Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with David Halberstam, 1979 [part 2 of 5]

One of these one of these harvest them ordering chairs for a bodega. I think the back of the right line noticed tour for the right magazine. I'd like to go back I want to write and I guess you know I mean that's the question you want to go. Let's go back on the question of reporters and their attitudes and whether they were questioning the commitment to Vietnam. The point you're making. Well I think so much of the American investment seemed to be in GM and there was this idea that GM was

wonderful he was winning the war this was the official position of the war was being won and it was being won because of him and he was very popular. Well it was quite clear to us today that it was not being won as actors it wasn't being fought. And in addition he was clearly and if there was any unifying strand to Saigon and Vietnam South Vietnam. Is there such a country which I think there is not. It was the opposition to the UN it was the one thing I think an awful lot of dissident groups had in common with each other. So I think those of us had a feeling you know that there was some alternate I think probably we were wrong I think that probably in effect that all of this had been decided because of the French Indochina War and what we're getting now with the people who were you the former French corporals who are now General Saigon generals were in fact former French corporals or someone like GM who had sat on the sidelines during his country's war of independence I mean no George Washington he I mean he was a guy who'd

gone America into a white colonial white capitalist society during his own country's war that depended. I don't think we saw that I think we just thought that there had to be some alternative because we did not see how deep the route went or how deep the cancer went in that's and we were wrong in thinking that there was some alternative. The real answer was that nothing was going to work and ZM was not the problem he was a symptom. You remember that during the Kennedy administration there was a notion of counterinsurgency as you'll turn it around her insurgency he's the head of the CIA there. Richardson when he said counterinsurgency used to go out five minutes as though he were some expert in this wonderful mystical arcane seal it was a very sexy thing counterinsurgency all the Kennedy people Max Taylor Bobby they were all in awe of the idea that we would stay out of the Cold War was at its height. There was a belief that we could we Americans would challenge the Soviet advance the communist advance in the underdeveloped world by having these

wonderful people who would be highly trained warriors and who spoke several languages and who could you know eat snake meat for a week in the field and you know the friend the Nadya's. I think we and Roger Hill Xmen was very much a part of because he'd been with Merrills Marauders I don't think they understood the difference between being commandos and being guerrillas. When I was a very considerable difference I mean it's one thing to stay out overnight in the boondocks and have all kinds of tricks and it's quite another thing to have a deep political route to the guerrilla highs and it's not by surprise that the only place in the counterinsurgency or the Green Berets were effective was with them own yards up in the Highlands it was the most yards of course hated the Vietnamese. So you were really not talking about Vietnamese Nachman you talk about an anti nationalism but it was a kind of thing of the Kennedy mystique of that whole idea of swift young men coming to take over this century modern tough intellectuals but tough you know intellectual balls we rushed out there it was a it

was really silly. There was an awful lot of silliness to that word to many reporters captivated by the idea of counterinsurgency as an alternative to the period. Well I think there was a feeling in the beginning that it would be nice to see you know work the commitment work and I think you longer you stay there the more you thought it didn't work. And then gradually be it wasn't going to work and the longer you were there you felt that the route was deeper and deeper in the Mau they the sickness was just particularly deep it went far beyond the particular moment of the war that I mean somebody once said to me Dave Hodgin when you talk about the the economy was. He was then semi with NBC but he was essentially with the CIA. So you're talking about some area in the delta some province and you're talking about a province chief on our side who is upper class of Vietnamese with lower class communities with a northerner among Southern Vietnamese who is Catholic among Buddhists and who doesn't want to as the Americans wanted him to reach down and

touch the peasants he wants to expand the difference he wants to get the mud off his heels not to reach out on the other side. And he's been trained at all he's been trained by the French or the Americans against him it is a Vietnamese of the account commissar whose comes from the very village speaks the very dial act has come from the very peasantry knows all the grievances and has fought for 20 years always on the winning side. And I think the longer we got there the greater sense we have that if you have that portrait finally of what the two sides are then you realize how silly and mindless the counterinsurgency thing was. Let's go to an example of an actual reporting situation. When all I want to talk about the outback there was a case in point. You know when you start just starting with my mention box. There was one battle that I think was a symbolic battle of the press crisis and the

