War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Jones, 1986 [1]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES C03070-C03071 DAVID JONES [1]

General LeMay

Interviewer:

GENERAL, COULD YOU FIRST OF ALL TELL ME WHAT SORT OF ATMOSPHERE IN SAC

WHEN GENERAL LEMAY TOOK OVER IN THE LATE '40S?

Jones:

Well, in the late '40s, our military capability was almost zero,

demonstrated in the Korean War when we almost got pushed off the

peninsula by a third rate country. We had some limited nuclear

capability, very little convention. The Strategic Air Command was in

terrible shape. First thing General LeMay did, or one of the first

things, is to tell one operational wing in SAC, B-36 outfit, to fly a

mission as they would under wartime conditions. Not a single airplane

successfully reached the target because they had been training at lower

altitudes and then when they flew at the higher altitudes, they had

engine failures and other aircraft troubles. So he would demonstrate

lack of capability very vividly to everyone involved. And he was a

superb military commander. Lousy politician, but a superb military

commander and unique in some ways in that we've had military commanders

who are great in war and poor in peace. He was great in war and great

in peace and was the ideal person to take the Strategic Air Command and

build it into a great operational force.

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU SAY HE WAS GREAT IN PEACE, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT? THAT HE

WAS ALWAYS READY FOR WAR?

Jones:

Yeah, he really believed the best way to maintain peace, in fact a SAC

motto that he adopted, it's the SAC motto today, "Peace is our

profession," and he believed that the best way to maintain peace is to

be ready for war and to be truly ready. And therefore, he raised the

standards. He raised standards higher than anybody else thought could

be achieved and they would be achieved in almost every case, by the

way. And he had a mystique about him in his command and tremendous

loyalty by those people who knew him, and he was loyal to them. There

was some degree of fear by people that didn't know him down below. But

there was an excitement in SAC, people knew that it was the most

important part of the national defense capability in those days. It was

getting new equipment, it was being built up. It was an exciting time

to be part of the Strategic Air Command.

US Nuclear Strategy

Interviewer:

IN LATE 1953, EARLY 1954, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT IN THE POLICY

OF MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THEY DIVERTED MORE MONEY TO SAC AND

CERTAINLY TOOK MONEY FROM THE OTHER SERVICES. WHAT WAS SAC'S REACTION

TO THAT AND DID MASSIVE RETALIATION CHANGE ANYTHING AT THE OPERATIONAL

LEVEL?

Jones:

Well, it obviously changed some things but I think basically it

validated what SAC had been saying.

Interviewer:

COULD YOU JUST SORT OF START THAT AGAIN AND MENTION THE PHRASE YOURSELF

'MASSIVE RETALIATION' SO THEY KNOW WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT?

Jones:

Okay. The time of massive retaliation, or the bigger bang for the buck,

was really a validation of SAC's position and the position of SAC had

been articulated. And that the best way to deter war was through a

great strategic capability. There was no way in that time period we

could come close to matching the Soviets or the Warsaw Pact,

eventually, in Europe from a conventional standpoint. Western Europe

was in disarray, military forces had deteriorated in capability

rapidly. And so, let's concentrate on strategic offensive forces. And I

think with some degree of success.

Interviewer:

WAS THE AIR FORCE, AND SAC IN PARTICULAR, CONSCIOUS OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT

OF JEALOUSY FROM THE OTHER SERVICES?

Jones:

Oh, yes. There was some internal jealousy within the Air Force. The

tactical fighter force tried to emulate SAC and get into the nuclear

business and build big fighter bombers that could carry nuclear weapons

because that was where the priority was. So there was internal

competition as well as understanding that the other services were not

happy with this priority.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TRY TO EXPLAIN TO THE ORDINARY VIEWER WHY EVEN AT THAT EARLY

STAGE WHEN THE SOVIET UNION HAD A VERY SMALL, IF ANY, NUCLEAR

CAPABILITY, THE AIR FORCE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO-- CAN YOU TRY TO

EXPLAIN WHY EVEN BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION HAD A SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR

CAPABILITY ITSELF IT WAS THOUGHT NECESSARY BY THE PENTAGON, BY THE AIR

FORCE, BY SAC, TO BUILD UP AN ARSENAL OF SOMETHING APPROACHING A

THOUSAND WEAPONS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, CERTAINLY SIX, SEVEN HUNDRED, AND

TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER THAT QUANTITY OF ATOM BOMBS ON THE SOVIET UNION?

