War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Wilhelm Grewe, 1987

Interviewer: PERHAPS YOU COULD TELL US BRIEFLY WHAT OST POLITIK WAS AND WHAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE WAS FOR GERMANY. Grewe: Well in the fifties, we had our opening to the west, so to speak. The treaties, the adherence to NATO, the French-German reconciliation and things like that. But uh, the other side remained an open question. And for many, many years, the Federal Republic was the object of Soviet discriminating attacks. Revolutionism, nationalism, and uh, other accusations which uh, were mere propaganda, but a propaganda which was not very uh...uh, welcome at a...not very useful from our viewpoint. So we had the feeling uh, one day, we had to come to grips with the east. And it was Konrad Adenauer himself who took the initiative to do that, and in 1955, during his trip to...his first trip to Moscow, he established the diplomatic relations with uh, the Soviet Union. I think this was really the first step of Ost Politik and Willy Brandt's negotiation were only the second one. But after those establishment of diplomatic relations, nothing followed that and uh, for many years, not much happened in German-Soviet relations, and the... uh... hostility of the eastern side uh, still prevailed. And in order to make a breakthrough uh, Brandt took the initiative in 1970 and uh, uh...it came to negotiations in Moscow which were conducted by his intimate uh, friend, Egon Bahr. And uh, finally, the Moscow Treaty was signed in summer 1970. And from that time on, the Soviet attacks on German revolutionism and nationalism died down and uh periods opened up which uh, useful co-operation in the field of economics and...and...and technical exchange. And so on. Mmm...so uh...this German Ost Politik in a way, was uh... the completion of the first step which Adenauer had taken in '55, and uh, also it was uh...a m....a method to associate our self with the general western trend of detente policy. Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE KISSINGER-NIXON POLICY OF DETENTE? AND DID IT CHANGE AT ALL OVER THE FOUR OR FIVE YEARS?

Grewe: In general, it was favorably accepted. And the Nixon-Kissinger years were really the years where the German-American relationship was the most... intimate one. Uh...in particular, between Nixon-Kissinger and which means there was a very close... contact and...and...uh...mutual trust... and it was in a way...it was the climax of German-American co-operation. And uh, well, sometimes Kissinger felt the Germans went too far and too fast towards the east..., but this... did not really... disturb the situation in general. It was only one facet of the development. Interviewer: WAS THERE A FEAR ON GERMANY'S PART THAT THE SALT TALKS WERE BEING CONDUCTED ABOVE THEIR HEADS AND PERHAPS WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND THAT IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE MADE FOR THEIR SECURITY?

Grewe: In general, not. I think in general we felt uh, that there was uh, a tolerable measure of consultation about SALT. The SALT negotiators came always to the NATO Council George Smith and Paul Nitze and other people told us how things went on. And uh, SALT in general was uh, accepted favorably in Germany. We felt it was an important step in order to improve uh, the relationship between the two super powers, and it was a necessary first step to armaments control. Interviewer: WHAT ABOUT THE KISSINGER YEAR OF EUROPE IN 1973? WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO THAT WHEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED? Grewe: Well, yes. It was a deep disappointment. It really didn't lead to anything. It was a hopeful initiative, but uh, then uh, the disappointment was uh rather uh...big afterwards.

Interviewer: WHY DO YOU THINK IT WAS SO UNPRODUCTIVE? Grewe: Well...f...the American policy was uh not really concentrated on what Kissinger had in mind. As a perspective appeared, relationship with uh, the east and...and... and uh...uh, other perspectives. And uh, difficulties appeared uh...in the field of uh, the military questions. Strengthening the conventional forces of Europe, the Americans had the feeling that their uh... burden was too heavy and the Europeans did not enough for their own defense. And those viewpoints became stronger as in the original uh...basis of the Kissinger ideas,