war. At that time it was the Battle of our park and if my memory serves me it's very very early January 1963 and I think you have to understand some of the background to understand the significance of it. This is some year after the Americans have made the enormous calm you know combat cannot comment commitment but a booster shot you know helicopters armored personnel carriers advisors down to be county level and of course when we first made a commitment for about two three months it worked. I mean for two or three months when you know the Vietcong would be in a boat attack somebody in the helicopters would show up. American helicopters would drop the Vietcong would panic and they would flee and we would shoot them down in the field. And then they are as they are they always learn how to deal with each new Western technological device. Remember these people defeated the French they are right they defeated a powerful western army as a group of force so they are used to the other side constantly having more air power artillery and gadgetry. It does not throw them they had they adapt

so they learned very quickly that when you saw a helicopter you didn't run in panic you stood and fought and you finally shot down the helicopter but you made the other side very well when the first American helicopters came in there was a momentary victory. Things were going well and then very quickly the Vietcong learned how to deal with it and very quickly afterwards. The into the enemy's army the Arban really begin to refuse to fight and begin to challenge them and we had a very great source down in the delta the primary where most of the battle was taking place the seventh division around me Tony was a man named John Van colonel and Colonel John Paul that smart Paulson enormously energized a kind of in effect deep throat of that day and John was getting angrier and angrier because his counterpart would not fight and he would. John would pinpoint where a Viet Cong battalion was your company was and he they would have time or if they attacked they would deliberately give them escape routes. Because he was finding out that his counterpart was under orders from the ZM the

great patriot and anti-communist never to take casualties ZM thought that if he took casualties he would lose face. So we begin to get this play back starting in about September 16th to October 16 to November 62 but they were time after time avoiding battle and the American mission in Saigon which I own on our little Tigris River phrasal Tigers tigers. Just as terrific as ever where they were winning this war where you know we always use the western army will always have a reward better statistics because we have more firepower or whatever because the statistics are often live. But we knew that they were evading battle. So what happened when what made op walk so symbolic was that they had cornered that given day I mean Van had finally prodded them into an attack attack and they had cornered a legendary Viet Cong battalion I think it was called the 514. And I mean they really had them trapped and it was a hell of a battle I mean they shot down three American helicopters that day which was given the rhythm of the war an enormous

number may be comparable to later in the war's stooping down 30 and and there were armored helicopters there and suddenly then with then in Sharjah they had closed off three sides of the operation. And I mean they really had to we had all our firepower armored helicopters had a lot of trouble with the Vietnamese troops they wouldn't have been Kalyan commander would take U.S armored troops and he was afraid of a bunch of tractors treeline. So there's an airborne battalion that then is trying to get to close off the fourth side. And his career his counterpart Colonel Woodburn Col du literately drops the airborne not to close off the four sides. But to reinforce this other side so they can in fact escape him and then was furious and he said you know my God they chose to reinforce the faith rather than risk victory and he was angry and he would cause he was by the new the end of his tour he was very outspoken and knew the war was being lost and sins Mito was only a God I think. Forty miles from Saigon we could all drive down we got very early and

it was a very big battle for five Americans killed three helicopters shot down and we are going into cabs and we went down there and it was true it was a terrific to feed and everything that we've been saying that had happened had not happened I mean it was I mean a symbolic thing of all the malaise and fraud of the war and so we got down there we started filing a story. Danny's very outspoken. So who comes down there the next day when they've already escaped. But General Paul hearkens and what eternal hold your heart and bunch of reporters around all of them have been on the field online of scenes it's ordinary screw up. John we've got it we've got them in a truck. And we're going to watch what happens. We're gonna try to sprain it. I mean they're gone. I mean they're long gone and I mean you've got furious American commanders I mean you've got this ten American battalion advisors who are friends of ours were just better as hell or high or I doubt my body's been killed my friend friend of mine can Goode was killed and a lot

of good people killed that day. So we've got them in a truck and we're going to bring it and it was so symbolic of all the mendacity of the war and of all the lying of the American mission and the upkeep the outcome of that was of course that they almost Court-Martial than not to tell you no not because of defeat but for talking candidly to reporters and that was the real soon. It was not a student who allowed the economy to scream it was a sin. And almost a court martial offense could tell American reporters what had happened and I mean I remember Neil Sheehan went out to Don Imus felt have seen Paxil the next day. He said I there was a very great victory. And so she said. Admiral I was there it was a defeated Well you ought to go down there yourself and take a look and I don't know why I was I was down there. Wonderful story about Neal who was a terrific reporter was at 25 years old.

