War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Fyoder Burlatsky, 1987

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 719000-722000 FYODER BURLATSKY

[1]

Reasons behind the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

THE FIRST THING IS, WHAT DO YOU THINK MOTIVATED KHRUSHCHEV IN PUTTING

THE MISSILES IN CUBA?

Burlatsky:

There were two causes. The first was connected with the defense of

Cuba, and the second Khrushchev wanted a balance of power between the

U.S. and USSR. This was the first move towards parity, the first

exploration in this direction.

Interviewer:

WAS HE IN ANY WAY MOTIVATED BY CHINESE PRESSURE TO SHOW THAT HE IS ON

THE FOREFRONT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES?

Burlatsky:

No, I don't think it was connected to the Chinese problem. At that

time, the Chinese leadership was against any steps in that direction.

They criticized Khrushchev because he put the missiles in, because he

took the missiles out... So I think that it was a Soviet-American

problem, not Sino-Soviet.

Interviewer:

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS KHRUSHCHEV MOTIVATED BY WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN

BERLIN? WAS BERLIN RELATED TO CUBA, AND HOW?

Burlatsky:

I don't think there was a direct link between Berlin and Cuba. One can

think of a link only in one context of relations and power struggles

between the U.S. and USSR But the Cuban story had its own specifics.

Foremost, it related to a desire to protect Cuba after aggressive acts,

and as I said before, to Khrushchev's desire for a show of power.

Interviewer:

WAS KHRUSHCHEV SURPRISED BY THE AMERICAN RESPONSE?

Burlatsky:

Of course. He didn't expect such a reaction.

Interviewer:

START FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SENTENCE. "KHRUSHCHEV WAS..."

Burlatsky:

...didn't expect. I think, since I know Khrushchev personally, that he

wasn't counting on that. That, in general, he had no idea what would

happen after he'd taken the first step. How would the Americans reply,

how would the Soviets reply, and what would occur afterwards?

Therefore, John Kennedy's reaction was a surprise.

Interviewer:

DO YOU KNOW THE STORY THAT MCNAMARA TELLS ABOUT THIS LONG TELEX THAT

KENNEDY GOT FROM KHRUSHCHEV? CAN YOU DESCRIBE TO ME THE MOOD? HOW DID

KHRUSHCHEV FEEL, AND HOW DID THE TELEX COME ABOUT? DO YOU REMEMBER THE

TELEX? THE SECOND TELEX, VERY LONG TELEX... SAYING "WE SHOULDN'T PULL

TOO HARD, BECAUSE IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDO..."

Burlatsky:

This was during the culmination of the crisis, and Khrushchev really

began to feel the threat of the two-sided nuclear attack. He wanted to

avert this threat at any cost. This Telex was designed to produce the

same feelings in John Kennedy, the urgency of preventing the crisis at

any cost.

Interviewer:

BEFORE THAT, I'M GOING A LITTLE BIT BACK... IS THERE NOW GOOD

INFORMATION ABOUT WHETHER TOGETHER WITH THE MISSILES THERE WERE

WARHEADS?

Burlatsky:

We discussed that issue during the meeting at Harvard and all Soviet

and American participants came to the conclusion that there were no

nuclear warheads in Cuba.

Interviewer:

DO YOU KNOW WHERE WERE THEY, THE WARHEADS INTENDED FOR THE MISSILES IN

CUBA?

Burlatsky:

I heard from American colleagues that some warheads were being sent,

they were on a boat going from the USSR towards the U.S., but I never

heard such information from Soviet authorities.

Interviewer:

WHO HAS THAT INFORMATION NOW? WHO CAN WE ASK?

Burlatsky:

Maybe Gromyko.

Interviewer:

ALONG THE SAME LINE, THE DAWNING OF THE U-2. WHO SHOT -- IT WAS SOME

MISSILE -- BUT, WHO SHOT DOWN THE U-2?

Burlatsky:

I heard two versions about that. One, that the Soviet military did it,

in spite of strict orders from Khrushchev not to provoke the Americans.

Two, that the Cubans did it. As far as my point of view, I'm convinced

that the Soviet military didn't do it, because of strict orders from

Khrushchev. But I can't prove the Cubans did it. To this day the

episode remains a riddle.

