War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with George Shultz, 1986

View online at openvault.wgbh.org

Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPE FD8011 GEORGE SHULTZ

Soviet-American Arms Control Negotiations

Interviewer:

GORBACHEV LEAVES REYKJAVIK AND AMONG THE THING HE SAYS AT THE END IS,

"ONLY A MADMAN WOULD AGREE TO SDI?" AND THEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON OF

COURSE AND SIGNS AN AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT LINK SDI TO THE AGREEMENT?

WHAT HAPPENED? WHY DID HE CHANGE?

Shultz:

You have to ask him.

Interviewer:

DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECULATION ON THAT?

Shultz:

He has come to recognize that President Reagan is insistent on learning

how to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles, if we possibly can.

And personally I think it would be mad not to try to do that, since

there seemed to be real possibilities of doing it. Why not learn how to

defend yourself against these things? They can wipe you out. So it

makes all kinds of sense to do what the President wants to do.

Interviewer:

I THINK YOU CATEGORIZED THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL

BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS BEING VERY TOUGH AND

DIFFICULT?

Shultz:

In this most recent ministerial, that's right.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU GIVE US SOME SENSE OF WHAT THAT MEANS? HOW ARE THEY TOUGH? IN

WHAT WAY?

Shultz:

Well, it wasn't that they were unpleasant or anything like that. We

have a very good capacity to discuss things. It's just that the issues

we were dealing with were all issues of importance and they were

difficult issues, inherently difficult issues. For instance, when you

talk about verifying a strategic arms agreement where what you're

verifying is the existence of certain kinds of weapons up to a certain

level as distinct from verifying zero, it's inherently difficult. It is

difficult in the sense that if you didn't have to negotiate with

anybody, but you just had to write down what you wanted, recognizing

that everything that you wanted to do to inspect what they're doing,

they had to be willing to do here, you had to be willing to have them

do here. So you just write your ticket. It's not that easy to write the

ticket. And then of course you have to negotiate it. So, when you get

to issues like that, it's tough going.

Interviewer:

I THINK I HEAR YOU SAYING ALSO, AS PART OF THAT, THAT THERE IS A

WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES TO MOVE AND MAKE AGREEMENT. THERE'S A SENSE

OF TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT NOW.

Shultz:

We have demonstrated, both of us,that we're willing to make an

agreement of significance, and the intermediate range treaty is the

best example of that right there. So we know that we are willing to

come to closure. Everybody likes to talk about the importance of

negotiations, and you ought to be doing it and working at it hard and

so forth. Then when you come to actually closing and making a deal,

everybody gets shaky about it. But that's part of negotiation, too.

Interviewer:

THIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE A DEAL SEEMS TO BE IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE

EARLY YEARS OF THE ADMINISTRATION WHEN THEY WERE BEING CHARACTERIZED AS

THE EVIL EMPIRE AND THE FURTHEST THING FROM OUR MIND SEEMED TO BE

MAKING A DEAL. WHAT HAPPENED?

Shultz:

I think the President's policy has been consistent throughout. And it

has been, first of all, we have to be starkly realistic with ourselves

and with everybody else about the nature of the Soviet system, the

differences between their system and ours, and the military capacity

that they have. Second, we have to be strong. If we're not strong,

we're not going to get anywhere. So then, with respect to any

particular area, we have to have some objectives and we have to be

persistent in seeking them against a background of strength, and in

that setting be wiling to negotiate. That's always been the policy. Now

in the case of the INF treaty, the basic positions were laid down in

1981. And they had a long history marked by a Soviet walkout in 1983

when we and our allies decided we would deploy the missiles on

schedule. They objected to that. That was a strength. And only after

they really saw that they couldn't talk us out of it, con us out of it,

rough us out of it, produce peace movements and freeze movements and so

forth to put on political pressure, all that failed, that they then

came around to negotiate. So it's been a consistent policy. It's just

that it's been bearing more fruit lately, and I have no doubt that the

change in leadership in the Soviet Union, a new perspective somehow on

the part of Mr. Gorbachev of course is part of that picture.

Interviewer:

WOULD YOU ELABORATE A LITTLE ON THAT? BECAUSE IF WE HAVEN'T CHANGED,

THEN THAT MEANS THEY'VE CHANGED. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU COULD CHARACTERIZE

HOW OR SPECULATE WHY?

