thumbnail of Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Myron Harrington, 1981
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This is my room and January-February of mine was the company commander built for that. Looking back now to a city that's as far away from your distance as it may be from Will you try to recreate for us. What was the most severe sustained combat war. What was it like the participation in the battle of way during the Tet offensive in
1968. Is a memory that you know is very difficult to forget. I think as any combat individual who's participated in combat. You try to divorce yourself from the horrors of the situation and you try to concentrate more on it. For me the humor that sometimes you see in those type of actions as a company commander getting ready to go up to the way we were aware of course with all the preliminary activity that was taking place during the Tet through the Armed Forces Radio. We were listening to that. So we knew how serious the situation was up and why and when we were told that we were going to go up there to reinforce the other Marines that were up there. I have to say that you know there was a great not that developed in my stomach. Not necessarily so much from fear though
I have to admit that there's a hell of a lot of the fear was there but more the apprehension of getting into that type of environment within a built up area which we were on a custom during the Vietnam era to be to be fighting in. So we realized the seriousness of it and went into it knowing what we had to do and how difficult it was going to be. But I think it was it was a period though of a great deal of confusion for a company commander because the only word that we heard was what we heard from the radio and what we got from our scattered and small degree of intelligence that we were getting as to what was happening throughout Vietnam at that time because so much was happening all over that it was very difficult to say well in your area there are because they may be there today and then tomorrow they'd be someplace else. But it was
my general impressions going into why are we talking about now. OK. The general impressions. If I went into a way again we went in and my company went up in a convoy were led off on the south side of the city which had already been cleared by the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines and the 1st Battalion 1st Marines and we moved in. Of course we were very nervous. We got into the most tactical formation you'd ever want to say to cover ourselves as we moved in even though we knew that the area was secure. But I think the first impression that you got was the desolation the smell of death that was hanging over the smoke. It just looked like a almost like a movie set that you were walking into. Except the props were were real I mean the burnt out tanks the trucks the automobiles that were turned over in many cases the bodies
still laying around. So it was it was very nerve wracking and a little bit frightening when you walked in and you saw this kind of desolation and this sort of impact and you knew right away that you weren't going in for a little picnic. It was going to be difficult. It the weather as we went into way was about the worst type of weather I think that you would ask for to conduct a military operation. It was wet it was cold which bothered us a bit but I think the thing that bothers the most was the low ceiling and the visibility which precluded any effective utilization of air support during the operation. Is there any way on a couple of occasions I could hear planes and on one day I actually saw a plane run an air strike when I was over with five and this was sort of a one of these situations where your coordination and your
control and your communication. You wonder who's shooting at who. Because the airstrike was run behind me as opposed to in front of me so you wondered where they were. And that was a little nervous for me there. Airpower Well let's go back. Let's keep it in roughly chronological order although it's quite alright to be sure. OK. So your men and I hope you'll tell us how many arrived that way and you saw this. This is a picture from a battle some of them or something like it. What would you describe your strength of anticipation. Well the rifle company that I commanded as we went into way
consisted of about one hundred and twenty men and Marines approximately. And it was a very seasoned rifle company. It had participated in a number of the combat operations south of denying the union operation swift and had recently been in a stand down type of position there and the food by and south area. They were very well experienced. Many of them were veterans had been there for quite a while and I was extremely pleased to take over such a company that did have a spree in one season and I had a great deal of confidence in them prior to going into a way we had conducted a number of operations down in south of food by down in that area which had not only given me confidence in them but had given me confidence in myself
to lead these Marines. And once I realized that this was the first time I'd been a rifle company commander. So once I realized that hey you know I can do this. And these Marines say they're so good they make it easy for me. And I had all the confidence in the world and them. Prior to going into the battle for way. I had been in Vietnam for approximately six months and had just taken over the rifle company in late January. In fact I think it was about the 21st 22nd of January that I took over the rifle company the company I took over Delta Company was a very seasoned company consisted of approximately 120 Marines that were on the road ready for duty one I assume command very seasoned
