Let's go on to to ah, describe the dimensions of the problem, ah, from
the government...from our point of view.
Bumgardner:
The uh, tremendous geographical and uh, human uh, dimensions of this
problem in Vietnam uh, just can't be overstated. It's a country with
many jungles, many inaccessible areas, uh, few roads and has a spine of
uh, high mountains running down uh, uh, the central part of the
country. You have, you had approximately twelve thousand populated
hamlets and villages within the country, and they were separated by
miles, quite often, from from their neighbors. As a result, uh, you
needed to have some type of pacification program that built upon
success. There were not enough forces, not enough resources, not enough
cadres, not enough anything to go out and simultaneously try to pacify
or secure twelve thousand hamlets and villages at the same time. You
had to do it piecemeal.
Interviewer:
And mention uh what portion of the population that rural society was,
why...it was important.
Bumgardner:
Ah, these twelve thousand hamlets and villages comprised about ninety
percent of the population. There were only ah, ah, a small number of
really large cities in Vietnam, ah, major portion of the population,
ah, lived in the countryside. As the war went on, and the security in
many areas could not be guaranteed by the government, as the enemy used
more and more, uh, terror tactics, on uh, uh, hamlets, that uh, like
Catholic hamlets and uh, hamlets that would not uh, readily go along
with their domination.
Uh, the urban people or the urban population increased significantly,
perhaps doubling ah, because they sought safety, ahh, in the urban
areas they sought economic, uh, uh, advancement, and uhm, there were
some social mobility later on in the in the cities as opposed to the
countryside, they were able to lose themselves among the large uhm,
migrant population.
Interviewer:
What was the proportion of that ninety percent of the population, and
that was open to government influence and...
Bumgardner:
In trying to determine where the loyalties ah, ah, were among the rural
people, I might say that ninety five percent of the urban people who
had lived there over any length of time, eventually came to see that
the future, ah, was with the non-Communist world, it was with their
government, perhaps their government was imperfect and corrupt, and at
times oppressive, but they saw the other side, they saw the insurgents,
and the Communist as a long term greater threat.
As a result, the people who eventually came to the cities in great
numbers, and who stayed there and who worked and who prospered a little
bit more than if they would have stayed if they'd stayed in the
countryside, eventually chose, and I think the proof of this pudding is
that most of our refugees who have left Vietnam since the takeover have
have come from the uh, mostly the urban the urban areas. Going back to
the uh, uh, population control picture of uh, whose allegiance belonged
to whom, and early '55, I had occasion to visit many of the hamlets in
the Delta, in the central area, and found that there were huge areas,
like the whole, almost the entire province of Quang Ngai in central
Vietnam, that couldn't ever be pacified in my opinion, because almost
every family had a father, or or a close relative in the Viet Cong.
Now in trying to turn that family against the Viet Cong, against their
uh, relatives and bringing them over to overtly support the government
and to literally take up arms against their relatives was an almost
impossible tra--task. Many times the government, backed by the
Americans, uh, uh, attempted to pacify these areas, but I term, I, I
want, I prefer to call them occupations of those areas, which is about
as good as you can do. Uh, changing their mind was almost impossible.
Uh, there were many other areas, uh, like that.
Six great areas, there were six great areas that you had to put in the
same category as Quang Ngai and Ca Mau the most southern province in
the country, because these are the relocation areas after the Geneva
Convention of where about one hundred thousand of the former Communists
troops that fought against the French, bivouacked for up to a year. And
during their time there they married into the local population, made
propaganda to such an extent that these areas were almost permanently
converted ah, to insurgent-oriented people.
Now, if we exclude those areas and we go back to the other parts of the
country, in '55 I found that there was about a fifty-fifty uh,
division, that about half of the people were anti-government and
pro-Liberation Force, and the other people were either neutral, and we
have say that in terms of sometimes neutrality is a vote for the
insurgents, cause they're unwilling to supply intelligence or unwilling
to to cooperate with the government. Uh, but at least they were denying
their resources, uh, to the insurgents. Uh, due to some problems on the
insurgent side, and some minor successes with the government...
Interviewer:
We have clean through...
VIETNAM
F. BUMGARDNER (cont.)
SR 2712
ch
This is a head of SR 2712 to go with the head of Camera
Roll #714. WGBH, Vietnam Project, Americanization TVP 007. Continuing
the interview with Ev Bumgardner, August 24, 1982.
Camera Roll 714. Take six. Clap.
Interviewer:
Can you generalize now about what conditions were in '66 in terms of...
