War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2]

View online at openvault.wgbh.org

Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES E05041-E05045 ROBERT MCNAMARA

[2]

Robert McNamara gaining defense expertise

Interviewer:

MR. MCNAMARA, WHAT WAS YOUR MANDATE FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHEN HE

ASKED YOU TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE?

McNamara:

It was a very simple one as far as force structure was concerned

is...was to examine the military forces which the US had at its

disposal taking account of those of its allies as well and determine

whether they are adequate in relation to our security requirements.

Interviewer:

DID YOU SAY YOU HAD AN ANECDOTE?

McNamara:

You may remember that during the campaign the issue of the missile gap

became very prominent. Although I didn't understand it until later,

there were two different intelligence estimates of the relative balance

between US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One prepared by the air

force and one prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. And at that

time there was no central director of intelligence within the

government as there was later in the '60s and as there is today. These

two different estimates, therefore, stood independently of each other.

One of them, the Air Force estimate, was leaked to the congress. It

became known publicly. It indicated that the Soviets had a substantial

advantage in strategic nuclear forces vis-a-vis the US. And this became

a major issue in the campaign. And therefore I felt responsible in

accordance with the President requirement that I examine the adequacy

of the US military forces to determine the size of that missile gap and

the way in which we should act to eliminate it. That was my first order

of business when I became secretary on January 20, 1961. And it took me

and my deputy, Ross Gilpatric about three or four weeks that yes, there

was a gap. But it was exactly the reverse of what had been understood.

The balance was substantially in favor of the United States. The total

strategic nuclear offensive force of the US at the time, as I recall,

was on the order of 6,000 warheads compared to the total Soviet

strategic nuclear force of on the order of 300. Now I want to emphasize

that this in each case included a small number of missiles. But even

with respect to missiles, I think it was clear the US had an advantage.

But in total, strategically, the US was much stronger in nuclear

offensive forces than was the Soviets. I made the terrible mistake of

meeting with a group of the members of the press at the urging of my

assistant secretary for public affairs about the time I came to this

conclusion, three or four weeks after I'd been sworn in as secretary.

He urged me to become acquainted with the press. I did so. I thought it

was clearly understood, the session was off the record. The first

question of course, was Mr. Secretary, you've been secretary three or

four weeks, surely you must have been looking at the missile gap. What

do you propose to do about it. And I said, Well gentlemen I have been.

It was clearly the first requirement. And I found there was a gap. And

there was a dead silence. I said, but it's in our favor. You couldn't

hold the door locked. They broke the damn door down. They went out and

the headline on the late afternoon edition of the Evening Star says:

McNamara declares no missile gap. And the next day, perhaps with tongue

in cheek, the Republicans asked that the election be rerun. They asked

the President to resign and that I resign. They claimed he had been

elected on false premises. Now I want to emphasize that the Air Force

put forward that intelligence estimate in good faith. They weren't

intentionally trying to mislead anybody. It was illustrative of how

little we knew about the Soviets at the time. The amount of information

we had on their force structure was very limited. And there was room

for difference of opinion. I thought then, and I believe today the Air

Force uh. . . misinterpreted the data. My view coincided with that of

the Central Intelligence Agency. And I think with hindsight it's very

clear that we had strategic nuclear superiority at the time.

Interviewer:

YOU DIDN'T KNOW A LOT ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS OR

THINGS WHEN YOU...

McNamara:

I did not.

Interviewer:

WHO DID YOU CHOOSE TO HIRE AND TO BRING INTO THE SECRETARY"S OFFICE TO

EDUCATE YOU?

McNamara:

I was very reluctant to accept President Kennedy's invitation to become

Secretary of Defense. And I did so only on the condition that I would

be allowed to bring into the department the ablest people I could find.

I clearly was not an expert on defense and I felt I needed the

brightest minds in the country to assist me to become an expert on

defense and I fully intended to be one. He promised me that I could

select whomever I chose without any regard to partisan politics. He

never once deviated from that promise. And the result was that I

recruited what I considered the ablest group of individuals that have

ever served in a single cabinet office in the history of our republic.

At one single time in the Defense Department we had Gilpatric, Vance --

later Secretary of State, Brown -- later Secretary of Defense, Califano

-- later Secretary of HEW, Charles Hitch -- the former president of the

University of California, Paul Nitze -- the current arms control

negotiator, Bill Bundy... A host of other extraordinarily bright

imaginative experience individuals. And they became my tutors. And I

hope I was a fast learner. In any event I made it my business to

quickly endeavor to understand the fundamentals of strategy in a

nuclear age.

Interviewer:

YOU TURNED TO A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO HAD OCCUPIED POSITIONS AT RAND. WHAT

DID THEY BRING TO YOU?

McNamara:

Well, there were a number of people from RAND, but I recruited them not

because they'd been at RAND, but rather because they were extremely

bright able people. Charles Hitch was the first I brought in from RAND.

He had been a tutor. As a matter of fact he had been a Rhodes scholar

and then a tutor at Oxford. He was a tutor of Harold Wilson who later

became Prime Minister of Britain. And I mention this only to indicate

the quality of his mind and the level of his experience in

international affairs. He then went to RAND and he became a security

expert at RAND. He was an extraordinarily able tutor of me.

Interviewer:

I NEED A WAY TO LEAD INTO OUR DISCUSSION WITH ENTHOVEN ON FORCE

STRUCTURE. HE DID PLAY A KEY ROLE ON SOME OF THESE DECISIONS...

McNamara:

In addition to Charlie Hitch we brought in from RAND Allen Enthoven and

Harry Rowen who I didn't know and who Charlie Hitch did and who he

recommended and whom he brought in to work with him. And the three of

them were extremely able. Very knowledgeable, very expert in nuclear

weapons and nuclear strategy and they quickly brought me up to speed.

Raising the Nuclear Threshold

Interviewer:

WHAT WERE THE GOALS OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS?

McNamara:

The following Kennedy's request that we examine the military forces of

the United States in relation to our foreign policy objectives and

taking account of our allies forces determine whether they were

adequate in relation to those foreign policy objectives. We...

translated the foreign policy objectives into military strategy,

translated the military strategy into force structure, and that into

defense department budgets. And with respect to the nuclear forces we

considered how those forces might be used and in relation to that

possible use, considered the size of force we needed and then compared

that with the size we had or the size that we were planning to have in

the years covering the procurement cycle. Let me go back a bit to

stress that nuclear weapons almost since the formation of NATO have

been a major element of the NATO military force structure. NATO was

formed as I recall, in 1949. Early in the 1950s the NATO powers sought

to determine the size of the forces they needed to defend against the

Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. At that time it was estimated that

the Soviet Union could field...put into combat a hundred and seventy

five divisions, combat divisions. Against those divisions, NATO

believed it would need 92 divisions. The reason for the lesser number

was that the NATO divisions were larger and stronger, had more fire

power etcetera. And the 92 division goal for NATO was accepted in 1952

at Lisbon and became known as the Lisbon Force Goals. However, very

quickly by 1954 it became clear that NATO was unwilling to finance the

recruitment and equipping of 92 divisions. And Secretary Dulles, the

then US Secretary of State proposed in 1954 that nuclear weapons in

effect be substituted for conventional forces. Because of budgetary

reasons. And he stated quite frankly that was the goal. Get a bigger

bang for the buck was the way it was phrased. And at that time, the

NATO force goal was reduced from 92 divisions to 30 divisions and in

effect the reduction of 62 divisions was justified by the proposal to

introduce and build up nuclear forces.

McNamara:

So from early in the '50s the nuclear forces became an essential

element of the NATO force structure and the NATO strategy. And the

strategy at that time, as it related to Europe was what was called

massive retaliation. It was thought that the conventional forces would

serve as a trip wire. That almost the smallest conceivable Soviet

incursion into NATO territory would trip that wire, trip the

conventional forces if you will and lead to an all out nuclear assault

upon the Soviet Union. So the first question we had to ask ourselves in

1961, was this a viable strategy and if so were the forces adequate.

And we very quickly came to the conclusion it wasn't a viable strategy.

