War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Alexei Arbatov, 1987

OK you ready. Dr. Brzezinski can I begin by asking you to describe for us the atmosphere in the meetings between Jimmy Carter and how much of it in 1977. I'm talking about the London meeting on particular the one in Washington in July. Well as far as I remember it was perfectly cordial and normal. The relationship that some of the worse later on. But I think initially the relationship was quite normal. I fucked up because Johnson Smith has said many times that the reason he made the speech in October was that he had said the same things in private before and his arguments have been ignored. I mean is that your recollection of recollection of the event. Well I don't know what he said in private so to speak if he was meeting with the president all by himself. I don't recall that in 77. The chancellor in the meetings that were attended by the respective advisors. Put a great deal of emphasis on what subsequently came to be called and the name of the SS 20s. He might have mentioned it. But I certainly didn't recall him putting

enormous stress on it. And therefore the speech that he gave at the high SS was to some extent at least a departure in the sense that it highlighted his anxieties much more sharply. And they were spelled out much more fully. I think his version of events is that is that he had worries over saw too and also cruise missiles that the administration felt that if they were to take European wise into account they never would get us all to agreement. I think that's as well and I can't argue with his version I haven't read his book but you do. Your recollection is that he didn't put these particular arguments in in the conversations in Washington in July 1970 them. I didn't recall these issues being raised as major obstacles to the ongoing stalled negotiations. There may have been some expression of concern. But not as a major issue the major

issue surfaced as best as I can recall with his speech in London where he articulated his position much more fully and he made a strong case for the kind of concerns he was expressing. Can I move on now Dr. Brzezinski just ask you quickly want your questions about the enhanced radiation or neutron bomb episode. What was the reaction inside the Carter administration when this story first broke in 77 in The Washington Post. Are you prepared for that. Well we certainly didn't expect the kind of furor that developed in the press. How do you say we weren't terribly happy about the spin that The Washington Post was getting to the issue. It seemed to me then it seems to me now that The Washington Post was rather hysterical on the subject. It was sloganeering it really wasn't addressing the problem that the weapon was supposed to address but was rather presenting it as some terribly anti-human device. And in tones which I thought too were overly dramatic.

OK now you went later on in 77 you went and talked to the Europeans about this question in order. I'm simplifying slightly but in order to establish a consensus of some kind what do you find when you went and talked to the Europeans about this issue. Now what you're sure you're not talking about the in-house radiation weapons. Well the question then was where would this weapon be deployed and what kind of a decision Should the United States make regarding production. In relationship to the question of deployment. Our position was that there was no point producing this weapon if it couldn't be deployed. Because this is the kind of weapon which if it were ever to be used. It would have to be used in the very early phases of hostilities if the weapon was stored in the United States. You couldn't exactly use it in the early phases of us to that date and as you had a lot of warning there was a protracted crisis you could then move it to Europe. A low moving event within itself escalate the crisis. So our view was it had to be deployed now

since it is primarily an anti-tank weapon. Didn't make much sense deploying it in Portugal. Or in Great Britain. The place where it had to deployed was on the central front. Now the central front means Germany. So the real question was would the Germans permit us to deploy it. And Chancellor Schmidt felt that it was too much of a political burden for him. To assume responsibility for deployment he would have preferred us to proceed with the production decision. While it's true wing. The deployment decision or as a fallback I'm not quite sure where that emerged exactly the course of my trip but I believe that it did. He. Took the position that if some other European power would permit deployment then Germany could also permit deployment you know that in turn begs the question where that other European power prevail. I would have to be a nutcase Benelux because it would have to be some power close to the theater close to the front line.