a number of campaigns and combat operations behind them. So I had a great deal of confidence in their ability and fortunately I had an opportunity prior to going into way to be out in the field and participate in combat operations with them. So they I think had confidence in my ability to protect them and to. They recognized right away that I was a very conservative type of commander and was not going to take the type of risk that were not prudent in trying to get the mission accomplished. And I didn't want to waste lives as some people might be prone to say as we moved in to the the area and saw this great amount of desolation and death and the stench in the Paul smoke and the blending with the clouds and everything you just it really kind of was a very eerie feeling because you it was almost not quite like a horror movie but if you could put
some weird music with it you had that feeling that any minute that something was going to happen and you are you are constantly waiting for that surprise to occur when you just knew they were going to jump out all around you and start shooting at you. But we moved into the city joined up with 4:58 initially and spent about two and a half three days operating in conjunction with him in the southern part of the city. Prior to getting the word to move over enjoying our parent Battalion 1st Battalion over inside the citadel. This move was accomplished by going down to the Elsy you ramp located there in a way which at this point was now back in our friendly hands and getting aboard. Elsie Hughes and moving up the Perfume River and actually away from the Citadel to come around from the rear where we would be somewhat protected. As
we moved I moved with my command group and a small security section in the first Elsy you and as we moved up the river there was an island or maybe a series of islands out in the middle of the river. And as we moved we were basically ambushed as we went up in that they were the NBA and Vietcong were on both sides of the river firing at us and we took several casualties as we went up including at least one or two of the Navy folks were hit. OK. Right. Right. Tell us how you got across the river after spending a couple of days over with two five. We were ordered to move across and I rejoin the 1st Battalion and we moved via the perfume river of course
because the bridge across the river had been knocked out. So we went down got aboard a Navy Elsy use along with some other supplies to move across. We had to take a roundabout route. We couldn't go directly across of course because the NBA still controlled the north bank of the river. So we went up the river and it came in from the rear of the citadel and I had one in the first Elsy you with a command group and a small security section with the remainder of the company to follow along. Well unfortunately we got hit as we went up the river which the Navy decided that they were going to be a little bit reluctant to to continue to move the Elsy use up there until they could get some airstrikes or something on this island where the fire was coming from there in the middle of the river. As a result I was deposited on the north end of the citadel in a fairly
congested area with civilians with my small command group and a small security section. And of course having heard all the stories of what was occurring within the citadel and the fact that we at this point knew that there were many in the way that were dressed as civilians as well as dressed as South Vietnamese soldiers. We immediately of course did everything we could throw up a very small little perimeter to provide our own internal security while we awaited the rest of the company. It took most of the day and a great deal of frantic communication on my part being relayed through about three or four different sources to make contact with the remainder of the company and to organize their move up the river. They eventually joined up with me later in the afternoon and they were transported via some Vietnamese junks which were quite colorful to a certain degree. I
remember them having the eyes painted on the prowl as they as they came in. But once we joined up reconstituted the company moved into the Siddall area back through the rear end of course coming in and rejoining one five after they had had two very tough days within the city trying to clear some of the very difficult areas within the city would you describe the action on the river. Well I just remember the action on the river. I don't really remember it being extremely intense. You have to keep in mind that almost continuously through out the battle for way city that there was was a constant noise in the air. There was a firefight going on everywhere and in
many cases you really didn't know that you were being shot at until you actually one someone was hit close by you or two you could hear the snap in the wings or hear the thuds as the bullets hit into the sides of the cell say you for example. So I just remember you we were shot at. We had folks that were wounded and we returned the fire. And of course this Elsy you was just chugging along as fast as it could go to get out of the beaten zone. Now would you please give us a description of some of the fighting in the city itself. What it was like what the taste of it was as we moved into the citadel to rejoin 1 5. My first thought was you know my God look look at this place and it was already just in a little area that we were seeing you know almost utter devastation. You know the