I THINK ORDINARY PEOPLE FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND THOSE NUMBERS.

Jones:

Well, the issue of forced requirements nowadays, when you looked at the

Soviet military capability, conventional, it was overwhelming in

comparison with the west and there were many, many military targets.

And weapons were not all that reliable in those days. Issues of

penetration, probability, multiple weapons were targeted in order to

assure destruction. So from a military standpoint, to carry out the

national guidance, there was a requirement for substantially more

weapons than were on hand.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THAT NATIONAL GUIDANCE? WHAT DID IT TELL YOU THAT THE OBJECT

OF AN ATTACK WAS?

Jones:

Well, the national guidance has been consistent over the years, have

been to have a strategic offensive capability to destroy or inflict

major damage on military forces of the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, in

days later, and also to have a capability to destroy urban industrial

targets. The urban industrial requirement has not been large in numbers

of weapons. The military capability has been large and continues to

grow as targets proliferate in the Soviet Union, as they've become

harder, requiring more weapons to destroy it. So that's been the basic

strategy, destroy the military. As they develop a nuclear capability,

destroying nuclear targets went to the top of the list in priority over

the conventional targets.

Interviewer:

IN QUITE RECENT YEARS, BEGINNING OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND

BEFORE THAT AT THE END OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, IT EMERGED THAT,

IN PUBLIC, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD A POLICY OF PREVAILING IN THE

NUCLEAR WAR. IT WAS A BIG FUSS, A BIG PUBLIC FUSS ABOUT, "WHAT'S THIS,

WE'RE TRYING TO WIN A WAR? I MEAN, I THOUGHT WE WERE ONLY TRYING TO

DETER?" SO THERE'S A CONFUSION IN THE PUBLIC MIND. I THINK A LOT OF

PEOPLE THINK THAT THE OBJECT IS SIMPLY TO DETER A WAR BUT THAT YOU

DON'T NEED TO WIN IT. CAN YOU SORT OF EXPAND ON THAT A LITTLE BIT, AND

ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF WHAT YOU'VE JUST SAID ABOUT THE EARLY '50S?

Jones:

Well, there has been a lot of rhetoric through the years and we had

massive retaliation, a minimum assured destruction and a flexible

response and winning nuclear wars and prevailing and sometimes words

are not used with a great deal of thought had haven't thought through

the implications. And other times, well stated but more of a

declaratory policy. Underneath that, within the government, the

guidance to the military has been remarkably consistent, so these tend

to be more declaratory than they are with regard to any change in

internal policy with it.

Interviewer:

AND THAT POLICY HAS BEEN, JUST TO EXPLAIN AGAIN, THAT THE OBJECT IS TO

WIN A WAR?

Jones:

Well, I think people have not come to recognition that no one wins a

nuclear war. In a sense if winning means you're better off at the end

than you were at the beginning, or at least you have had a society

intact and are able to function as a society, if there's a major

nuclear war between the Soviet Union, I think both the Soviet leaders

and American leaders now recognize you don't-- you don't win the war.

Now, what you do is try to prevent it and there's a strong argument

that the best way to prevent it is to show that the consequences will

be worse for the other side than for you even though the consequences

on both sides would be devastating. But that's behind this comment

about prevailing. I don't think it's useful to talk about prevailing

and winning nuclear wars. It ought to be around preventing--

Interviewer:

ALL RIGHT, TAKE IT BACK TO THE '50S WHEN THESE THINGS WEREN'T QUITE SO

WELL UNDERSTOOD. I MEAN, THERE WAS TALK THEN ABOUT WINNING, AND INDEED

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IN THOSE DAYS.

