War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [1]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES D04003-D04006 ROBERT MCNAMARA

[1]

Cuban Missile Crisis and aerial reconnaissance

Interviewer:

ARE THE EVENTS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS STILL QUITE CLEAR TO YOU?

DID...

McNamara:

Twenty-three years have elapsed, so the answer is no. But certain of

the events are burned into my mind and will never leave me.

Interviewer:

WOULD YOU THINK IN MANY WAYS IT WAS THE MOST DELICATE TIME, OR THE

MOST...WHAT ADJECTIVE WOULD YOU USE?

McNamara:

I would use the most dangerous time of the seven years I served as

Secretary of Defense. And I say that because it was a period of great

tension confrontation between East and West. And confrontation in the

nuclear age carries with it risks that the world has never faced

before. And that's what led to the tension. I think it was fortunate

that we had a President who understood that the nuclear age introduced

totally different dimension into political reactions to crises such as

the Cuban Missile Crisis. And not only was it the most dangerous period

in my seven years as Secretary of Defense, but I think it was also the

most expertly handled.

Interviewer:

LET'S GO BACK TO THE SORT OF PRE-MISSILE CRISIS TIME FOR A MINUTE, DID

YOU, DID YOU THINK -- IF YOU CAN TRY TO TAKE YOUR MIND BACK THERE --

THAT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PUT MISSILES IN CUBA?

McNamara:

Certainly I didn't think it was a probability. I don't want to say I

didn't believe there was any chance. But I didn't think it was a

probability. Before the photographs became available in approximately

October 15th or 16th, 1962, we had for two or three months reports that

the Soviets were engaged in some additional activity in Cuba.

Additional military personnel, Soviet ships apparently landing military

equipment in Cuba. We were fairly certain that they were introducing

some form of missiles, presumably anti-aircraft missiles or something

of that kind. We had no indication that they were nuclear-tipped

surface-to-surface missiles capable of striking at intermediate range

the West-- the East Coast of the United States. And as a matter of

fact, when we had queried the Soviet Union on the possibility that they

were introducing offensive weapons into Cuba they indicated that was

not the case. They made categorical statements that they-- there were

no offensive weapons being introduced into Cuba, and there would be

none?

Interviewer:

AND YOU BELIEVED THEM?

McNamara:

We believed the statements in the sense that we saw no evidence at that

point of contrary action. But we continued to maintain very heavy

reconnaissance of what was going on. And it was through that

reconnaissance carried out on Sunday the 14th of October, that we

obtained photographs of the missiles being introduced into Cuba.

Interviewer:

BEFORE WE GET INTO THE PHOTOGRAPHS, YOU HAD NO-- I MEAN, DESPITE THEIR

PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT THEY WEREN'T DOING IT AND, I MEAN, DID YOU EVER

HAVE ANY FEELING THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT THEY MIGHT DO? I MEAN,

PSYCHOLOGICALLY?

McNamara:

I, myself, didn't think it a likelihood. Because it seemed to me that,

(a) it would not change the military balance I can go into the reasons

for that later if you wish; and (b) it would carry with it very serious

political risks which might actually lead to some form of military

confrontation. And therefore I thought they would be sufficiently wise

to avoid those risks and they would not introduce the weapons. But, I

recognized before -- this isn't just with hindsight -- I recognized

before the possibility that they would, and it was absolutely essential

that we carry out the reconnaissance that would keep us informed of

whether they were introducing offensive weapons.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN YOU FIRST HEARD ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS? WHERE YOU

WERE AND WHAT THE SITUATION WAS?

McNamara:

I don't recall when I first heard about the photographs. It was, I

believe--

Interviewer:

IT WAS THE NIGHT OF THE-

McNamara:

...early Tuesday morning or Monday evening. The photographs were taken

on a Sunday, they were developed and rushed up to Washington on Monday.

I believe the President was informed very early Tuesday morning, 8 or 9

o'clock. I don't recall whether I had been informed late Monday evening

or not.

Interviewer:

BUT-

McNamara:

In any event, by Tuesday morning 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning, both

the President and I knew.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST REACTION WHEN YOU SAW THEM? WHAT DID YOU THINK OF

THEM? COULD YOU, COULD YOU SEE ANYTHING ON THEM YOURSELF?

McNamara:

Well, they were interpreted for me by photo-interpreters, and once the

photo-interpreters interpreted them properly, it was very obvious that

offensive weapons had been introduced, both aircraft and missiles. And

it was clear that it was essential we immediately organize ourselves to

decide how to react. And that was, of course, the President's

conclusion. And right on the spot very early Tuesday morning he formed

what came to be known as the executive committee a very small group of

high level officials whom he charged with considering how to react and

whom he instructed to tell no one, other than a very limited number of

people, of the evidence we had of the introduction of offensive weapons

into Cuba.

Interviewer:

THERE'S ONE OF THE UH, I DON'T KNOW IF THAT RINGS A BELL FOR YOU OR...

McNamara:

Well, sure, it's a picture of a missile site. I don't recall whether

this was one we-

Interviewer:

THAT'S ONE OF THE FIRST ONES.

McNamara:

--had on that Tuesday morning.

Interviewer:

THAT'S ONE OF THE FIRST ONES.

McNamara:

Well, you can see very clearly the missiles. You don't have to be a

photo-interpreter to see it. What you don't see on here are the nuclear

warheads. And it's my recollection that we never had any photographic

evidence of the existence of nuclear warheads on this soil of Cuba,

even up to the time when Khrushchev said that he would withdraw the

missiles. There was a high probability that the nuclear warheads were

there. Why would they put the launchers there if they didn't have

warheads? But I think it's interesting that there are no warheads

visible on this photograph, nor were there on any other photographs

that I'm aware of that we had throughout the entire period.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU REMEMBER JUST WHEN YOU FIRST SAW THOSE PHOTOS, AND THEY WERE

INTERPRETED FOR YOU BY ART LUNDAHL AND THE PEOPLE IN THE MEETING, WHAT

YOUR IMMEDIATE SORT OF REACTION WAS?

McNamara:

Well, my immediate reaction was one of concern, because this at a

minimum, carried very high political implications. It was clear that we

could not tolerate introduction of Soviet offensive weapons into this

hemisphere. And in some way we would have to accomplish their removal.

I didn't believe that the introduction of the weapons shown here or

shown on the other photographs would change the military balance

between East and West. But I did believe, then, and I do believe now,

that it was a politically unacceptable move. We could not allow this

hemisphere to become a base for offensive Soviet forces. And this was

the first step in that direction. It had to be turned back.

Political response to the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

YOU'VE SAID, YOU KNOW, NOW THERE ARE THESE EXCOMM TAPES THAT HAVE BEEN

RELEASED AND THAT SORT OF THING, AND ONE OF THE QUOTES FROM YOU IS "A

MISSILE IS A MISSILE, AND IT DOESN'T REALLY MATTER WHETHER IT'S..."

McNamara:

That's a very important statement.

Interviewer:

SAY IT AGAIN, AND TELL ME WHAT IT MEANS.

McNamara:

My first reaction when I saw the photographs which I expressed in one

of the early EXCOMM meetings -- I think I expressed Tuesday morning as

a matter of fact -- was that the movement of those missiles into Cuba

the introduction of those offensive weapons, and they are offensive

weapons, into the Western Hemisphere, did not change the military

balance between East and West or between the US and the Soviet Union.