Do you think it's fair to say that this issue the enhanced radiation weapon brought to the surface ambiguities and tensions which existed in the alliance within the doctrine of flexible response over whether or not limited nuclear war was what was final. Up to a point yes I love those issues were never really fully debated directly and I think the issue was to some extent. And dealt with in political terms much more in terms of how to handle the opposition and the anti-nuclear wave that was surfacing. So there really wasn't debate in strategic terms. I think it was a rather a political spamming that was taking place because President Carter didn't want to assume total responsibility for the production decision outside of deployment. And Mr. Schmidt wasn't prepared to assume responsibility for a deployment decision. He would have preferred Mr. Carter to make the production decision or alternatively share the department decision of someone else and the reason throughout had

nothing to do with the war fighting flexible response. It had a lot to do with the domestic political situation of the respective leaders. Right. Thank you. Now can I ask you if you could briefly to describe the meetings that you had with President Carter in March of 1978. As a result of which you in the course of which it became clear that President Carter changed his mind. Can you give us some sense of how this process works. Well I described a very full and I mean what I say actually is that there isn't really much point repeating that allows I come up with your memos on the screen but really it's going well. THE PRESIDENT I think was rather surprised when he learned that interview of his advisors myself included but also the second defense of the secretary of state. The moment was ripe for a decision and that the Europeans had made at least a provisional commitment to deployment somewhat fuzzed but provisional and therefore a production decision was ripe. It

then surfaced at least to me in my own mind that the president really didn't want that weapon period. And that he had hoped it would go away. He had hoped. It all of some became clear to me that basically the Europeans would not bite the bullet. On the planet and therefore he would have to produce. And he was rather disturbed when we told him that now the setting is. Ripe. For a production ascension. He then wanted to review the deployment decision. And I think as a refuge so to speak. He then insisted that the European production decision be much tighter than it had been contrived I believe by Warren Christopher in my memory serves me right who went to Europe to work out some sort of a new arrangement that would span the deployment decisions and the production decisions and give everyone. Some flexibility by permitting the process to go forward. In your book you define President Carter you say that the perception that he fumbled

is unfair. Can you explain. Yes I think it is unfair because Mr. Schmidt as a city was slick cultivated the impression that he courageously bit the bullet and the president defaulted whereas in fact Mr. Schmidt was hiding behind looks and boric or Holland or Belgium using them as a shield. And then when the president decided not to go ahead. With the production decision by itself. Which in all fairness I have to say I would have favored Then Mr. Schmidt took advantage of that to blame Mr. Carter in toto for the failure of the process to go forward. Whereas in my judgment quite frankly I think both Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Carter are responsible. I felt at the time and it leaked to the press because I said it privately to saya Vance and his press attache was there. And that subsequently became a matter of public record that if the president does not go ahead with a decision it will be the worst decision he left taken in the first 17 months of his presidency. So I feel stronger

the Pres. should go ahead. But I also felt very strongly that Schmidt was being in my judgment at the best evasive and fundamentally disingenuous on the subject and what he subsequently said on the subject is even more appalling. Because he has been unwilling to shoulder at least some of the responsibility for the setback. That was a byproduct both of Carter's and Schmidt's and a willingness to bite the bullet. Do you think that there is in this a problem which is inherent to has been a problem inherent in the alliance which is that the Europeans are rather like adolescent children. They want to revolt but then they want me to be hit over the head and told what to do by the Americans and President Carter was being more democratic and was not prepared to do it. There is something to that. I didn't say that. Let me just move on now. You were skeptical of the case for the military case for the deployment of new theater weapons in Europe.

Is that the case. He was going yes. Why did you change your mind. Because I became convinced of the political aspects required some response. It's going to cost but I mean what you wrote basically that and that's why I responded that would be such a sense of anxiety in Europe about the possibility of an American non-response which I excluded given the fact that we have 300000 troops in Europe that the result would be in effect what has come to be called decoupling. And that the decoupling would be a psychological political fact rather than a military thing. But in so being it would be highly destructive. And therefore we have to give some tangible token of our willingness to respond in kind to what the Soviets were doing. But it was your view that in purely military terms the SS 20s didn't pose a threat which required come to the point that they posed a threat to which we could respond adequately with existing forces.