Jones:

No question in those days we could win. Before they had a nuclear

capability, there was absolutely no question. We had one, they didn't.

So even when they developed their initial capability, we still had a

capability to win in that we could limit the damage to the United

States, still would be substantial but they had a very nominal

capability in the early days of their weapons.

Interviewer:

COULD I JUST ASK YOU TO SAY THAT ONE-- I THINK THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT

TRANSITION, THAT MOVEMENT FROM WHEN YOU COULD DO TO WHEN WE COULDN'T.

COULD YOU SORT OF JUST PHRASE THAT AGAIN FOR ME? I MEAN, WHAT WAS THE

SITUATION WITH REGARD TO A WINNING A WAR IN THE EARLY 1950S FOR THE

UNITED STATES?

Jones:

I think in the early 1950s, there's no question but we could win a

nuclear war. It's when the Soviets got a nuclear capability and one

that could deliver weapons against the United States, then you started

getting into the fuzzy area, can you win, can you prevail when they had

a very small number with very limited-- a delivery capability, then no

question that we could win or prevail, whatever words you wanted to

use. We've come to the point today where I think people recognize that

any nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union is a no-win war for

both sides. That doesn't mean that there isn't a possibility to happen,

but both sides would end up in such bad shape after it's over, I don't

think it's useful to be talking about winning a nuclear war in this

age.

Interviewer:

NOW, THERE CAME A TIME IN THE LATE '50S WHEN THAT SITUATION WAS ALREADY

BEING REACHED, WHEN THE NAVY STARTED ARGUING THAT BECAUSE THAT WAS

TRUE, BECAUSE NO ONE COULD ANY LONGER WIN, THERE WAS NO POINT IN HAVING

THESE LARGE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS FOR A COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY. ALL YOU

NEEDED WAS THE POLARIS SYSTEM AIMED AT CITIES THAT WOULD DETER THE

SOVIET UNION FROM A WAR, AND IF YOU DIDN'T SUCCEED IN DETERRING THEM,

THERE WAS NO POINT ANYWAY. WHAT WAS THE AIR FORCE'S REACTION TO THAT

ARGUMENT?

Jones:

Well, I think the reaction was that it was not a valid argument, that

we still needed to have a capability to go against the Soviet military

capability. And what's very important is linkage with Europe. We've

been very fortunate. We've gone just about the longest time in modern

history without a major war and without a major war involving the

European powers. And it's not because we've had a big, conventional

capability even though the conventional capability is important to the

deterrence. It's that conventional capability and its linkage to our

strategic offensive capability that the great deterrence in Europe has

been that somehow war between east and west will get out of hand and

will escalate to the use of not only theater nuclear weapons but

strategic weapons. I was asked one time by President Carter, would we

be better off if we could wave a magic wand and all nuclear weapons

would disappear from the face of the Earth? It's a good question, a

philosophical issue. And the answer is that there's something wrong

with man having in his own hands the tools of his own destruction. On

the other hand, we ought to recognize that if all of a sudden they

disappeared from the face of the Earth, it increases the likelihood of

a conventional war. I mean, you lose that overriding deterrent. So it's

an academic question.

Interviewer:

I MEAN, TO COME BACK TO THAT PERIOD IN THE LATE '50S, AND IF WE COULD

TRY TO JUST THAT, I DON'T THINK PEOPLE WOULD STILL UNDERSTAND, FROM

WHAT YOU'VE SAID, WHY IT WOULDN'T BE ENOUGH JUST TO HAVE ENOUGH WEAPONS

TO...

