War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [1]

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPE A0301 MICHEL TATU [1]

Interviewer:

AT THE TIME IN THE '50S YOU WERE WITH LE MONDE?

Tatu:

Yes, yes, and the first one in Moscow. From '57 to '64.

Khrushchev's Exaggeration of Soviet Nuclear Forces

Interviewer:

SO THE FIRST QUESTION, WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV CONSTANTLY EXAGGERATE THE

SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITY IN THE LATE '50S?

Tatu:

Well he boasted very much about his missiles.

Interviewer:

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO START AGAIN. USE HIS NAME SO WE KNOW WHO YOU'RE

TALKING ABOUT.

Tatu:

Yes, Khrushchev boasted very much about his missiles beginning in '57,

'58. He exaggerated the kind of missiles he had. He did as if the

United States were under threat. But in fact he did not cheat about the

number of his missiles, but he just he just had in mind only the

missiles against Europe. As a matter of fact Khrushchev did not build

up a strong ICBM force. He built up an European force, and that was by

the hundreds, the SS-4 and the SS-5, which in fact a couple of them

were deployed in Cuba. So he was right in saying he makes, he has many

rockets, he does it as sausages, see. He said that in his speeches. But

these were not ICBM against the United States. ICBM were built up much

later after Khrushchev.

Interviewer:

SO I'LL ASK YOU THE SAME QUESTION. WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV EXAGGERATE SOVIET

MISSILE CAPABILITY IN THE LATE 1950S?

Tatu:

Well, in one aspect he exaggerated because everybody had the impression

that he was, he had masses of missiles.

Interviewer:

START AGAIN AND USE NAME "KHRUSHCHEV."

Tatu:

Oh, I'm sorry. Well, in fact, Khrushchev exaggerated very much the

number of his missiles in the sense of ICBM. Everybody believed that he

has masses of missiles able to hit the United States territory. In fact

he had very little ICBM and those were deployed much later under

Brezhnev. But he did not Khrushchev did not exaggerate the number of

missiles altogether, because at the time he was building hundreds and

hundreds of SS-4 and SS-5, which were rockets able to hit Europe and

Asia. And he came up to something like 700 such missiles in 1964. So it

was true that he was making rockets like sausages, what he said in one

speech. But the only thing was that these were not missiles for the

United States. These were not ICBM.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS HIS, WAS HE TRYING TO CONFUSE THE UNITED STATES INTO THINKING

THAT HE HAD MORE MISSILES THAN HE REALLY HAD?

Tatu:

Probably so, yes, but at the same time he did not conceal the fact that

the... he had a huge arsenal against Europe. I remember having listened

to him several times in Moscow in those years and he said to every

European visitor we, you are our hostages. That means that if the

United States attacks us, we will strike Europe. And that meant that he

wanted to use deterrence against Europe just to deter the United

States.

Interviewer:

BUT DIDN'T HE THINK THAT BY EXAGGERATING THE NUMBER OF MISSILES THAT

WOULD JUST CAUSE THE UNITED STATES TO BUILD UP ITS ARSENAL FURTHER?

Tatu:

Certainly, that was his mistake. Yes he...

Interviewer:

START AGAIN.

Tatu:

It is true that by exaggerating or just even showing too much the

number of his missiles in his arsenal he had a counterproductive result

because it incited the United States to build up very strongly. So that

was a mistake from his part, certainly. But you know, he want, he was

so proud about his force that was the first time the Soviet Union had a

new type of weapon, ahead of the United States especially the ICBM and

the Sputnik. We...we must not forget that he boasted very much about

the Sputnik which were at the time the Soviet Union was ahead of the

United States also for that.

Effect of U-2 Incident of Soviet-US Relations

Interviewer:

OK, GOOD THANK YOU. KHRUSHCHEV KNEW ABOUT THE U-2 FLIGHTS FOR FOUR

YEARS BEFORE 1960. WHY DID HE WALK OUT OF THE PARIS SUMMIT BEING HELD

WITH EISENHOWER?

Tatu:

Well, this is a complicated question. I remember that we had strange

impressions at the time in Moscow during, just during the days of the

U-2 incident. At first he tried to minimize the...impact of this

incident. He certainly boasted that he gave the order of shooting down

powers with his U-2. But at the same time, he wanted to go to Paris,

and in fact he went to Paris and he maybe hoped that Eisenhower would

make the apology he wanted. And maybe the real problem was that he had

trouble inside the Soviet Union with his Politburo in the communist

movement at the time.

Interviewer:

DID HE USE THE U-2 INCIDENT AS AN EXCUSE TO BREAK UP THE SUMMIT

MEETING? HE WANTED TO BREAK IT UP FOR OTHER REASONS, BUT ...

Tatu:

Khrushchev probably did not want to wreck the Summit meeting, but some

people around him in the Politburo used this incident to compel him to

break the Summit Meeting and to stop the policy of d鴥nte which was

unpleasant for them. We had the Chinese who exerted an influence at the

time still on the communist movement. We had tough people around him in

the Politburo, especially Kozlov. Kozlov, was the number two man in the

party beginning in 1960. And he was working to replace Khrushchev. In

fact, the funny thing is that if Kozlov had not a heart attack in 1963,

a couple of months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, he would have been

instead of Brezhnev and maybe for 18 years also. And Khrushchev was

rather happy with this heart attack, which just expelled outside

somebody who was a main nuisance, the main obstacle he had to his own

personal power at the time.

Interviewer:

SO DO YOU THINK THAT THE U-2 INCIDENT WAS THE FINAL STRAW, THE FINAL

EVENT THAT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR KHRUSHCHEV TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE

DɔENTE AFTER HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING SOVIET MILITARY

FORCES?

Tatu:

Yes, d鴥nte in fact was criticized. Already after the main event of

that period '59, the '59 summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, Camp

David, you know. So called spirit of Camp David, all that. It was

criticized at the very beginning by the Chinese. Then in 1960 we had

sort of open break with the Chinese although at this time they were not

mentioned by their names, but it was exactly the same, now. And in '62,

Khrushchev was under strong pressure from the Chinese, from internal

domestic pressure, Kozlov and other people around him, to make, to have

a tougher policy towards the west. And he needed very strongly a

success. He needed something to gain against the United States

particularly. So he tried Berlin in 1961, and it failed. Except that he

could build the wall, and but in fact he could not make his, what he

called "the peace treaty," between the Soviet Union and East Germany, a

peace treaty which would have meant in fact the end of the western

powers in West Berlin. And then he tried another approach to the same

problem, probably Berlin again. But he tried through Cuba, and he tried

to change the balance of forces in his favor, by deploying missiles in

Cuba.

Interviewer:

THE U-2 INCIDENT ITSELF, WAS THAT OR WAS THAT NOT A PIVOTAL INCIDENT IN

PUSHING KHRUSHCHEV AWAY FROM DɔENTE?

Tatu:

Yes, it was the, yes, a turning point, the U-2 incident was the turning

point a sort of culmination of the campaign developed by many people

around Khrushchev against his d鴥nte policy with the United States,

and especially since 1959, since the Camp David Summit Meeting between

Eisenhower and Khrushchev. The opposition to that policy was

developing, and the U-2 incident was a sort of the best opportunity for

those people for this campaign, to make definite results.

[END OF TAPE A0301 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-2j6833mz78

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-2j6833mz78).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Tatu, Michel, 1933-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 40e27529b404c11fd9446ee4990d4c9ae15a87a3 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [1],” 1986-03-16, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 4, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-2j6833mz78.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [1].” 1986-03-16. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 4, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-2j6833mz78>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Michel Tatu, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-2j6833mz78