Let me know I ask you about Guadalupe. Can you tell us something about your disc the discussions of. How Chancellor Schmidt. Comported himself well he sulked most of the time. And so that a reader constructive discussions were between she sky. And. Well the British prime minister Callaghan. And Carter and. Now on the subject of what came to be known as IMF it wasn't called that at the time. And the four who were having all of their discussions in private called me in to give them a briefing on what the US was planning to propose to be Alliance and I did that. And I outlined our plan was to have a mixture of forces some ground launch cruise missiles some Persian too. I do not remember whether I gave them precise numbers. My guess is probably not. Because

my. Vague impression is that we fixed a number somewhat later. But they have given them the general both ballpark numbers. And I tried to explain what was the reason for the mixture why. The two systems were mutually complementary and why we favored a certain kind of disposition of these forces. And I previewed the fact the proposition that. This kind of deployment either militarily would nullify whatever potential military benefits the Soviets would obtain from their SS 20 deployment or it would offer a negotiating counter in the event there should be negotiations you know affect a two track approach. Why do you think that Chancellor Smith was sulking. I have no idea. May have something to do with this political personal life I have no idea. I mean you all without being too personal about your your objection is that the

Germans having. Raised this problem were not prepared to address the precise problems of how you cope with it and the precise solution all subsequent today did particular when Chancellor Kohl took over. And you know the ajna problem has worked out extremely well. Did you realize at the time that the Pershing 2 would be a. Slightly tricky thing as far as the Soviets were concerned it was that the idea. Where you realized there was a useful system and I'll ask you to expand on that it is a very accurate system. It doesn't take a long time to reach its targets. It certainly gave the Soviets food for thought. Let me just move on to one of two things not let me ask you a general question. Do you think that the 1979 fuel truck decision looking back on all the pain and whatever that it's brought with it has been worthwhile. Do you think it was worthwhile. I think it was a surprise. It's really an astounding success. I mean the result is

that the Soviets have now in effect agreed to an accommodation in which they're dismantling systems at the rate of 4 to 1. Which is a very major accommodation by them which negates everything they did in this respect. In the meantime I think the alliance has demonstrated something very important that if pressed. It can stand together and respond together both in terms of. An affirmative and assertive response through deployment and through negotiations. Yes I accept that's perfectly true but as a student of history would you claim that this was what people intended at the time in 1979. Well I don't know what the Soviets intended. But I know that whatever the Soviets intended they didn't get it. Let me ask you a general question about whether this is this period that we're that I've been dealing with I've been talking about with you from 75 to 87 whether you think that mark some kind of major watershed in the history of NATO in the history of the nuclear relationship between the

Americans and the Europeans or whether you think relationships with the relationship fundamentally start in the 40s and 50s are going to continue. Well first of all I have a little bit of antipathy towards the whole idea of watersheds. You know every year one hears about historic watersheds because there is a summit because of some agreement or because of some events. And so there are some of the watersheds that I hardly find any landfill between them anymore. Obviously that kind of an arrangement I was going to drive between America and Europe in the late 40s and the 50s. I thought a lot of staying power. And that's all to the good. But an arrangement that has a lot of staying power is not the same thing as an arrangement that continues to exist indefinitely. The contrasts I would draw between the latter and the former would be that historically for example there are some nations that battering some total

catastrophe are likely to endure for a long long time and have endured for a long long time. There are again ik there reflect a certain enduring historical reality. There are also international arrangements which are long lasting. But are inevitably subject. To change because of the fluidity inherent in international politics. I consider NATO to be in that category rather than like an organic historic nation something which is part of our scene for a thousand or two thousand years. I think the Iraq that was ushered in by the Olten constant is beginning to come to an end and. Is beginning to come to an end. Which means it's a process. But I think we can begin to see the outlines of that process in the midst of a coming and a more defined. And. Obviously NATO is to some extent also a reflection of the division of Europe between two super extra European

powers. Both powers have now. Increasingly non-European preoccupations. And I think that is going to affect NATO. My guess is NATO will continue to exist for quite some time but its interest substance will begin to alter. Its in Tralee. In world affairs and even in the Atlanta connection may somewhat diminish and other issues may become increasingly important. And I don't I don't shed a minute tears over that I accept that as inevitable provided we can manage it responsibly and don't precipitate consequences which would be destabilizing.