Interviewer:

IT'S HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT A CUBAN INFANTRY UNIT ATTACKS SAM-2

MISSILES, TAKES IT OVER AND RIGHT AWAY SHOOTS A PLANE, IT'S A

COMPLICATED PIECE OF MACHINERY...

Burlatsky:

Yes, what you're saying is logical. Really, its hard to believe that

the Cubans could get a missile installment and assimilate the

technology to shoot down an airplane. But on the other hand, we have no

information that the Soviet military did it.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU EXPLAIN -- CAN YOU TELL ME THE FIRST STORY, BUT AS A FULL

SENTENCE?

Burlatsky:

I know for a fact that Khrushchev gave the order to our military to in

no case do anything that would provoke American sensitivities during

the crisis. Besides, it's hard for me to believe that our commanding

general would go against such a strict order from Khrushchev. On the

other hand, it's hard to believe that the Cubans seized a missile

installment and were in command of the technology to shoot down a

plane. I'm putting forth that, for the time being, this remain a

riddle. New information is needed in order to answer that question.

Interviewer:

THE MOOD IN MOSCOW DURING...SUNDAY. YOU TOLD ME A GOOD STORY LAST TIME

IN ENGLISH ABOUT SATURDAY AND THE TENSION HERE. CAN YOU REPEAT IT? THE

MOOD IN MOSCOW THAT SATURDAY...

Burlatsky:

About Black Saturday? I recollect a Black Saturday, October 27, 1962. A

colleague and I worked with in the Central Committee were leaving the

building together, and he asked me: "Did you send your family to the

country?" I asked why I should send my family to the country. "Because

there could be a surprise nuclear attack by the Americans," he said.

Later, when I was at Harvard I learned that the Americans had the same

feeling, that John Kennedy gave the same order to his people that they

send their families to the country.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE MOOD OF KHRUSHCHEV WHEN -- UNDER WHAT

CIRCUMSTANCES DID KHRUSHCHEV DECIDE TO WITHDRAW THE MISSILES?

Burlatsky:

I think that was after Robert Kennedy's visit to Dobrynin, when they

concluded a secret agreement on the Turkish bases. That made the cup

overflow, and Khrushchev seized the opportunity to arrive at a

compromise. He got a guarantee, not to attack Cuba, and an American

promise to remove the missiles in Cuba.

Interviewer:

IN RETROSPECT, WHAT DID YOU LEARN FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS? WHAT

DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER?

[END OF TAPE 719000]

World Leaders on Nuclear Weapons

Interviewer:

WHAT IS THE BASIC LESSON THAT YOU THINK SHOULD BE REMEMBERED FROM THE

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Burlatsky:

...Oh yes, I understood. First, from what I learned from Kennedy's

books (the ones he wrote or owned, unclear), nuclear weapons are a club

one can't use. Americans had six times more bombs, and yet they

couldn't use them against us. The second thing I understood is that

both sides have plenty of weapons for a counter attack, and so the

weapons race is ridiculous from the security standpoint. Third, what I

understood from our meetings with McNamara and other representatives of

the American administration is that it is impossible to control the

nuclear crisis. Here there are so many competing factors, political and

psychological, that it is impossible to come to a decision that would

be adequate to the situation. This is probably the most important,

that... were against the arms race and against the use if nuclear

weapons at all.

Interviewer:

OKAY. WE'LL MOVE TO PRESENT DAY... WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG

SOVIET LEADERS TOWARD THE NOTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS? TRY TO MAKE IT

CONCISE, AND TRY TO MAKE THE DIFFERENCES -- I KNOW THAT "EVERYBODY

WANTS PEACE, EVERYBODY WANTS PEACE," BUT THERE ARE VARIANTS...

Burlatsky:

I think that huge changes took place from Stalin to Gorbachev in our

leadership's attitude towards nuclear weapons. For Stalin, it was a

problem of getting even with the... Americans, because they invented

the atom bomb. Stalin was shocked that they had acquired superiority,

and wanted to catch up at any price. For Khrushchev, nuclear weapons

were a problem of achieving parity with the U.S. Stalin couldn't even

dream of that. He just wanted to create nuclear weapons. And Khrushchev

was already beginning to dream of parity. I remember, during the 22nd

Party Congress, we were testing some of the biggest nuclear bombs in

the world. But, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, he felt something

new--that no one can use nuclear weapons, and that the process had to

be stopped. Unhappily, John Kennedy and Khrushchev disappeared from the

political arena, and at that time, we lost a wonderful chance to stop

nuclear weapons. For Brezhnev, who was a conservative by nature, this

was.... The problem of nuclear weapons was, so to say, a... one. He

took the track that was prepared for him, and traveled that way.