I recall that there was a group named,I believe, the Joint Evaluation

Subcommittee which had been appointed by President Eisenhower and which

consisted of four star officers. And they did nothing but examine the

results of a nuclear exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,

presumably initiated by NATO. And there were....their conclusions were

so devastating that only, literally only one copy of their report was

prepared and it was almost impossible to gain access to it. The

president and later I as secretary of defense were allowed to have

access to it. But essentially no one else. And what the report the

showed was: there was no conceivable situation in which NATO could

initiate the use of nuclear weapons without the destruction of both the

Soviet Union, and Western Europe, and the United States. And that,

quite obviously, caused us to doubt the desirability of the strategy of

massive retaliation. And it wasn't long after it was early in 1962 that

we concluded that strategy should be changed. And President Kennedy

authorized me to put forward to the NATO ministers, foreign and defense

ministers of NATO meeting in Athens in I believe April 1962. I proposed

[a] new strategy known as flexible response. The purpose of which was

to insure that it would not be necessary to confront a small Soviet

conventional force aggression with the launch of NATO's nuclear forces,

but rather to respond to Soviet conventional force aggression with NATO

conventional forces. And utilize NATO's nuclear forces only as an

action of last resort in the event that the NATO conventional forces

were in danger of being overrun. What we were saying to NATO in Athens

in 1962 -- and it was very, contravene... controversial was that

massive retaliation was a bankrupt strategy. We should move away from

that. We should raise the threshold of nuclear retaliation. We should

depend primarily on conventional forces. This was extremely

controversial. Some exaggerated the danger of nuclear war. Others said

that the withdrawal of the threat of early use of nuclear weapons would

damage the deterrent and increase the likelihood the Soviets would

engage in war. And a third argument was that NATO couldn't afford the

increase in conventional forces that would be required. With respect to

the latter, I should say that it was true then, and it's true today,

that the United States and the western world has consistently

overestimated the strength of the Soviet conventional force and

consistently underestimated the strength of NATO's conventional forces

and therefore exaggerated the imbalance, the conventional force

imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO and that has contributed to the

support of what I'll call the nuclear option. The nuclear strategy.

McNamara:

The argument was so great in April of '62 over the proposed shift from

massive retaliation to flexible response that it wasn't until five

years later that the proposal was accepted. It was accepted in 1967

after five years of debate and argument. And moreover, it was accepted

in a substantially diluted form. When it was accepted the NATO nations

failed to agree to increase their conventional forces as had been

proposed even to the limited levels we thought necessary evaluating

properly the relative balance of Soviet and NATO conventional forces.

And as a result, the threshold of nuclear war was not raised as high as

we believed desirable. And to this day, it is far lower than I find

acceptable. There is an unacceptable risk of nuclear war today because

NATO has failed to carry out the strengthening of conventional forces

which we recommended in April of 1962. And the NATO commanders will say

today and have said publicly, that they would expect that in the early

hours of any military confrontation between east and west to request

authority to use nuclear weapons. I think that's a disgraceful state of

affairs.

US and Soviet first-strike capability

Interviewer:

LET'S GO BACK TO SOME OF THE STRATEGIC FORCE DECISIONS. YOU CAME IN ON

THE CUSP OF A NEW AGE. THE FORCE STRUCTURE WAS MAINLY BOMBERS. WHAT DID

YOU DO ABOUT THE BOMBERS? WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THE BOMBERS? WHAT'S

THE CASE FOR MISSILES OVER BOMBERS?

McNamara:

At the time the administration came in missiles were just being put

into production. The Eisenhower administration had initiated the design

and development and deployment of missiles, quite correctly I think.

And it was obvious to us that regardless of what role the bombers would

play -- and we thought they would continue to play an important role as

they are today. But at that time it was clear that while we needed the

bombers and we needed to modernize the bomber force needed to protect

it and needed to reduce its vulnerability, nonetheless we should place

primary reliance on missiles. And therefore we put great emphasis on

the Minuteman missile and the Polaris missile.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE UTILITY OF THE MISSILE?

McNamara:

We were placing such emphasis on the missile because two reasons:

number one, they were fast. They responded quickly. They would reduce

the ability of the adversary to respond with certain of their weapons

if our weapons were targeted on theirs. And secondly, there was no

known defense against them. The bombers while we believed they could

penetrate defenses, those defenses were becoming stronger at all times

and they carried the risk that increasing number of bombers would

become vulnerable to those defenses. So for both reasons we put great

emphasis on the missiles, while, as I suggest, strengthening the bomber

force.

Interviewer:

DIDN'T YOU INHERIT A FORCE STRUCTURE DESIGN FOR A FIRST-STRIKE?

McNamara:

The issue of whether we did or didn't have first-stike capability and

if we didn't whether we should or shouldn't have a first-strike

capability was a very important issue, indeed, in the 1960s. It is

today, one of the fundamental problems standing in the way of arms

control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. To this day,

the Soviets believe that we have over a period of years starting if not

in the '50 certainly in the early '60s had a first-strike strategy. And

we today, and for a number of years have believed that the Soviets have

or are seeking to achieve a first-strike capability. I know the Soviet

belief is wrong. We did not have, we do not have, we never intended to

have a first-strike capability. I don't believe the Soviets have or are

seeking to achieve a first-strike capability. However, each side

believes it, and even though the beliefs are irrational and in my

opinion incorrect, they must be treated as reality. And this has a

tremendous impact on strategy and particularly on arms control

agreement. But to go back to the early '60s -- At that time we had on

the order of 6,000 strategic warheads. The Soviets had on the order of

300. There were many in the US, some in the military and some not in

the military, but many in the US administration who believed that with

our 6,000 if we targeted them on the Soviet military forces,

particularly their nuclear forces, we could achieve a first-strike. By

definition, a first-strike is not only first use in the sense that you

initiate the use of the weapons before the opponent has initiated the

use of nuclear weapons. But the difference between first use and

first-strike is that, by definition, a first-strike is first use that

is so overwhelming it... destroys such a high percentage of your

opponents retaliatory nuclear force that he cannot inflict unacceptable

damage on you. Now...

[END OF TAPE E05041]

Single Integrated Operation Plan

McNamara:

...Now under that definition, we did not then, do not today, and never

had a first-strike capability.

Interviewer:

DID YOU FEEL THAT THE SAC OR THE AIR FORCE AT THE TIME YOU CAME INTO

THE PENTAGON HAD A FIRST STRIKE PLAN?

McNamara:

The Strategic Air Command was perhaps the most highly disciplined

element of the military force. General LeMay did a fantastic job in

shaping that command to a standard of perfection that was unequaled

elsewhere in the military and that included a very high standard of

discipline which means that the strategic air command operations were

managed to conform to the directions it received from the highest

political authority, the President. However, given the then balance of

force - say at 20-to-1 numerical advantage for the US -- there were

certainly some in the Strategic Air Command that thought we

should...they should develop what might be called a first-strike plan,

which would be a plan targeted...uh... targeting our whole force

against the Soviet retaliatory force and designed to inflict such

damage on it that the force that survived would not have sufficient

power to inflict unacceptable damage on us. And there was such a plan.

But, it didn't meet the requirement. The President's requirement or my

requirement as to... or call it acceptable damage. Even a small number

of surviving Soviet nuclear weapons if delivered on targets in this

country, particularly uh..cities would cause such numbers of fatalities

as to be totally unacceptable to any responsible political leader. And

surely that particular SIOP plan was unacceptable to the President as

it was to me.

Interviewer:

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE SIOP. DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR FIRST BRIEFING IN OMAHA

IN FEBRUARY 1961, WHEN YOU FIRST LEARNED WHAT THE WAR PLAN WAS?

McNamara:

In 1961, after having concluded that there was no missile gap or if

there was a gap, it was a gap in our favor i visited the headquarters

of the strategic air command at Omaha with some of my associates, met

with the commander of the air command at the time and went through the

SIOP alternatives. I wanted to understand the targeting. The numbers of

weapons that would be brought on the targets. The operational plans.

The degree of control that the political authorities could exercise

over those plans. And I can recall to this day my shock and amazement

because basically they were all out plans. Designed to unleash our

total force against particular targets. And that would carry with it,

so it seemed to me, the results that the joint evaluation subcommittee

-- this committee of four 4-star officers had pointed to. That is to

say the destruction both of the Warsaw Pact of nations, particularly

the Soviet Union, but also the destruction of the...of the United

States. And hence, the plan, from my point of view was totally

unsatisfactory. Moreover it carried with it an extraordinary amount of

peripheral damage. Damage to countries on the periphery of the Soviet

Union across which our bombers would have to fly. Endangering the

bomber because of the air defenses in those countries which led our

targeters to plan to take out those air defenses either by missiles or

by bombers in advance of the time that our bombers would pass over. And

that caused immense damage to the surrounding nations. So I found the

plans quite unsatisfactory. And it led me to conclude that it was going

to be necessary to introduce flexibility into the plans -- what I'll

call flexible re-targeting. So that very quickly, following a

Presidential decision to launch a part of the or all of the strategic

air command, targets could be changed in accordance with whatever

wishes the President proposed to follow and apply at the time.