Now why did I say that? Because at that time, we had on the order of

6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, mostly bombs, some missiles. The

Soviets had on the order of 300, mostly bombs. We were so far superior

in numbers, you might have thought that we had military superiority in

nuclear arms. That was not the case. Our numerical superiority, great

as it was, on the order of 20-to-1, could not be translated into usable

military power. Before the missiles were put in Cuba! Now why? Because

we knew, having studied the possibility, that there was no way we could

use our 6,000 warheads, if we launched first, against the Soviet Union.

There was no way we could destroy such a high percentage of their 300

as to leave them with a number so small that it could not inflict

unacceptable damage on the US Even a few of those 300, if launched on

target in the U.S., would kill millions of Americans. And no

responsible President and no responsible Secretary of Defense -- and

certainly Kennedy was responsible, and I hope I was -- would expose his

nation to that. And therefore we knew there was no way that we could

utilize, in a military fashion, this tremendous military superiority-

numerical superiority.

Interviewer:

SO WHY DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT?

McNamara:

Well, the important point I want to come to is that conclusion we held

before the missiles were put on the soil of Cuba. Now after they were

on the soil of Cuba, they didn't strengthen the Soviet capability

because the Soviets didn't have a usable nuclear power against us

before they were put there, and they didn't have a usable power in the

sense of a first-strike capability against us after they were put

there. So the military balance didn't change. But politically it was a

different day, a different world. The Soviets had introduced offensive

weapons into the western hemisphere. There was a strong possibility if

we tolerated that they would expand their offensive forces. This was a

political shift that would affect the behavior of our allies, the

behavior of the Latin countries. They would be fearful. They would

change their attitudes their political programs, their political

platforms. We couldn't tolerate that. So it was absolutely essential

that the missiles be withdrawn, but they should be withdrawn with the

lowest possible cost, and the lowest possible risk that the actions

leading to the withdrawal would lead to a military confrontation

between East and West. And that was the initial conclusion I put

forward Tuesday morning, it was the conclusion of the President. It w--

it was the problem we grappled [with] the remainder of that week.

Because there were two totally different points of view amongst us. One

group felt that at any cost, including military cost, those missiles

must be driven out of Cuba. The other group felt we should avoid the

use of military force, except as a last resort, and should use all

forms of political persuasion to remove them, and included in political

persuasion I would include the use of a quarantine which we eventually

put in place.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE TONE IN THE MEETINGS? WHAT WAS THE STYLE OF THE MEETINGS?

McNamara:

Well, it's very interesting, because the President made quite clear in

the first hours of the crisis that he wanted this group of high level

officials -- the Secretaries of State and Defense the National Security

Advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of CIA, and

their immediate associates -- to calmly and quietly and continuously

and secretly consider the problem, consider what options he had open to

him, and not talk to anybody until they were prepared to expose the

options to him, give him a chance to thoughtfully consider them, and

allow him to make their -- make his decision. And he did not want us to

feel under excessive time pressure during those considerations. And

therefore the mood was one of tenseness, but it was not one of

irrational response to a crisis. And I think that it's very important

to understand that in the nuclear age war games rarely lead to one side

or the other initiating the use of nuclear weapons. And the reason is

that in a non-crisis atmosphere the burden of responsibility to an

order initiating the use of nuclear weapons, is so clear in your mind

that as I suggest rational people, operating calmly in a period, a

quiet atmosphere, do not, in war games, except under the greatest of

stimulus, initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But, the danger is that

in a period of confrontation, such as we had, you're not in a quiet

atmosphere, you begin to act emotionally rather than rationally, you

have inadequate information, misinformation, emotion. And these act in

multiplication. They're not additive. And they multiply each other's

force, and you very quickly in a period of crisis -and I've seen this

many times -- you very period-- in a period-- in a crisis make

misjudgments. And you, as illustrated by the Soviet misjudgment when

they shot down the Korean aircraft. I felt at the time no Politburo

member issued the order to shoot down the Korean aircraft. The military

commander who shot it down didn't believe he was shooting down a

civilian aircraft with 269 civilians on it. It was a catastrophe. It

would be a tragedy if one made the same misjudgment in a period of

crisis, because of lack of information, because of misinformation,

because of emotion, but instead of shooting down one civilian airplane,

you launched a nuclear attack that destroyed your civilization. That's

the danger. And the President almost intuitively realized that danger,

and he established an atmosphere of quiet contemplation insofar as you

can think of quiet contemplation recognizing the crisis we faced. But

it was a rational debate. And it was a true debate, that went on for

several days.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU DID HAVE A TIME CONSTRAINT. I MEAN THEY WERE BUILDING THESE

THINGS UP.

McNamara:

Well, they were building them up, but we concerned about the buildup

that would occur in, say, another 24 hours if we were to use an

additional 24 hours for debate, as I was that we would lose the

opportunity for quiet debate because of a leak of the information. And

we knew that once this information be-- became known to the world, we

would have to act. We would have to act within minutes after it became

known. Preferably we should make it known after we had decided how we

were going to act. And therefore, there was that time constraint. (?)

it for long. But while we held it, the President insisted that we

consider the problem in a contemplative way, and we did.

Interviewer:

ONE OF THE, ONE OF THE QUOTES THAT ONE SEES IN READING ABOUT THIS

DEBATE IS ROBERT KENNEDY'S COMPARISON WITH TOJO AND PEARL HARBOR. DO

YOU RECALL THAT?

McNamara:

Well I don't-- what Robert Kennedy said in partial response to those

who were proposing what was called a surgical air strike, designed to

strike the missile sites, destroy them, but which the advocates of it

were honest enough to note would have to be followed almost surely by a

land invasion. And what Robert Kennedy said was it was ill becoming of

a great power to launch an all-out attack on a small nation such as

Cuba. And it was ill becoming, it was in a very real sense, I think he

used the word, immoral. And he didn't want to see a chapter in history

read by his great grandchildren a hundred years from now that indicated

that this great nation had that level of morality.

[END OF TAPE D04003]

Enforcing the quarantine of Cuban during the Cuban Missile crisis

Interviewer:

ONCE THE BLOCKADE DECISION WAS MADE, WAS CONTROL OF-

McNamara:

Well, my concern that the political message, and I want to stress this

was a political message, not a military action that the President had

authorized, that the political message was conveyed exactly as I'm

gonna say it was written. Now, what I'm talking about is the

President's determination that the offensive weapons would be removed

from Cuba and not reintroduced into the hemisphere. That was the

message, just exactly that he wanted conveyed to Khrushchev. The

blockade was put in place to convey that message. The blockade wasn't

put in place to sink ships. The blockade wasn't even put in place to

stop ships. Now obviously, if we let all of the ships moving to Cuba

pass through the blockade, it wasn't a blockade. It would have conveyed

a different message, that he said one thing and did another. And so we

clearly were going to have to stop some ships. But it didn't mean we

had to stop all ships, it didn't mean we had to sink ships. It didn't

mean we wanted to start a war with the blockade. And yet we were

calling upon the military, to use military weapons, to literally convey

a political message. That was something that there was no historical

precedent for. And it was absolutely essential, therefore, that control

in that sense, control in the sense of achieving the President's

purpose and no other purpose, and in exactly the way he intended, be

maintained. And I lived in the Pentagon, literally, except for moving--

going to the meetings in the White House, I lived there for the entire

10 or 12 days of the crisis. I never left. Slept there, whatever.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THAT LIKE, SLEEPING...?

