Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Dean Rusk [1], 1982

You know down in cold water how now you. Just have to V-J Day the United States demobilised almost completely and almost overnight by the summer of 1946 we did not have a single division in our army nor a single group in our Air Force considered ready for combat. Those ships of our Navy that remained afloat were being manned by skeleton crews. Our defense budget for three fiscal years 47 48 49 came down to just a little over 11 billion dollars groping for a target of 10 billions. So it was during that period that Mr. Joseph Stalin could look out across the West and he saw the divisions melting away. We also know that he knew how few atomic bombs we had at that time could kept them on the fingers of one hand. So he tried to keep the northwest province of Iran. He demanded the two eastern

provinces of Turkey supported the guerrillas going after Greece with sanctuaries in places like Albania Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. He ignored the wartime agreements to give the peoples of Eastern Europe some sort of say in their own political future. He worked out the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia blockaded Berlin gave the green light to the North Koreans to go after South Korea. Now despite all the revisionist historians those were the events that started the Cold War we were disarmed. It was not until 1950 that we began to build up our armed forces in any significant fashion. So in a sense we've been picking up the pieces of that disastrously mobilization ever since. I think at the end of World War II the British Chiefs of Staff and Mr Churchill were the executive agents

for the combined Chiefs of Staff and for the U.S. and British governments the United States government at the end of the war became wholly preoccupied with arrangements for the surrender of Germany the occupation of Germany the surrender of Japan and all those problems. So that under Mr. Churchill's guidance despite the attitudes of Franklin Roosevelt during the good part of World War II the great colonial areas of Asia did not emerge immediately as independent nations. The British came back to India Burma Malaysia and the French came back to Indochina and the Dutch came back to Indonesia. So that our relationship to that part of the world consisted mainly and encouraging the move with the British government for independence for India Burma Malaysia or working out the very difficult problems between the Dutch and Indonesia and

to some extent an interest in Indochina. But the French were not really ready to invite us to take much of a part in the Indochina problem. You see very shortly we became involved in the construction of the Marshall Plan and of NATO. Western Europe was the great issue before all of us at that time and the role of France was critical both in the Marshall Plan and in NATO so that we on the one side wanted to work very closely with France and we knew that the aid that we were giving to France was being used in part to support their position in Indochina. But at the same time we knew instinctively that there then relationship in Indochina could not last that it was too late in history for that. So we tried our best to persuade the French to come to a political settlement with the three

nations of Indochina comparable to the way the British and the Dutch had handle their relations and their former colonies. But we did not press the French unduly because we wanted to keep close relationships with France for the Marshall Plan in NATO and we did not want to put such pressure on France as to cause them simply to say all right this is your this is for you. This is Eurobasket you take care of it because we did not want to take responsibility for for that far off place. Under those circumstances. So for some years there we had a rather uneasy relationship with France helping them on the one side pressing them to move toward a political settlement with the governments and the peoples of those three Indo-Chinese countries.

It was good one. We're continuing on what you mean by your work rate by that time by May 1950 the French seem to be ready to accept some kind of political organism there in Indochina and we thought that by giving aid directly to those associated states that we could not only do something worthwhile from the point of view of human beings development that kind of thing human need but also could give a little encouragement to the

notion that these states were indeed to become members of the community of nations. Now at that time there was some skepticism on the part of the French about just how we channeled such aid and how we for what purposes it was being given. So it was a continuing part of that uneasy relationship that we had with France during the period say up to 1950 in American goals. You see France had gone through a deeply traumatic experience in 1940 and as a patriotic Frenchman who had lived through that period must have come out of the war with a deep and passionate feeling about restoring the position and the self respect and the public morale of France before the war France had been an empire. And

these overseas representations of French presidents French power French influence were I suspect unusually important to them given the circumstances of their defeat in World War II. So they were getting many of those sentiments around. But I think the there were many in France also who could see the handwriting on the wall. They could see what was happening in the rest of Asia and these great colonial areas and that they knew that somehow the time to wind up was coming. We tried to get the French to understand that if they were to move boldly and simply to give independence to the three nations that the French presence would still be the most important external presence in these three countries as the presence of the Dutch turned out to be in Indonesia and the presence of the British in India. But the French were skeptical about that. You see I think

