War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Wilhelm Grewe, 1987

Yes. OK this is the fourth I think tape on the festive Gryba this one is for program 7 it's 7 1 5. So perhaps you could just tell us once more perhaps a little bit more briefly what that what US politic was and and what its significance was for German. Why and see if 50 is. We had our opening to the West so to speak. The treaty is the it erodes to Natal the French-German frequency radiation and things like that. But the other side remains an open question and for many many years the Federal Republic was the object of Soviet discriminating get tax revenues isn't nationalism and accusations

which propaganda about the propaganda which was not very. Not very useful from that viewpoint. So we had to feeling. One day we had to come to grips with the East and it was gone I don't know him so who took the initiative to do that and in 1955 doing his trip to his first trip to Moscow he established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I think this was really the first step of us to play Dick and Billy Brown's negotiation where only the second one. But I have to as it was established meant of diplomatic relations nothing followed up and for many years not much happened in German and

so good relations and see hostility used on side still prevailed. And in order to make a breakthrough. Brown took the initiative in nineteen seven and it came to negotiations in Moscow which were conducted by his intimate friend gone by. And finally as the muscle car treaty was signed in summer 1970. And from that time on NZ. So if you tax on German nationalism died down and periods of cooperation and the field of economics and

technical exchange and so on. So I spotted dick in a way it was the completion of Cif first step which I don't know I had taking in 55. And it was. Massive to associate with the general western trend of detail on policy. What was the German reaction to the Nixon policy of detente and did it. Did it change at all over the four or five years and it was favorably accepted and Tillich's and years where real easy years where there's a German-American the relationship was the most intimate one in particular between Nixon and them which means there was a very close

contact and trust and did was in a way it was the climax of German American cooperation and. Well sometimes the Germans went too far and too fast towards the east. But did not a reality. Just the situation was only one fear set of asset development. Was there a theory on Germany's part that the SALT talks especially were being conducted above their heads and perhaps without consultation and that important concessions might be made for the security. Not that I think it was a terrible measure of consultation about swords. I just saw it

negotiators came always to easy Natal Council George Smith and Barney and as a people daughters how things went on and saw it in general was accepted favorably in Germany. You quoted was an important step in order to improve the relationship between the two superpowers and it was a necessary first step to armaments control. What about the year of Europe in 1973 What was the reaction to that when it was announced. Well yes it was a deep disappointment. It really didn't lead to any think it was a hopeful initiative. But then the disappointment was big afterwards. Why do you think it was such a why do you think it was

unproductive. Well if the American policy was not really concentrated on what Kissinger had in mind as a perspective does it appear that relationship with the East and as the perspectives and difficulties of it and defeated off the military questions strengthening conventional forces of Europe American sets of feelings that was too heavy and so Europeans did not enough on defense. And those viewpoints became stronger as NZ or original basis of the business ideas. Can we stop that.