McNamara:

Well, it was...I'd spend so damn many hours in the building anyhow that

a few more -- particularly when I was able to sleep a few hours a night

-didn't bother me at all--

Interviewer:

DID YOU GET ENOUGH SLEEP? I MEAN, YOU WERE OBVIOUSLY UNDER STRESS.

McNamara:

We were under stress, and we were working long hours, certainly 18

hours a day in which you were not going to go to sleep.

Interviewer:

TELL ME ABOUT YOUR VISIT TO THE NAVY'S-

McNamara:

Well, each evening during those days after the quarantine was put in

place, my deputy, Ros Gilpatric, and I would go up to what was known as

flag plot. Our offices were on the 3rd floor of the Pentagon, and the

Chief of Naval Operations office Admiral Anderson's office, and the

naval I'll call it war room, which was called flag plot, was on the 4th

floor. And we would go up each evening, as I remember around 10

o'clock, and the navy staff would have received the latest reports of

movement of Soviet vessels. At that time, by the way, we had taken many

of the Strategic Air Command's aircraft off of Airborne Alert, nuclear

alert, and put them on a mission of scouring the seas and recording the

movements of all Soviet vessels moving toward the western hemisphere,

moving toward Cuba. This in order to know what to expect to quarantine

during the next 24-48 hours. And on one of these evenings, I've

forgotten exactly which evening it was, probably Tuesday or Wednesday

night we saw on the plot an indication that a Soviet vessel would move

up to this guarantee line, an imaginary line as I recall 600 miles off

the coast of Cuba within the next 24 hours, certainly before we would

meet again with the officers in the flag plot. And I asked George

Anderson, Admiral Anderson, the Chief of naval operations what he

proposed to do when that ship reached this imaginary line, the

quarantine line. He said, well, we're supposed to stop it. Well. I

said. . . that's good, George, but how are you going to do it? Well, he

said, we'll use our customary methods. I said, what are those? Well, he

said, we'll hail it. I said, what language will you hail it in? Well,

he said, how the hell do I know he said, I guess we'll hail it in

English. Well, I said, do you know that the Soviets have individuals on

that Soviet freighter that's moving up there that speak English? He

said, come on, how would I know whether they have anybody. Well suppose

you hail it in English and they don't speak English, what are they

going to do? Well, he said, I suppose they'll move on. I said, what are

you gonna do? Well, he said. we'll stop 'em. I said, how are you going

to stop them now, they don't know what you're trying to say. Well, he

said, there's an international flag code. We'll put up the flags. OK,

what if they don't stop then? He said, well, we'll fire a warning shot

across their bow. I said, what if they don't stop then. He said we'll

fire a shot through their rudder. I said, what kind of a vessel is

that? He said, it's a tanker. I said, what are you gonna-- what will

happen if you fire a shot through the rudder? Well, he said, it might

catch on fire, might miss a little bit, might catch on fire. I said,

let me tell you something, George, we're not trying to start a war,

we're trying to convey a message, a political message. There'll be no

shot fired by anybody, by your order, by the order of the destroyer.

And by the way, the name of the destroyer was the Kennedy. I said,

there'll be no shot fired by anybody, no order issued by anybody to

fire a shot, without my personal authorization, and I'm not going to

give you that without discussing it with the President first, is that

understood? He was absolutely furious, and I don't blame him for being

furious in one sense. But he was absolutely furious. He said, he said,

Mr. Secretary, he said, the U.S. navy has been carrying out blockades

-- he called it a blockade, not a quarantine, we thought there was a

slight difference -but he said, the US navy has been carrying out

blockades for 200 years, since the days of John Paul Jones, and we've

carried them out successfully. If you'll keep your hands off this,

we'll carry this out successfully. I said, Admiral, let me tell you one

thing, and I stood up -- there were 30-odd admirals in the room, wasn't

a chair for him, enough chairs for all of them -- I said, let me tell

you one thing, Admiral, there will be no shot fired without my personal

authority. Do you understand that? Is that clear to you? He said, yes

sir, and walked out of the room. Now that was a rather harsh way of

conveying the message that control would remain in the hands of the

President and in his designated representative, the Secretary of

Defense. Not because we didn't trust the military. I had the most

tremendous respect and admiration for them, then and now, but because

this was a unique operation. It was using military weapons, if you

will, to convey a political message. And it was a very delicate

situation, and it had to be controlled, as the President wanted it. It

was.

Interviewer:

EVEN AFTER THAT, YOU WERE ON THE PHONE TO THESE SHIPS.

McNamara:

Oh, yes. During the day. And as a matter of fact, the vessel came up to

the line, and it didn't stop, and it went on for while. But then, my

recollection is, I may be wrong in this, but I think I'm correct, that

before the vessel got-- certainly before it got to the island of Cuba

and before it got very far past the quarantine line, we received word

from our reconnaissance aircraft, including these B-47 bombers that'd

been taken off nuclear-- or had been put on reconnaissance, we received

word that every single Soviet ship moving to the Western hemisphere

went dead in the water.

Interviewer:

THEY-

McNamara:

They obviously, the Soviet Politburo had obviously decided that they

were at least going to have to take the first step, which was to stop

the movement of further forces, presumably offensive forces, into Cuba,

and they were not, in effect, then going to contest the quarantine

line. And I think it showed the wisdom and judgment of our not firing

on that first ship which proceeded past the line.

Interviewer:

NOW IN ROBERT KENNEDY'S BOOK -- I SAW YOU HAD IT OUT THERE THIS MORNING

-- HE REMEMBERS THAT AS THE MOST SORT OF CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE WHOLE-

McNamara:

It was a dramatic moment.

Interviewer:

HOW DID YOU GET THE NEWS AND HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN-

McNamara:

I don't recall exactly. I was in the Pentagon at the time, and I must

have gotten it from the war room. The war room was manned by a general

officer or an admiral 24 hours a day. And my-- I had a telephone on my

desk direct to the war room-

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER HOW YOU FELT AT THAT MOMENT?

McNamara:

Oh, I felt immense relief. Now, now, it was only the first step. They

weren't taking the missiles out at that point, hadn't agreed to take

them out. But they very clearly were reacting to the quarantine. They

very clearly in a sense wanted to proceed the way we wanted them to

proceed. They did not wish to escalate the level of confrontation,

which was already severe, but which we could have escalated by firing

on that first ship as it came to the quarantine line and which they

could have escalated by continuing to try to pour ships through that

quarantine. And here they had in effect told us, by their actions not

their words, that their ships were stopping. And they went dead in the

water, and they turned around.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER GETTING ON THE PHONE TO SOME OF THOSE SHIPS, TO THE

CAPTAINS OF THE FLAGSHIPS OF THOSE-

McNamara:

I don't. I don't. But I know we were in direct communication -- I don't

recall that I was -- but I knew we were in direct communication with

the Kennedy, which was the destroyer that was on the spot observing

this Soviet tanker at the time it was passing this imaginary line.

Interviewer:

NOW THE NAVY GETS VERY UPSET ABOUT ALL THIS. I'M SURE YOU'VE-

McNamara:

Well I don't-- don't blame them. As I say, I understand them. They have

traditions. They had standard operating procedures. They had manuals.

The manuals say a quarantine line's a quarantine line, stop the

vessels. What does a quarantine mean? It means you don't go through it.