there were a good many among the French who somehow had a an incorrect but rather sneaky idea that somehow the United States was trying to replace them in Indochina. That was the last thing in our minds. We had a basket full. We didn't need to think about such consideration. So it was not easy on the succession of French governments there were relatively weak politically they were on the edges. And the question was how far a French government could go and remain in power given the fragile and turbulent internal political situation in France itself. And non-controversial. People are hungry for. Anything relating to foreign aid involves a

major debate in Congress and there are always pressures from different points of view to put conditions on foreign aid to achieve what turned out to be contradictory purposes as far as these groups in the United States are concerned. There were some who simply wanted to insist that the French connection with Indochina be completely severed. But there were others perhaps even stronger that time who felt that France was so important to the reconstruction and the safety of Europe and of the North Atlantic that we should simply do whatever France wanted us to do. How did that part of the world to follow along wherever France decided to lead. But Mr. Truman followed the tried to follow the middle ground and the middle ground is always very uneasy and uncomfortable because there will be those who are unhappy with it for quite opposite points of view of the

United States progress. I don't have any recollection that there was any serious discussion in government about our becoming more directly involved after After all we had played a major role as the midwife for the birth of the Indonesian independence. We had applauded and cooperated with the new state of India. We it was clear where our sympathies were and this was a part of a longstanding American tradition on such matters. After all we were the first colony to break away from Great Britain. But. I just don't believe it. As a matter of fact that at that time General Public opinion was focusing in very much on Indochina as far away would had very little interest. There there were very few Americans in Indochina

and there were so many other things preoccupying as the news is filled with Europe and Japan and Russia and all the rest of it. See one take one sound one Cambodia. The onslaught of the North Koreans on a South Korea in 1950 made a major difference to us and our attitude toward events in Asia when the North Koreans first attack. President Truman looked at this matter very hard and he remembered all those incidents which contributed toward World War II where collective security failed to prevent the present obstacles to aggression. We had had a special responsibility for South Korea we had accepted the Japanese surrender there we had helped the Republic of Korea come into being as a nation and it was not

until 1949 that we withdrew our final Regimental Combat Team from Korea. So that when the North Koreans attacked we had to think very hard about what this might mean. At the moment of the attack we could not be sure we did not know whether this meant a general offensive by say China and the Soviet Union in Asia. And so in order to circumscribe the problem and try to limit it to the Korean peninsula President Truman intruded the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland and he immediately stepped up our aid to Indochina very very large very generously in terms of military equipment and economic supplies the rest of it because we were trying to send a signal to Major communist capitals that they should not expand this Korean matter into other fronts and turn it into a

general offensive. And the whole thing could just I guess just when. It was decided on the very weekend of the North Korean attack that we would step up our aid very significantly to the French into Southeast Asia because we did not know at that point whether or not the Chinese might attempt to move into that area as a part of a general offensive in Asia. So that the combination of the decision to put American forces directly into Korea put the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland and to increase aid to Southeast Asia was an attempt to limit the temptation which others might have to open up a general course of aggression in Asia.

Q Well what do you know. Oh no no no no we're not we're actually looking for anything. During World War II when I was in the China India theater I personally authorized the dropping of arms and American cigarettes to Auchi man. We were trying to mobilize everyone who would help resist the Japanese. But at the very end of the war we did not look upon this as our responsibility. Our hands were full and with German problems and Japanese problems and a lot of other

things and history might have been quite different had Indochina emerged from the war as an independent nation under the leadership indeed of hoti man who knows. But we were in a sense playing second or third string to the French in that part of the world particularly in Indochina. We did not want to substitute ourselves for the French. We did not want to assume French responsibilities because we were simply not in a position to do much about it. After all some of us can remember that the British simply signed out of Greece and said We can no longer do this is up to you Americans to do what has to be done in Greece. We were disarmed. We did not have the capabilities of undertaking all these new responsibilities. And I would have to say that given all the other questions on our agenda at that time particular the building of the Marshall Plan NATO and

all sorts of other problems that events in Indochina were not in any sense of high priority in our thinking. You can even question it or any other critical mass. You can take it. Well we were not prepared to work with Holcim man over against the French at that time because to us the French were very important to us and Europe and in all sorts of other problems at the United Nations. So that I don't know that we ever at the top of the government Anyhow gave any serious thought to the possibilities of an independent or Titos type of bogyman that would involve a direct engagement with the French in a very very