Military buildup continued. And he knew that, with military buildup, we

could maintain parity with the United States. He did so perhaps without

thinking much about the future. Under Brezhnev, the SS-20 missile was

developed. To a certain degree, this created to new situation in

Europe. Andropov looked at the nuclear weapons situation in a

completely new way. Foremost, it was a security issue for him; also, a

problem of parity and of his relationship to the West. He accomplished

very little, but managed to announce the necessity of sharp cutbacks of

nuclear weapons in the face of military opposition, cutbacks foremost

in Europe, on the whole between the U.S. and USSR, and East and West...

Well, Chernenko didn't succeed in defining his views on nuclear

weapons. And Gorbachev...

Interviewer:

A BIT LONGER SENTENCE ABOUT CHERNENKO.

Burlatsky:

But he told nothing about this.

Interviewer:

HE DIDN'T WRITE ABOUT IT, DIDN'T THINK ABOUT IT?

Burlatsky:

He didn't have time... I don't know what to say about him... I think

that if Chernenko had remained in power for a while, this is my

personal supposition--that he would have returned to Brezhnev's policy

in the military sphere. But that's my own opinion. Gorbachev came with

a completely new attitude--the attitudes of post-war... The leader of a

new... It became clarified with words known to all: new thinking. He

realized that the continuation of military competition, especially, in

nuclear arms, is absolutely without perspective. It is an investment of

money, time, and minds into something that could destroy Russians,

Americans, and everyone on the planet. The idea of complete elimination

of nuclear weapons interests him; that idea seems illusory to many, but

precisely this idea became a base for, the grounding of social opinion

in the U.S. and, if you like, in the Soviet Union, as a first step in

getting an agreement on medium- and close-range missiles. So I think

that a new principle in our attitude towards nuclear weapons was born.

It gives cause for hope if it becomes generalized, that is, if the West

will think and do the same thing that Gorbachev wants.

Interviewer:

LET ME ASK YOU TWO SETS OF QUESTIONS. ONE ABOUT THE EUROPEAN MISSILE

CRISIS... DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS AWARE THAT THE

SS-20 MIGHT BE USED, OR WOULD PROVOKE, OR WOULD START THE KIND OF

CRISIS THAT WAS STARTED?

Installing the SS-20 in Western Europe

Burlatsky:

I don't think that our leaders really understood the consequences of

installing the SS-20. I don't know if I will be believed in the West,

but I have the feeling that the installment of these missiles was the

result of long-standing military confrontation. Nobody planned it

specially, the installment of the SS-20. A new missile appeared, we had

SS-4 and others for a long time, why not put in a new missile? I offer

that no one for real, no one weighed the political and military

consequences. But later, when Pershing II and cruise missiles appeared,

we were forced to compete. Who wins, who loses? Our leaders knew that

no one could win, and both sides would lose. Us too, in that the

installment of these missiles was a strategic problem for us, and the

installment of the SS-20 was a tactical problem for the Americans,

since these missiles can't reach the United States. So I think that it

is one of the examples, in the West there were the same examples, of

mutual misunderstanding of our problems.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THE ATTITUDE THAT THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT TOOK?

BY THE FEELINGS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, THE FRENCH, THE DUTCH, THE

BELGIANS, AND SO ON? WAS... DO YOU THINK THAT WAS CORRECTLY ESTIMATED

BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP...AT THAT TIME?

Burlatsky:

I think that the European reaction was a surprise for our government.

They even suspected that through the Europeans, the U.S. was trying to

install Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, that it wasn't a

European idea. Only later we began to understand that it is, although

to this day some people think that it isn't the Western Europeans, but

Americans who want to strengthen their power in the Western European

theater and defray the threat, insofar as just at this time, the

American military conception arose about the possibility of a contained

nuclear war. Therefore I think that Western Europe's position to this

day surprises many in the USSR.