You stop something. Particularly the word blockade connotes it even

more clearly than quarantine. And by the way, the navy was calling it a

blockade, because in a sense it was a blockade. We were calling it a

quarantine, thinking it was something slightly looser than a blockade.

The navy said it's a blockade. Standard operating procedure says, use

your power to uphold the blockade, that means preventing things go[ing]

through it. We have the power. And by the way, this is a very important

point. It is often said that, in effect, the US won, if you want to

call it that, prevailed in the Cuban Missile Crisis because of our

superior nuclear power. That's absolutely wrong. We prevailed not

because of our superior nuclear power. We had a superiority of 20 to

one, but we couldn't use it in any way. It was a militarily unusable

power. We prevailed because we had superior conventional power. And

particularly we had superior conventional power in the region. And this

is one of the things that made the navy even more upset, because it was

absolutely clear we had the power on the scene, to uphold and maintain

the blockade, and we didn't use it. And they couldn't understand why.

And they hadn't yet really understood the delicacy of the situation,

that the use of the military force to convey this political message.

Interviewer:

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE?

McNamara:

As it has always been, to anticipate military confrontation; to prepare

force levels to recommend to the President and the Secretary of Defense

force levels that will protect our security in the face of those

potential confrontations. And then, if the confrontation develops, to

recommend use of that force, and to propose alternative ways of dealing

with a confrontation. The, the role of the military is no different

today than it was prior to 1945. The factors it must take account of

are different. And there is still great debate. Not solely or even

primarily within our own military, but there is great debate within, I

was going to say within the West, I would say within the East and West,

as to the function of nuclear warheads. I maintain nuclear warheads

today are not military weapons. They have no military role whatsoever,

excepting only to deter one's opponent from initiating use of his

nuclear warheads. Others in the military and out maintain that is not

correct, that NATO's present strategy, which contemplates actual use,

initiating the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet

aggression, a Soviet conventional force aggression war fighting

capabilities of nuclear weapons the warheads for example, is a proper

use of those warheads. There's a tremendous debate going on beneath the

surface. Frankly, I think it's swinging in my direction, and within

five or six years I think it'll be quite common to say nuclear warheads

are not weapons. But that was not the view, that was not the common

view at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is not the prevailing

view today, it will be tomorrow, in my opinion.

Interviewer:

LET ME SHOW YOU SOMETHING HERE. THIS IS A SECTION FROM -- THE SECTION

ON THE RIGHT THERE -- FROM KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER. CAN YOU READ A LITTLE

BIT OF THAT PART THAT I MARKED WITH A PENCIL, AND...

McNamara:

Read it to myself?

Interviewer:

NO, READ IT ALOUD, AND THEN I'LL ASK YOU TO SORT OF COMMENT.

McNamara:

I presume this is Soviet to Kennedy. "If you, Kennedy, did this as the

first step toward the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that

nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If,

however, you have not lost your self control, and sensibly conceive

what this might lead to, then Mr. President, we and you ought not now

to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war,

because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied.

And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he

who tied it will not have the strength to untie it. And then it will be

necessary to cut that knot. And what this would mean is not for me to

explain to you, because you yourself understood perfectly what terrible

forces our countries dispose." Now that is a paragraph, I believe, from

a letter we received on a Friday evening a letter or a teletype. It

was-- it was both. It was a letter that had been delivered to our

Ambassador in Moscow who sent it by teletype. I recall it came by

teletype, because it was a yards long teletype, a phenomenal teletype.

It was a teletype written by a man under tremendous emotion as, in a

sense this paragraph implies. It was clearly written by Khrushchev

himself. It expressed his deep, I'll call it deep fears and deep

concerns, but fears and concerns, but also determination. And when we,

when we received it was received in sections, and we read it in

sections. And we recognized it for what it was, an extraordinary

document. A fearful one, by a man in fear, but one which had to be

dealt with very carefully. It was absolutely essential that we

recognize his emotions. That we recognize that we wanted to avoid

pushing him into a corner. Because very clearly a man expressing those

emotions, when pushed into a corner, would lash out, as he implies he

will here. On the other hand, there was an implication also that his

fear would lead him to...in a sense accept what I'm going to call a

reasonable proposition. So we were left with the feeling, and I think

we slept on it that night, that there was both danger and hope inherent

in that message. And then what happened was amazing. Saturday morning,

before we had a chance to respond to this very emotional document, a

paragraph of which I've just read, we received another document. A

long, hard, tough, fully-staffed-out document that left little room for

hope and gave great cause for concern. And then-- I think one of the

most astute decisions made by the President during the entire two weeks

of the crisis was made, and I think it was made on the recommendation

of either Tommy Thompson or Bobby Kennedy or perhaps both, I think

perhaps it was Tommy who said, Mr. President, we have two messages,

they in a sense say different things, they're written by different

people, they express quite different opportunities for us. Why don't we

respond to the one we consider offers us the greatest hope, that's the

first one. And that's what we did. And the President and we all then

worked out an answer to the first, without even indicating we'd

received the second, and without responding in any way to the thought

and theme and context of the second. And that's what finally triggered

Khrushchev's decision to move the missiles.

Khrushchev announces the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba

Interviewer:

THAT SATURDAY -- THAT SATURDAY MANY PEOPLE HAVE SAID WAS THE MOST

CRITICAL DAY, THAT'S WHEN-

McNamara:

Yes.

Interviewer:

ANDERSON WAS SHOT DOWN?

McNamara:

Let me think now, that was...

Interviewer:

THE DAY BEFORE THE LAST.

McNamara:

Yes, that was the Saturday before the Sunday in which Khrushchev

announced withdrawal of the missiles on a Sunday, and a U-2 was shot

down on Saturday. That would have been the 27th, Saturday the 27th. I

remember leaving the White House at the end of that Saturday. It was a

beautiful fall day. And thinking that might well be the last sunset I

saw. You couldn't tell what was going to follow. It sounds perhaps

excessively dramatic to make such a statement, but the tension was so

high. We knew we had to get those missiles out. Up to that point in the

face of possible escalation to a large-scale conflict, the Soviets

hadn't agreed to take them out. While those of us who had fought hard

to avoid a military strike against Cuba had prevailed up to that point,

there was a possibility if the Soviets didn't remove the missiles we

couldn't continue to prevail and that some form of military action

would take place. And those who had recommended military action in the

first instance had always been forthright enough to say that they

didn't know how it would end. They didn't know what would follow. They

thought that if we had a surgical strike against the missile bases, we

would have to follow that with a land invasion. They thought, and I

felt strongly, that if we were to invade Cuba with armed force, not

only would there be tremendous casualties suffered by the Cubans and by

Americans in the invading force, but almost surely the Soviets would

respond at some point of their choosing. Not in Cuba, because they

didn't have the power to prevail there against our strong balance of

power. But that they might well initiate military action against the

flanks of NATO, for example, against Turkey, even possibly against

Norway, the northern flank. Or even possibly against Berlin, the

center. Or even almost too dreadful to contemplate, an unauthorized

launch of a nuclear weapon from Cuba might not- might take place, not

by order of the Politburo, we thought it very unlikely that-

[END OF TAPE D04004]

Negotiations to end the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

TELL ME ABOUT ... WHAT WE DIDN'T GET WAS THAT YOUR CONCERN I SUPPOSE

AND THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN WAS NOT SO MUCH THAT A MISSILE MIGHT BE

LAUNCHED FROM THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THAT-

McNamara:

Let me assume you've got through the possibility of Soviet strikes

against Turkey and

Interviewer:

RIGHT, WE DID GET THAT. WE GOT AS FAR AS BERLIN.