houses just blown apart. Cars overturned still smoking and smoldering from the debris of battle so to speak. There were still unfortunately bodies civilians primarily laying out in gardens laying out in the middle of the street. All in all it really gave it almost an unreal appearance. I think my most vivid memory is as I went in was in talking with one of the other company commanders who had already been participating there in the action for a couple of days. And I'm in a very matter of fact way without a great deal of embellishment on his part. He just frightened the hell out of me and telling me how bad it was. And just looking around I could recognize that yeah it was. It was difficult. And in particular he told me of a fortified position along the east wall there for two days. The battalion had been trying to take and I thought in my mind right then and there that you know hey
here I am with a fresh company. And I knew without having to be told what my mission was going to be the next day was going to be to try to take this fortified tower position along the east wall. And then it turned out that that was exactly what occurred. I turned in my gunnery sergeant at the time and told him Gunny I said the more MORNING we're going to take that tower and sure enough that that evening when I went in to be briefed with the other company commanders on the next day's operation then Major Thompson. Now Colonel Thompson said in Delta Company in the thing that impressed me most of all is that he didn't embellish it and he just said Delta Company tomorrow you're going to take that east wall. I said Aye aye sir and went at it. You spent that night with your company. You take your few casualties already crossing
the river. Would you tell us how you organize briefly and then actually fought for control. This is pretty well known. Well the next morning as we prepared I'm going to have to serve you again without. Well OK. The following morning as we commenced the attack I had with me two platoons in my command group with my mortar section attached. If anyone is familiar there was the city and the Citadel. We were now at the north end trying to move south to clear the NBA and Viet Cong out of the southern portion of the city. During this time I must mention that we weren't of course acting and operating independent. We had Vietnamese Army and Marine and airborne units who were fighting in conjunction with us on our right flank and to
a certain degree over on our left flight though that was very exposed. Initially supporting the attack and these were all done independent of each other and from best I could tell there was very little coordination as to who was attacking when and where. And everyone was doing their own thing but going back to the attack on the tower. I had these two platoons in this command group as well as I had a tank that was in support of me. My basic or them organization was a frontal attack because there was very little else that could be done. And as we lined up we moved in and take full advantage of the debris the houses that were blown down the overturned vehicles the walls the hedgerows the ditches and moved into these positions prior to moving out when the signal
was given to move out. The heavy amount of preparation fire from both artillery and naval gunfire that had been going on for what sounded like hours but may have only been just for a few minutes because the noise was all blended together a very intense amount of noise and it's like being a combination on the rifle range and an artillery impact area all at the same time with the just the noise almost indescribable relative to the intensity of the sound of the weapons and the fire. But on signal we moved out and as we did one of the very common situations develop it is prevailing in this type of combat is the control and coordination and communication. I found out later that one platoon is they moved out the platoon commander moved up to a
vantage point to try to see his area in front of him and as he did his command group with the radio took a RPG round which seriously wounded the lieutenant and his radio operator put the radio out of commission. So before we even started this attack I had lost contact with my platoon that was now on my right flank. But needless to say we continued the attack by moving Marines up only the wall. And then these Marines super guys went through crawling with hand grenades primarily up to the the little spider holes of positions that the NBA were in and threw very accurate rifle fire and hand grenades. We began to inch our way up towards the tower fully
supported by this tank. And of course by the artillery and the mortars from the battalion once we moved up and I got to a position where I could see the tower and we could we could basically see what the enemy disposition was where we were getting the most amount of fire from the terrain was such. At this point that I could only put about eight to 10 Marines up on the wall because it would be for Colonel urging to proceed with our. Perhaps we could just back up a little bit and start with. Well I was always looking for a full stop.