Interviewer:

BUT THERE WAS, I THINK, FOR A VERY LONG TIME THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE

THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT WOULD TURN THE GOVERNMENTS AROUND.

Burlatsky:

Of course, maybe some of our leaders hoped that the Western European

anti-nuclear movement was directed against the Pershing II and cruise

missiles, or it could have exerted influence against them. But no one

had illusions and didn't think it would really change the situation or

avert the installment of the American missiles in Western Europe. I

think so because in the beginning of the installment phase of these

missiles, Andropov put forth an offer, if you remember, straight in

line with American and West European wishes.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK IN THIS CONTEXT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN MISSILE

CRISIS, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND

ANDROPOV? CAN YOU TELL ME HOW IT SHIFTED WHEN THE POWER SHIFTED?

Burlatsky:

I think that in some sense, there really were different approaches,

because Brezhnev didn't imagine genuine results from the installment of

the SS-20. And Andropov saw these results. That's in the first place.

And in the second place, because Andropov had a sharp political mind

and could think several moves in advance, he understood that he had to

decide to reduce SS-20 missiles with reciprocal reductions In West

Europe. For him, the only problem was the character of the compromise.

Interviewer:

WOULD YOU TALK IN THIS CONTEXT ABOUT LEAVING THE GENEVA TALKS AND THEN

COMING BACK? WHAT KIND OF THINKING DOES THAT REFLECT? BOTH THE LEAVING

AND THE COMING BACK... WHAT SHIFT IN THINKING, WHAT DIFFERENCE IN

THINKING DOES THAT REPRESENT ON THE SOVIET PART?

Burlatsky:

There was a fairly sharp discussion. Two points of view emerged. One

was that, in all circumstances, we should maintain superiority in

nuclear weapons in the European theater, and the other point of view

was that this superiority will give us absolutely nothing. Contrary to

and dependent on the interrelationship of our missiles and bombs in the

European theater, the increased danger will be a threat. And because of

this, the Soviet side wavered. On the other hand, we saw the same

wavering in West Europe and the United States. They were also having a

battle of differing opinions and approaches to this problem.

Interviewer:

YOU CAN CUT, I NEED THE TRANSLATION... COMING BACK FROM GENEVA, WHAT

MOTIVATED IT?

Burlatsky:

The reasons for our return were what I said, the second viewpoint won.

It proceeded from the idea that military competition with the Americans

in Europe will inflict a loss--to our security, and to the security of

Europe.

Interviewer:

ALL OF THIS WAS HAPPENING AT SORT OF THE LOW OF AMERICAN...

[END OF TAPE 720000]

Soviet-American Relations under Gorbachev and Reagan

Interviewer:

...HOW DID YOU FEEL AT THAT TIME, WHEN THERE WAS A LOW PERIOD OF

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS ABOUT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF REAGAN ON THE

LEGITIMACY OF THE SOVIET UNION?

Burlatsky:

Reagan's saying that the Soviet Union was an "Evil Empire" would shock

any Soviet citizen. As for me personally, I was rather calm. I was

convinced, without any satisfaction on my part, that all kinds of

conservative, dogmatic thought are to be found on both sides of the

ocean. We also have people who think there can be no agreement with

America, because they want to destroy our system and their capitalist

system is in opposition to ours. I remember summit meetings, starting

with Khrushchev and Eisenhower, and looked at Reagan's pronouncements,

if you like, as at the words of an expert politician. I knew that,

sooner or later, the governmental interests of the U.S. would supersede

political rhetoric.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID YOU THINK WHEN YOU HEARD ABOUT THE SDI SPEECH FOR THE FIRST

TIME? AGAIN, NOT NECESSARILY AS AN EXPERT, BUT AS A SOVIET JOURNALIST.

WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND FROM IT? WHAT DID YOU THINK WAS THE INTENTION

OF PRESIDENT REAGAN?

Burlatsky:

When I first heard about SDI, my first feeling was surprise. Even now,

there are naive politicians who believe that it is possible to defend

oneself against nuclear attack. My second feeling was that Reagan had

other objectives, more political than military. I never heard that SDI

could be effective, that one could really ward off a nuclear attack. If

some new system were created, it would be followed by a new offensive

system, and the balance would always be maintained. These are political

goals to put pressure in the Soviet Union, not to give us a chance to

reach parity in industrial/technological development. Now I think that

this goal is gradually evolving in the consciousness of the United

States political leaders. We'll see what happens.