Interviewer:

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE ENTIRE SIOP WOULD GO OFF AND NOT ONLY THE

SOVIET UNION, BUT CHINA AND EUROPE...

McNamara:

Well I don't...I don't recall this. And if I did I wouldn't wish to

mention the specific countries that would have been involved in a SIOP

attack. Even in an attack that was planned as far back as 1962, '61.

Interviewer:

WE...

McNamara:

By the way, I don't think that China was included, I don't recall that

at all. But certainly, as you might expect, it was one might think

reasonable when you're sending in an attacking force to attack targets

in the Soviet Union, if it had to pass over anti-aircraft sites on the

way in it would only be thought to be reasonable to take out those

anti-aircraft sites and they might or might not be within the Soviet

Union.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU HORRIFIED?

McNamara:

Well, I was horrified because it seemed so senseless to me. There was

no way that I could conceive of our nation coming out a winner from

such an exchange. There was no way in which I could conceive of our

nation benefiting from such an exchange. And it led me to conclude then

there could be no way to either limit or win a nuclear war.

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU FIRST UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE WAR PLAN WAS, WEREN'T YOU CONVINCED

THAT THIS WAS SIMPLY TOO MASSIVE A RESPONSE WITHOUT -- I MEAN TOMMY

POWER DIDN'T CONVINCE YOU WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO BACK TO US?

McNamara:

No, he didn't, but the joint evaluation subcommittee did.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU PRIVY TO THAT AT THAT TIME?

McNamara:

I think so. I think I became privy to that before I went to SAC -- I

don't recall exactly. But one didn't have to be a -- didn't have to

read the joint evaluation subcommittee report to know that the Soviets

would launch all out. There's no question about that. So you could make

your own judgement. It was a, you know, they went through

extraordinarily onerous approach to obtaining the results. You could do

it in two hours on the back of an envelope. It would be just about as

accurate.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU WERE HORRIFIED?

McNamara:

Absolutely.

Interviewer:

I WANT YOU TO SAY THAT.

McNamara:

Well I was shocked at the approach that was being taken. Or let me

phrase it differently, I was shocked at the result that would accrue

from initiating any one of the SIOP plans each one of which was certain

to lead to Soviet retaliation with all the power at their disposal.

Now, the power at their disposal, after we had struck them, would be

less, substantially less of course, than the power before we struck

them. But the power that they very possibly would have after we had

struck them was more than any responsible US leader would voluntarily

accept directed against his country. It was more than any US leader

would draw upon himself by a decision to launch against the Soviets.

And it convinced me then that there was no set of circumstances in

which we could benefit by initiating an attack on the Soviet Union. A

nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

Discussion of commencement address given by Robert McNamara in 1962

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS IN YOUR COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS AT

ANN ARBOR IN 1962?

McNamara:

Well, there were in a sense, three messages. The first and the main

purpose of the speech was to say, as I had said, I think, a month

previously in Ann Ar...in Athens that the US had proposed to NATO a

massive shift in nuclear strategy away from massive retaliation to

flexible response. And that we believed that this would greatly reduce

the risk of nuclear war. It raised the threshold of the initiation of

the use of nuclear weapons very substantially. It thereby reduced the

risk that those weapons would be used and reduced the risk that the two

sides would be destroyed as a result of a nuclear exchange. B, it was

to say to the Soviets that it wasn't phrased exactly this way - it was

to say that given the tremendous force imbalance, the tremendous force

superiority that the US has today of superiority in the ratio of

20-to-1. 6,000 US warheads to 300 strategic offensive nuclear Soviet

warheads. We believe it's very much in the interest of both powers were

we ever to find our way in a...into a nuclear war that we seek to limit

that nuclear war. And that certainly it would be our hope and intention

to try to limit it by holding the numbers of warheads launched to far

below the total we had available and launching then solely at military

targets and we would hope that the initial exchange could be limited to

a relatively small number of warheads focused on military targets. And

that after that, in some fashion, the war can be terminated. And

thirdly it was to say to the Soviets that we thought independent

nuclear forces, such as those possessed by France, could be dangerous.

And while we didn't put it quite this way, in the speech there was a

strong indication that we would not permit the US nuclear forces to be

triggered by an independent decision made by France which was

withholding its nuclear force from NATO at the time. An independent

decision by France to launch part or all of its force against the

Soviet Union.

Interviewer:

THIS IS A DIRECT MESSAGE TO DE GAULLE ISN'T IT?

McNamara:

Well, it was more a statement perhaps, than a message. And it was a

statement for which I was severely criticized at the time. And as a

matter of fact, it's a statement that the French haven't forgotten to

this day.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU COULDN'T HOPE TO LIMIT DAMAGE IN A WAR IF THERE ARE ROWDY

PEOPLE WITH THEIR FINGERS ON THE BUTTON.

McNamara:

There was then and I think, to this day, there is danger that if allies

take independent decisions with respect to initiating the use of

nuclear weapons, there will be unintended responses. And any decision

to use nuclear weapons in defense and alliance, whether they by French

nuclear weapons, or British nuclear weapons, or US nuclear weapons

should represent a decision by the alliance.

Interviewer:

SOME PEOPLE HAVE INTERPRETED THIS SPEECH AS AN INDICATION THAT A WAR

COULD BE FOUGHT IN A TIDY LITTLE WAY BY AVOIDING CITIES.

McNamara:

Absolutely...absolutely not. With hindsight I'm not even certain that

the speech was appropriate for the time. I'm inclined to think on

balance it was. But if it was appropriate for the time, it was a very

narrow window in the nuclear age -- a very small window in the nuclear

age and a very peculiar period in the nuclear age. It was the period

when we had this 20-to-1 nuclear superiority and it was a period when

we wanted to make clear that it would be in their interest and ours to

avoid an all out nuclear exchange by either side. And that was in

effect the theme of... one of the three themes of the Ann Arbor speech.

Interviewer:

SO WAS IT DAMAGE LIMITING?

McNamara:

It was damage limiting, in that sense. It was -I don't like to use the

term damage limiting because it has other connotations. But it was an

attempt to ensure that a nuclear war once started would be limited. And

as I suggest, I'm not even certain with hindsight that was possible at

that time I know it is impossible today -- not with the huge numbers of

forces and the wide deployment of forces and the detailed war plans for

their use that exist today. It's absolutely impossible. I don't know

anybody who thinks that a nuclear war once started today can be

limited. But that was our hope then.

Interviewer:

BUT A FEW MONTHS AFTER ANN ARBOR YOU TOLD STEWART ALSOP THAT YOU

THOUGHT THAT A COUNTERFORCE MOVE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY IF THE SOVIETS --

WHEN THEY DEVELOPED A SECURE RETALIATORY CAPABILITY...

McNamara:

Well...

Interviewer:

IT WAS SORT OF A LONG RANGE STRATEGY...IT WASN'T CENTERED ON THE

IMBALANCE...