[INTERRUPTION]

Interviewer:

WHY WOULD THAT DETERRENT, EVEN FOR EUROPE, NOT BE JUST AS POWERFUL AS

THE UNITED STATES SIMPLY HAD ENOUGH TO DESTROY EVERY CITY IN THE SOVIET

UNION? ISN'T THAT ENOUGH TO DETER SOMEBODY FROM TAKING--

Jones:

I think that would deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United

States and out of the blue doing it. But in the broader sense,

particularly in linkage with Europe, I don't think they would--the

Soviets--would take it as seriously as just the capability to destroy a

few Soviet cities, that we would threaten the use of our strategic

offensive forces. Take the time of the Cuban missile crisis. If all we

had was the capability to destroy a few Soviet cities, I think

President Kennedy's threat to the Soviets, that one missile on our soil

meant full retaliation, it's a lot more credible when we had a very

strong military capability and to be able to destroy not only the

Soviet cities, but their military capability and their war making

capability.

Interviewer:

CAN I COME TO THE EPISODE WHICH I DON'T WANT TO DESCRIBE AGAIN IN

DETAIL WHEN THE DAY THE GAITHER COMMISSION MEMBERS WENT DOWN TO OMAHA

IN, AS THEY SAY, IN THE FALL OF 1957. WHAT'S YOUR REACTION TO ROBERT

SPRAGUE'S VERSION OF THAT STORY WHERE HE SAYS, ESSENTIALLY, THAT

GENERAL LEMAY TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD KNOW A WEEK IN ADVANCE THAT THE

SOVIETS ARE AMASSING THEIR BOMBERS FOR AN ATTACK, THAT IF HE THOUGHT

THEY WERE DOING SO, HE WOULD, IN HIS WORDS, "KNOCK THE SHIT OUT OF

THEM" AND HE WOULD DO IT, AS SPRAGUE UNDERSTOOD THE STORY, WITHOUT

REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Jones:

Well, I think the allegation that somehow General LeMay would have used

military force or nuclear force without presidential permission is

absolutely wrong. There was a mystique about LeMay, there was an image

of what you expected from LeMay. Some people who questioned the buildup

of strategic forces expected LeMay to be the type that would go off on

his own and do something. And I have known him for a long time, and I

was his aid for years in the '50s and we've been close associates. I

have never seen any indication at all, in any time, back in the '50s

when the Strategic Air Command or subsequently when he was Chief of

Staff of the Air Force, any inclination to do anything but to fully

respect civilian authority. Now, he would tell civilian authority what

he believed in unmistakable terms, and tell them when he thought they

were wrong and give them a capability they may have even thought they

didn't need with regard to capability with strategic forces. But

certainly a strong advocate for civilian control and to follow

presidential orders.

Interviewer:

WHAT ABOUT JEROME WIESNER'S VERSION OF THE SAME STORY WHERE WHAT HE

SAYS IS THAT CERTAINLY LEMAY SAID THAT HE WOULD KNOCK THE SHIT OUT OF

THE RUSSIANS A WEEK IN ADVANCE, BUT WHEN TOLD THAT WASN'T NATIONAL

POLICY SAID, "WELL, IT'S MY JOB TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT

TO CHANGE HIS POLICY." DO YOU HAVE A REACTION TO THAT VERSION OF THE

STORY?

Jones:

Well, I think that one is a possibility, the version that he would

provide the President with a capability that the President didn't think

he needed in being able to preempt, if you would. That's much different

than saying, "I would take the authority unto myself." But, LeMay

wanted to give a president every possible option so that in time of

crisis, they would have many alternatives.

[END OF TAPE C03070]

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS SAC'S ATTITUDE TO THE ISSUE OF FIRST OR SECOND STRIKE IN THE

MID-'50S, AGAIN, FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW?

Jones:

I think with regard to first strike, second strike, it was more in the

context that there were military advantages to preemption. However,

you'd want to make sure that you weren't making a first strike, which I

put as different than preemption. If you thought there was going to be

an attack and were convinced of it. I think there was a considerable

debate as to whether we'd have that information or not. But at least we

ought to have the capability to preempt and we ought to have a good

capability to retaliate. I think there was a strong feeling that the

worst thing would be a Soviet attack where we did nothing until bombs

were actually impacting on the United States. And so it was more in

that context than in an aggressive first strike capability, the minute

we see anything going on in the Soviet Union, we just knock them off

the face of the Earth. They may ascribe that to SAC, but that wasn't my

feeling.