Interviewer:

DID YOU BELIEVE ABOUT THE IDEAS OF SHARING TECHNOLOGY... HE SAID THAT

ONCE IT EXISTED IT COULD BE OFFERED TO THE SOVIET UNION. DID YOU

BELIEVE IN THE NOTION THAT SUCH A TECHNOLOGY IF IT COMES INTO BEING

WOULD BE SHARED?

Burlatsky:

I think the very idea of cooperation in new technology, including

military technology, and especially verification, is a good idea. We

should try it, in spite of our mutual secretiveness. As far as

cooperation in implementing the SDI program, I don't think it will be

effective. Why spend insane amounts of money and effort on a program

which, in my opinion, is ineffective and only stimulates a new round of

escalation?

Interviewer:

LET'S GO THROUGH THE SUMMITS... GENEVA, WHERE YOU PARTICIPATED. TWO

THINGS, SOME SENSE OF PERSONAL PARTICIPATION - WHAT YOU FOUND

IMPRESSIVE, WHAT YOU FOUND INTERESTING BEING THERE... AND WHAT DO YOU

THINK WAS THE ACHIEVEMENT, OR THE FAILURE, OF GENEVA, WHAT EVER IT MAY

BE?

Burlatsky:

The main thing I felt in Geneva was deep satisfaction that two such

unalike leaders could find a common language, they sat facing each

other, touched each other, compared...

Interviewer:

OKAY. SAME QUESTION.

Burlatsky:

(Repeats answer)...The second feeling was about the agreement. Each

side admitted that nuclear war is unthinkable, that there can be no

winner, and based their decisions on long-range perspective, precisely,

on medium-range missiles, 50 percent reductions, and the elimination of

chemical warfare, and other issues. I felt that we were at the brink of

some kind of fundamental breakthrough in Soviet-American relations, and

East-West relations in general. That we were at a historical moment of

the 20th century. I felt that way in Reykjavik and in Washington.

Interviewer:

THE SAME ABOUT REYKJAVIK...

Burlatsky:

We waited during the press conference. We waited for an hour, then

another hour, and learned that the conference was still in session

between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan. I remember the mood among the

Soviet and American journalists. At first, there was great optimism.

Everyone thought that there would be a real agreement, American and

Soviet specialists thought alike. It was like a bomb exploded when,

Gorbachev, coming to the press conference, told us an agreement had not

been reached. That evening, I wrote an article for Literaturnaia Gazeta

entitled "We'll Remain Confident Anyway." It sharply differed from what

was being written on the subject both here and in the United States.

Others were bowled over by the meeting and considered it a failure. My

colleagues reproached me for joking about it. I looked at that meeting

in the context of all the summit meetings and the development of

Soviet-American relations and understood that this was just a stage.

Interviewer:

OKAY. WASHINGTON. AGAIN THE SAME KIND...

Burlatsky:

Before I went to Washington, I published an article called "Optimism

without Illusions." ...there, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed practical

questions. This was a practical stage in Soviet-American relations. It

allowed them to come to an agreement, but both sides knew there were

still many problems, and there were obstacles to further development.

As far as my personal feelings, I got more satisfaction out of the

change in American public opinion. I had been there before. I was there

in October, and I saw new attitudes among simple people, experts,

members of the conservative and liberal parties, toward the Soviets and

Gorbachev. In other words, a new perception, no longer through black or

red glasses, that we're the Reds and you're the Whites. A new

understanding that you and I share the same fate and must take steps to

insure that our grandchildrens' fate isn't tragic.

Interviewer:

LAST QUESTION. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE?

Burlatsky:

I call myself a biological optimist. Some are born happy, other are

born pessimistic, but in politics, this isn't enough. Nonetheless, I

keep guarded optimism about the future. In spite of the problems along

the way, Reagan will come to Moscow soon. I think we can get an

agreement for a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms during his visit.

This is very important, but not the most important. The most important

thing is a change in the psychological climate between East and West.