McNamara:

Stewart Alsop came in to see me one day and said, "Bob, I have word

that the CIA had information that the Soviets are beginning to harden

their missile sites. Isn't that a heck of a mess?" And I said, "Stew, I

never comment on CIA reports, but I'll tell you this: If the Soviets

are beginning to harden their missile sites, thank God." He thought

that was absurd. He went ahead and printed my statement. And I remember

Senator Dirksen and perhaps with his tongue in his cheek demanding my

resignation. He said, My god, we have a Secretary of Defense that's

pleased when the Soviets become stronger. Get him out of there. Of

course that isn't what I meant at all. What I meant was -- that what I

believed then and believe today is that we must seek to increase what I

call crisis stability. And let me take a second to tell what I mean by

crisis stability. There's a great danger that in a period of crisis,

one side or the other may fear that the other's about to initiate a

nuclear attack. And the person who is likely to be the recipient of

that attack may feel that in the face of a high probability the attack

will be directed against them, they would be better off to launch

what's known as a preemptive attack. Seeking to blunt the attack that

they expect will be initiated. Now that was exactly the situation that

we the US faced in the early 1960s because we had this numerical

superiority of 20-to-1. The Soviet missiles that were part of their

strategic offensive nuclear force were what were called soft. They were

unprotected. They were highly vulnerable to both our missiles and our

bombers. And if you had been a Soviet political or military leader

sitting there, facing 20 US strategic offensive warheads for every one

of yours inferring that those 20 would be directed to your one and you

knew your one could be destroyed by one, or two, or three of those 20

you'd be scared to death. And you would think, Well it would be a

horrible thing to have a nuclear exchange, but I will be much better

off if I launch my 300 before their 6,000 are launched against me. And

that's what I call crisis instability. A stimulant to preemption. And

what I was trying to convey to Stewart Alsop was that if the Soviet 300

warheads were less vulnerable to our attack there was less likelihood

that in a crisis they would fear our attack and less likelihood they

would preempt. And more likelihood that together we could avoid a

nuclear war. And I believe that was exactly the correct judgement then.

And I believe it's the correct judgement today.

Interviewer:

YOU ALSO SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE THE SECURITY OF A STABLE

RETALIATORY FORCE, THEN A COUNTERFORCE WAR WOULD BE MORE LIKELY BECAUSE

THEY WOULDN'T HAVE TO GO FOR CITIES.

McNamara:

Well, if they felt that they had weapons that were going to survive,

there was less likelihood they'd direct them initially against cities.

They might be willing particularly if we were -- as we were suggesting

at Ann Arbor - using only a small portion of our force against their

military targets, there was greater likelihood they would direct their

surviving force against our military targets. Particularly if they

could hold in reserve some survivable force which they later could

direct against our cities if this limited exchange didn't prove

limited.

[END OF TAPE E05042]

First-strike capability and responding to a theoretical Soviet first-strike

Interviewer:

WAS YOUR--THE EXTENT YOU HAD TO THINK ABOUT THESE THINGS, DID YOU EVER

THINK THAT THE-CAN YOU IMAGINE ANY SITUATION WHERE THE US MIGHT WANT A

PREEMPTIVE STRIKE OR A FIRST-STRIKE, OR WAS IT YOUR IDEA TO BE--TO

ABSORB A FIRST-STRIKE AND BE DELIBERATE?

McNamara:

In 1962, as I recall I a bomber, I think it was a B-47 bomber on a

training mission carrying a nuclear bomb...

Interviewer:

LET'S START OVER. WOULD YOU MIND PUTTING YOUR PEN IN YOUR POCKET.

McNamara:

In 1962 there was a--a bomber I believe, a B-47 bomber which was

carrying a--a nuclear bomb that crashed in I think South Carolina. And

in examining the what happened it became clear obviously that the bomb

didn't detonate. However the safeguards against detonation were several

but a number of them had been in a sense by-passed by the effects of

the accident and it led me to focus on what would have happened had for

example the chief of staff of the air force, called me, or the

President and said, "Request authority to--to launch the SIOP." And I

then went to the President and said, "Mr. President someday General X

may call you and say 'Mr. President we're under attack, the Soviets

have launched a nuclear attack against us city X has been destroyed, we

request your authority to launch SIOP.'" And the President said, "Well

Bob, what do you think I ought to say?", and I say "Well, Mr. President

I suggest you say to him, 'General, thank you for calling me collect

the other chiefs, ask Bob McNamara to join you and come over and meet

me in my office.' And the general's likely to say, 'Mr. President

you're crazy before I get there you'll be destroyed.' And you say,

'Well General don't worry about that we've got our airborne command

post, we have means of insuring that in the event that the President is

destroyed, or the White House is destroyed, we may nonetheless

retaliate, use our forces to retaliate against the Soviet Union, they

know that's one of the strengths of our deterrence. But as I told you

get the hell over here and get here fast, and we'll sit down and talk

about this." But, I say, "Mr. President, before hang up, tell him

that--what you're going to do when he gets here." "Well what is that,"

the President said, and I said, "well you say to General X, 'Now

General when you get here, let me tell me what we're going to do. We're

then going to drive out to Andrews air force base and we're going to

get into an airplane and we're going to go down there and look at the

results of this Soviet attack. And he'll say "Mr. President you're

insane, you're absolutely insane, we're under attack, we got to get

going, the damn place will be blown up before you even launch." And you

say, 'Well that may be General but I want to be absolutely certain I

know what happened. I want to know that a Soviet senior leader

consciously attacked the United States. I want to know this is not an

isolated attack, I want to know what's going to happen next, I want to

know whether more missiles are going--or bombs are going to detonate, I

want to know what they're trying to do. I am not going to start a

nuclear war which I know will destroy this nation if what has happened

to date is an accident so you get over here and let's start talking

about it.'" Now, the point I was trying to make then, and I think is

very relevant today, is there should never be the launch of a nuclear

weapon unless you know what you're hoping to achieve by doing so. I

think we can agree that there's no way to limit a nuclear war. Once you

start a nuclear war, your society is going to be destroyed. That isn't

to say one shouldn't launch in the face of an attack, but it is to say,

you better never launch other than in the face of attack and you'd

better be certain that you know the size of that attack and how it

started and what the intent of it was.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE AIR FORCE, OR SACS REACTION TO THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH--TO

THE--COUNTER FORCE WAS A TERM THAT WE--WAS IN--USED BRIEFLY THEN

AND--AND WHAT WAS THEIR REACTION, DID THAT MEAN THEY WANTED MORE

WEAPONS TO COUNTER...

McNamara:

Well, the--the air force at various times has--has thought it would be

possible to develop a first-strike capability. The Ann Arbor speech was

I--as I remember in May of 1962, in November of 162, I wrote a

memorandum to the President and the only reason I recall this is, it

was a very highly classified memorandum and perhaps a year ago, a man

came into talk to me and ask me about the events of 1961 and '62 which

I couldn't recall, and he said, well perhaps this will stimulate your

memory and he showed me, my memorandum to the President this highly

classified document. I said "I can't imagine where you got that." He

said, "Well I got it out of the Freedom for Information Act." Now in

that memorandum and the reason it was so highly classified among other

things was the statement that I made to the President regarding the air

force's request for a strategic offensive nuclear force. The--the

document subject was a military budget to be put to the Congress in

uh--in January 1963, I guess it would have been for fiscal year 1964.

And in that document I was making certain recommendations regarding

Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines and B-52 bombers. And I said,

"Mr. President I'm going to recommend the following to you but you

should understand the air force differs with these recommendations and

the air force said to me recently in a memorandum the following..." and

then I quoted from the air force memorandum. And in the Air Force

memorandum to me it said: We believe we should procure X number of

missiles as part of a first-strike force. And I said, "Mr. President, I

don't believe we could achieve a first-strike force procuring the

number of missiles recommended by the Air Force or any other number of

missiles. Moreover, if we could achieve a first-strike force, I don't

believe we should, so I recommend against that." Now I mention this

because there was a difference of view among military leaders and among

civilian leaders at the time. Some believe that we have or should have

or could have a first-strike capability. Others, including me, did not.

Interviewer:

HOW MANY MISSILES DID THE AIR FORCE WANT?

McNamara:

I've forgotten what they were recommending in November 1962. But I do

remember an episode that indicates the number that they were thinking

about at that particular time. It was perhaps in May of 1962, the

University of California at Berkeley was awarding President Kennedy an

honorary agree. Because I had graduated from there, they asked me to

join him and receive a degree as well. We flew out together. As we were

leaving he said, Let's go down to Vandenberg, which is an Air Force

base in California and observe a missile launch. We did. The commanding

general of SAC met us on the air strip. We got into his car -- I can

still remember the vehicle. It was a large open convertible car. He was

sitting in the middle of the back seat. And the President was on one

side or the other and I was on the other and the general said to the

President, "Now Mr. President when we get the 10,000 Minutemen

we'll"...And at that point President Kennedy said, "General what did

you say?" "Well," he said, "you didn't let me say it. I was just

getting started. I said, when we get the 10,000 Minutemen we will. The

President said, "I thought that's what you said." But Bobby said,

"We're not ordering 10,000 minutemen are we?" And I said, "No Mr.