US Missile Gap Projections

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO SPUTNIK IN SAC AND TO THE REALIZATION THAT THE

SOVIET UNION REALLY DID HAVE, OR WAS GOING TO HAVE, AN ICBM CAPABILITY?

Jones:

Well, I think there were mixed reactions in many ways. Our capability

was still much better than the Soviets, but we had better get on with

the space programs and missile programs and that it had a beneficial

effect of waking up the American public and the government to the

growing Soviet threat. With regard to the Soviet buildup, there have

been mistakes in estimates, intelligence estimates, and the Air Force

always, or almost always, projected a greater buildup than the national

intelligence authorities. And both are right and both wrong in some

respects. The Air Force was right in the fundamental of the Soviet

buildup. They were much closer to it than the national intelligence

people. They were wrong on timing. For example, in the missile gap,

they projected the Soviets were building ICBM, intercontinental

ballistic missiles. The Soviets were actually building the shorter

range ballistic missiles, but they did build the missiles the Air Force

projected. It was different priority, they went with the shorter ones

first while much of the national intelligence estimated that the

Soviets wouldn't build up their large forces. So, Air Force are wrong

on timing but right on, to a great extent, on the basic projections.

Interviewer:

BECAUSE TO GREAT EXTENT UNTIL ABOUT 1961, EVERYBODY WAS GUESSING ON

INTELLIGENCE, WEREN'T THEY, TO A DEGREE?

Jones:

Yeah, you were guessing and you saw building of what turned out to be

missile silos in the Soviet Union. It was hard to say whether they were

intercontinental or shorter range. They turned out to be shorter range

to start with and then switched to the intercontinental.

Interviewer:

THERE WAS A TIME, THOUGH, IN 1961 WHEN SAC, IN PARTICULAR SAC

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, OF PRESENCE OF ICBM CAPABILITY WAS SO DIFFERENT

FROM EVERYBODY ELSE'S. I MEAN, IT REALLY WAS DRAMATIC, THAT THERE ARE

OTHER PEOPLE WHO HAVE SAID, "IT'S GOT TO BE A CYNICAL EXERCISE." THAT

THE GAP WAS SO ENORMOUS, IT COULDN'T HAVE BEEN.

Jones:

Well, there was even controversy within the Air Force between the SAC

estimates and the Air Force estimates as to the missile capability. I

think the SAC estimate was sincere. They were taking fragmentary

information and turning it into projections on capability. However, you

have to say that although they were wrong in timing, they weren't too

wrong on a projection of what eventually the Soviets would build.

Interviewer:

A CIA ANALYST WHO I ASKED ABOUT THIS SAID TO ME, AND I PUT TO HIM, THIS

IS HOWARD STOERTZ WHO'S IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, AND I PUT

TO HIM SOME OF THESE OTHER PEOPLE WHO'D CHARGED THAT SAC HAD BEEN

BASICALLY CYNICAL IN THE '60S, IN '61, OR AT ANY RATE HAD BEEN

INFLUENCED BY A VESTED INTEREST, WHATEVER. AND HE SAID, AND I JUST WANT

TO KNOW WHAT YOUR REACTION IS TO HIS REMARK, HE SAID, "I KNOW SOME OF

THESE OFFICERS, I'M CONVINCED THAT THEY WERE ACTING IN THE WAY THEY SAW

LEGITIMATE. IF YOU ARE IN THE AIR FORCE, AND PARTICULARLY STRATEGIC AIR

COMMAND, YOU HAVE A NATURAL--" I FORGET EXACTLY HOW HE PUT IT-- "A

PROFESSIONAL OUTLOOK THAT SAYS THAT BUILDING A LARGE INTERCONTINENTAL

STRIKE FORCE IS A SENSIBLE THING FOR A BIG POWER TO DO. AND WITH THAT

OUTLOOK, IT TOOK A LOT OF EVIDENCE TO SHIFT THEM FROM THAT BELIEF, AND

THEY WEREN'T SHIFTED UNTIL THERE WAS AN AWFUL LOT OF EVIDENCE THERE."