McNamara:

And most frightening of all-

Interviewer:

YEAH. OK PETER?

McNamara:

And most frightening of all was the thought that one of the nuclear

warheads which we had not yet observed but had every reason to believe

were on the soil of Cuba, would be launched against a major

metropolitan area on the East Coast. And I want to add that we didn't

believe that even in the face of a an air strike on those missile

bases, or even in the face of a land invasion, we didn't believe that

the Politburo would authorize the launch of one of those warheads. They

knew that we had a superiority of 20-to-1. We had 6,000 nuclear

warheads against their 300. No sane political leader under those

circumstances would authorize the launch of a nuclear warhead from the

soil of Cuba against the East Coast. But we were fearful that in the

face of an air attack, or in the face of a land invasion, a Cuban

sergeant or a Soviet second lieutenant under that tremendous pressure

without orders would launch a warhead against one of the metropolitan

areas or several warheads. And in that event millions of Americans

would be killed. And no responsible U.S. President, and no responsible

U.S. Secretary of Defense would put his nation at risk under those

circum--if he could possibly avoid it. And we were seeking to avoid it.

We had avoided it up to that point. The question was, could we continue

to avoid it? That was not clear.

Interviewer:

WAS IT A BEAUTIFUL SUNSET?

McNamara:

It was lovely. It was lovely. It was a typical fall sunset in

Washington, mid-October sunset.

Interviewer:

DID YOU THINK THAT WAS-

McNamara:

Clear day. Absolutely gorgeous.

Interviewer:

THINK THOSE THOUGHTS PASSED THROUGH MANY PEOPLE'S MINDS THAT WERE-

McNamara:

I don't know. It was not a thought I discussed with others.

Interviewer:

LET ME ASK YOU BRIEFLY ABOUT THE JUPITERS. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE ROLE

OF THE JUPITERS WERE IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRI-- EISENHOWER SAID THEY

WORTH-WORTHLESS RIGHT FROM THE START.

McNamara:

The Jupiter missiles became an issue, as I recall, when Khrushchev at

one point late in the period, it would have been Thursday, Friday,

Saturday of the last week in effect made an offer to as I remember it,

remove the Soviet offensive forces, aircraft and missiles from Cuba, if

we would both agree not to invade Cuba and remove what were known as

Jupiter missiles, intermediate range nuclear tipped missiles in the US

forces based in Turkey. Up to that point he had indicated that they

might remove the missiles from Cuba if-- an offensive forces from Cuba,

if we agreed not to invade Cuba. Then he suddenly threw in this new

element. And it was a very shrewd move on his part. Because while the

Soviets feared the missiles, perhaps, they were a pile of junk. They

required hours and hours to bring them to readiness, the were

unreliable, they were obsolete as a matter of fact, President Kennedy

had asked the government particularly the State Department some time

previously to consider ways and means of removing them. This was

delicate because at that point we had nothing to replace them with,

physically, on the spot. And the Turks looked upon them as an important

supplement to the defense of Turkey. It would have been bad enough to

try to negotiate removal of those missiles with the Turks without a

Soviet threat. But to remove the missiles from Turkey under Soviet

threat was just inconceivable. It would indicate to the Turks a loss of

will, a lack of will on the part of the US And they would question the

value of our commitment to their defense. So it was inconceivable that

we would yield to that threat. And yet, should we go to war over an

obsolete weapon that was a pile of junk. There is a great danger that

you will try to deal with and solve political problems with military

action. This was a political problem, it wasn't a military problem.

Nobody in the Defense Department felt the weapons were worth a damn.

Should we ... go to war or run the risk of going to war with the

Soviets because we couldn't take care of a political problem with the

Turks. And essentially we said no. And this was a story that for, I

would say, 20 years wasn't told. And one of the reasons it wasn't told

was that there were only about five people I think knew it the

President, Bobby Kennedy, Dean Rusk, myself, I believe Mac Bundy. I

don't think there were any others. And what we knew was that we had a

discussion similar to what I just related my God, don't initiate

military action to solve a political problem. Try to solve a political

problem by other means. And what we conceived of was saying to the

Soviets, we had intended to take those out. We are not going to take

them out if you say that is one of the conditions of your removing the

missiles and the offensive aircraft of Cuba. You must remove those

weapons from Cuba unconditionally. Now, we will tell you that separate

from that action, we will take the Jupiters out of Turkey. Moreover, if

you ever say or even imply that our removal of those missiles from

Turkey were a condition of your removing the missiles from Cuba our

weapons will go back immediately and yours will never get in Cuba. This

message was passed to the Soviets by Robert Kennedy, first to Dobrynin,

through Dobrynin to Khrushchev personally. The Soviets never violated

the understanding that we then had with them, in the slightest degree.

There was never one hint from the Soviets or one statement from the

Soviets that we removed the missiles from Turkey, which we did, because

of their pressure or threat. What we actually did was I went back to

the Pentagon, and I called one of my most trusted associates, John

McNaughton, who was then the Assistant Secretary of International

Security and I said John, I want you personally to get in touch with

the proper military authorities to instruct them to remove the Jupiters

from Turkey and to take them to Italy, to cut them up, I mean literally

cut them up with acetylene torches, and bring me photographs of the cut

up missiles, and I don't want you to ask me why I'm doing this. And I

don't want you to give any instruction to anybody else as to why it's

being done. Just instruct them to do it, period. It was done. We got

the photgraphs.

Interviewer:

SO IT WAS A DEAL?

McNamara:

No, it wasn't a deal. We had-- the President had instructed State and

Defense prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, to get those missiles out of

Cuba. I mean out of Turkey. And he had instructed them to do it because

they were no-- they were worthless. And we in a sense were on the way

of doing it, State was thinking about how to negotiate with the Turks

the removal of weapons that we knew were worthless, but which they put

some mythical value on.

Interviewer:

SO THEY TURNED OUT TO BE VERY USEFUL IN A SENSE.

McNamara:

Well, in a sense that it probably facilitated the Soviet decision to

remove their offensive weapons from-

Interviewer:

IT HELPED KHRUSHCHEV TO SAVE SOME FACE IN A SENSE.

McNamara:

Yes, I think probably that's the case.

Interviewer:

HOW CONCERNED WERE YOU ABOUT THAT? ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV'S SITUATION AND HIS

EXCOMM?

McNamara:

Well, we were-- we were concerned not with his survival as a political

leader, literally or figuratively, and of course he didn't survive

figuratively, he didn't survive politically. He was forced out some

months after that. And I think almost surely it's a function of his

misjudgment in initiating this action that led to this tremendous

crisis and what I think was widely recognized in the West and in the

East as a crisis in which the US prevailed. We were, we were concerned

not with behaving in a way that related to Khrushchev's political

survival, but rather to something that was in a sense comparable. We

were concerned, and the President was particularly concerned about

behaving in a way that didn't force Khrushchev or his associates in a

corner, in which they felt that, I'll call it the Soviet honor was at

stake. And that regardless of the cost they must act in a, in a

military manner, which might carry with it very heavy costs, both for

them and us. So every possible effort was made to avoid that pressure

on the on the Soviets. I think that is one of the most important

lessons to learn from this crisis. Give your an opponent an out. Look

at the crisis from his point of view. I don't mean to say be weak,

that's not my point at all. My point is, look at the crisis from his

point of view, look at the options that you are considering from his

point of view. Try to pick an option that achieves your purpose at

minimal cost to him, political, military, otherwise to him. That avoids

pushing him into an emotional frame of mind in which he is likely to

lash out irrationally with great cost to him and you.