Once we were able to maneuver into a position where I could see the tower and the various positions up there I was then able to disperse my Marines a little bit better to try to gain some tactical advantage. The wall within the inner portion of the total at this point was fairly narrow and the frontage up there was only large enough to put about a squad of Marines I had about eight to 10 Marines that were up on the wall maneuvering creeping crawling actually clearing these holes one by one as they moved up towards the tower. This was right at an intersection of one of the major streets. I think there and away of course at that time you couldn't tell because of the devastation and debris that was all over. But we were able at this point now to cross the main street which we did basically in a platoon type rush of 15 to 20 Marines all at once quickly across the street
and got into a position where we now were able to face the tower from two sides from the north side and from the west side. So we now were able to bring fire to bear on it from two sides. And with at this point we were able then to assault the tower and the in particular fortified positions behind it. And once we got up there we took those positions and then we occupied the tower which of course was a critical point because it was providing the flanking fire against our Marines as the battalion was trying to move to the south. And we were then able to take the tower once we took it. We of course consolidated the position tried to get the best advantage that we could of the cover what little there was up there.
Apparently this area had been an area where the the Vietnam the poor Vietnamese were living because there was an awful lot of 10 laying around and you couldn't see any other signs that they were. There were structures and you could only imagine that these were the roofs and perhaps some of the walls of some of these type of huts that they would have had there which would just blown to smithereens. And you had this vast amount of this 10 corrugated sheeting. So we dug in and put people up on the tower as best we could. And at this time we realized that across from us to the further to the east there were some high rise type buildings apartment buildings office buildings or whatever. And then we began to realize that we were beginning to get an awful lot of fire from these buildings.
Fortunately we were able to utilize artillery to neutralize this somewhat but for several days the flanking fire that we were getting from the east across one moat into the another built up portion of the area there caused us a great deal of problems. Tell us what dates the taking of tower took place and how significant you thought it was. Briefly we took the tower on the afternoon of the 14th of February. And I considered the significance of that tyre to rank very very high in that as a Marine you're always looking to take the critical terrain the high ground and this tower represented and was the high ground there in this portion of the
total that the battalion was fighting in and our securing this was essential to further operations and moving the remainder of the battalion down through the the inner portions of the citadel. So yes I would. The securing of the tower at the time was certainly a turning point of sorts but it would be difficult to say that was the turning point. It was certainly a turning point because once we were able to entrench ourselves up on the wall the Vietnamese never got us off the wall. So I think we were able to move forward and if we had not secured this then it would have been extremely difficult in fact it would have been impossible to do it. Would you give us a general description of the remaining days of combat operations.
Is it a very general way taking that final objective and that if you might the cause of all the devastation mentioning the kinds of weapons being used by both sides after securing the arched tower the movement was extremely slow as we continued the attack to recover the inner portion to the citadel there the North Vietnamese and Vietcong supporters were heavily dug in entrenched. They had mutually supporting positions. And of course they had the advantage of they knew the terrain. And as a result they had all the avenues of approach extremely well covered. They had their mortars and they had almost every spot that was an open piece of ground was under under fire as a result of their being so entrenched and utilizing the concrete type buildings that we were running
across it required for us to bring maximum firepower at our disposable disposal to to eliminate them as a result. We were using what else exis we were using our tank and its heavy weapon there as well as his machine gun which was a very very effective. And we were using all the artillery that we could get at our disposal. This was a little bit on the hairy side because we were on what you call the gun target line in that the artillery was firing from the south of us it flew by and was firing directly at us. But I had a superb forward observer a staff sergeant who just did a fantastic job. And we would call this artillery in within 50 and in some cases 25 meters of our location. And we were working with the eight inch batteries down in FUBAR which would allow us to make these very minute adjustments.