Bumgardner:
In general early '54, '55 you might have had half of the rural people
supporting the insurgents giving them their their cooperation, and the
other half ah being neutral or at least in some way supporting the
government. By late '65 early '66 through some problems on the
insurgent side, making some mistakes, perhaps the overuse of terror,
and some small successes on the government side and doing the right
thing, they probably effected a ten percent shift of ah...
[Phone rings in background]
Bumgardner:
By late '65 or early '66 I would say a slight shift towards the
government had occurred. Ah. Principally due to some problems that the
insurgents had. Perhaps the overuse of terrorism, ah, some small
successes the government had had in key areas around major cities doing
some things right for the first time that you had this ten percent
shift. So, probably a a 60-40 division of rural people towards the
government.
Terrorism of the villages by the Viet Cong
Interviewer:
Would you tell us what terrorism is just recently. How the VC used it.
What their ends were?
Bumgardner:
In most cases the Viet Cong used terrorism in a very careful manner.
They used it as a scalpel instead of a, of a hatchet, that terrorism
was a threat they held over ah the government apparatus. If you keep
killing a village chief you get to the point of where no one will take
the job of coming in to to ah run that ah that ah village, or no local
person will step up and take the leadership, or you can use the threat
of assassination ah to to ah let him sit in place but be entirely
inactive, ah be a village chief in name only but not exert his control
and to give perhaps even false and misleading information about the
security of the place ah back to the government, ah, to indicate that
it's more in government control than it is so that the government does
not send security forces there.
But, the threat of force and the willingly, willingly using the force
is a tremendous tool in in destabilizing ah ah a sitting government.
Ah. In order not to alienate too many people, the Viet Cong would use
it very carefully principally on ah people who had been recruited as
intelligence agents in the villages and hamlets. Ah. The apparatus that
were there to represent the government, and in some cases ah villagers
who tended to espouse pro-government or anti-communist sympathies. The
average villager who simply was neutral. Ah. Who simply bent with the
wind like the bamboo was very safe ah from the terrorist because he was
he was not the target. He was ah a ah a a non sequitur in this
equation. As a result he was safe by being neutral.
Interviewer:
Let's, before we forget it, go back to... give us your personal example
of... knowledge of VC areas and VC troops and how you ha...
Bumgardner:
Well, my personal knowledge of of the VC ah modus operanda how they
operated and how they obtained their success and what their political
and social messages were came to me beginning about early 1964 or I'm
sorry late '64 right after ah ah... My personal observations on the
modus operanda and the methods of operation of the of the Viet Cong
began to take shape in late 1964 after the Diem government fell.
Ah. I was asked along with some friends, both Vietnamese and Americans
to form up what you might call survey teams to go go into the hamlets.
It was first chance we had had to really do anything of a of a nature
where we could operate without a a large government presence which, of
course, tended to make the villager ah apprehensive. We went in ah for
a period of six months and interviewed people. Lived in the hamlets
with the people. Ah.
We took along medics who held ah ah medical call for ah minor ill,
illnesses that occurred in all hamlets and talked to the people at
length to develop a a rational of what had happened to the Diem
government, why it was unpopular, why the people gave their support to
the enemy and in so doing we ah gained a great deal of information
about ah ah ah his program and his cadre and ah how he ah managed to
destabilize the government. We called this the Long An Survey.
Ideological warfare in rural South Vietnam
Interviewer:
Do you want to mention a specific instance of going down into the
dungeon with those people, was that particularly revealing for you?
Bumgardner:
We did this in a number of ways. We we did these surveys or had these
long talks with villagers and and people in rural areas by going to
their homes, by quite often going to the prisons where some of the Viet
Cong were were held prisoner and one particular case in in a a very
remote area of Long An I was on the spot in the district town when they
brought in a rather elite platoon of propaganda people, armed
propaganda team, in fact, and they had them in an old French dungeon
and the value to me of talking to these people before they had been in
captivity overcame my reluctance to crawl down into this dungeon and
and ah sit with them and talk with them for hours.
As a result of of experiences like this a number of us developed for
the first time a really ah truly understanding of what kind of
apparatus we were working against and how they how they managed to do
what they did with so meager ah resources. Other occasions ah ah took
us to the schools in Vietnam ah where with a an edict from the local
province chief we would have the senior or the most ah mature of the
males and females in the classes there come away with us to the
athletic fields out of teacher's sight and we'd sit with children and
quite often from children ah great truths emerged and ah ah old friends
like Douglas Ramsey who spent seven years as a captive with the Viet
Cong ah later in his life.