Responding to crises in the Nuclear Age

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK IF KHRUSHCHEV HAD NOT REMOVED THE MISSILES ON SUNDAY THAT

YOU WOULD HAVE ENDED UP WITH...

McNamara:

I like not to think about that. We, we were successful. I stop there.

Interviewer:

HOW GREAT WERE THE PRESSURES-

McNamara:

I stop there except to think of the lessons, because I think there are

many lessons to learn from that episode.

Interviewer:

BUT DO YOU -- WE'LL GET TO THOSE IN A SECOND -- BUT WERE YOU FEELING

THAT YOU'D JUST ABOUT RUN OUT OF TIME IN TERMS-

McNamara:

Well, the reason I felt so concerned Saturday evening, as I say, I

wondered whether I'd ever see another Saturday sunset, was that events

were moving out of control. There were forces at work in the Soviet

Union, in the West, that very possibly would have escalated, perhaps

not through initiation or action by the West, I hoped it wouldn't come

that way, perhaps the Soviets would move in some fashion moved. And

they had Castro to think of. Perhaps they weren't entirely in control

of his actions. They had the troops to think of perhaps they weren't

entirely in control of them. At that point neither we nor they had what

are known as permissive action links in all of our weapons, nuclear

weapons. We didn't have them in all of ours, and we were almost certain

they didn't have it in even a few of theirs. These are automatic call

it barriers, preventing troops on the spot from launching nuclear

weapons without an external input of authorization from the President.

And we therefore had every reason to believe that those nuclear weapons

on this soil of Cuba could be launched by personnel on Cuba without any

authority from outside. So all of these factors together were on our

minds, and we would have been less than human if we didn't face the

future with great concern.

Interviewer:

BUT IN TERMS OF THESE MEETINGS, I MEAN, WERE THE MILITARY PEOPLE OR THE

SO-CALLED HAWKS IN THESE MEETINGS STARTING TO GAIN MORE-

McNamara:

No, no.

Interviewer:

CREDIBILITY AS THE DAYS WENT ON? BECAUSE--

McNamara:

No. The military were very well disciplined in this situation. They

weren't putting what I'm going to call pressure on me or the President

to change our course. They were carrying out the preparations for

military escalation, should those become necessary. That was perfectly

proper that they should. As a matter of fact, as I remember, we called

up reserves during those last few days both to indicate to the Soviets

will and intent, and also as a perfectly proper preparatory move toward

possible use of military force. And the military were going through

very detailed planning for application of force. But, but I didn't feel

that they were breathing down my neck just panting for the opportunity

to unleash military power, not at all. The military in our society

understand war better than most civilians do. And I never thought that

they were trying to push us into war. I didn't feel it then, and I

didn't feel it on other occasions.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER THE SUNDAY MORNING WHEN YOU HEARD THE NEWS THAT

KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO...

McNamara:

Well, I remember the great feeling of relief.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER THE INCIDENT AT ALL?

McNamara:

No, I don't recall. I think I was in the Pentagon at the time. I was

either there or the White House, and I don't remember which.

Interviewer:

WAS THERE A GET TOGETHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE?

McNamara:

Oh I'm sure there was. I'm sure there was afterwards. I-- I don-"t

recall my- I was overwhelmed by joy at the at the recognition that we

would not face the need to decide whether to escalate or not escalate,

in a way that carried with it very ugly risks, and the burden of that

potential decision was removed very suddenly. And it was with a

magnificent sense of relief that I went through the rest of the day.

Interviewer:

IT MUST HAVE ALMOST FELT LIKE BEING REBORN IN A WAY.

McNamara:

Really literally reborn, you're right.

Interviewer:

AND HAD ANOTHER CHANCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT SOME OF THE MILITARY PEOPLE

WERE UPSET BY THAT. I MEAN, THEY HAD WANTED TO GO IN AND GET IT OVER-

McNamara:

No, no, well-

Interviewer:

ON TUESDAY MORNING. THERE ARE STORIES ABOUT LEMAY AND ANDERSON.

McNamara:

Well, there were-- I don't want to comment by name on who thought what.

But I do want to confirm your point that the word "some" connotes many,

it wasn't many, it was a very small group of both military and

civilians. It wasn't by any means only military. Uh. those small group

of civilian and military leaders, civilian particularly in the

Congress, more in the Congress than in anywhere in the government than

anywhere in the executive branch, a small group of both civilian and

military leaders believed that we had missed an opportunity to throw

Castro out of Cuba. And they thought we should have in a sense shaped

our actions to take advantage of that and removed him, which we

certainly had the military power to do.

Interviewer:

YOU WEREN'T ONE OF THESE?

McNamara:

I certainly wasn't. And I'd say 80 percent of the senior military, and

I'm speaking of chiefs and senior military leaders were not part of

that group.

Interviewer:

ONE LAST QUESTION BEFORE WE GET INTO THESE ... YOU THEN YOU TOLD US

WHEN AUSTIN AND I WERE HERE LAST TIME THAT YOUR FEELING AFTER IT WAS

THAT SOME OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED.

McNamara:

Well, I felt that there'd been some misunderstanding between civilian

and military authorities during the crisis. Some indication that

certain military leaders might not fully comprehend the limitations

that one should consider perfectly appropriate on military action in a

nuclear age, and that therefore it'd be wise to make some changes, and

I did recommend certain changes to the President, and he approved, and

we did make them.

Interviewer:

YOU TOLD US YOU WANTED TO CHANGE TWO OF THEM, RIGHT?

McNamara:

Well let me simply say that I recommended to the President that he

remove one of the senior officers and he approved.

Interviewer:

ANDERSON-- I SPOKE TO ANDERSON BY THE WAY THE OTHER DAY -- AND HE

STILL-- HE HAS QUITE A BIT OF RESPECT FOR YOU-

McNamara:

Well I want to stress I have for him. He's a magnificent officer.

Interviewer:

HE GOT ON THE COVER OF TIME MAGAZINE DURING THIS WHOLE EPISODE, DO YOU

REMEMBER THAT? HE'S VERY PROUD OF THAT. THERE'S A PHOTOGRAPH OF HIM ON

THE COVER OF TIME MAGAZINE. BUT HE SAID, I THINK DURING THE CRISIS, HE

FELT VERY HURT IN A SENSE BY-

McNamara:

I think he did.

Interviewer:

BY YOU AND BY THE-

McNamara:

I think he did. And as I suggest, I think in a sense he had reason to

feel hurt. Because we were behaving in ways that were not traditional.

And the reason we were behaving in ways that were not traditional is

because this was a crisis of the nuclear age, and I'll call it

traditional behavior had not yet adjusted to the nuclear age. I think

it began to do so. That was in a sense a watershed in behavior response

to crises-

Interviewer:

CAN YOU SAY THAT AGAIN?