DO YOU THINK THAT'S A FAIR ESTIMATE OF SAC'S POSITION AT THAT TIME?

Jones:

Oh, I think it's an oversimplification, but I think there's some of

that behind the projections. You know, they were right in the sense

that a super power would build a large number of intercontinental

ballistic missiles. I mean, the Soviets have. They were badly wrong on

timing and their credibility was questioned as a result of that timing.

There were some who said the Soviets will never try to even match the

US capability. They were wrong in a more fundamental way. It's a real

strong reflection on that--

Interviewer:

WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO THOSE WHO-- AND AGAIN, I HONESTLY DON'T THINK

IT'S GOING TO BE EVEN IN THE FILM BUT I'M INTERESTED-- THE ARGUMENT

WOULD BE, WELL, OUR ESTIMATES, NOT JUST SAC'S, BUT THE AIR FORCE AND

INDEED THE CIA TO SOME EXTENT, ARE PROJECTING THIS MISSILE GAP.

THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES TOOK DECISIONS DURING A PERIOD OF

UNCERTAINTY THAT LED TO AN ARSENAL OF A CERTAIN SIZE THAT IT MIGHT NOT

OTHERWISE HAVE BUILT. AND IN THE END, THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION

MATCHED THAT. AND SO IF IT HADN'T BEEN FOR THOSE HIGH ESTIMATES IN THE

FIRST PLACE, WE MIGHT ALL HAVE SETTLED AT A LOWER LEVEL. I MEAN, DOES

THAT HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY?

Jones:

There are many who have said-- apologize to the Soviet Union-- by

saying that the reason they had built up is because we built up. And we

built some substantial strategic forces, but for the last decade and a

half, or two decades, we've shown a lot of restraint and we stopped at

a 1,050 Minuteman missiles, plus a few titans. We stopped building

bombers. We build other things, yes, but the Soviets-- as Harold Brown

has said, the former Secretary of Defense, "We build, they build. We

stop, they build." So I don't think it's a fact that we-- the Soviets

have done what they have done because we had to lead. Maybe in some

areas, that may be true in specific cases of certain weapons. But

overall, I think there was a fundamental decision made by the Soviets a

long time ago to make a major buildup in their strategic forces. And

look what they're doing now with the SS-24 and the 25 and we have a

number of strategic programs, but theirs outnumber ours substantially

in what they're doing.

Interviewer:

JUST ONCE AGAIN ASK YOU THEN ABOUT SAC'S ESTIMATES.

Jones:

Yeah, I understand.

Interviewer:

AND HOW IT--

Jones:

And that was the--

Interviewer:

WELL, WHEN HE SAID THAT--

Jones:

The statement that there was-- there are some who have said that at SAC

there was a conviction the Soviets were going to build a large

intercontinental ballistic missile force and that then drove the

estimates. I think there's some truth to that and they did overestimate

the number of missiles, but more in error in timing than in numbers.

They projected they would be deployed earlier and they were deployed

substantially later, but I think that they were right in the numbers.

There were some who said, in influential positions, that they didn't

think the Soviets were going to try to match the United States. Well,

they were wrong in a more fundamental way.

Joint Planning and Targeting

Interviewer:

GOOD. OKAY, THANKS A LOT. SO WHAT WERE THE AIR FORCE CONCERNS AS IT WAS

CLEAR THAT POLARIS WAS GOING TO COME ON STREAM, IT WAS GOING TO WORK

AND IT WAS GOING TO BE QUITE A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE?

Jones:

I think there were some that would advocate a one force strategic force

that would include all three legs of the triad. But that wasn't a major

thrust of the Air Force position. The Air Force was worried that there

wouldn't be cross targeting, there wouldn't be an integration of

planning and there was a terrible fight over the formation of the joint

strategic planning staff that ultimately reached, I think it was

President Eisenhower and it required a bunch of bumping heads together.