Now we are in the first stages of a new relationship. I hope that, in

the course of five or ten years, or at least by the end of the century,

we will see each other in a new light.

Interviewer:

ONE MORE THING. CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME GOSSIP FROM THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE

NEGOTIATIONS? HOW DID THEY FIND GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS, I'M TALKING

ABOUT THE INF AGREEMENT. DO YOU HAVE A SENSE OF HOW THEY FELT GOING

THROUGH THAT? WAS IT MORE DIFFICULT THAN OTHER TIMES, WAS IT EASIER? IF

YOU HAVE A SENSE OF IT...

Burlatsky:

We came to the agreement with a lot of hard work. We had to overcome

the traditional, conservative attitudes, not only among the military or

political spheres, but throughout our society. To this day, the

Russians have a complex because of Nazi Germany's surprise attack on

the USSR. Maybe this complex is exaggerated, but it's the same thing

Americans had with Pearl Harbor. You have the same complex--you feel

you have to guard against surprise attacks from real or imagined

enemies. Of course, the Russian/Soviet people, in the course of 100

years before the Revolution and 70 years afterwards, want to be strong,

well-defended. In that respect, we are like Americans. They also want a

strong government, not a weak one. The elimination of such a large

number of missiles took so much work, so many sleepless night, such a

straining of effort. It wasn't a popular idea here. We had to explain

to the simple people why this was necessary. It's necessary from the

standpoint of our security and that of others. It's necessary for our

perspective for the direction we're fighting for--in other words, for

elimination of all nuclear weapons and the of the threat that has been

hanging over all mankind.

Interviewer:

...YOUR MOST GENERAL THINKING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR AGE.

Burlatsky:

The most important thing is that no one was prepared for the nuclear

age. Not only the military and the politicians, but everyone on Earth.

No one wants to die, but few understand how to avoid it. Avoid it, not

for some time, but for always and everyone. Here's what we need to

search for: a completely new way of thinking. For us, the Americans,

and for all the peoples of the Earth. This is a very difficult job, but

I hope it's the path we will all take.

[END OF TAPE 721000]

Origins of the Soviet-American Conflict

Interviewer:

WHAT IS THE AMERICAN-SOVIET CONFLICT ABOUT?

Burlatsky:

I have a particular opinion about the origins of the Soviet-American

conflict. I don't think that the basis for it is two contradictory

systems. I don't think so. Because we and the Americans have existed

for the course of decades without excuses for war, conflicts, or

even... I think that messianic ideas lie at the foundation, which for a

long time have been nurtured on both sides of the ocean. Our belief

that our system is the best example for others, the American belief

that their system is the best example for the world.... From this, we

have false steps and mutual misunderstanding, which the Chinese call

"hegemonism." The U.S. was in the center, in my opinion. They made a

serious mistake after World War II in opting for nuclear weapons, which

were opposed by Einstein and other scientists. We accepted the

challenge, and the Cold War began. It became a traditional policy for

both sides. And only now we are crawling out of the pit that this

policy dragged us into.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THE MAIN REASON FOR THE COLD WAR?

Burlatsky:

I think it was the complex of fear which appeared in the Americans

because we had superiority in conventional forces in Europe, and for us

because the Americans created nuclear forces, which we didn't. This

complex was fortified because both sides were the victims of a surprise

attack, us, by Nazi Germany, and you, by Japan. Out of this arose a

mistaken view that the other side was a brigand, waiting for the right

moment to inflict a blow. For forty years maybe, the Americans believed

that the USSR wanted to take Europe. And for a long time, we believed

that we were threatened by a surprise nuclear attack by the U.S.

Therefore, a false understanding of the genuine aims of the other side,

traditional thinking, that strength necessarily gives rise to war, this

was the foundation of the Cold War.

[END OF TAPE 722000 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Fyoder Burlatsky, 1987

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-3t9d50fz77

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Credits: Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Burlatskii, Fedor Mikhailovich

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 6b38fba47d305bba71730b91c14149ac8952aa15 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
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Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Fyoder Burlatsky, 1987,” 1987-12-22, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 6, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-3t9d50fz77.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Fyoder Burlatsky, 1987.” 1987-12-22. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 6, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-3t9d50fz77>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Fyoder Burlatsky, 1987. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-3t9d50fz77