And by this superb use of this artillery we were able to keep the attack going and keeping the NBA and Vietcong down as we would try to move forward as well. Of course is destroying them and their positions as we moved as a result of using the heavy firepower primarily the artillery. There was a great amount of devastation that occurred within the city at all. And this was in the area that was more residential section than a office complex they were further to the south of the citadel but there was unfortunately a great deal of destruction. Many homes were destroyed. The difficult to give an estimate of how many people lost their home. But I'm sure it was sizable
Yeah where we may perhaps get a little bit general here. But if you could describe the type of fighting whether or not you were accustomed to it and what happens is that property as we continue the attack the fighting was extremely intense and it was very close in many cases the NBA and Viet Cong would be as close to us as 20 30 meters from us. On one occasion we had a sniper that was right in our company. Position was killed no more than 10 meters from where I had my little C.P. set up. So you were almost in the face to face eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the NBA and I think the severity of the casualties that we were taking
was a testimony to the intensity of the of the fighting because some of the casualties were very severe because of the close in nature of the fighting. And at this point in the fighting many of the civilians had already been evacuated or had made their way out of the Citadel area. We did however as we moved south we would uncover civilians still alive who had gone into their little bomb shelters their basements and whatever and it survived some of the artillery of course many were wounded which we would care for and would get immediately back to an aid station. But for the most part the civilians had were had left the area as we went in. And speaking of civilians one of the major problems we had was trying to control the civilians as they tried to move back into the area as we cleared it to get back into their home and to try to
regain control of their possessions what they might have been lifted at the time. And this created a problem again because of the infiltration of the the NBA. And in fact we had a very sad incident and the chaplain who was there. But there was in discussing overall strategy of the battle for the city. Looking at it strictly in a company commander's perspective the only strategy that that I had was that I wanted to to keep me and my Marines alive and accomplish our assigned mission as quickly as possible. Survival after a while becomes the name of the game because when you sit there and you see all your friends
your buddies getting hit getting wounded being evacuated it is a very depressing thing. And you do not want to waste the lives and you should always strive to try to be as protective as you can. But keeping in keeping in mind that that's why you're there and that you've got to accomplish your mission. And I think the Marines understand that. And again if they have confidence in you and that you're doing everything that you can do as a commander to protect them i.e. you're getting them artillery. They know that they're going to be medivac the helicopter if they're hit they're going to get up and go. And so I think from a strategy point of view or tactics if you will internally it's survive. Accomplish a mission protect your man. The other questions What was it like in street fighting. Were you prepared for it. And what role did.
Street fighting was a entirely new experience for everyone in that company. Our last Marine Corps experience in street fighting had been in 1950 in Seoul Korea and there were very few Marines left on active duty and those that were would have been too senior to participate in the battle of way. So we had to really learn the lessons that the army had learned in Europe. And they're fighting there and that the Marines had learned in World War Two. And in Korea we had to learn these all over again. And one of the beautiful things about a Marine is his basic training as such. His leadership is very good that he is adaptable and that once he gets into a new environment he had depth very quickly and we were able to adapt. Unfortunately we took the number of casualties learning some of these basic lessons of not to bunch up not to gather spots that were open and under fire
not to go for a building just because it looked like it might be a good cover to go for a ditch instead. And once we learn these once we learn to gain control by going back to our old hand and arm signals and using runners to communicate with and using smoke to cover our moves to fire and maneuver which is of course a basic tactic. We were able to be successful but it was an entirely different experience. The Marines had been accustomed to the rice paddies the open areas the hills and the the jungle type environment that we had experienced south and to the west. When we were operating out in the bush there so city fighting was an entirely new experience. But I must say that the the morale the esprit de corps was with super. And one of the things that we did until the
battalion commander finally said no because it was too confusing is that we were using a number of the captured NBA weapons against them and the troops thought this was great sport and that we would be able to pick up the captured weapons and to utilize these. Of course our own weapons were perfectly good weapons. The M-16 was a very good rifle but there was something special about being able to pick up that AK. It was your adversaries and they fired back at him. And that really helped the morale of the troops. What rules or. What was the role of airpower in the battle of way. When and why was it brought in and did it cause a great deal of destruction and then re destroying the city in order to save it during the battle for way city the role that air airpower played
would from my point of view would be very difficult to assess. I only saw one airstrike being run and this was over on the southern side of the city which may have been on this 13th of February when the sun was shining for a couple of hours. But over in our zone of action within the Citadel airpower tactical airpower i.e. the fixed wing bombers attacked type aircraft close support missions did not play a significant role. In fact I never several times I ask for them but because of the close proximity of our friendly troops to the enemy troops the fact that we would have to withdraw over ground that was very very hard fought in order to make a safety zone there for the aircraft to come in. Even if we could get them just made it not worth utilizing because of the close confines of the area.