And it worked out over the long run very well.

Interviewer:

BUT THAT CONCERN ABOUT CROSS TARGETING, CAN YOU JUST ELABORATE ON THAT

A LITTLE BIT? I DON'T KNOW IF PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT?

Jones:

Well, a concern was initially the Navy was targeting strategic targets

in the Soviet Union and the Air Force was targeting separately. And

that didn't make sense. And the Air Force strongly advocated a joint

targeting arrangement. The Navy thought that that was a move by the Air

Force to take over the Polaris fleet and so they developed a plan with

lots of safeguards which have now worked out very well. But there were

a lot of suspicions to begin with. And a part of it, I think, came out

of the fight-- I think it was about 1948, between the Air Force on the

B-36 versus the aircraft carriers of the Navy and the Navy had had some

nuclear capability before the Polaris and there was that holdover, that

argument. But I think in the end, it worked out quite well.

Interviewer:

AND DID THAT ARGUMENT CONNECT WITH THE ARGUMENT ABOUT STRATEGY, THE

ARGUMENT OF THE MINIMUM DETERRENCE VERSUS A MUCH GREATER CAPABILITY?

Jones:

I think the argument was more on force requirements than on let's have

a joint planning and targeting on this. That argument existed even if

there hadn't been a planning argument as to how you target the forces.

But that was a worry that we would go heavily towards the force that

was used primarily to attack cities when the greatest requirement was

against military targets.

Interviewer:

SO IN A SENSE, THEY WERE BOTH THE SAME TIME, ANYWAY?

Jones:

Well, attacking cities requires a very small part of a force of total

strategic capability. It doesn't take very many weapons. Attacking

military targets takes a very substantial capability. Some of them you

can do with fairly inaccurate missiles as the Polaris was in those

days. But, a lot of them required greater accuracy, greater

discrimination and use of the weapon. So there was a fundamental

argument on force requirements which was separate from the planning

argument.

Interviewer:

AND JUST LASTLY, I PROMISE YOU IT'S THE LAST, THERE ARE THOSE WHO SAY,

LOOK, ALL THESE STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS ARE BASICALLY JUST BASED ON WHAT

EACH SERVICE NEEDS TO JUSTIFY THE LARGEST POSSIBLE FORCE REQUIREMENT

FOR ITSELF. THE NAVY ARGUES MINIMUM DETERRENCE BECAUSE THAT HAPPENS TO

SUIT THE POLARIS FORCE. THE AIR FORCE ARGUES THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE A

COUNTERFORCE REQUIREMENT BECAUSE THAT JUSTIFIES ALL ITS BOMBS AND

MISSILES. AND THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT. WHAT'S YOUR--?

Jones:

You know, there's some skeptics say the services are totally driven by

parochial service interest and that the Air Force will advocate a

certain type of strategy because it justifies its force. The Navy will

advocate a strategy. I reject that. I don't feel there is parochialism

and I've been a critic of the joint system and I've been a strong

advocate of reorganization. But I've never used the word parochial. I

think there's a deep conviction, it's an honest, sincere conviction, as

to what's being advocated. At times, it may be wrong, many times it may

not be integrated with the efforts of others. But there's a basic

feeling that what I'm doing is best for my country and it's an honest

feeling as opposed to one that has some nefarious connotations to it.

Interviewer:

THAT'S GREAT. GOOD, THANKS A LOT.

[END OF TAPE C03071 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with David Jones, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

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Credits: Interviewee2: Jones, David C., 1921-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 3ef11687f2905fe046d333d15db00123ed04a077 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
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Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Jones, 1986 [1],” 1986-06-28, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed January 15, 2025, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-542j678z8g.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Jones, 1986 [1].” 1986-06-28. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. January 15, 2025. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-542j678z8g>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Jones, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-542j678z8g