President, we're ordering 1,000. Now I mention this because that

particular officer had recommended that we procure 10,000. The Air

Force chief had cut that back from 10,000 to 3,000. And he was

recommending 3,000. And I had recommended 1,000 to the President. And

that was the number we procured. And by God, that's the number we have

today.

Interviewer:

THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE WHITE HOUSE WHO FELT WE COULD GET AWAY WITH

FEWER?

McNamara:

Yes, that's right. I think Carl Kaysen, if I remember, who was working

as part of the national security council staff at the time, believed we

could get by with -- I don't recall -- 400 say. And he may well have

been right. I'm not arguing that I was right and he was wrong. But I

think the difference in approach was that we were dealing with

uncertainties. We were procuring missiles, proposing the procurement of

missiles in November 1962. Not for November '62 or 1963. We were

proposing that we buy missiles that would be produced and deployed at

some date in the future which would take roughly 5 to 7 years to

translate our order into design and production and deployment. And we

had to anticipate the size of the Soviet force that would exist at the

time those missiles were deployed 5 to 7 years in the future. It was

difficult enough to know the size of the Soviet force that existed in

November of '62 at the time we were planning the order. It was next to

impossible to know the size of the force, with any accuracy, that would

exist at the time our missiles were em... deployed. And therefore, what

we did was estimate the Soviet capability to produce missiles during

that 5 or 7 year period. And that of course was a very difficult figure

to estimate. It led to quite a range of potential error. And within

that range of error there was, I'll say, the most probable position.

And then there was -- I'll call it the worst case. Well not really the

worst case, but the most probable worst case. And as Secretary of

Defense I had to take account of the possibility the Soviets would not

choose the most probable force level, but the most probable worst case.

So I built my proposed procurement of 1,000 missiles on that most

probable worst case. I suspect Carl Kaysen built his recommendation on

the most probable case, which is understandable but not the basis on

which the Secretary of Defense should be making recommendations.

Assured destruction and flexible response

Interviewer:

AT SOME POINT WE STOPPED TALKING ABOUT COUNTERFORCE AND BEGAN TALKING

ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WHAT DID THAT MEAN?

McNamara:

Assured destruction is the foundation of our deterrent. The rationale

goes this way: No rational political leader would initiate the use of

nuclear weapons if the other side had nuclear weapons. But --Cut that

out. Let me start again. Assured destruction means this: That in this

nuclear age we don't believe -- at least I don't believe -- that the

Soviets wish large scale war with the west. But confrontations have

arisen. Three arose during my seven years: the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban

Missile Crisis, the Middle East Crisis. They'll undoubtedly arise in

the future. It is absolutely essential that in a period of

confrontation, tense relationships between east and west that the

Soviets understand that were they to initiate the use of nuclear

weapons, that would lead to their destruction. That's what assured

destruction means. It's our ability to destroy the Soviet Union and our

complete confidence that they understand that we have that ability to

destroy them that gives us the deterrent. They are deterred by their

recognition that no matter what they do or how they do it, with the

nuclear force they have if launched against us, our forces will survive

with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on them. I'll call

it to assure their destruction. That's the way the words apply...

Interviewer:

NOW IS THIS A CAPABILITY OR.... YOU SAID THAT IF THEY WERE TO TAKE

ACTION AGAINST US THAT WE WOULD..IS THIS A STRATEGY OR A CAPABILITY?

McNamara:

...Deterrence is both a capability and a state of mind. And it's

essential that both elements be present. If we have the capability to

absorb a Soviet offensive nuclear strike against us and survive with

sufficient power to destroy them, but they don't believe it -- That is

not a deterrent. They must believe that we have the capability to

destroy them and that we will use it to destroy them in the event they

strike us. So it is both -- Deterrence is both a capability and a

belief and I have every confidence that today (a), we have the

capability; and (b), the Soviets know we do and believe we will use it

and therefore they are deterred and will continue to be deterred.

Interviewer:

BUT WHEN YOU BEGAN TALKING ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION WAS THIS

ACCOMPANIED BY ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM OMAHA, ANY CHANGES IN THE

SIOP? DID THE WAR PLANS CHANGE?

McNamara:

No...no...What changed was the introduction of greater flexibility in

the targeting. We found for example that Polaris missiles could not be

re-targeted easily and quickly. And we changed the design...changed the

design of the missile and the electronic gear in relation to it so that

it could be re-targeted quickly. And we did...we made similar changes

in the Minuteman missiles and to some degree in the bomber operational

plans to insure that in the event of a situation where the President

would wish to launch, that he could very quickly change the targeting.

He could withhold forces for example. He could say "Don't target any

cities." Or "Don't target anything other than forces ABC" or "don't

launch more than one tenth of your force and target it as follows." And

the... both the war plans and the and the hardware were adjusted so as

to permit that greater flexibility in targeting.

Interviewer:

BUT NOTHING CHANGED BETWEEN THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH AND THE TIME YOU

STARTED TALKING ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

McNamara:

What changed was an increasing understanding that the NATO strategy, if

you will, was bankrupt. That massive retaliation was not a strategy

which a US President would wish to follow.

Interviewer:

NOW WAIT A MINUTE. WE'VE ALREADY GOTTEN RID OF MASSIVE RETALIATION.

McNamara:

No...no. Massive retaliation in effect as NATO strategy wasn't

superseded until 1967 when flexible response was finally accepted. But

throughout that period, our understanding was evolving I'll give you an

illustration. In...at some point, I've forgotten exactly when I believe

in 1962 with President Kennedy and later perhaps in '64 with President

Johnson -I had long discussions with each President and said in effect

that I didn't believe there was any circumstance without any

qualification what so ever, in which we should ever initiate the use of

nuclear weapons. Now that was contrary to the NATO strategy which we

had proposed for flexible response, not yet accepted by NATO. But even

in the strategy we proposed, there were certain circumstances -- those

that I call circumstances of last resort -- in which the use of...the

initiation of the use of nuclear weapons was called for. But I was

saying to the Presidents that even in those circumstances, I cannot

conceive of a situation in which it would be in the interest of NATO

for you to authorize initiating the use of nuclear weapons. And without

qualification, I recommend against this. Now, I mention this because

it's an illustration of the evolution of our thinking during those

days. And those views were quite heretical and to a considerable

degree, are today.

Interviewer:

I JUST WANT TO GO BACK TO THE ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WHETHER THIS IS A

PROCUREMENT CRITERION OR A STRATEGY.

McNamara:

Oh, no.. .no. It was both a procurement criterion and a strategy. It

was a basic philosophic foundation of our military force structure and

our military strategy.

Interviewer:

BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS THAT WE WOULD LAUNCH THE

ENTIRE SIOP A LA MASSIVE RETALIATION. THERE COULD BE NO MEASURED

RESPONSE?

McNamara:

Well, it doesn't mean we wouldn't have a measured response. But we did

not believe as the forces grew large that a measured response would

lead to any significant reduction in destruction of our society.

Because when you're...when you have forces as we did in the latter part

of the '60s of something on the order of then we had on the order of

4,800 warheads -- something like that. A lesser number of warheads than

we had at the beginning of the decade. The strategic offensive nuclear

warheads, but a much higher number of those warheads launched by

missiles. And therefore a much higher probability that even a

relatively small number of them, say 300, delivered on almost any set

of target in the Soviet Union, would destroy the Soviet Union and

similarly a small percentage of the Soviet force which was much smaller

than ours at the end of the '60 but must have been on the order of --

oh, I've forgotten--say 1,500, 1,800--a relatively small percentage of

that, say 20 percent of that, launched against this country would

uh..,for all practical purposes, destroy our nation. So, at that point,

limiting the size of the launch was relatively unimportant. What was

important was never initiating the launch. That's the way to avoid

nuclear war. Don't ever start it.

Superior nuclear military power and deterrence

Interviewer:

HOW DID YOU DETERMINE HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH IN TERMS OF HOW BIG A FORCE

STRUCTURE TO BUILD? I MEAN WHAT CONSTITUTED UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE...

McNamara:

In principle it was very simple. We considered, we must have a force

large enough to absorb their attack. Assuming it was a well planned,

well executed attack with missile with the accuracy that we ascribe to

them, and bombers with the penetration capability we ascribe to them.