Most of the devastation that I observed appeared to have been from the artillery. This is not to say that prior to our moving into the total that there may have been airstrikes in the area that would have caused devastation. The air power if you want to call it airpower that was of great use. And we made maximum use of was of course our helicopters to resupply us to evacuate our casualties and to bring in replacements. But I really from an air power point of view on the periphery of the battle out in the approaches two way I'm sure that they were using saturation bombing and that there were other type of airstrikes being run there to deny the inveigh access into the city but within the city itself. From my point of view air power did not play a significant role. The weather
the weather was a primary factor that airpower didn't play a role because of the low ceiling and limited visibility which were below the minimum that even for combat conditions because of the safety of the troops and the close confines of the the NBA and the the Marines being so close together that airstrike did come in. It was a good chance that you might be right in the direct line of the the bombs or the rockets. So for those reasons as well. We did not use the fixed wing air. What's your opinion. What was it then. What is it now the ability of enemy we're facing as fighting the NBA as a fighting organization. I think we're extremely well disciplined. They had to be to face or suffer not only the
casualties that they took but the constant combat that they were in for the number of years that they were. I had had occasion prior to going into a way of being in contact within V.A. and watching them maneuver against me which is a very frightening experience as you hear them. Their squad leaders their commanders blowing the whistles as you see the squad rushes and then you compare that type of training with some of our own training which unfortunately due to some of the circumstances you couldn't train as perhaps you would have liked to because you were you are constantly in a combat environment. And it was difficult to train. But I'm started up in the battle of way in particular. What's your assessment of fighting ability bravery or lack of it during the battle for the city.
I think as a as a combat individual Marine I would only have to have great admiration for the tenacity of the NBA their ability to stick in there. The fact that when there's overwhelming amount of firepower in the form of artillery the tanks the fact that their indoctrination was such that they would come charging out against these tanks with these little RPG to fire at them. The fact that they would not desert their posts the fact that they would stay there and be killed in a position is a strong indicator that they were thoroughly indoctrinated and instilled if you will with a desire to defeat us. So I think that they were extremely courageous. No more so than of course the individual Marines and Army and Army that participated. But I think as a participant you have to have a great
deal of respect and admiration for your adversary during this type of fighting. What's your assessment of the fighting abilities strengths and weaknesses of the Arvin friendlies who were battles during the battle for a way. I had hardly any opportunity at all to observe the Arbonne forces in action in that we were operating with them. But actually we were independent from all indications that I heard and having seen some of the areas that they had to fight through I can only say that they did one hell of a job in taking the push into the city that they did which I think is a tribute to their leadership and their tenacity and the bravery of the individual. Arvin in trying to retake their city of course I think that for many of them who actually live there in way in the
environs it was an emotional thing they were fighting for their home and in many cases probably participated in the destruction of their own home family and stressful home. No telling how many years old. So I think that there was a great deal of emotional involvement on their part whereas as a Marine we went and this was a job we had to do. And we sort of divorced ourselves from the emotional aspect of we were destroying someone's home. We got to seven. And one of the Marines during the fighting said he wasn't sure what he was fighting for. You were fighting for what I was fighting for and why I think has a deeper meaning of why not you know why was I fighting period and why was I in Vietnam and
why am I Irene and not a salesman for a soap company. And I think I would have to answer as to why I was fighting that. I'm just one of these guys that feel I have a very strong obligation to my country. The fact that a humongous number of folks have gone before me and made a hell of a lot more sacrifices and then I've been called upon to make in order to ensure that I would be able to do what I wanted to do what I wanted to do it. So I think that you'd have to say I just have a strong belief in the traditional American values and a strong sense of obligation to my country and where they send me to fight and what they ask me to do is up to the politicians and the generals and I'll just follow the directions as it's put forth. I think from a personal point I've certainly wanted to be in the military all my life.