We used to sit with the children and ah find out what it was their
parents talked about and why they and many of their friends would join
the Viet Cong and ah what the government had to do to regain their
loyalties. Many of them told us during these interviews that they were
going to graduate from that school and then go off and join their
friends in the Viet Cong.
Interviewer:
What was your your feeling ah at the time ah about that challenge as an
American ah working in Vietnam? Did you feel that optimistic, did you
feel we could do the job?
Bumgardner:
I felt like all of the Americans who were assigned there and who stayed
there any time. If you had any political or moral qualms about being
engaged in this type of new warfare you soon left. Those who stayed
tended to be the most dedicated people. That is, people who could
accept this challenge, who felt ah that again ah it was a long
proposition ah where we had to support the Vietnamese over a long
period of time to almost any lengths. Ah. We couldn't lose this, that
for international as well as domestic reasons we couldn't lose this.
This was as much a war as say WWII or Korea to us. It was a different
kind of of conflict. But it was one we had to master, and as a result,
I accepted ah the ah part of the job that ah was ah pretty difficult ah
for most Americans to accept from a moral or a political point of view.
Ah. Literally taking part in a conflict ah which was not in a a direct
way involving the security of the United States, of being a a surrogate
ah government representative sometimes. It even amounted to the fact
that ah we were involved with our counterparts to the point of where we
were the only communication chain from the lower level back to the
central government to get things done.
We were doing a job for village chiefs and district chiefs that they
couldn't do for themselves because of their own bureaucracy, and in
that way, it was an invigorating ah circumstance. It was a a a ah most
unusual situation which you could be in and and from the standpoint of
seeing micro and macro economics at work, of seeing a developing,
budding political system, of seeing democracy ah a context which was
not ah very well known in Vietnam being introduced to see what its
problems were, of trying to get it introduced, or trying to get people
interested in electing their own officials, setting up economic systems
like a rural bank, land reform which was fraught with many problems,
land reform being a a method of of increasing social mobility and
economic mobility, taking the land away from the vested gentry and
breaking it up and getting it to the people, and then being able to
institute a government program allowing them ah ah credits and monetary
flexibility so that the production didn't go down.
So that you could keep production up and so forth. These were
fascinating things from an intellectual standpoint and ah and
invigorating from the point of view that to my knowledge very few
Americans have ever faced this in the past. We've had wars that
involved tanks and airplanes and and basic ideologies but not this kind
of of delicate...Out?...
Military and political security as means of the Program
Turning. Camera Roll 715. Take eight. Claps.
Interviewer:
Let's start with the...
Bumgardner:
By '66 when we started what I think was the the most important
pacification program that ah ah we started ah in the in the entire
period where we had come together and understood the various things
that goes into pacification from the point of view of first security,
uh then democratic evolution of the political system, making the
changes that were necessary. Ah. Of trying to sail in front of the Viet
Cong revolution with an evolution of ourself. But, an evolution that
would ah mature in in a time that would satisfy domestic politics in
the United States.
We all felt under a tremendous time constraint from our our superiors
that if we developed a program which we thought would work, in five
years we were pushed to make it bear fruit in two years because we were
working against this this backlash developing here in the United
States. The the opposition at home which really had nothing to do with
the Vietnamese directly but it had a heck of a lot to do with our
ability to stay and see it done and continue to have the American
taxpayer put up the resources.
Ah. We attempted to convince the Vietnamese government that main force
troops are necessary but what's really more important for the security
of the people local people are regional forces and popular
force--people drawn from the local population properly trained properly
armed who provide close and day and night support. They live there.
They're the families ah of the villagers there, and that they stay
there forever because if you move the regular army in from fifty miles
away the peasants knew that eventually the army was going back to their
base and then everyone who had cooperated would have a visit from the
Viet Cong enforcer.
So, we were successful in developing this paramilitary force ah
beginning in in the sixties and to the late '60s, '70s ah because we
put so much effort in it. We put so much force on the Vietnamese to
accept this idea and we had the resources committed so that we could
raise a tremendous number of local military forces. The follow-on or
third phase of security then was to get the old men and the young
children of the hamlet to take an active part in their security as
lookouts. Gave them old weapons and we didn't expect them to fight the
Viet Cong units but when they saw a VC unit approaching or they were
aware of it they would fire the guns into the air, draw attention to
the fact there was infiltration going on.
Make them do a an overt act which forever put them on the side against
the insurgent and for the government. In the economic field ah we
introduced agricultural credits and the most successful thing we ever
did I think was to introduce what's called the Honda rice, a particular
type of rice ah developed in the Philippines which when properly
fertilized developed tremendous yields. Four hundred percent increase
in in the peasant's reward for his labor and it was not a proto
periodic rice as the indigenous rice, that is to say, it didn't depend
upon the lunar ah conditions ah to mature.
It was simply a a certain amount of time in the ground and you had a a
crop. So, they could three crop their paddies a year. With the increase
yield you can see that they soon had enough surplus to buy a radio and
a Honda bicycle or a Honda motorcycle, hence its name. Ah. That was
successful. It depended, however, on on high fertilization ah backup,
that you had to introduce fertilizer and distribute it. Ah. The
democracy part of it or the self-government part of it was more
difficult.
Peasants for generations had been told what to do. Suddenly to say hey,
hey democracy is here. Elect your own village chief and your own
administrators. Quite a new idea. So, they tended to look to the
traditional leaders to tell them who to elect (chuckle) and quite often
it was really the same people who would oppress them because they
didn't know what else to do. In a few cases in some cases the old
rascals were thrown out and somebody new was put in, but in general the
elective process takes a long time.
It takes literally generations before you can build an understanding of
democracy and to have democracy work ah in a way that is is positive
for your political situation, and the village level in Vietnam, the
villa--the hamlet and village, the district, the province and the
national level represents the flow of power back and forth. And, the
Vietnamese were never willing to let democracy go as far as electing
the next level of government, the district chief who really had
tremendous control because he had control of all the forces in his area
and he who controls the gun really controls.
So as a result we had these experiments in self government ah
successful a few times, unsuccessful in many times and never getting
beyond the lowest level of government. Whenever it seemed that this
political process was getting out of control someone some village chief
or in the case of the central government where you had a national
assembly popularly elected, got too powerful and challenged the
government something happened to these people. They were out of power,
out of resources, or in the case of a a famous Vietnamese, Tran Ngoc
Chau who was a a ah firebrand in the Thieu government ah he was sent to
jail for contact with his brother who was on the other side.
So, the government while going along with the general concept of a
freer more liberal ah type of political environment did not really
believe you could bring over a short period of time a free choice or
democracy to the rural population without the government itself being
displaced. Ah. As a result, we made a little head road here but not
very much. The, by the end of '66 in this era of the great pacification
effort, the integrated pacification effort. We had taken back and
secured a great number of people ah from the Viet Cong.
We had made roads secure for ah unescorted travel. Ah, we had had
increased those roads by 500 to 1000 percent in some areas where a
person could reasonably drive in his jeep ah in a remote area without
expecting to be ambushed or blown up. This allowed the administrators
from the government to bring supplies, to come and bring leadership ah
ah to the lower levels. It allowed the people to move out of the areas
when they had to for commerce, to move their resources out to sell
them. Ah.
To receive ah medical aid and so forth. And, during those those days of
the big pacification program ah Vietnam looked like it was ready to
take off. It looked like we had attained our in, and then, of course,
that was ah stepped upon by the famous Tet Offensive and after that we
had to start all over again because we had lost the security umbrella
around all of these these gains.
Exigency of the Program's implementation
Interviewer:
Did ah...were we ah...just mention the ah the principal obstacles in in
your mind whether on our side or the Vietnamese side in ah making it
take off.
Bumgardner:
Okay.
Interviewer:
Was there underestimation of the of the ah the nature of the problem
from a policy level ah or complete...
Bumgardner:
There are a few basic problems. There are a few basic problems in
implementing a pacification program. One is from the the strategy
concept. What you're asking the ruling gentry of the country to do. The
three to five percent of the people who control ah all facets ah of of
a country in the throes of an insurgency. You're asking them to be very
effective, non-bureaucratic, non-corrupt. Don't think about yourself.
Think about the country. So that when you are successful you have
displaced yourself.
They're, that that vested gentry can look forward to their children and
their grandchildren, their great grandchildren benefiting from this
hard fight against the communists, if you don't change the system. You
keep them in power and they're they're family members in power. If
they're very successful and you have social mobility then the rulers of
the future are going to come from all aspects of life. You're going to
use the resources of all the people and through a democratic process
th--some of the better ones are going to rise up and take over the
positions they hope to reserve for their grandchildren.
So, you're asking a man to work hard, risk his life, fight the enemy so
you can be, you yourself be displaced. In Confucianism terms that's
kind of a contradiction. Okay. The second thing you have is the trying
in a short period of time ah to make a bureaucratic neutral type of
administration. The public servants take fire and become active and do
their job in an enthusiastic way. Because when you're fighting a war of
attrition or you're fighting a protracted war ah the idea is to
survive.
As a soldier told me who would not move very quickly towards the enemy
dug in a in a fence line. He said you've only been here a few years.
I've been here all my life. Why do you want me to rush to my death
towards that fence line. They will be in that fence line next month and
the month after and and many times it will come back to that fence
line. I simply want to survive. I've never forgotten that. Well, this
this applies not only to the soldier but it applies to the civil
servant. Ah.
It is unknown in Vietnamese culture for the lower echelon administrator
to make suggestions up to the boss or to say no, boss, you're wrong.
Here's a better way to do it. You're only there to take orders from top
downward. So, as a result implementation of programs are very clumsy
very slow and very, inefficient. Quite often the implementer not
knowing really why he's doing certain things.
Interviewer:
And why....Let's, why don't we start again.
Beep, beep, beep.
End of SR 2712.
VIETNAM
BUMGARDNER (cont.)
SR 2713
ch
This is a head of SR 2713 to pick up with Camera Roll 716 for WGBH.
Vietnam Americanization, TVP 007 and we're continuing with an interview
with Everett Bumgardner on August 24, 1982.
Turning. Marker. Camera Roll 716. Take nine. Claps.
Interviewer:
Start with the US as...
Bumgardner:
After we developed an expertise in pacification and an understanding of
the Vietnamese mentality and the limitation of the government's forces
for implementing change, we had on our own side a a tremendous ah
problem. We had all of these eager young Americans who spoke the
language, understood what they were doing, working with Vietnamese they
liked and admired but always under this push from Washington to get
things done quicker. When the Viet Cong talk about a protracted war
they mean just that.
That one of the most important weapons they have is time. When they
talk about fighting a twenty, forty, fifty year war most Americans
laughed and scoffed. That was funny to them. It wasn't for the Viet
Cong. They thoroughly were willing to fight fifty years. They would
wait us out. If we were successful one year and we thought everything
had been completed and retired they'd be back the next year and undo
what we had done and they were willing to do this fifty times, if
necessary. That's the way they were indoctrinated.
We had pressures on us from Washington. Every day. Every week. Every
month. To get the figures, to get the numbers. How many enemy have you
eliminated? How many hamlets have you taken back? How many roads have
you secu--have you secured. Get this thing over and looking in back of
the the reason for this was, of course, that a protracted war would
become unpopular eventually and we'd lose the support of the American
people and we'd lose the resources. Get it done while you can.
Make hay while the sun shines. But there are some things like an
evolution of a of a system of ah changing the nature of a people, of
having a people who were denied access to a weapon all their lives
suddenly have a weapon thrust upon them say now it's okay. You're
supposed to defend yourself with this. This is a very long process.
It's one really that takes a a bit of ah brain washing as the communist
used the term. Of convincing people ah of working with them, of
educating them.
Starting with the young and and ah bringing them forward so they where
they accept these things as normal requirements on a a citizenry. Ah.
We would have something that would ah be successful in a pilot project
because in a pilot project we had no focus upon us. The, the
administration the government, the American government wasn't looking
closely at us. The press wasn't reporting on what we were doing and we
could take our time.
So that the pilot project was very successful. Then in the analysis of
this, the administration, the leadership would buy this and say now you
have to mature this thing, you have to make it bear fruit in a third of
a half or a fourth of the time. A baby takes nine months. You can't
have a baby in two months, and we kept feeding this back up the line
but we kept getting orders back down, it's got to be done faster,
faster, faster.
We, and John Vann is was a very close friend of mine who was killed in
the war there and he used to use a phrase almost everyday that we have
enough time to do something over ten times but we don't have enough
time to do something correct the first time and take ten years. Ah. He
was very aware of this problem of pressure to get things done quickly
even though often it was imperfect and had to be done over again the
next year.
Interviewer:
Put that a different way. Say it again. Ah...
Bumgardner:
Ah. Eager Americans knowing what to do and how to do it ah after being
there some time understood how long it would take ah to change
Vietnamese ways of doing things and then the Vietnamese have to believe
this and they had to be convinced that it was important in order to
sustain it after we left, after we were not immediately involved. This
took time.
Constantly from Saigon and from Washington to Saigon ah we got the
pressures ah to get things done more quickly to to ah speed up the
whole process so that we could wind this war up in a way that we wound
up WWII ah Korea and so forth. We were caught in this ah domestic
political ah problem of doing things quickly ah if not perfectly.
Escalation, Vietnamization, and the fate of the South
Interviewer:
Was the introduction of so many American troops ah a sign that we were
going to lose?
Bumgardner:
When the, had the introduction of the American troops ah the ah the
process ah had two of...let me start all over again.
Interviewer:
Do you want to answer that?
Bumgardner:
Yeah, I will. When the American troops were introduced ah there were
some good benefits to it and some bad benefits. The good benefits were
that in the in the immediate we got increased security. Ah. The bad
benefits ah were that we introduced into essentially a civil war ah
situation a foreign ah element. The French had been there as conquerors
and as as ah ah the exploiters of Indochina and as a result of that the
the communist nationalist forces formed a coalition to drive out the
foreigner, drive out the the French.
Ah. By reintroducing American troops in the minds of many
unsophisticated people it was almost like history repeating itself.
And, it became a good propaganda ah vehicle for the enemy. It also
escalated the war because North Vietnam simply wanted to maintain some
kind of parity in the size of their military forces as to those that
they were opposing, and as we raised the ante they were forced to raise
the ante so the war got larger and larger and more people got killed
and injured and there were more devastation and and in terms of the
size of the military operation it took much longer to put back a
populated area, to put it together again after two giant war machines
had clashed in in the in the area.
So, it had negatives and positives and the fact that we could never
stay there forever, and the fact that the American army was not going
to be an occupation army and stay there for twenty to forty or fifty
years almost had defeat built into it because as you exercise one limb,
which is the American army, at the expense of the other limb which is
the Vietnamese army, the one that exe... not exercises so much gets
weaker and I think Madame Binh put it very correctly when we announced
Vietnamization. She said...
Interviewer:
Say who she was.
Bumgardner:
Madame Binh was a political leader...
Madame Binh was a...
Interviewer:
Just say Madame who was...
Bumgardner:
Binh, who was a political spokesman for the ah the Viet Cong, said
after we announced Vietnamization that it would be admitting defeat ah
for the South Vietnamese because if two people could barely carry a
heavy stone when one set it down how could the other expect it to carry
it alone, and she was alluding to this very fact that ah ah the ARVN or
the regular army of Vietnam could not stand against this huge formal
army that had been built up to contest the American army, and as we
withdrew they were not going to withdraw also. They were going to keep
the size of their army. And, essentially, it moved in to the
traditional set peace battle and the country was lost by division to
division contact and not through the insurgents and the guerrillas at
the lower level.
Interviewer:
Cut.
Preceding this note to the editor is several seconds of reference tone
at minus etb and ah coming up is an interview with Vernon Gillespie and
we're going to... go to magazine 717 or Camera Roll 717.
Series
Vietnam: A Television History
Raw Footage
Interview with Everett Bumgardner [2], 1982
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
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Description
Episode Description
US Information Agency employee Bumgardner describes the conditions in the Vietnamese countryside and aspects of the day-to-day life of villagers, including the lack of power held by landlords and the invasion by guerrillas. He discusses how family members left the village to fight, how this changed the dynamic of the village, and the impact this had on the immediate family. Bumgardner also discusses pacification, health conditions, and educational conditions of rural Vietnam.
Date
1982-08-24
Date
1982-08-24
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
War and Conflict
Subjects
Vietnamese reunification question (1954-1976); Propaganda, Communist; New democracies; Chieftains; rice; Intelligence officers; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Public opinion; Social conflict; National liberation movements; Vietnamese language; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States--History--1945-; Vietnam--Politics and government; literacy; Vietnam--History--1945-1975; Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Psychological aspects; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Prisoners and prisons; Relocation (Housing); Vietnam (Republic); Recruiting and enlistment; Rural conditions; Village communities; consultants; Social mobility; Politics and war; Nationalism and communism; Confucianism and state; Rural Health; Communism and Confucianism; Education, Rural; War and family
Rights
Rights Note:1) No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the responsibility of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project.,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
01:15:32
Embed Code
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Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Bumgardner, Everett
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 79594220e2d167a5db2baf962ea4d70a6ad6ffa3 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 01:15:28:11
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Citations
Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Everett Bumgardner [2], 1982,” 1982-08-24, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed February 26, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-833mw28g9r.
MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Everett Bumgardner [2], 1982.” 1982-08-24. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. February 26, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-833mw28g9r>.
APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Everett Bumgardner [2], 1982. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-833mw28g9r