Shultz:

Of course the situation has changed. That is, in 1981, we had an

objective, namely get their missiles out, but we had no missiles put in

of our own. We had a schedule. It said we were going to do it. And a

lot of people doubted that we, the alliance, would have the willpower

to do it, particularly with the assaults in our own political system on

doing that. And the Soviets were obviously, in the first two years of

the negotiation, mainly had as the objective preventing our

deployments. Then it turned out that all of our democratic allies stood

up to this decision, stood up magnificently. The cohesion of the

alliance was apparent. And so, the situation was now different for them

to contemplate. And so, they had more incentive to be willing to talk

about taking their missiles out, since we had some in that they wanted

to get out. So, there's that. And just what impact Mr. Gorbachev has on

their system, we can speculate about it. We don't know. But it does

seem that he sees that their economy and their society is going very

poorly and he has proposed a rather massive restructuring of it, which

he may or may not be able to pull off, but its clear that he's trying.

Interviewer:

I KNOW THE START TALKS AREN'T OVER YET, BUT HAS THERE BEEN SIMILAR

MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF START, STRATEGIC WEAPONS?

Shultz:

There's been a tremendous amount of movement in the strategic arms

talks, and actually it was the Reykjavik summit meeting that the most

fundamental aspects of the INF agreement were worked out, and that the

basic numbers in a strategic arms treaty were set out there on the

table. And then we've made a lot of headway since then. But we still

have some very important and difficult issues, and we're struggling

with them.

Interviewer:

FINALLY, FROM MY STANDPOINT, COULD YOU GIVE ME A SENSE: HOW HAS

AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO SDI AFFECTED THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS?

Shultz:

Well, just from the standpoint of the negotiating process, it

undoubtedly has got the Soviets' attention, and they have played it way

up for a while as a key thing. They seem to be playing it down somewhat

now. But it's an American initiative that has come to play a part. In a

sense, SDI has already been deployed in that it is very much on their

minds. And we have made some headway in working out a kind of

predictability over the next few years that probably both sides would

like to see.

Interviewer:

MR. SECRETARY, I'M DOING A PROGRAM WHICH IS DEALING WITH INF ISSUES

BETWEEN 1977 AND 1987, BETWEEN THE SCHMIDT SPEECH OF 1977,

APPROXIMATELY, IN 1979 THROUGH TO THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT IN 1987. I'D

LIKE TO BEGIN, IF I MAY, BY PICKING UP SOMETHING WHICH YOU SAID TO

CHRIS, WHICH WAS THAT YOU SAID THAT THE REAL BREAKTHROUGHS ON INF WERE

MADE AT REYKIAVIK. WERE YOU SURPRISED WHEN THE SOVIETS REVIVED THE 1981

ZERO OPTION AT REYKIAVIK?

Shultz:

Well, we had been pressing for that, and at Reykjavik, where they came

to was first of all agreeing on our principle of globality. You

couldn't separate Asia and Europe. Then agreeing that third country

systems would not be part of it, so that we got the French and British

question out of the picture. Then we came down to a number that is low

by comparison with the amount of deployments, 100. So, those were

principal things that we made headway on, and on the subject of

verification, basic matters of principle like onsite inspection and so

forth were basically agreed to in a general way there. And of course

that needed a lot of follow-up. Subsequently, we of course had to work

on the short-range INF systems, and finally to get the 100 reduced to

zero.

Interviewer:

I'D LIKE NOW TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT. YOU WENT TO MOSCOW IN APRIL 1987

AND YOU TALKED TO MR. GORBACHEV AND MR. SHEVARDNADZE AND OUT OF THAT

CAME THE SO-CALLED DOUBLE ZERO ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES. CAN YOU

BRIEFLY DESRIBE HOW, IN THAT MEETING THE SECOND ZERO CAME TO BE ADDED?

Shultz:

Well, it sort of evolved. But in the discussion I had with Mr.

Gorbachev, we had two principles that we argued about. One was that any

restriction on short-range INF missiles had to be global in nature, in

part because from our standpoint we were as interested in what went on

in Asia as we were Europe, because we had friends and allies there. And

second because these particular weapon systems are very mobile. You can

put them in an airplane or you can put them on trucks and you can move

them around. So that means that it only makes sense to talk about

something on a global basis. We argued that back and forth. And he, in

the end, agreed on that. At first they proposed that they keep so many

in Asia. Then we insisted on the principle of equality, that we

couldn't wind up with a result in which they had some of these missiles

and we had none. We had to have a parallel. Now, of course, we had none

deployed at all. We had some in storage, but we didn't have any

deployed, and they had quite a lot deployed. And so, subsequently,

since we argued for equality, and that would have meant, if there was

some finite number, us deploying missiles, they said, "Well, that

doesn't make sense. Why don't we just agree on zero," and then there

will be a small period of time in which they have some deployed and we

don't, but if it's a small enough period, a year or 18 months, that

perhaps isn't so significant. So that was a way they proposed for

dealing with that. And then we had, of course, a long period of

discussion with our allies about what we wanted to do, and we decided

that that outcome that we had worked out made sense.