My father was in World War One in France. I was too old for World War 2 and my father in law was a Marine and I fought it. Peleliu and Okinawa. So it's not that I'm trying to keep any sort of family tradition going but I think you can see that I have a strong sense of values and a strong background. Of the military and supporting the country and in its role and its position in the world. And talking about the the feel for how it was inside the city during this battle. I think one of the correspondents is described it as a scene out of World War One in that the barbed wire entanglements
the dust and the smoke from the the artillery the shells and the constant whine of the not only the artillery but the small arms that it seem like for four or five days straight. It was like being at a rifle range with nothing but just small arms fire going all the time. And then off in the distance you would hear the artillery supporting another unit. You would hear the sudden burst of automatic fire as you knew another unit was moving off into the attack. And throughout all of this you know you had this horrible smell. I mean it you just cannot describe the smell of death especially when you when you're looking at it. A couple of weeks so long. It's horrible. And I think that this was combined with the the semi-darkness type of environment that we were fighting in because of the low overcast the fact that we didn't see the sign.
The fact that it was as I say semi-dark gave it a very eerie spooky look and you constantly had this fear not so much that you were going to die because I think to a certain degree that was a given that it's something very seriously could happen to you but that you had this utter devastation all around you. You had this horrible smell. And it was it was there when you ate your rations. It was almost like you were were eating death or you couldn't escape it. And you of course it permeated your clothes and the water was very very scarce. We couldn't bathe we couldn't shave it was a number of days before we even had enough water that we could shave much less take a bath. So the whole feeling during this time was was not one of depression though it sounds like that you could be depressed. We were very
optimistic in our attitude because of what we were doing how we were doing it. The success that we were having but through out it was a very dreary period. We were up for hours at a time. And of course as a as a commander Sometimes I felt that I never slept because of the concern that something was going to happen and I was not going to be there when it happened. So I think I would say that you got into a zombie like trance because you did because you still were aware and you had that mental discipline that you knew you had to be alert and you could not allow yourself to fall into any sort of trance you could not allow yourself to relax for a moment. You were tense you were tight. You knew something was going to happen. Of course the V.A. didn't disappoint you. Something did happen. It was. It was a new ballgame almost every morning every afternoon a different mode of attack. Something a little bit different happening.