unpleasant situation and could jeopardize a lot of our purposes in Europe at that time. France may not even be. Talking about it. That was always a sharp contrast in the underlying purposes which the French and the Americans had out there in that part of the world during the late forties and early fifties. I think the French really had in

mind that they would restore the position of France and Indochina in effect restore their colonial empire. To that extent. Well that was not our attitude at all. We were prepared as Franklin Roosevelt expressed often during World War Two to see the great colonial areas of Asia come out of the war as independent nation and we were in the process of helping that to happen. India Pakistan Burma Malaysia Indonesia. I saw that. We felt that if there were an independent Indochina or three independent states of Indochina who were secure able to pay attention to the needs of our own people ready to cooperate as a member of the community of nations that that would be a situation in the interest of the United States. We never wanted any presence there ourselves. It's a matter of fact during the Truman administration and there were discussions at the staff level

about the ideas that later came to be the Southeast Asia treaty. And at that time we turned down these ideas. We thought it would be a mistake for the United States to go into Southeast Asia and make an alliance with certain ones of these countries and not all of them and have the association with the United States itself become a divisive influence in Southeast Asia generally that we should wait until the entire region developed its own regional security consciousness and then we can stand in powerful second line support in the region as a whole later. Situation changed and then in the 50s and President Eisenhower and sector Adela's brought about the Southeast Asia treaty. But we turned down those ideas during the Truman administration. Not.

When Mas'ud and his colleagues seize power throughout the mainland of China that created some very difficult problems for the United States. After a century of warm and friendly relations between the American and the Chinese people in all sorts of ways many of us felt like rejected lovers here the Chinese people of all people had turned against us and Holcim and picked out the United States as enemy number one. He tried to erase all traces of that century of close relationships between our two peoples and he arrested some of some of our officials beat some of them up. So we got off to a very bad start with the People's Republic of China. I'm sorry did I say OK I mean you know. When mouse dung seized power in China he seemed to

pick out the United States and the Americans as enemy number one. He went to great lengths to try to erase all traces of that century of close and friendly relationships. He arrested some of our officials in China beat some of them up and the United States became his principal target of propaganda. So that was not easy for us but at the same time we were not all that concerned about the potential of China for external aggression. They had a lot of problems to cope with our relationships with Japan the Philippines Australia New Zealand were much more important to us. Indeed our security treaties were with Japan Philippines and Australia New Zealand were actually aimed as much at the possibility of a future Japanese military restoration and

in that sense of China it was not until the Korean War and the entry of the Chinese in large numbers into the Korean War that we became increasingly concerned about where China would go. We had in mind in Napoleon's remark that China sleep for when she awakes the world will tremble. And so I think it was the participation by the Chinese in the Korean War that brought to focus these issues concerning security. Now that that in turn increased our interest in a non communist solution in Indochina. And by that time I watched him in it positioned himself in such a way that it be very unlikely that any American government would support hoti man as a potential Tito just because he was after all communist and close relations between him and Peking or possibly Moscow was not a very inviting prospect. Guess

this sound real to Kermode all three. Dean Rusk well. Our assistance to Vietnam or Indochina went through several phases. We began simply as a close partner of France and the Marshall Plan later related directly to the Europeans. Then we began to move toward more direct assistance when we saw some movement in French policy toward some kind of autonomy or independence for the associated states of Indochina. Then came the Korean War and the speculation about whether there would be a major communist offensive into Southeast Asia and that stepped up our aid very considerably.

Of course the more Maussa done consolidate his power on the mainland and gave expression to his hostility toward the United States. The more we became concerned about what his attitude was going to be toward Indochina and so we again stepped up our effort there. When the battle lines were drawn and Indochina itself and what turned out to be the conclusive series of engagements there. We had divided councils and our own government during the Eisenhower administration there were some like Mr. John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford who wanted a considerable involvement necessary by U.S. forces. But there were others primarily President Eisenhower himself who did not think that we should become involved on the mainland or intrude ourselves militarily into that situation.