You've been out all night and the province Jeez was mortaring throwing rounds and murdering his own man. I mean you know the great cowardice of that there was a wonderful general very straight honorable general named Bob York and there under this terrible firing from the problems of I think nine of his room and got killed. But he cared a lot more. I mean everybody Laba a mortar Howitzer round the enemy who cares who cares about them hasn't cared what was happening. So there's Neil Sheehan actually you know cleaning into the mud he looks over and there's Bob you're sort of like in a push up position to keep yourself dry. Later she was absolutely terrified and scared to go to General your beach as a child. Why do you why do you not position yourself. Sean I don't want to get my cigarettes wet. I mean I was a guy but he was in the middle of shooting almost got killed in the second round I mean was it I mean it was all the fraud of the war. Tied up in one battle and it symbolized symbolized the lack of American leverage with the government the fact that when they lied we would follow in their footsteps lying to protect them rather than seek the truth and we would punish our own

officers who were truthful and we were there upon challenge the reporters who tried to tell the truth rather than find out what had really happened. When you were reporting things that were not popular either with the government in Washington or with the Vietnamese government in Saigon or the U.S. mission in Saigon. Did you ever find that you were under pressure from your editors. Well. I think you have to think of the mindset of those days and how different it was. I think you had two things. First off we were challenging in effect a kind of cold war conventional thinking I mean not true than the cold war conventional thinking was a really great model as the Cold War struggle where the good guys they're the bad guys in a way that was beginning to come apart even before Vietnam in a way you could see it in Cuba I mean the idea of bringing the kind of attitudes that dealt with communism anti communism and in containment in Europe and trying to bring it into areas where it was you did not have as

you had in Europe and you know comparable Christian democratic societies which wanted only need where in fact the very fact of the that we were aligning with a Christian democratic society friends were aligned with the colonial power. And I think that the mindset was very important in terms of the anti communism so you were jarring one set of perceptions and also making your editors quite nervous that you might be accused of being soft on communism. A lot of publications like the Hearst publications and to a lesser degree talk but not much lesser degree time. Later wrote about people like me as wanting an Asian feed El Castro and wanting to be a no good being a left wing radical or whatever. I mean I would not take the reporting for what it was but they began to politicize what you were doing and try to put you on the defensive that you were trying to create a communist menace while they were helping the other side which was a very potent argument in the early days. The second thing you had a problem with in terms of your editors was the you know the World War too much I mean they were all part of a lot of these people were part of World War

Two in Korea where American generals always told the truth our guys always were straight and honorable the American soldiers walked off to war and God marched in lockstep and we were on the good side of the guys on the bad side we gave chewing gum to little kids a lot of that in Vietnam. But the mindset of World War 2 that American generals told the truth and here are a bunch of young reporters saying a you know they want words and their lie. We always had you know anonymous sources because anybody in Vietnam who spoke to us had to protect a career and therefore had to be an anonymous. And so we had a lot of problems our editors were very nervous. Their own mindset was different and they just found it inconceivable that a high American officers would draw and it was outside their frame of reference. The Tet offensive in it was symbolic in that it did not change the reporting so much from Saigon. It changed the way editors and readers perceive the reporting and that was the significance of the Tet Offensive. It changed the way Walter Cronkite thought it changed the way Ben Bradlee

thought eventually Peter Arnett or David Halberstam or Neil Sheehan award just brought in that's significant and we had a mindset and they were they had a much more traditional view of patriotism and everything in Vietnam was challenging I mean this was an enormous generational moment my friend Michael Oren believes that the really first postwar moment begins with Vietnam where you begin to feel that you can you know challenge an American version of of events while still being a loyal patriot. Did you have any problems with Iraq.