And of course I think throughout this whole period the emotion that you were going through the fact that you were seeing your friends your lieutenants your sergeants your corporals your privates being hit being evacuated some that you knew some that you didn't know because of the fact that I'd only been there a short time but you went through the full range of emotions. But again you didn't have time to feel sorry for that young Marine because you still had a whole bunch of other young Marines that you had to take care of and that you had to be concerned for. And I think that probably the last person you thought about was yourself. And occasionally I'd sit there and I think about myself. But it was very few and far between that when you have that opportunity because as a commander you had so much else on your mind during this battle the coordination of the fires the coordination and the control of your
your troops the resupply the evacuation. Being a company commander. You're just not fighting all the time. I mean though in a way we were. But you had all these other details that you had to worry about. Excellent. On the question of devastation did you have to be destroyed to be saved. Did we have to destroy way in order to save it. Well I think that's a very catchy term that was coined by the correspondents that you had to destroy the village or the city in order to liberate it. I think in the case of way that it was required because the NBA wanted it. It was part I think of their grand strategy to whole way to try to capture portions of the Iraq war there to influence the Paris peace talks. And I don't think that they were about to give it up even if we had surrounded the city and cut them off and tried to starve them out. I think eventually
we would have had to go in and get them. And I don't think there was any other way and I think going in digging them out was the way and I think the fact that we did destroy portions of the city. But we had a I think a tremendous victory. And I think we showed that our adaptability and that we could fight not only in the jungle in the rice paddy but that we could fight in the city and that we could take care of it and that we would get in there and we tried our best to avoid malicious damage if you would. We just didn't shoot it was just a bomb down. But when we had to shoot it a house we shot at a house when we had to destroy a house. We destroyed it. We didn't go in there with the express purpose that this is a wonderful opportunity to show how great our weapons are and how much destructive power they possess. But we were fortunate in that we did have the weapons that were capable of routing the NBA and the Viet Cong out of their positions.
Q. Delta Company is it went into the battle for way consisted of about 120 Marines and is the battle progressed. I lost a significant number of the Marines. I think I had around 17 were killed and I don't know how many were wounded. And at one point I was down to somewhere in the vicinity of around 30 Marines that were fit for duty which consisted of my C-p group and a mortar section of about 13 Marines and two platoons of about a squad each. I got replacements in the form of a platoon that I had detached out earlier returned to me and unfortunately many of them were wounded and killed. The first minutes they arrived in the city and rejoined us and that we were moving in an
attack as they joined us. And it was it was basically too late for anything and they moved out with us which is the true Marine spirit and many of them veterans of the rice paddies in the jungles in the hill were wounded is the charge forward there in the city at the end of the battle. When I received some replacements we received approximately 50 replacements and that brought my company strength up to around 80 85 Marines. And I think that in my own case that I just have to wonder you know why I'm sitting here today because of the intensity of the combat the fact that I had folks go down on both sides of me all around me. Not that I lead a charmed life or I'm destined for something else it's just fate I guess.
But I was I was very very grateful that that I was not hurt. And of course I grateful that I wasn't killed. But when when when I left there I had a tremendous feeling that hey not only has this company accomplished something but this has been a significant victory for not only the Marine Corps but for the U.S. forces here in Vietnam and I've later found out that in some circles that the Tet Offensive and the battle of way is listed right up there is one of the decisive battles in history. Thank you very much Mr.
Series
Vietnam: A Television History
Raw Footage
Interview with Myron Harrington, 1981
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-319s17sr1t
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Description
Episode Description
Colonel Myron Harrington was a Marine captain at the Battle of Hue during the Tet Offensive, ostensibly an Allied victory that resulted in the destruction of the town and the killing of its residents, and marked the beginning of the loss of the American public's support of the war. Harrington is credited with the quotation "Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it?" He recounts the battle in great detail, from the preparations to what exactly he saw, saying it is impossible to divorce oneself from the "horrors".
Date
1981-12-08
Date
1981-12-08
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
War and Conflict
Subjects
Hue, Battle of, Hue, Vietnam, 1968; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American; Tet Offensive, 1968; Military art and science; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Vietnam--History--1945-1975; combat; United States--Armed Forces; Veterans--United States; morale; Urban warfare; United States--History, Military--20th century; United States--History--1945-; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns
Rights
Rights Note:1) No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the responsibility of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project.,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
00:57:29
Embed Code
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Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Harrington, Myron
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: e3a9b811c0bb87d2e660b48399926334f2de0a9d (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:57:25:24
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Citations
Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Myron Harrington, 1981,” 1981-12-08, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 20, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-319s17sr1t.
MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Myron Harrington, 1981.” 1981-12-08. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 20, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-319s17sr1t>.
APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Myron Harrington, 1981. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-319s17sr1t