That compromise was reflected in part at the Geneva conference when we ourselves did not even sign the Geneva agreements when we made it known that as far as we were concerned they were not binding upon South Vietnam or upon the United States although it was declared that any attempt to interfere with those results by military force would be looked upon by us as a threat to the peace so that we we began in a small fashion steadily increased as the stakes grew and then the critical time came in after the Geneva conference when President Eisenhower and sector and others concluded the Southeast Asia treaty that added an entire new dimension to the problem because under that treaty the United States committed itself solemnly quote to take steps to meet the common danger unquote. If those protected by the treaty were

subject to attack that was directly related by us to the entire question of collective security in the post-war period because we knew that the response of the United States under that kind of treaty had a bearing on the judgment that other capitals would make about how we would act under NATO or are they real pact or other such treaties. But unfortunately entered into the Southeast Asia treaty at a time when there was a lot of talk about massive retaliation and a bigger bang for a buck that kind of thing. And there were those who seem to think that Southeast Asia treaty was a cheap treaty. All we had to do was to send some carriers out there and bomb somebody and that would be all over with. That was not a thoughtful serious wide ranging discussion of the seriousness of entering a mutual security treaty in which we

pledged ourselves to take action because our failure to do so could have chain reactions with regard to other treaties and deeply undermined the possibilities of collective security in the world. That was shortly before this period. Q You want to make sure this is really. Can you give us that. Looking back. What's your assessment was very successful. By the time I left the government in 1952. It was clear that the major fighting in Korea was coming to a stop and the negotiations were already underway. Those are more protracted

than any of us thought when they began but there were clear indications that the North Koreans and the Chinese and the Russians were prepared to settle that matter on the basis of the status quo ante to call it off on the basis of the pre-war situation. Now in 52 we did not look upon Indochina as a problem that was engaging the total security situation on a worldwide basis. A constellation of forces as the Russians sometimes put it it seemed clear that the French were moving toward some kind of political settlement that the associated states of Indochina would in due course be independent would take their place as members of the United Nations and that American aid would have to continue for a considerable period of time although the prospect was that those three countries.

We knew that American assistance to Indochina would have to continue for some time to come although they were potentially relatively well off with the resources of a relatively educated people so that we did not look upon them as being a basket case for indefinite major aid over the decades ahead. But I think we look forward to a period of some repose out there as we anticipated the end of the Korean fighting and it was not until the battle was actually joined in Indochina itself between the French and the nationalist and communist forces that that problem moved front and center to the front and center stage again. Yes. It was not until the direct military engagement between the French

and other Vietnamese forces on the one side in the so-called nationalist and the communist forces on the other. Moved toward that climax that was reached at the then been food. Now there's a lot of division within the American government as to what our attitude should be at that point. But President Eisenhower's judgment was that we should not intrude militarily. So nothing much happened from that point on until the Geneva Conference of 1954. The time that you left off and you were not really creating any defeat it was not at all clear that the French really meant it. I think. In 1952 it was not at all clear that the French would lose that struggle with the Ottoman forces. Indeed we thought there was a fair chance that the nationalist aspirations of these countries

having been recognized by the French taking direct specific steps toward national independence would be able to carry the day. But events proved otherwise in the spring of 1950 President Truman asked me to take on the job of assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs. He also at the same time invited Mr. John Foster Dulles to come back into the administration. Mr. Phillip Jessop became ambassador at large and the hope was that we somehow could work very closely with the leaders of both parties and work out a better bipartisan understanding with regard to policies in Asia. But we succeeded pretty much across the board except for China itself. We were clear that we were going to have a Japanese peace treaty.

Our attitudes toward Taiwan itself offered no part and problems as it turned out attitudes toward Indochina provided no parties and difficulties in the Congress itself. Now there's never unanimity there were groups around the country different sorts of groups criticizing us from one point of view or another. But that's normal. But finally when we understood that we could not get bipartisan understanding on the subject of China proper that Mr. Dulles was pulled off of that effort and given responsibility for the negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty which he did with great success and beautifully. But actually so long as there is a bipartisan consensus in the Congress then the fact that there may be margins of discontent or criticism from different people around the country or from other countries was relatively

unimportant provided you were so sure about the mainstream of support for what you were doing with your own domestic pressure mounting pressure. You have faith that you could be just not seen the mystic pressures in my judgment that had very little to do with our attitudes toward Indochina. The the McCarthy period was one of those evil chapters but it did not have as far reaching effect on policy as many people suppose. And so we would not we did not feel constrained by the attitudes of the people of the United States to do one thing rather than another as far as Indochina was concerned. This is more a matter between the executive branch and the Congress and the leaders of the two parties in Congress at that time.

Yes that was always I think sufficient bipartisan agreement on Indochina itself so that we never really had any serious deeply gouging political struggles over the Indochinese situation.