We determine the number of our weapons that would be destroyed and then

we determine the size of force that we would require to inflict

unacceptable damage on them and we added those two together and that

was the size force we needed to start with. A force large enough to

absorb their attack, survive with sufficient power to inflict

unacceptable damage on them. Now, what's unacceptable damage to--to the

Soviets? Well, frankly I am certain it was far less than the damage

that we defined as unacceptable. In order to insure that our deterrent

was sufficiently large to lead them to believe that we would survive

with a force sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage to them. We in

effect exaggerated their ability to absorb damage and I don't recall

the exact figures, I think I defined unacceptable damage as destruction

of something on the order of 50 percent of their industrial capability

and something on the order of a 100 or a 125 million of their citizens.

I [have] forgotten the exact figures. But I know, I believe then and

I'm certain now that the I'll call it acceptable damage limits to the

Soviets were far below what we defined as unacceptable which simply

meant we bought and maintained a much larger force than we needed for

deterrence. And we did this to be absolutely certain that (a), they

knew we were capable of inflicting this damage on them; and (b), that

we had the will to do it; and (c), that they accepted that as

unacceptable and therefore as a deterrent.

Interviewer:

MAC BUNDY TELLS A STORY ABOUT HOW WHEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS GOING TO

DALLAS ON NOVEMBER 22. YOU KNOW HE HAD BEEN THERE ON A CAMPAIGN AND

SAID, YOU KNOW "WE'RE GOING TO BE #1... BUT #1 PERIOD." AND HE WAS

GOING BACK TO TELL THEM WE WERE #1. WERE YOU AWARE OF THE SPEECH THAT

HE WAS...

McNamara:

I uh--I must have been. I don't recall it today.

Interviewer:

IN NOVEMBER OF 1963, DID YOU HAVE ANY ASSURANCE THAT WE WERE #1?

McNamara:

One of my constant problems was with the Congress which contrary to

conditions today was pushing us then to buy more. Today the Congress is

pushing the Defense Department to buy less. And there was a constant

pressure from the Congress to buy more particularly in the area of

strategic offensive nuclear weapons. And it was necessary for us to

continue to repeat that we had more than we needed or we were superior,

we used various way--various forms of expression. But I think the

words, while technically correct, we certainly were superior in--in

November '63, we must have had whatever, say 500 strategic offensive

nuclear warheads and they probably didn't have more than maybe 600 by

that time. So we had a ratio of 8 or 9 to one, which was surely

superior in numerical terms but it was not superior in strategic terms,

it was not superior in usable military power. Because neither one of us

could initiate the use of that strategic power with benefit to

ourselves. So part of what the President might have been planning to

say in Dallas and part of what I had said at the time to the Congress,

while technically correct was perhaps connoting something we didn't

have, usable power. We did not have usable nuclear military power. We

had nuclear power to sufficient to fulfill its purpose which was to

deter the Soviets from nuclear attack, but we did not have nuclear

power that we could use, despite our superiority of 8 or 9 to one, that

we could use to achieve political purposes and superiority therefore,

in that sense was an--in-- incorrect statement.

Interviewer:

YOU SAID 500, THEY HAD 600, YOU MEANT 5,000. WELL WE'VE COVERED THE

SAME POINT SEVERAL TIMES, I THINK WE'RE OKAY...BUT THAT WASN'T THE

MEGA-TONNAGE GOING DOWN...

McNamara:

...When I'm

Interviewer:

WARHEADS...

McNamara:

...Discussing superiority I'm talking about superiority in terms of

numbers of warheads. It's--it's very difficult to use any single

measure to define adequacy or superiority and offensive nuclear forces.

But the most important measures are numbers and accuracy. Frequently

mega-tonnage is used. Mega-tonnage is a much less important measure

because the destructive power is far more a function of improvements in

accuracy than it is in increases in mega-tonnage. Moreover the Soviets

many years ago because they were not as technically advanced as we were

particularly in the miniaturization of navigation devices and

electronic gear chose to build very large launchers which permitted

them to de--put into flight very heavy warheads with high mega-tonnage.

So the Soviets, traditionally have had per warhead much larger

mega-tonnage than we have had and at times not only have they had

larger mega-tonnage per warhead but they've have larger mega-tonnage in

total. But that did not give them larger destructive power.

Interviewer:

WHAT AT ONE POINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY, THE POSTURE STATEMENTS

TALK ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE LIMITATIONS... WHAT WAS THE--WHAT

DID YOU MEAN BY DAMAGE LIMITATIONS?

McNamara:

Damage limitation could come about either by destroying some of their

offensive nuclear forces before they were launched or by strengthening

our defenses, the anti-air craft defenses, or by introducing civil

defense. And at various times we--we sought to limit damage by each of

those measures. I would say very ineffectively.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE A--DID YOU RECALL EVER ASKING COMMISSIONING A--FROM HAROLD

BROWN OR ANYONE ELSE A COMPREHENSIVE DAMAGE LIMITATION STUDY THAT WOULD

GIVE AN INDICATION OF HOW MUCH WE CAN PROTECT THE POPULATION?

McNamara:

Over the years, we periodically examined ways to--to reduce fatalities

to the US in the event of a nuclear exchange. At one point in the early

1960s when we had that tremendous numerical advantage of some 6,000 to

300 we considered civil defense as a damage limiting factor. This came

as a result of a study of how we might limit damage to the US in the

event of a--a nuclear exchange. At other times we made damage limiting

studies associated with increasing the strength of our air defense. By

the way I should say, that-- that after 2 or 3 years of pursuing a

civil defense program we quite rightly judged we'd made an error or at

least the circumstances had~ changed and we withdrew support of the

program. Similarly after many years of supporting a strong air defense

program we concluded that given the substantial increase in the

percentage of the Soviet offensive nuclear force represented by

missiles that air defenses were not likely to be significant and

therefore in contrast to the Soviets which to this day are spending

tens of billions of dollars a year on air defense we substantially

cut--cut back on air defense in the mid to late '60s. I think it was

very wise. All of this was part of a continuing series of damage

limitation studies. Those studies included examination of the possible

use and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses and we concluded

those as well, would not significantly reduce the damage to this

country from a Soviet missile attack. And we were therefore very much

opposed to putting in place an anti-ballistic missile defense directed

to defend the country against Soviet missiles.

Interviewer:

THE AIR FORCE GENERAL GLENN KENT FOR ONE DID A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY THAT

CONCLUDED THAT THE--IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SAVE--ASSURE 70 PERCENT

POPULATION SURVIVAL WITH ALL THESE MEASURES. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR

REACTION TO THAT WAS?

McNamara:

Well, studies that showed 70 percent survival showed by definition 30

percent loss. And 30 percent loss of say 200 million people in this

country is 60 million. It was inconceivable to me that any President

would initiate action which was likely to lead to the loss of 60

million people. And I couldn't conceive of us therefore, benefiting

from-from expending funds to insure that the loss was quote only

unquote 60 million and we didn't.

Interviewer:

THESE STUDIES WERE ALSO POSTULATED ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS

WOULDN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT THEM...

McNamara:

Well, the--the it was very important when--when tailoring our offensive

nuclear force to our requirements, to our strategy of--of maintaining

an invulnerable retaliatory capability. It was very important to

consider how the Soviets would react to our--our force additions and

summarily when considering possible defensive deployments it was very

important to consider how the Soviets would react. And the Soviets are

no different than we are. They feel they must have a deterrent against

our use of our offensive nuclear capability against them for either

military or political advantages. As I have said, we never have had a

first-strike capability. I know no US President who has ever thought of

initiating the use of strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet

Union, however, the Soviets feel they must deter us from doing so and

therefore if we put up a defensive shield to in some fashion reduce the

damage to us from a Soviet offensive attack, they are going to fear

that defensive shield is designed to reduce and weaken the their

deterrent and they're going to respond to our defensive shield by

expanding their offense. Such an old question, but what--that's the way

they would react. That's the way we would react. That's they way we

told Kosygin in 1967 at Glassboro that we'd react. At that time the

Soviets were deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow.

We believe they were planning to extend that defense across the face of

the Soviet Union. We told Kosygin that were he to do that, perhaps the

Congress might think the response should be an anti-ballistic missile

defense deployed in the US, but that would not be our response. We

would respond by expanding our offensive force. If we had the right

size offensive force to maintain a deterrent before he put up a

defense, by definition when he put up the defense and made that

offensive force less of a deterrent we had to increase the offensive

force to maintain the deterrent and that's what we would do.

Interviewer:

JUST A QUESTION OF SORT OF MIRROR IMAGE PERCEPTION OR SOMETHING...