McNamara:

Pre-nuclear and post-nuclear.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU SAY THAT AGAIN AND SAY THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN A SENSE

WAS--

McNamara:

The Cuban Missile Crisis was, in a sense, a watershed dividing the

pre-nuclear and the nuclear age, and establishing forms of behavior. I

hope norms of behavior that are appropriate for the nuclear age that

were quite different from the norms of behavior in the pre-nuclear age.

And it was that, it was that difficulty in shifting very quickly from a

pre-nuclear form of behavior to a post-nuclear form of behavior that

came quite considerable difficulties certain of the military leaders.

And one can understand why. They'd spent a lifetime training for

response in a pre-nuclear period. Almost none of them had any training

or any experience in forms of response appropriate to a nuclear age.

[END OF TAPE D04005]

Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

BEFORE WE GET TO THE PARITY-- HOW DID THE MISSILE CRISIS AFFECT YOU

PERSONALLY? DID IT CHANGE YOU IN ANY WAY DO YOU THINK?

McNamara:

Well, it was the first-

Interviewer:

CAN YOU START AGAIN?

McNamara:

I'll start over again. The Cuban missile Crisis for the second time,

but very early in my tenure as Secretary of Defense, I was in the

second year of my service, concentrated my attention on the risk-

Interviewer:

OK. LET'S GO.

McNamara:

The Cuban Missile Crisis for the second time in my tenure as Secretary

of Defense, the first being the Berlin Crisis of the previous year,

concentrated my attention on the risks of military action in the

nuclear age. The situation is totally different today or then from what

it was in the pre-nuclear period. And I don't think our doctrine then,

and I'm not even sure our doctrine today takes full account of that.

But for 12 or 13 days, we lived with the knowledge that a military

response or a military action initiated by either party might well

escalate into possible use of nuclear weapons. Not that either side

would wish to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, but would possibly

escalate to use of nuclear weapons because of I'll call it the fog of

war that political leaders are enveloped in any confrontation. I don't

think the public can understand the restrictions on I'll call it

rational action, rational response to political and military crises.

The restrictions are lack of information, misinformation, emotion; and

these combine to bring misjudgments. Now misjudgments in any situation

involving political confrontation or military confrontation between two

great powers or two great alliances are potentially very costly and we

must try to avoid them. But misjudgments that conceivably could lead to

initiation of use of nuclear weapons could be disastrous, and they

could occur. And there's a great danger that one side in a nuclear age,

fearing that other may ultimately be forced to nuclear action, will

preempt, even though they know how dangerous that is. And you say,

well, that's, that's not possible. Look at the Middle East in July-- in

June of '67. The Israelis knew as we did that the Egyptians were

building up their forces. The Israelis were fearful that the Egyptians

would launch against them not nuclear but conventional forces. The

Israelis preempted it. Preemption is a perfectly rational military

option in a pre-nuclear age. Preemption through the age of nuclear

forces in the nuclear age is disaster. But it is the kind of risk that

one must avoid. And the way to avoid it is to avoid crisis. And one of

the major lessons we should draw from the Cuban Missile Crisis is

anticipate potential crises ahead of time and take actions that

minimize the risk of those crises developing. Look at the Falkland

issue. Surely Britain didn't wish to go to war with the Argentines.

Clearly the Argentines didn't wish to go to war with Britain. The

people who initiated that war are now in jail. They clearly didn't want

a war with Britain. Britain and the Argentines should have worked ahead

of time to avoid that. The Soviet Union and the US could have made

their intentions clear to each other before the Cuban Missile Crisis

and avoided that crisis. The Israelis and the Egyptians could have made

their intentions clearer before the June '67 crisis. We today could

make clearer what I hope is our determination to defend the existence

of Israel under all circumstances. We have not done so, to this day,

there is no security treaty between the US and Israel. What are the

Soviets to think about that? I say that carries with it an unnecessary

risk. We should try, one of the major lessons of the Cuban Missile

Crisis is anticipate crises, try to avoid them, make clear to the other

side your intended behavior under certain circumstances.

Interviewer:

DID IT ALTER YOUR PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

McNamara:

Not really. I didn't think before the Cuban missile crisis that nuclear

warheads were weapons. I try to distinguish between the term warheads

on the one hand and weapons on the other. We had nuclear warheads. We

didn't have weapons in the sense that you could initiate the use of

warheads as though they were conventional explosives in a typical

military operation with potential benefit to yourself or with the

intent of achieving a political objective. Weapons are the military

hardware which you can initiate the use of under certain circumstances

to achieve a political objective and a potential advantage to yourself.

There is no circumstance, in my opinion, under which you can initiate

the use of nuclear hardware to achieve a political advantage or with

benefit to yourself. None. And therefore the warheads are not weapons.

They weren't then and they aren't today.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK IT CHANGED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S VIEW OF THE ROLE OF

NUCLEAR...

McNamara:

I think he in a sense went through the same thought processes I d-- I

did.

Interviewer:

BUT A LITTLE LA-- BUT LATER PERHAPS-

McNamara:

No, I think then.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE-

McNamara:

No, no, I think then. I think one of them, neither one of us at that

date expressed quite as clearly as I hope I have now the distinction

between a warhead and a weapon, or, nor did we divide military hardware

into two categories. Hardware, military hardware that represents

weapons that you can use, initiate the use of to achieve a political

end and a potential advantage for yourself versus military hardware

that you couldn't initiate the use of to achieve a political end and

potential advantage to yourself. The second category not being weapons,

the first category are weapons. That, that is a, I'll call it a

rationalization of my thoughts that developed at the period but I've

expressed since then. But, I think that Kennedy very clearly understood

the necessity of avoiding unintended escalation in a nuclear age. He,

he had earlier, I'm almost sure I'm correct in saying this, he had,

prior to the missile crisis, he had asked each member of the Security

Council to read the first chapter of Barbara Tuchman's book, The Guns

of August, which describes the way that powers bungled into the First

World War without any intention of starting the First World War. And

he, in a sense he said, read that, recognize that it was a tragedy to

bungle into the First World War that way. It'll be the end of

civilization if we bungle into a nuclear war that way.

Interviewer:

MANY PEOPLE FEEL THAT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HELPED PRECIPITATE THE

ATMOSPHERIC TEST BAN TREATY.

McNamara:

I don't think so.

Interviewer:

THAT KENNEDY WAS SO FRIGHTENED-

McNamara:

No. No.

Interviewer:

BY THE MISSILE CRISIS-

McNamara:

No, no. I don't think that was the case. We were thinking of moving

toward a test ban treaty before the Cuban Missile Crisis, and we

continued to do so afterwards.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THIS WAS THE MOST SERIOUS NUCLEAR CRISIS?

McNamara:

I do. I do-

Interviewer:

CAN YOU PUT THAT INTO A SENTENCE?

McNamara:

The, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a very serious crisis, more serious I

would think than the Berlin Crisis of the previous year, although that

also carried with it potential use of nuclear weapons. Not that we

considered that, but under certain circumstances these things can

escalate to that. I think that the June '67 war was a very serious

crisis. At one point Kosygin sent Johnson a message which said, in

effect, if you want war you'll get war. So during the seven years I was

Secretary, we had three occasions on which confrontation between East

and West carried with it the very high risk of military escalation. And

once that starts in the nuclear age, then the risk of use of nuclear

weapons is totally unacceptable to me. Because emotions take hold the

mindsets of emotional people take hold. We have today between the two

of us 50,000 nuclear weapons. We have contingency plans, military

strategy, war plans, force deployments training missions -- all

designed to support the use of those if necessary. Now, if you take

that set of condi-- you take that environment and you see military

escalation moving up in that environment, there is a, to me, totally

unacceptable risk that those weapons will be used. And Kennedy realized

that at the time. It's much greater today than it was then.