German Reaction to INF Treaty

Interviewer:

MR. SHULTZ, I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE IN GERMANY

HAVE HAD THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THIS, AND ALSO LATER ABOUT GETTING THEM TO

THE PERSHING 1-A. DID YOU HAVE TO TWIST THEIR ARMS, THE GERMANS?

Shultz:

No, we didn't twist anybody's arm. We, in fact, assured the Germans

that if they wished to have some number of short-range systems

deployed, we would support that, and we would support them on the

Pershing 1-A, and we did, wholeheartedly. They thought carefully and

agonized about it a lot, and, in the end, came to the decisions that

are represented in the treaty.

Interviewer:

YOU MUST, MR. SHULTZ, HAVE HAD AN...

Shultz:

I think it's very important when you're working with your allies not to

be twisting their arms, but to be working with them and letting the

situation be apparent to everybody, and of course discussing it in a

collaborative way. But you certainly don't want to try to push people

around on something like this. It would be unwise.

INF Treaty in Effect

Interviewer:

LET ME MOVE ON NOW TO THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THERE HAVE BEEN A VERY

LONG PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION ON VERIFICATION AND SOME SIGNFICANT

CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE SOVIETS. YOU MUST HAVE HAD AN

EXTRAORDINARY SENSE OF TRIUMPH WATCHING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY

GORBACHEV SIGNING THAT TREATY IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY, AS YOU SAID,

BECAUSE IT WAS THE CULMINATION OF A LONG PROCESS. CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR

FEELINGS THAT DAY?

Shultz:

Well, it was actually, of course the ceremony was a major event, and

those are always fun, but there's more a sense of, there's a day's work

to be done, because as soon as that ceremony was over we went right

back into our hard negotiating meetings. And it was as though you took

a deep breath from one negotiating session to the next, and the deep

breath was the signing ceremony. So I didn't really have that much time

to reflect on it. I suppose I had more of a feeling of closure when we

worked out the last details, which happened in Geneva, and then it was

all just sort of following up from there.

Interviewer:

LET ME ASK A FINAL QUESITON, MR. SHULTZ. THE INF TREATY HAS BEEN

PUBLICLY WELCOMED IN EUROPE, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME WORRIES ABOUT ITS

IMPACT ON NATO STRATEGY, BECAUSE THESE TWO AREAS OF MISSILES ARE BEING

REMOVED. CAN YOU PERHAPS GIVE US YOUR OPINION OF HOW THIS TREATY, THE

EFFECT THE TREATY WILL HAVE ON NATO AND PERHAPS REASSURE SOME OF THE

WORRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRSSED IN EUROPE?

Shultz:

The treaty has been welcomed in Europe wholeheartedly. All of our NATO

allies support it. They support it without any ambiguity in their

statements. And I think that if we were not to ratify that treaty,

there would be an uproar in NATO. This is as much NATO's treat as it is

ours. The objectives that we have attained are the objectives we worked

out collaboratively together. So, basically, this has been an

experience that's added to the cohesion and the strength and the sense

of capability in NATO. Now, the missiles that we're taking out have

only been there for three or four years at most by the time they get

taken out. So it isn't as though we're taking out something that's been

there forever, and we have to rearrange ourselves. It's more that

what's happened, as compared with, say, 1980, '82, and so forth, is

that a lot of Soviet missiles that were there without any counter

deployment on our part are coming out. So we're better off. However,

there remain important problems for NATO to face up to, and we're

working at that, and I think that basically this whole process has been

one of strengthening the NATO alliance.

Interviewer:

FINAL QUESTION, ABSOLUTELY FINAL QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE GREAT

LESSON OF THIS EXPERIENCE, LOOKING BACK OVER THE PERIOD YOU'VE BEEN

INVOLVED, AND PERHAPS BACK TO WHEN MISSILES WERE FIRST DEPLOYED? WHAT

DO YOU SEE AS THE GREAT LESSON OF THIS EXPERIENCE?

Shultz:

Well, the lesson is that you have to have a program of your own, you

have to be willing to go ahead with it, and have the strength and

cohesion and follow-through to do that. In this case, it meant being

willing to deploy those missiles in 1983 and `4 and `5 and so forth.

And then I think having goals that are sensible, that you work out, and

being patient and persistent about it. Those are the things that - And

having the willingness to take yes for an answer when it comes. And so,

finally the Soviets said yes and we said fine.

[END OF TAPE FD8011 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with George Shultz, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-1r6n00zq4k

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-1r6n00zq4k).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Shultz, George Pratt, 1920-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 8ac3abb9674792a56401115f85251fefb3626a3d (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with George Shultz, 1986,” 1986-03-28, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed October 7, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1r6n00zq4k.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with George Shultz, 1986.” 1986-03-28. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. October 7, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1r6n00zq4k>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with George Shultz, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1r6n00zq4k