McNamara:

It's a question of action and reaction.

Interviewer:

WE CAN SAY, LOOK WE'RE ONLY DOING THIS TO LIMIT DAMAGE TO US, BUT THIS

THREATENS THE OTHER GUYS ASSURED DESTRUCTION...

McNamara:

Limiting damage to us threatens their deterrent and they as we, will

under all circumstances maintain a deterrent.

Interviewer:

SAY THAT AGAIN.

McNamara:

Uh-

Interviewer:

JUST THE WAY--LIMITING DAMAGE...

McNamara:

We're we to seek to limit damage to ourselves, the Soviets would

consider that those actions we can bear deterrent and they would seek

to offset our defense by expanding their offense to maintain their

deterrent at the same level at which it was before we put our defense

in place. That's exactly what we would do in the face of Soviet action

to deploy a defense. Each side must maintain a deterrent. A deterrent

sufficient to insure that the other under no circumstances feels it

would benefit by launching an offensive strike.

Interviewer:

SO YOU CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENSE IS REALLY NOT GOING TO

WORK...

McNamara:

(a) They probably won't work,technically they're far too complex; (b)

they're far too costly; (c) they will simply draw the reaction of the

other side which will negate them; (d) they run the risk of introducing

instability in a crisis because they lead the other side to believe

that they are part of a first-strike strategy and therefore the other

side is tempted to pre-empt, to dull that first-strike capability.

Interviewer:

COULDN'T--DON'T SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU DO INTRODUCE SOME UNCERTAINTY

AND BY INTRODUCING UNCERTAINTY YOU KNOW, THEY DON'T KNOW HOW MANY OTHER

MISSILES ARE GOING TO GET THROUGH...

McNamara:

I don't want any--

Interviewer:

THAT MAKES FOR A BETTER DETERRENT.

McNamara:

I don't want any uncertainty in connection with nuclear deterrents. I

want only certainty. I want certainty in the Soviet mind that if they

ever launch they will be destroyed. Under all circumstances there's no

set of circumstances that they can hypothesize associated with a Soviet

launch that will lead to anything other than destruction. I want that

certainty in their minds. That's the foundation of deterrence.

Interviewer:

IF THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING A MOVE IN THE UH-THE PERSIAN GULF AND THEY

KNOCKED OUT ONE NATO BASE IN TURKEY WITH ONE WEAPON, THAT THEY WOULD BE

DESTROYED COMPLETELY, BALL GAME'S OVER.

McNamara:

Well, if we're talking about, we're talking an exchange of nuclear

weapons with respect to--to Europe and under those circumstances I want

absolute certainty in the Soviet mind that if they launch a nuclear

attack on western Europe or North America they will be destroyed. I

don't want any uncertainty there. Now, in the case of use of one

nuclear weapon by the Soviets against Turkey, uh--uh I want them to

feel certain that they're going to get more than they gave. And I think

they do and we don--defenses don't enter into that kind of a

calculation.

Interviewer:

WELL THEN, WHY DIDN'T WE GO BACK TO THE MASSIVE RETALIATION SIOP...IF

THAT'S THE WAY YOU FEEL?

McNamara:

Because--because it was increasingly apparent to the Soviets we were

unlikely to respond to let's say their pressure on Berlin, in August of

'61 with an all out launch against the Soviet Union, of--all out launch

of our strategic offensive weapons when we knew that were we to do that

the remaining Soviet forces would be launched against us and would

destroy us. That's not a credible deterrent. You cannot make a credible

deterrent out of an incredible action. And massive retaliation by the

early 60s was an incredible action.

Interviewer:

BUT IF THE SOVIETS HAD LAUNCHED ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON OR SOMETHING OR IF

THERE'S LIMITED EXCHANGE IN EUROPE WOULD THAT HAVE TRIGGERED THE

ENTIRE--THE DESTRUCTION OF THE-

McNamara:

Well...

Interviewer:

IS THAT CREDIBLE?

McNamara:

Well... quite frankly I think it's very unlikely they would ever think

about launching one nuclear weapon in Europe. But, I want to say to you

that is a very dangerous thing to do in a nuclear age, 'cause how do we

know it's one. We don't know, what--what's happened. One of these

things blows up, electronic communications are severed because

electro-magnetic effect on the atmosphere, we can't get in touch with

our commanders their exaggerated reports of what happens. Emotions rise

the likelihood is we think it's not one that nobody can conceive of an

attack of one, we think it's ten or a hundred or a thousand. We think

that they're going to launch. If they launch one, they'll ten tomorrow

or today. So we think, you have to respond with a hundred. That is a

very dangerous set of circumstances which I hope they'll never move

into.

[END OF TAPE E05044]

Anti-ballistic missiles and deterrence

Interviewer:

MR. MCNAMARA, WHAT DID YOU TELL KOSYGIN AT GLASSBORO?

McNamara:

The Glassboro meeting occurred in June of 1967. At that time, the

Soviets were deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow;

moreover, our Congress had already authorized and appropriated funds

for the production and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense

in the United States. That made absolutely no sense whatever to me,

although the chiefs were in favor of it - Cy Vance..who was my deputy

at the time, and I were very much opposed. The President had agreed

that we should seek to initiate negotiations with the Soviets leading

toward a treaty that would prohibit each side from deploying an

anti-ballistic missile defense. And the Kosygin meeting at Glassboro

with Johnson was for the purpose of persuading the Soviets to start

those negotiations.

Interviewer:

MAKE IT A STORY.

McNamara:

The, the morning session concluded, we moved into lunch; the luncheon

took place around a small table, perhaps 12, maybe six on each side.

The President sat on my left directly across from Kosygin, and the

President was becoming very frustrated, seeking to make his argument

with Kosygin; finally he turned to me and said, "Bob, for God's sakes,

you tell Kosygin what's wrong with their plan." So I said, "Mr. Prime

Minister, you don't seem to understand that well, perhaps it's not your

intention to initiate large-scale war against the West; we must assume

that in other circumstances you would; in any event, we are determined

to deter you from ever, under any circumstances, launching your nuclear

weapons against the west. We believe in order to deter you we must have

a force sufficiently large to absorb your strike, survive with

sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on you. That's the way

we size our offensive strategic forces. Now, if we had the right size

force to achieve that objective before you built your anti-ballistic

missile system, then we must expand that force after you build it. And

therefore what I'm telling you is, if you proceed with that

anti-ballistic missile system deployment, our response will not be,

should not be, to deploy a similar system. That would be a waste. I

hope we don't do that. But our response will be to expand our offensive

weapons in order that we may maintain that deterrent, in order that

after you strike us, we'll now have sufficient weapons to launch,

against you, to penetrate your defense, accepting that some of them

will be destroyed by that defense, and a sufficient number will

penetrate to inflict unacceptable damage on you. That will be what we

will do. It's not in our interest or in your interest to do that. The

way to stop that is for both of us to agree today that we will engage

in talks leading to a treaty that will prohibit deployment of

anti-ballistic missile systems, and which, by the way, we hope, will be

followed by a treaty that will limit offensive systems." He absolutely

exploded. The blood rose into his face, his veins swelled, he pounded

the table, and he said he -- he could barely talk, he was so emotional

-- he said, "Defense is moral; offense is immoral!" And he believed it!

Now, fortunately they've changed their plea. And apparently so have we

-- we're the ones that are saying that today. And we're as wrong as

today, we're as wrong today as he was then.

Interviewer:

IN BERLIN YOU DIDN'T HESITATE TO SAY, IN PUBLIC, THAT IF WE HAD TO WE

WOULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WAS THAT A BLUFF?

McNamara:

I don't think it was a bluff, but it was simply a... statement of the

then accepted and official NATO strategy. It was certainly nothing that

I contemplated doing at the time, and nothing that I believe the

President would have authorized at the time, or nothing that would have

been wise at the time. As a matter of fact, I called in one of the

senior allied officers -- you may recall that under, at that time the

Soviets had dropped what's known as "chaff," which is in effect tin

foil, in the atmosphere in order to cause malfunctioning in the

navigations systems of our aircraft. And we had to stop all air

resupply of Berlin because of this interference with navigation. To

offset that reduction of air supply, we expanded the ground convoys

along the ground corridors crossing East Germany into Berlin, and then

the Soviets instructed the East Germans to stop the ground convoys,

which they did, and then we added military escorts to the ground

convoys, and on one occasion the Soviets instructed the East Germans to

allow a militarily escorted ground convoy to enter the ground corridor

into East Germany, but to prohibit it from exiting into West Berlin. We

finally got it out, but following that, I asked this senior allied

officer to speculate on how the situation would develop what would the

Soviets do next and how would we respond? He said, Well, they'll do A

and we'll do B, and they'll do C, and we'll do D, and they'll do E, and

we'll do F, and they'll then do G, and I said "How will we respond

then?" He said, "Well, we'll have to use nuclear weapons." I couldn't

believe it -- it just seemed absurd to me. So I then called Lord

Mountbatten, who was then chief of the British defense staff, into my

office -- I'd known him in the China-Burma-India theatre during World

War II, and I'd known him while I was secretary, and I put the same

question to him, and he went through A, B, C, D, E, F, and then G, and

I said, "And what do we do then?" I said, "You haven't mentioned the

use of nuclear weapons." He said, "Are you insane?" Now, Mountbatten,

by the way -- that was in 1961 -- but Mountbatten was killed in, I

believe November, December, 1978, and he made quite a famous speech in

Strasbourg 1978, before he died, and in that speech he said that he

never, under any circumstances, would have recommended NATO initiate

the use of nuclear weapons. He believed that then, he believed it in

'61 as I did in '61.

Interviewer:

BUT IT WAS STILL THE POLICY.

McNamara:

It was still the policy. It was the stated policy, absolutely.

Interviewer:

BUT EVEN THOUGH YOU DIDN'T BELIEVE IT, YOU STILL HAD TO...

McNamara:

Well, we were...

Interviewer:

THE THREAT IS IMPORTANT, ISN'T IT?

McNamara:

Well, I think that, I think the threat is a danger -- but in any event,

it was a policy and it was standard routine to refer to it.

Mutual assured destruction and dealing with crises

Interviewer:

IS MAD A CONDITION OR A STRATEGY?

McNamara:

Oh, I think that's semantical I don't wish to argue the point. I think

it's a condition. It is a fact that the human mind -- many human minds

-- know how to build nuclear weapons; it is a fact that nuclear weapons

in the hands of some pose a threat to others; it is a fact that the

others wish to deter the possessor of those weapons from using them;

and that leads to assured destruction a condition. I call it a

condition brought about by acquiring a sufficient number of weapons to

deter one's opponent from utilizing theirs.

Interviewer:

SOME PEOPLE LIKE WOHLSTETTER OR ROWAN SAID THAT YOU HELPED CREATE THE

CONDITION BY NOT BUILDING DEFENSE, OR BY NOT MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF

REFINING WEAPONS IN TERMS OF ACCURACY OR PUSHING THE CUTTING EDGE OF

TECHNOLOGY.

McNamara:

Well, there were certain individuals then, and there are today, who

believe that nuclear wars can be fought. I didn't believe it then, I

don't believe it today. I have never seen, on paper, a plan for

fighting a nuclear war. I've never seen a piece of paper that says that

we, NATO, will initiate the use of nuclear weapons by firing one, or

ten, or a thousand, against targets A, B, C, D, E, and we expect the

Soviets will respond not at all or in some fashion, and we will then do

such-and-such, and they'll do such-and-such, and at the end of one

hour, or five hours, or five days, we'll be better off than when we

started. There is no such plan. It's impossible to conceive of such a

plan. And the Wohlstetters, to this day, are trying to say that nuclear

warheads are weapons, that they can be used in military operations.

That is absolutely wrong! Nuclear warheads are not weapons. They have

no military use whatsoever,excepting only to deter one's opponent from

using nuclear weapons.

Interviewer:

BUT IF THEY HAPPEN TO BE USED FOR WHATEVER REASON, NOBODY IS GOING TO

TAKE THE STEPS TO ASSURE THEIR OWN DESTRUCTION.

McNamara:

You, you take a step to assure your destruction when you initiate the

use of nuclear weapons, and nobody can tell you how you can avoid that

once you initiate it, not Wohlstetter, not anybody. I have never had a

person dispute the statement I've just made: that there is not a single

piece of paper in the world that shows how you can initiate the use of

nuclear weapons with benefit to the initiator; that is to say, without

a high probability that the society of the initiator will be destroyed.

There is no such plan.

Interviewer:

BUT IS IT MORE LIKELY THAT YOU COULD USE THEM IF YOU HAD SMALLER AND

MORE REFINED...

McNamara:

No. There is no more likelihood if you do that.

Interviewer:

IS THERE UTILITY TO USE OPTIONS AS A BETTER DETERRENT?

McNamara:

No. I don't believe so. The Soviets are not deterred because they think

we have an artillery shell that we might use against one or two or ten

divisions, instead of Moscow; they're deterred by the knowledge they

have that we have a force such that we can absorb their strikes,

survive, and inflict unacceptable damage on them. That's what deters

them. There is no way to plan the use of a few artillery shells. A few

artillery shells will destroy tens of villages, will create a fog of

war, a period of uncertainty such that God knows what'll happen. No

human being can believe it can stop there. And I don't know any

responsible human who does believe it will stop there. Many, many

people who disagree with some of the statements I've made on this

program -- Al Haig, for example -- would nonetheless agree...that he

can't conceive of a limited nuclear war.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU AWARE OF HARRY ROWEN AND CARL KAYSEN'S FIRST-STRIKE OPTION

DURING THE BERLIN CRISIS?

McNamara:

No, no.

Interviewer:

YOU WEREN'T AWARE THAT THEY HAD DEVELOPED...

McNamara:

I... have no recollection -- I don't want to say, "didn't," but I have

absolutely no recollection of it. I doubt very much that, if they did

develop it ever came to me, and if it ever -- and I doubt very much it

ever went to President Kennedy.

Interviewer:

WELL, HE DID. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND...

McNamara:

Well... I think contingency planning occurs all the time, and involves

responses to a host of unlikely contingencies, in... including unlikely

responses. So I don't want, wish to say that Carl Kaysen and Harry

Rowen didn't develop a... plan for first use of nuclear weapons in

connection with Berlin, but I have absolutely no recollection of it and

I'm... certain that there was no discussion between me and the

President on applying such a plan.

Interviewer:

HE DIDN'T ASK YOU TO PREPARE-

McNamara:

He certainly, he certainly did not.

Interviewer:

WAS THAT A SCARY TIME?

McNamara:

Well, it was scary in the sense that we were concerned that the Soviets

might miscalculate The Berlin crisis began with the Bay of Pigs, in my

opinion, which was a disastrous episode -- I won't go into why it was

disastrous but it was disastrous -- and that occurred some 60 or 70

days after the administration took office, in... late March or early

April of 1961, and that was followed by... a meeting between Kosygin...

rather, Khrushchev and Kennedy, in Vienna, and I guess it was June of

1961, and I think Khrushchev made a serious misjudgment of Kennedy at

the time -- judged him to be weak -- and he, in a sense, added that to

the Bay of Pigs debacle, in which he concluded, and I think rightly so,

that the administration following a CIA plan grossly misjudged the

situation in Cuba, and suffered a serious if not military defeat,

certainly a serious political defeat. And he put those two episodes

together and concluded that with little risk, the Soviets could wrest

West Berlin away from the control of NATO, and he was just absolutely

wrong -- we didn't intend to allow that to happen, and we had

sufficient power to prevent it from happening -- but, in the course of

preventing it from happening there was a serious risk they would

escalate, and they did escalate through a whole series of moves. They

finally stopped when we called up reserves and moved additional forces

to Europe. But it might well have gone beyond that, and that was I

won't say scary, but it was certainly a matter of great concern.

Interviewer:

WHAT IF THE WORST HAD HAPPENED? THE OLD SIOP CALLED FOR MASSIVE

RETALIATION.

McNamara:

Well, there was no, there was absolutely no thought given by the

President or me, or Secretary Rusk, to the use of nuclear weapons. But

there certainly was thought... given to conventional force escalation,

which would carry with it very heavy risks, and potential costs.

[END OF TAPE E05045 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-707wm13t62

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-707wm13t62).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 8502b76dd48c25b73476bf3634b58973285b55e7 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2],” 1986-03-28, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed December 22, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-707wm13t62.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2].” 1986-03-28. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. December 22, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-707wm13t62>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-707wm13t62