Arms build up after the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

KUZNETSOV IS QUOTED AS SAYING TO JOHN MCCLOY THAT "YOU'LL NEVER DO THIS

TO US AGAIN." MANY PEOPLE HAVE THOUGHT--RIGHT AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE

CRISIS--MANY PEOPLE HAVE THOUGHT THAT THIS PUSHED THE SOVIETS TO BUILD

UP.

McNamara:

Well, I think it did. I think it pushed them to build up both their

conventional forces and their nuclear forces. I think they realized

that, as we did, and that as some of our critics did not -- or

commentators did not -- that we prevailed because of conventional

power. And I think therefore when Kuznetsov said you'll never do this

to us again they believed it necessary to build both their conventional

and their nuclear power, which they have been doing since that time.

Now, as I, as I suggest today there is not Soviet superiority in

nuclear power, there is parity. So as they have built we have built and

we've maintained parity. It existed then, it exists today.

Interviewer:

DID ANYONE WIN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

McNamara:

I don't like to use the word "win." I think we prevailed. There's a

slight difference. We prevailed in the sense we achieved our political

objective. We tried not to I'll call it win. We, the President made

very clear, after he received the notice from Khrushchev that he was

removing the missiles that we were not to boast about it. We were not

to convey to the public that we had "won," because almost surely that

would carry with it some Soviet response. And then you're on another

train of potential escalation.

Interviewer:

IN A SENSE, THE SOVIETS ALSO ACHIEVED THEIR AIM IF THEIR AIM WAS TO

DEFEND CUBA FROM INVASION.

McNamara:

Well they had no reason to believe we were going to invade Cuba. We had

no plans to invade Cuba.

Interviewer:

WELL, THE-

McNamara:

It's inconceivable--

Interviewer:

THE BAY OF PIGS--

McNamara:

Oh, well, my God, we learned -- in the first place that wasn't

invasion, that was-

Interviewer:

THERE WERE ALL SORTS OF ATTEMPTS TO KILL CASTRO, YOU KNOW...

McNamara:

Anyhow, the Bay of Pigs was a debacle. And let me just simply say that

the US government, the Kennedy administration, had no plans whatsoever

to invade Cuba, with or without the missile crisis. No plans to invade

Cuba without the missile crisis.

Interviewer:

BUT I MEAN THAT'S ONE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S-THAT'S WHAT HE SAYS; THAT HE

WANTED TO DEFEND CUBA.

McNamara:

Well, look, if you'd gone through what he'd gone through, you'd seek

for explanations that you hadn't lost completely.

Interviewer:

AND YOU DON'T THINK THAT ALL THE CIA ACTIVITIES IN CUBA, THESE ATTEMPTS

TO KILL CASTRO, THAT HAVE COME OUT SINCE THE..., THAT THEY WERE BLOWING

UP BRIDGES AND ALL THAT TYPE OF THING COULD HAVE...

McNamara:

No. No.

Interviewer:

COULD HAVE PROVOKED THAT KIND OF THING?

McNamara:

No. No, I do not. I do not. And I don't by that answer, I don't wish to

convey that I believe there were attempts to kill Castro. I won't argue

the point, but I just don't want the answer misunderstood.

Interviewer:

LET'S NOT GET INTO THAT. LET'S JUST CONCLUDE THEN IN TERMS OF LESSONS,

OTHER LESSONS THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO DRAW FROM.

McNamara:

Well there's one-There's one lesson I'd like to mention, because I'm

not certain that it's a conclusion accepted even today and it certainly

had not been as vividly in our mind prior to the Cuban missile crisis

as in was in mine and I believe the President's after the Cuban missile

crisis. And that is that, as absurd as it may sound, I believe that

parity in nuclear forces existed in October of 1962. It existed at a

time when we had an advantage of 20 to one. We had 6,000 strategic

nuclear warheads; they had 300. And yet, parity existed. Now why?

Because I define parity as a condition ... of mind, a condition of the

holder of nuclear weapons that believes he cannot initiate the use of

those nuclear weapons against his opponent with advantage to himself,

and that his opponent feels exactly the same way. Now that is parity.

That condition certainly exists today. We have 11,000 strategic nuclear

warheads, they have roughly 10,000. Clearly it exists. Some people say

they have superiority. That's absolutely absurd. But clearly parity

does exist today. It existed then, because we did not believe we could

initiate the use of one or ten or a hundred, or all 6,000 of those

6,000 warheads directed against their 300 with advantage to us. So we

were deterred from initiating their use. Parity existed. And a second

point to make is that the band to parity was then very wide, and it is

very wide today. The band of parity in a sense was measured by 20-to-1.

And what that tells you is that arms control agreements do need to be

drawn to be verifiable, it is absolutely essential that we not enter

into an agreement that can't be verified. It is absolutely essential

that we verify adherence. It is absolutely essential that we insist on

adherence. But it is not correct to believe that deviations from arms

control agreements will occur so covertly, so suddenly as to endanger

our security. They will not, because the band of parity is so wide that

before the deviations from an arms control agreement destroyed parity

and put us at risk, we will have detected it. Now that is a very

important lesson affecting arms control negotiations. I don't think

it's yet learned, I don't think it's yet accepted.

Interviewer:

APART FROM THE FEW PARTICIPANTS WHO ARE STILL ALIVE AND WENT THROUGH

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS THAT PEOPLE

TODAY HAVE PARTIALLY FORGOTTEN-- THE KIDS WE SPOKE TO, KIDS WE SPOKE TO

JUST BEFORE WE CAME OVER HERE AT THE CEMETERY WERE SAYING, OH, THE

AMERICANS WON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. WE WERE TOUGH AND WE STOOD THEM

DOWN, AND TOUGH GUYS CAN WIN, IN A SENSE.

McNamara:

I think that today, the American people almost intuitively accept the

basic lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We must behave in ways to try

to avoid confrontations. Because confrontations in the nuclear age

carry the risk of nuclear war. Secondly, in the event of

confrontations, we must minimize the risk that anyone of our actions,

political or military, will escalate to nuclear war. I think the

American people quite clearly certainly intuitively understand those

lessons. And they are very important lessons. What I don't think they

understand are the particulars of how to apply those lessons. Because

we are behaving in way with respect to arms control, with respect to

weapons development, with respect to weapons deployment, that run

counter to those lessons. We should change the application of the

lessons. We should change our behavior to more closely conform to the

lessons.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE FORGOTTEN THE LESSONS OF THE-

McNamara:

Well, I don't want to charge this administration with greater

insensitivity that previous administrations. Neither our military nor

political leaders have thought carefully enough intensively enough

continually enough about affecting and modifying our strategy, our

weapons development programs, our weapons deployment programs, our arms

control agreements to take account of those lessons and to be more

appropriate for this very dangerous period we're living in.

[END OF TAPE D04006 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-4f1mg7fx30

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-4f1mg7fx30).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 5550d3077d1e12f87a2af4ccb0d688d3a827c3ba (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [1],” 1986-02-20, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 22, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx30.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [1].” 1986-02-20. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 22, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx30>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx30