War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Deutch, 1987

Why did you not stay. I believed in October of 1981 that the Reagan administration had placed domestic politics in front of what were the clear national security interests of the country and the understanding that had been reached with Congress and with our allies about what the United States was going to do with ICBM modernization next year. First looking at this instead they said look you know you're coming. Well Charlie Townes I think did an absolutely admirable job of trying to elucidate and examine every possible technical option for ICBM survivability an ICBM basing in the years Nineteen eighty two and eighty one eighty three

small portions of those two years. He basically was searching for a technical solution to what was essentially a political problem. And I believe that it was doomed to not being a successful venture because the problem of ICBM basing in this country is not a country which permits a wonderful technical solution that will avoid all the difficult policy issues and political issues that confront confront our country in this area. Yes. You know what. My view was is that the Reagan administration had placed domestic politics ahead of what was in the country's national security interest and the understanding's which had been reached both with our Congress and with our

allies was breached when he decided to abandon the racetracks form of basing that the Carter administration had proposed. But Charlie Townes did an admirable job of examining all possible technical solutions to ICBM basing. There is no more honest or capable individual in this country to examine that question and he did so completely objectively and I think extremely effectively however. In my judgment the town's panels during 1982 are unlikely to become successful because in my judgment there isn't a technical solution to the problem of ICBM basing in this country. It is impossible to find a mode of basing which is simultaneously of low cost can resist even the most determined Soviet attack and does not require any infringement on

the public spaces of this country. So the problem we have is a basically a political problem of how do we want to meet those competing requirements in any ICBM. The basing decision yes. So what was yours. What a time the closely spaced basing proposal was put forward. In my view there had not been an adequate amount of data collected to really defend some of the claims which were made for it. More importantly there had been an inadequate consultation with a wide variety of interested parties especially in Congress to give it end any credibility with the country. And third I believe that the administration's efforts to propose the closely

spaced Basing to Congress was done without sufficient care. There wasn't one individual high civilian SENIOR ADMINISTRATION an individual in charge. And therefore it was doomed to become a butt of jokes rather than a serious alternative. The dense pack came too late without sufficient technical support and without sufficient advocacy to have a real chance of being considered as a serious proposal it looked like a quick idea that was put forward to remove the president from an uncomfortable situation after his cancellation of the race track system. Now what do you think. Yes. In my view the Scowcroft commission was put together asked to come together by the president to really help solve a very serious political problem in the country. That is what were we going to do about ICBM

modernization. And the idea of the president as I understood it in discussions with him and with his senior staff at that time was not to find a magic technical solution which as I've indicated I don't think is present but to find a reasonable middle ground which would gain the support of a large part of the political spectrum both Republicans and Democrats both liberals and conservatives behind a program for ICBM modernization which would be neither too much or too little. And where there would be the continuity of attention to it by many administrations and many houses of Congress so that one had some confidence that subset of program would actually take place. The the job of the Scowcroft committee was to find that middle ground that program which matched reasonable ness with prudence and where there was enough of a consensus which would assure that the programs would actually take place

over time. When you were members of that right. Right right. They were you right. Many members of the Scowcroft commission were well-known critics. So yes I'm right here. I'm sorry. I have a cold. But many members of the Scowcroft commission were known to be critical of the administration's. Steps towards national security and foreign policy in general. How brown Bill Perry were members of the prior Carter administration. Jim Schlesinger. Al Haig. Who had been secretary of state were known to be more Republican oriented

individuals who were also critical of the administration so it was a commission composed of people who were questioning about both the ideas and the ability of the administration in the national security area. I think it's because I believe that they properly perceived. The Reagan White House correctly perceived that it was not going to be possible to have congressional approval of an ICBM modernization program without a group of individuals who were viewed as being nonpartisan. Yeah. OK.

Yes. You have to tell me the question I get why you're one of the senior members of the Reagan White House. I believe correctly appreciate that it would be impossible for any plan for ICBM modernization to be approved by Congress and to have a chance of actually being implemented unless a group of individuals who are viewed as being objective nonpartisan and not beholding to the administration actually gave a seal of approval to it and advocated its balance its meeting the military need and being in the interests of long term arms control. Without that kind of independent justification for a case the Reagan

administration was not going to have anything passed by the Democratic House of Representatives and at that time a Democratic Senate. No it was me. I do not believe that the every member of the Scowcroft commission believed that it was essential to go ahead with M-x immediately. I do believe that most members of the Scowcroft commission thought that it was very important that we undertake ICBM modernization. The Soviets were known to be increasing the capability both in quality and quantity of their ICBM force. And it was believed that we had to find an ICBM

modernization program but first of all would improve the survivability of existing forces and secondly which would place the United States relative to the Soviet Union in a position where arms control on long range intercontinental ballistic missiles was more possible rather than less possible. It is true that the Amex was one of the few missile systems available to carry out such an ICBM modernization program. The problem was not the missile. The problem was the basing mode. Now why is it that you know several times the missiles. And yeah why was it rejected his final solution. Yes. Why. Because it was part of the reason that the M

backs and Minuteman silos was acceptable recommendation for the commission to make was because it did not stand alone as the solution to the ICBM problem. It was part of a three element program inseparable three element program which consisted first of all of the small ICBM with its attention on mobility with attention on having fewer rather than more warheads per launcher which provided for the survivability of the ICBM force as one part of the triad. It importantly consisted of a new approach to arms control which stressed warheads rather than launchers. Again pushing toward survivability in contrast to simple numbers and third element the third element was the Amex portion. Putting it Minuteman silos showing the Soviets providing an incentive to the Soviets to say listen if we don't do something about both reducing both

sides reducing our ICBM force you will have the same vulnerability with your ICBM force that we the United States face currently. The important aspect of the M-x deployment in Minuteman silos was it demonstrated to the Soviets the resolve of the United States to place the ICBMs of the Soviets at the same risk that their actions with the ICBM systems like the SS 18 that were in place or the SS 24 and 25 that they were planning placed our ICBMs at risk and accordingly it was a way of saying to the Soviet Union we both have an interest in reducing the levels of our ICBM forces. I believe I believe many other commission members believe that without putting the axis part of our program the Soviets had absolutely no incentive to negotiate a reduction in their long range intercontinental ballistic missile forces.

I. Know it had been proposed before. If it had been proposed before that M-x should be based in Minuteman silos. But it was not part of a program which looked at arms control aspects and which looked at an element of the ICBM force as being very survivable and therefore had been an accepted not and not reached acceptance in Congress or with many observers of national security because it was looked at as being a cheap alternative and a rather aggressive alternative to our ICBM problem. We. Oh so I believe that the solution standing by itself would be would be viewed as being an stabilizing because it would mean that you had M-x missiles in targetable soft relatively

vulnerable Minuteman silos. But it become very acceptable as part of an overall package an overall package of these three elements that I've mentioned before the small ICBM the new approach to arms control and the M-x in the minute and Salah to be candid about it also had a very important political aspect for those more conservative members of Congress for those members of Congress who had had a long term commitment to the emic system. It provided something for them too. It did help reach a political consensus. And so there is an element of that in the program as well but standing by itself it would not be acceptable as a defense measure. You know what. I think that the survivability question for the ICBM forces had been highly oversold. First of all it had been over promised

the many secretaries of defense had gone to Congress many chiefs of staff of the Air Force indicating that the most important objective of a missile basing system was a survivability. To Soviet attack that most of that property of of invulnerability a Soviet attack must be seen in the context of all of our forces. It proved to be a false hope that one could get a completely insane survivable force. Secondly. We know. That. The issue is that many secretaries of defense many chiefs of staff of the Air Force had gone to Congress and said that a missile basing system was going to be invulnerable was going to be survivable to any kind of Soviet attack.

That has proven to be a false hope. It is technically not possible or at least exorbitant league set expensive to have a basing mode which is invulnerable to all parts all kinds all imaginable types of Soviet attack such survivability absolute survivability cannot be obtained. Yes. I personally was a supporter of going to a method of arms control accounting which counted warheads rather than launchers. I think one of the very bad aspects of salt one was that it chose to focus on launchers counting numbers of launchers giving both sides the incentive for putting as many possible warheads on each launcher as possible thereby reaching a situation of instability where there was a great

advantage to going striking first. It seemed to me that it seemed to me that there was a overwhelming reason for going to a Arms Control basis which relied on numbers of warheads rather the number of launchers to get away from that destabilizing aspect of counting launchers rather than warheads. So I was very much an advocate of that method of calculation. I also was a very strong advocate of the small missile. I must admit that when it becomes mobile which I also advocate whether it carries one warhead or two warheads. It's less important than the survivability which comes from mobility. So the first question is. Avoid many warheads on one launcher in a fixed land based silo. But if you have mobility like is proposed for the

small missile or mobility like you have in the submarines whether you have one or two or a few warheads per launcher is less important than the survivability which comes from mobility. The key issue is not Mer. The key issue is vulnerability of the ICBM force. For those of you like yourself. Mission. Why. Any way and I mean it would eventually be like arms for one. Why do you think you were. Well first of all let me say that I was for the small missile. I was for mobility of a small missile but it is not in my judgment the case that it should only necessarily be a single warhead missile.

It could as presently designed eventually have two warheads on it. The important issue is the mobility of the small size of the missile and the fact that it was an invulnerable basing mode. To be sure it was costly but that was the price that one had to pay to put our ICBM force posture in a matter which was stable and and avoided the possibility of nuclear war as much as rational calculation can reach. I also believe that it was essential to provide the Soviets with an incentive to negotiate arms control agreements with respect to ICBMs 500 small mobile launchers by themselves would not be enough to give the Soviets an incentive. In my judgment to negotiate in a serious matter on arms control the M-x part of the program that we put forward was intended principally to show the Soviets that we had the resolve to put their ICBM force

at risk in the same manner they had our CB ICBM force at risk. So it would be in our mutual interest to reach balance force reductions on both sides absent the M-x part of the program. It would not have had my support because I do not believe I do not believe that there was a credible basis for thinking that the Soviets would have negotiated an arms control agreement. It took all three aspects of the proposed program to gain my promised support to the result. You're right. Forget that we are both extending it turns away that I'm not you know that could strike military targets. How do I write for an instrument that can change the way you are

you know torn down or three directions. Well the number of military targets that is required for extended deterrence is a function of the size of the military forces in both the Soviet Union or the United States. So as you pull down the number of SSA teens or SS 20s as you pull down the number of ICBM targets you lower the requirements for the number and kind of forces you need to provide extended deterrence. There was of course a difference within the commission about how. There was of course a difference within the commission about the importance of extended deterrence and the credibility of extended her us from the ICBM forces of the United States. I must say I joined with Jim Schlesinger in believing that an important purpose ov the ICBM forces of the United States is to provide

extended deterrence to provide a political linkage with our allies in Europe to give them the assurance that we have the means and the will to deter Soviet aggression should it occur against them in your view. The credible mission for M-x missile in Europe at the ICs event of a war in Europe is that it has the capability of prompt destruction and accurate destruction of Soviet military targets. I want to make it clear I'm not proposing the use of M-x vessels in response to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. I am proposing that the existence of the M-x vessels and their prompt accurate military destruction potential is important in the calculation of the Soviet general staff and deterring them from considering

a conventional or chemical or nuclear attack in Western Europe or on the flanks of NATO. The purpose of those missiles is to deter such attacks not to be used necessarily in the case of such attacks. It's a very subtle difference but an important one. You can figure the military forces to prevent violence not to be used in times of violence but still. It is that whole issue about how much. Oh. Oh. Yeah.

Well the reason that. What is so interesting about ICBMs and extended deterrent goes back to the basis of NATO's which is summarized by the arm patch which all NATO's soldiers wear the emblem of NATO's which is a shield and a sword the sword being the ICBM forces which the United States has of the nuclear forces the United States and the shield being the conventional forces of the allies in Europe. And that is at the essence of the political alliance which makes up NATO. Now as you accurately point out the Soviets develop a capability against us ICBMs and the US has a capability of Soviet missiles systems. The credibility of that shield and sword symbol becomes more and more a question and therefore the political. Fiber of the alliance becomes more and more strained and it is that whole question about what you place replaced to make a credible contribution to deterrence and

we've the United States and NATO allies together that lead to the whole theater nuclear force issue which may be tomorrow. We will have a treaty removing those theatre nuclear forces from being part of a political alliance between the United States and its European allies. I agree with you. You're right. There was a huge year with the Scowcroft commission members were uniformly surprised and uniformly I think horrified would not be too strong a term that the president of United States would

make a major public address changing the whole basis of strategy from one which was based on deterrence to a new concept of strategic defense without any consultation with the president's own commission charged with the responsibility of achieving a political solution to a very complicated subject. And all the members I think were we fair to say were stunned at this presidential announcement and believe that it made their task our task a great deal more difficult and actually have the opportunity to meet with the President discuss it and we found ourselves all certainly I was not only technically skeptical but also very politically skeptical about the prospects of SDI being able to be replaced. The problems of deterrence with a magical new technical system for avoiding the horrors of nuclear arms.

Right. But Reykjavik occurred after the commission was through with its work. The president's speech on Star Wars occurred in the midst of the deliberations of the commission. It was quite a different circumstance. We ALL the commission members responded to Reykjavik as private citizens we no longer said it was an act of commission. But Star Wars was in the midst of our deliberations. Why. Though the the so-called Deutsch panel was a task force of the Defense Science Board. The secretary of defense one of the Defense Science Board to undertake a study ob the technical health and prospects for the small ICBM. It is hard while the launcher and fundamentally what our task force was asked to do was to review the progress of the program and asked was it able to. Provide survivable. ICBM basing for the small ICBM at affordable cost

relative to several other alternatives. You hear me. I see you. The fundamental conclusion about the small ICBM on mobile launchers is that it is survivable against any credible kind of Soviet attack not against all conceivable Soviet attacks but very survivable against all credible Soviet attacks. But that survivability is expensive and in my judgment it is the price worth paying for a survivable ICBM force elements of Congress or elements of the US Air Force may believe that it is not a price worth paying that you do not need that survivability given other elements of our strategic forces. For example submarines in my

view the Congress of United States politics United States will lead one inevitably toward seeking that survivability for our ICBM forces. And so I predict that we will move towards mobility and we will move towards those more survivable mobile land based systems but which are however very expensive. I should note that the Soviets have already moved to such systems and I have already begun to understand the importance of moving to mobile systems in order to obtain survivability. Well hear me now. Yes the IMAX proposal to not base an axis in Minuteman silos but to put them on rel road trains. In fact buys you some greater survivability especially if you have strategic warning that is hours of warning about the possibility of a Soviet attack rather than 30 minutes warning about a Soviet attack. That is

a basic system which does provide some greater survivability than putting M-x in Minuteman silos. What alternative would be and one which I find extremely interesting is the so-called carry hard system where one has basically inexpensive silos very very big. Simple silos and an one M-x missile carried in a catalyst or which is hard to withstand the damage of nuclear attack and moves the M-x in its canister between several different silos. Thus presenting the Soviets with the problem of having to target not one silo with its Minuteman missile at it but to target many many silos where the minute where the M-x missile might be as it is carried with its hardened capsule from location to location that strikes me as being another alternative way of basing M-x which would lead to a good deal of survivability and probably

more than the railroad train. When costs are taken into account. Oh. Yes you're right that's right. So it's hard to be sure. This is it. I believe that that argument is not correct. The proposal by some to put the small vessel or several small missiles in an Amex in a minute manned silo or in a larger silo in my judgment maintains the high attractiveness of having several warheads at one fixed land based site and therefore is a vulnerable basing

mode. And contributes to instability rather than stability. So I do not favor putting the small missile one or several in fixed land based silos except perhaps as a transition to another basing mode which would have the survivability that we've advocated namely a mobile. A form of BASIC. So while I would foresee that kind of basing as a transition unless it went to some more survivable mobile basing scheme I would not support it for the reasons mentioned. Moreover we've already understood that if you just want warheads that is the cheapest way to do that is to purchase Amex. But we know that that's not enough. There must be a survivable maze basing mode as well. I don't have any addict outs about it.

Well the there are. One of the obviously politically new aspects of the Scowcroft commission was the ability to work with some of the at that time junior members of the House of Representatives and reaching a political consensus. And it was a rather innovative matter to work with Congressman Aspen to work with Norm Dicks and Al Gore at putting together a substantial number of younger or more moderate Democrats behind a. But Arms Control and ICBM modernization program where prior to that time the matters on defense in the house were normally seen to be the province of an older.

Longer. Tenured more conservative element of the Democratic membership of the house. So all the working with Norm Dicks and with Les Aspin and Al Gore were a way of politically opening up the house in the area of defense and certainly was what made it possible for the Scowcroft commission to turn from a situation where there were 60 votes against any ICBM modernization program in the House of Representatives to one where there were 60 votes in favor of the consensus of the Scowcroft commission put forward. Yeah. Well I must say to briefly summarize how we did it in quotes would be. A difficult task but it was a very systematic program. The members of the commission. Were politically very sophisticated and each of us took responsibility for

Senators for Congressman for presidential candidates this is before the Nineteen Eighty-Four presidential election. Four members of the press for public and forced different interest groups in the public and we systematically went out and discussed with many many individuals and had lunches and breakfasts and dinners and private meetings with congressmen and the answer is yes we spoke with the congressmen and senators all the time and each one of us had a significant number who we had relationships with. I had had from my time in government worked with some people with spent time working with them it was very very highly organized and very very carefully done. It was. Due to the elegance and sophistication and wisdom of the chairman that we were able to get so much done and working with Congress. But it was really very highly organized. It wasn't haphazard. Do you think.

No I I think and here I probably differ from how Brad I differ baby from of several other members of the commission I believe that the commission's recommendations are more in the long term interest of stability and arms control and national security and strength than the race track proposal which as you may recall called for 200 M-x systems as being the initial deployment. I might point out however that neither has been implemented by the country so that. It is hard to compare. Do you like your failed solution. Better to than some other failed solution the fact is is that as we sit here and speak there is no agreed upon credible sensible ICBM modernization program for the station.

What I want. How are you basing the Amex and how are you basing this midget man. I would vote for the small missile. I'm not supposed to say you but if there's no chance of that happening I'd say or at least let me be careful since you're showing this in 89 I don't think there's any chance of that.